3GPP TDocs (written contributions) at meeting
Meeting: S3-90 - 2018-01-22 to 2018-01-26, Gothenburg
meeting id: S3-90 (click id for more info on this meeting)Click on the Tdoc to open its file.
TDoc | Title | Source | Remarks |
---|---|---|---|
S3‑180000 | Agenda | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180001 | Report from SA3#89 | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180002 | SA3 Work Plan | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180003 | Report from last SA meeting | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180004 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180005 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180006 | Corrections to clause 5.3 Requirements on the AMF | NEC Telecom MODUS Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180007 | Corrections to clause 5.2 Requirements on the gNB | NEC Telecom MODUS Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180008 | NAS security conference call notes | NEC Telecom MODUS Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180009 | TCG progress report | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180010 | Discussion Paper on the need and ways to make SUPI protection opaque to IMSI sniffers | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180011 | PCR to Annex C for making SUPI protection opaque to IMSI sniffers | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180012 | Authentication for Untrusted Non-3GPP Access using EAP | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo, LG Electronics, Nokia, KPN, Broadcom, Brocade | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180013 | Addition of EAP-5G method ID | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180014 | Remaining restructuring of Clause 6.9 (Security handling in mobility) | Ericsson, NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180015 | How AMF and SEAF deal with null-scheme SUCI | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180016 | Privacy requirement improvement related to using non null-scheme | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180017 | Privacy requirement of using SUCI in initial registration procedure | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180018 | Solution for meeting LI and privacy requirements | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180019 | Solution for raw public key provisioning | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180020 | Security aspects of RESUME REJECT in INACTIVE state in NR | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180021 | Handling of user-related keys – key setting | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180022 | Discussion on multi-NAS in same PLMN – structure of 5G security context | ZTE Corporation, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180023 | Discussion on multi-NAS in same PLMN – NAS message handling after first registration procedure | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180024 | Discussion on multi-NAS in same PLMN – concurrent NAS message handling | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180025 | Discussion on multi-NAS in same PLMN – re-authentication handling | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180026 | Multi-NAS in same PLMN - structure of 5G security context | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180027 | Multi-NAS in same PLMN - NAS message handling after first registration procedure | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180028 | Analysis of different approaches for implementing SBA security over N32 reference point | TIM (Telecom Italia) s.p.a. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180029 | Collection of clarifications and editorial changes to BEST TS 33.163 | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180030 | Reply LS on LTE call redirection to GERAN | C1-175377 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180031 | Reply LS on LTE call redirection to GERAN | R2-1714121 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180032 | Response LS on LTE call redirection to GERAN | R3-175030 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180033 | Reply LS on PLMN and RAT selection policies for roaming | C3-176332 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180034 | LS on Use of Subscriber Identity in HTTP URI | C4-176395 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180035 | LS on a potential USIM solution for PLMN and RAT selection policies for roaming | C6-170696 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180036 | LS on maximum data rate of user plane integrity protected data | R2-1714125 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180037 | LS on Security aspects of supporting LTE connected to 5GC | R2-1714244 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180038 | LS on Removal of 'over LTE' limitation from Mission Critical Specifications | S1- 174542 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180039 | Reply LS on 5G Identity and Access Management Requirements | S1-174557 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180040 | Reply LS on selectively disabling legacy radio access | S1-174601 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180041 | Reply LS on clarification on Restricted Operator Services | S1-174604 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180042 | Response to LS on encrypting broadcasted positioning data and LS on provisioning of positioning assistance data via LPPa for broadcast | S2-179617 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180043 | LS on end-to-end encryption for mission critical communications between LMR users and 3GPP MC users | S6-171838 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180044 | Response LS on voice service continuity from 5G to 2/3G | SP-171078 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180045 | LS on secure storage and processing of subscription credentials | S1-173475 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180046 | LS on security during Resume reject in INACTIVE state in NR | R2-1712052 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180047 | LS on Extension of USAT Application Pairing mechanism | C6-170737 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180048 | How AMF and SEAF deal with null-scheme SUCI | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180049 | Privacy requirement improvement related to using non null-scheme | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180050 | Privacy requirement of using SUCI in initial registration procedure | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180051 | Solution for meeting LI and privacy requirements | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180052 | Solution for raw public key provisioning | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180053 | Adding context on key setting | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180054 | Adding the abbreviations of NF and NFR | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180055 | Clarification on 5G security context | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180056 | Proposal for UP integrity protection activation | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180057 | Discussion on Identity Request and Registration Procedures in 5G | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180058 | LS to SA2 on Registration Request and Identity Request with clear text SUPI | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180059 | Adding the subscription identification procedure to TS 33.501 | KPN, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180060 | Discussion on PC-5 security | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180061 | Discussion and pCR on authorization | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180062 | Resolving Editor's Note in clause 5.3 | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180063 | Resolving Editor's Note in clause 6.2 | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180064 | Resolving Editor's Note and adding evaluation in clause 6.4.3 | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180065 | Evaluation of solution #6 | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180066 | Evaluation of solution #13 | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180067 | Miscellaneous editorials to TR 33.843 | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180068 | Adding conclusions for key issues 1,4, and 5 and adding an overal conclusions clause | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180069 | PCR to Section 6.12.2 | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180070 | Adding numbers to the figure for EAP AKA prime | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180071 | Adding numbers to the figure for 5G AKA | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180072 | Conclusions from IPX Security Conference calls | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180073 | Removing Editor's note on network sharing | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180074 | Normative text for support of both authentication methods and text clarification to distinguish HN and SN | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180075 | Editorial clarification in clause on anchor key binding | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180076 | Resolving editors notes in clause on key hierarchy | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180077 | UDM requirements - key management and privacy - S3-173121 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180078 | SUCI intro and handling - was S3-173316 | Nokia, KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180079 | HN authorization of serving network actions directed to the UE | Nokia, KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180080 | Privacy related function in UDM - Authorization proof | Nokia, KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180081 | Requirement on AMF related to HN authorization | Nokia, KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180082 | Requirement on AMF related to LI | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180083 | LI conformity when privacy is used - was S3-173124 | Nokia, Orange, T-Mobile USA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180084 | Resolving editors note on emergency call handling | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180085 | Authorization of SN by UE - was S3-173125 | Nokia, LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180086 | Visibility and configurability supporting serving network authorization - was S3-173126 | Nokia, LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180087 | Preventing bidding down between 5G releases - was S3-173128 | Nokia, KPN, LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180088 | Collection of changes based on feedback from GSMA SECAG - CR to 33.117v1 Rel.14 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180089 | Collection of changes based on feedback from GSMA SECAG - CR to 33.117v1 Rel.15 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180090 | Collection of changes based on feedback from GSMA SECAG - CR to 33.916v1 Rel.14 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180091 | Collection of changes based on feedback from GSMA SECAG - CR to 33.916v1 Rel.15 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180092 | Clause 6 Corrections for 5G AKA over n3gpp access | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180093 | Multiple NAS Security Discussion | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180094 | Clause Annex D | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180095 | Clause 6.3.4.2 Multiple Registration in same PLMN | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180096 | Clause 6.4.2.2 Multiple active NAS connections in same PLMN | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180097 | Clause 6.4.5 Handling of NAS counts | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180098 | Clause 6.2.3 Handling of user related keys | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180099 | Security Algorithms Negotiation for Initial AS security context | Huawei; HiSilicon;China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180100 | AS Security Negotiation and Activation | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180101 | Meeting SUPI privacy and LI Requirements | Huawei, Hisilicon, Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180102 | Moving UE handling SUCI to SUCI clause | Huawei, Hisilicon, CMCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180103 | Adding Forward & Backward Security definition | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180104 | Flexible retaining AS keys solution | Huawei, Hisilicon, CMCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180105 | Intra-gNB retaining AS keys exception | Huawei, Hisilicon, CMCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180106 | Address EN in requirements for gNB setup and configuration | Huawei, Hisilicon, | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180107 | Requirements for UP and CP for the gNB | Huawei, Hisilicon, CMCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180108 | Security Procedures between 5G Network Functions | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180109 | The impaction of 256 bit keys for NG areas | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180110 | The clarification of the entropy CK and IK | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180111 | Adding content to NAS security | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180112 | Adding key issue to Living Document S3-173482 | Huawei, Hisilicon; Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180113 | Adding potential solution for living document S3-173482 | Huawei, Hisilicon; Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180114 | Interworking with EPC without N26 interface in single-registration mode | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180115 | Clarification of Introduction of REAR | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180116 | Delete Editor’s notes in clause 5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180117 | Clarification of solution #4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180118 | Clarification of solution #8 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180119 | Add Evaluation for Solution #12 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180120 | Clarification of solution #7 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180121 | Conclusion for the Key Issues | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180122 | Add Evaluation for Solution #6 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180123 | Add Evaluation for Solution #13 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180124 | Discussion on deleting KSEAF from key hierarchy | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180125 | Clarification on security in AMF change within an AMF set | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180126 | Removal of the number of AVs requested in Authentication Information Request message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180127 | Resolve Editor’s Note in clause 6.1.3.2 of TS 33.501 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180128 | Adding 5G Authentication Confirmation Answer for 5G-AKA | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180129 | pCR to TS 33.501 Security Handling for RRC Connection Re-establishment Procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180130 | Draft Reply LS on security during Resume reject in INACTIVE state in NR | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180131 | Discussion on security during Resume reject in INACTIVE state in NR | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180132 | Delete allowed NSSAI in NAS SMC | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180133 | Discussion on Protection of initial NAS message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180134 | pCR to TS 33.501 delete protection of initial NAS message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180135 | pCR to TS 33.501 key identification | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180136 | pCR to TS 33.501 key lifetimes | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180137 | Clean up the EN in 6.1.3.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180138 | Clean up the EN in 6.2.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180139 | Procedures for security context transfer in idle mode mobility | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180140 | Subscription identification procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180141 | Corrections on NAS security mode command procedure (subclause 6.7.2) | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180142 | Scope of CAPIF security | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180143 | Security requirements on CAPIF entities | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180144 | Additional security requirements for 3rd party API provider | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180145 | Delete the mandatory implementation of NIA0 in gNB | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180146 | Change the support of NIA0 in SgNB for ENDC | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180147 | Idle mode mobility from 5GS to EPS with N26 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180148 | Handover procedure from 5GS to EPS with N26 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180149 | pCR to TS 33.501 Key Handing at Transitions between RRC-INACTIVE to RRC-CONNECTED states | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180150 | pCR to TS 33.501 Key Handing during mobility in RRC-INACTIVE state | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180151 | pCR to TS 33.501 AS algorithm selection in state transitions between RRC-INACTIVE to RRC-CONNECTED states | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180152 | Authentication in the service registration procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180153 | [eMCSec] 33180 R15 IWF security | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180154 | Authorization of NF service discovery | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180155 | Authorization of NF service access | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180156 | [eMCSec] 33.180 R15 Interworking media and signaling | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180157 | Authorization of SCS/AS to send requests for the 3GPP Network Entity | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180158 | [eMCSec] 33180 R15 Interworking key mgmt (InterSD) | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180159 | [eMCSec] 33180 R15 Interworking key mgmt (MCData) | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180160 | [eMCSec] 33180 R15 Interworking SeGy clarification | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180161 | [FS_MC_Sec] 33880 Interworking eval (InterSD) | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180162 | [FS_MC_Sec] 33880 Interworking eval (MCData) | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180163 | New WID for MONASTERY security | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180164 | NF Service Discovery Request Procedure | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180165 | NF Service Request Procedure | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180166 | ID linkage verification in secondary authentication | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180167 | DN authorization grant and revocation | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180168 | Secondary Authentication for multiple PDU sessions | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180169 | A key issue proposal on security capability for TR33.811 | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Moible, China Unicom, CATR, CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180170 | A key issue proposal on security level | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Moible, China Unicom, CATR, CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180171 | A key issue proposal on isolation degree | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Moible, China Unicom, CATR, CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180172 | draft LS on the status of work on interfaces | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180173 | Security Procedures for EAP-TLS | Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated, China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180174 | pCR for overview of 5G security architecture | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Mobile, CATR, ZTE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180175 | UP policy | Huawei, Hisilicon, | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180176 | Modification of Kausf | Huawei, Hisilicon, | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180177 | Merge two procedures of SBA authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon, | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180178 | Key distribution and key derivation scheme | Huawei, Hisilicon, | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180179 | Confidentiality protection of NSST | Huawei, Hisilicon, | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180180 | Confidentiality protection of NSI monitoring data | Huawei, Hisilicon, | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180181 | Replay protection for UP, RRC and NAS | Huawei, Hisilicon, | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180182 | Integrity for UP, RRC and NAS | Huawei, Hisilicon, | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180183 | Confidentiality for UP, RRC and NAS | Huawei, Hisilicon, | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180184 | NF Service Register Request Procedure | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180185 | Security requirements for Service Request | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180186 | Solution to prevent unauthorized access to external Data Network | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180187 | Discussion paper on voice service continuity between 5G and 3G | China Unicom, Huawei, HiSilicon, ZTE, CATR, OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180188 | New study item on Security aspects of single radio voice continuity from 5G to 3G | China Unicom, Huawei, HiSilicon, ZTE, CATR, OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180189 | Discussion paper on encrypted traffic detection and verification | China Unicom, Huawei, HiSilicon, ZTE, CATR, OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180190 | Study on security aspects of encrypted traffic detection and verification | China Unicom, ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, CATR, OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180191 | Key issue on topology hiding of the service | China Unicom, China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180192 | ey issue on secure communication between functions in CAPIF | China Unicom, China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180193 | draft Reply LS on security during Resume reject in INACTIVE state in NR | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180194 | Discussion on Security Issues with RRC Reject for INACTIVE Mode | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180195 | Binding Primary and Secondary authentication | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180196 | Secondary Re-Authentication | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180197 | Discussion on the enhancement of SUCI construction scheme | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180198 | Additional input for SUCI construction - Annex C. | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180199 | Draft LS on the security of a known part of plaintext for subscription identifier | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180200 | Clarification of security visibility | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180201 | Clarification on network slice access authentication and authorization | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180202 | Add context for multiple registrations in the same PLMN | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180203 | Add a new requirement in scenario when UE has multiple registration in different PLMNs | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180204 | a new WID for 5G SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180205 | new SID on security of 5WWC | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180206 | Meeting SUPI privacy and LI Requirements | Huawei, Hisilicon, Intel, China Mobile, CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180207 | Scope of CAPIF security | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180208 | Security requirements on CAPIF entities | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180209 | Reply LS on algorithm selection in E-UTRA-NR Dual Connectivity | R2-1714124 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180210 | Inter Operator Signalling Security in 5G Proposal | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180211 | Discussion and pCR for SUCI home routing | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180212 | Requirements on SIDF | NEC Telecom MODUS Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180213 | Discussion and pCR for privacy calculation in UE side | China Mobile, ZTE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180214 | Updates to Clause 6.12.2 regarding protection scheme identification | NEC Telecom MODUS Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180215 | Enhancing the security of the key KAMF | China Mobile,Huawei, Hisilicon; Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180216 | Handover from 5GS to EPS | NEC Telecom MODUS Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180217 | Enhance the security of the key KAMF in the NAS SMC procedure | China Mobile; Huawei; Hisilicon; Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180218 | Handover from EPS to 5GS | NEC Telecom MODUS Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180219 | Updating NAS security mode command procedure | China Mobile,Huawei, Hisilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180220 | Annex-DH usage modes, DH capability identifier and the calculation of KAMF' | China Mobile, Huawei, Hisilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180221 | Adding details of K’AMF to clause 6.2.1 | NEC Telecom MODUS Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180222 | New WID on GBA enhancements for Internet of Things | China Mobile, CATR, China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180223 | LS to CT3 CT4 on SBI Design and its Security Implications | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180224 | Security requirements on the CAPIF-4 reference point | China Mobile, Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180225 | Discussion and pCR about NF authentication for SBA | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180226 | [eMCSEC] Notifying the use of Security Gateways | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180227 | [eMCSEC] LS to SA6 on Security Gateway notification | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180228 | [eMCSEC] Security Gateway clause update and move to annex | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180229 | Document showing the changes to SeGy functionality | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180230 | KAMF Derivation when AMF set changes during idle mode mobility | Huawei; Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180231 | Interworking: Handover from EPS to 5GS | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180232 | Interworking: Handover from 5GC to EPS | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180233 | Interworking: Idle mode mobility from EPS to 5GS | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180234 | Interworking; Idle mode mobility from 5G to 4G | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180235 | Adding Emergency Services paragraph for Subscription Identification procedure | KPN N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180236 | Secondary authentication: Clause 12.1.2: Resolve ENs | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180237 | Secondary Authentication: Align with SA2 procedure and removal of EN on making the figure updatable | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180238 | SBA: Prioritization for Phase 1 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180239 | SBA: Resolve EN on Information Elements that require protection | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180240 | Protecting the IMSI and IMEI in NAS Security Mode Command | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180241 | Removing allowed NSSAI from NAS Security Mode procedure | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180242 | Removal of the hashing method from NAS SMC as security covered by the initial NAS message protection | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180243 | Adding a generic bid down solution to the 5G TS | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180244 | Discussion on the whether there is a need for one NAS SMC to change the security context on both 3GPP and non-3GPP access in the same PLMN | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180245 | Discussion on completing the LTE bidding down procedures | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180246 | Discussion on the use of the serving network identity to generate keys that are used in the AUSF | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180247 | Adding references to the algorithm test data | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180248 | Adding requirements on CU-DU split based on the key derivation used | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180249 | Identifying problems with secondary authentication | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180250 | pCR to update the secondary authentication procedure to include the authentication/authorization confirmation between UE and SMF when a key generating EAP method is used | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180251 | pCR to update the secondary EAP authentication clause to take into account the roaming scenario | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180252 | pCR to provide a normative text for handover from 5GC to EPC | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180253 | pCR to provide a normative text for handover from EPC to 5GC | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180254 | pCR to provide a text for idle mode mobility from 5GC to EPC | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180255 | pCR to provide a text for idle mode mobility from EPC to 5GC | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180256 | User plane integrity protection granularity | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180257 | Keys in the UE | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180258 | Support of privacy schemes and profiles by the UE | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180259 | pCR: Multiple Registrations in different PLMNs using K_AUSF (Updated) | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180260 | SBA: Considerations on applying security on HTTP message payload | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180261 | Reply LS on Use of Subscriber Identity in HTTP URI | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180262 | Clarification need of CMPv2 in TS 33.310 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180263 | SBA: Resolve EN on use of JOSE with multiple HTTP Sessions between two NFs. | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180264 | SBA: Service access authorization | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180265 | Clause 6.7.2 (NAS SMC, SUPI from UE for LI) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180266 | Clause 5.1.5 (SUCI – on-the-fly indication to use null-scheme) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180267 | NF discovery with SUCI | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180268 | Clause 6.12.4 (subscription identification procedure) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180269 | Clauses 6.12.1 and 6.12.2 (Moving SUCI related text from 6.12.1 to 6.12.2) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180270 | Clause 6.7.4 (user plane and RRC security - AS SMC procedure) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180271 | Clause 6.7.3.0 (user plane and RRC security - initial AS security context establishment) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180272 | Clause 6.8.2.1 (key handling – RRC INACTIVE/CONNECTED state transition) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180273 | Clause 6.8.2.2 (key handling – RRC INACTIVE mobility) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180274 | (Clause 6.3.4) Multiple registrations in the same PLMN’s serving network | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180275 | (Clause 6.4 ) Multiple active NAS connections in the same PLMN’s serving network | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180276 | New requirements for algorithm selection in TS 33.501 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180277 | Clause 6.4.6 (rectifying partial protection aspects) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180278 | Exception lists of NAS and RRC message to be integrity protected and encrypted | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180279 | Handover from 5GS to EPS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180280 | Idle mode mobility from 5GS to EPS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180281 | Idle mode mobility from EPS to 5GS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180282 | Handover from EPS to 5GS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180283 | Mapping of security contexts during interworking between EPS and 5GS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180284 | Multiple registrations in different PLMNs serving networks | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180285 | Clause 6.6.3 (user plane – security activation) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180286 | Clause 6 (user plane security – security policy) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180287 | Clause 6 (user plane security – non-activation of integrity protection) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180288 | Annex D.1 (user plane security – null-integrity not allowed for DRBs) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180289 | Clause 6 (user plane security – conflict between RAN and CN) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180290 | On the need for multiple NAS SMC procedures | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180291 | Proposal for way forward on the biding problem in the secondary | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180292 | On feature set relevance for independent SEAF deployment | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180293 | New annex for 3GPP 5G profile on RFC 5448 EAP-AKA’ | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180294 | Clarifications and clean-up of 5G AKA procedure | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180295 | Construction of serving network name with 5G AKA and EAP-AKA’ | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180296 | Adding forward secrecy for AKA in phase 2 without bidding-down problems | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180297 | Signalling procedure for periodic local authentication | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180298 | LS (S3-180034/CT4-176395) on the Use of Subscriber Identity in HTTP URI | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180299 | LS on protection of HTTP messages between SEPPs | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180300 | Including authentication into authorization aspects | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180301 | TLS mandatory to implement for SBA security | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180302 | Annex C (SUCI – scheme properties) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180303 | Clause 6.12.2 (SUCI – behaviours when USIM calculates SUCI) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180304 | Clause 6.12.5 (SIDF – size of SUCI) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180305 | Clause 6.12.5 (SIDF – validating calculation of the SUCI) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180306 | Annex C (SUCI – ECIES profiles) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180307 | CAPIF Security requirements | Samsung, Motorola Solutions | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180308 | Assignment of KSIamf | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180309 | Security procedure for CAPIF-1e reference point | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180310 | Registration state transitions in TS 33.501 | Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180311 | Connection state transitions in TS 33.501 | Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180312 | Security Procedure for CAPIF-2e reference point | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180313 | New UE requirement to store two 5G security contexts in TS 33.501 | Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180314 | CAPIF security within PLMN Trust Domain | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180315 | LS to CT1 on Protected Payload message type | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180316 | New key issue on UE behaviour on failing integrity check | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180317 | New solution: Protected UE configuration update commands | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180318 | New solution: key management via AUSF | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180319 | Addition of soltion to living document (Steering of roaming) | Vodafone GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180320 | Clause 6.9.2.3 (horizontal K_AMF derivation at N2-Handover) | Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180321 | Clause 6.9.3 (horizontal K_AMF derivation at mobility registration update) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180322 | Handling of 5G security contexts in the UE | Gemalto, IDEMIA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180323 | Storage of key material in the UE | Gemalto, IDEMIA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180324 | SUCI calculation | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180325 | Clarification for TCP connection reuse | Ericsson Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180326 | pCR to 33.501 - SUPI Encryption Protocol: issues identified by ETSI SAGE | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180327 | Considerations on Network Function Authorization in 5G SBA | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180328 | Clause 6.9 (policy dependent horizontal K_AMF derivation) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180329 | Attributes requiring confidentiality protection on the N32 interface | Deutsche Telekom AG, KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180330 | Clause 6.9 and new Annex (input parameter for horizontal K_AMF derivation) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180331 | Discussion on SUPI privacy proposals | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180332 | [eMCSEC] Adding Integrity Key for KMS communications | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180333 | Discussion of security visibility | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180334 | a new WID for 5G SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180335 | New WID for 5G SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180336 | Comments on Adding forward secrecy for AKA in phase 2 without bidding-down problems | China Mobile; Huawei; Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180337 | Comments on S3-180306 - Annex C (SUCI – ECIES profiles) | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180338 | Business rationale for requirements in “S3-172175: DESS Update and Requirements for Securing Inter-PLMN Signalling Interfaces in 5G” | GSMA FASG DESS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180339 | Commenting contribution on draft LS to CT3, CT4 (S3-180223) | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180340 | Comment contribution to S3-180223 (LS to CT3 CT4 on SBI Design and its Security Implications) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180341 | Comment contribution to S3-180223 (LS to CT3 CT4 on SBI Design and its Security Implications) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180342 | Draft reply LS to R2-1712052 = S3-173023 on security during Resume reject in INACTIVE state in NR (to: RAN2; cc: -; contact: Ericsson) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180343 | Comment contribution to S3-180087 and S3-180243 | Ericsson Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180344 | Clean up the EN in 6.1.3.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180345 | NESAS Pilot Findings and Recommendations to SA3 | GSMA SECAG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180346 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180347 | Reply LS on clarification on Restricted Operator Services | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180348 | Reply to: LS on Security aspects of supporting LTE connected to 5GC | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180349 | Reply to: LS on security during Resume reject in INACTIVE state in NR | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180350 | Reply to: LS on Use of Subscriber Identity in HTTP URI | Deutsche Telekom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180351 | NGMN White Paper on Service-based Architecture in 5G | NGMN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180352 | Living document on SBA | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180353 | SBA: Prioritization for Phase 1 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180354 | SBA: Resolve EN on Information Elements that require protection | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180355 | Attributes requiring confidentiality protection on the N32 interface | Deutsche Telekom AG, KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180356 | SBA: Resolve EN on use of JOSE with multiple HTTP Sessions between two NFs. | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180357 | TLS mandatory to implement for SBA security | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180358 | NF Service Register Request Procedure | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180359 | Adding an editor's note on NF Service Register Request Procedure | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180360 | Authorization of NF service discovery | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180361 | Security requirements for Service Request | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180362 | Draft TS 33.501 | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180363 | NF Service Request Procedure | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180364 | Adding the abbreviations of NF and NFR | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180365 | Report from SA3#89 | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180366 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180367 | Security Procedures between 5G Network Functions | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180368 | Including authentication into authorization aspects | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180369 | Adding key issue to Living Document S3-173482 | Huawei, Hisilicon; Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180370 | New key issue on UE behaviour on failing integrity check | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180371 | Living document on PLMN RAT selection | ORANGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180372 | Adding potential solution for living document S3-173482 | Huawei, Hisilicon; Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180373 | Concerns of the use of authentication for steering of roaming | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180374 | New solution: Protected UE configuration update commands | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180375 | New solution: key management via AUSF | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180376 | [eMCSec] 33.180 R15 Interworking media and signaling | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180377 | Addition of solution to living document (Steering of roaming) | Vodafone GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180378 | Reply to: LS on a potential USIM solution for PLMN and RAT selection policies for roaming | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180379 | Secondary Re-Authentication | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180380 | pCR to update the secondary EAP authentication clause to take into account the roaming scenario | Qualcomm Incorporated,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180381 | New SID on GBA enhancements | China Mobile, CATR, China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180382 | Presentation for Joint SA3/SA6 meeting | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180383 | New WID for 5G SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180384 | New study item on Security aspects of single radio voice continuity from 5G to 3G | China Unicom, Huawei, HiSilicon, ZTE, CATR, OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180385 | New WID for MONASTERY security | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180386 | [eMCSec] 33180 R15 Interworking SeGy clarification | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180387 | [eMCSEC] LS to SA6 on Security Gateway notification | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180388 | LS to CT1 on Protected Payload message type | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180389 | LS to CT3 CT4 on SBI Design and its Security Implications | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180390 | Construction of serving network name with 5G AKA and EAP-AKA’ | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180391 | Removal of the number of AVs requested in Authentication Information Request message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180392 | CAPIF Security requirements | Samsung, Motorola Solutions,China Unico,Huawei,China Mobile, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180393 | Clarifications and clean-up of 5G AKA procedure | Ericsson,Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180394 | Security Procedures for EAP-TLS | Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated, China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180395 | Normative text for support of both authentication methods and text clarification to distinguish HN and SN | Nokia,Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180396 | Adding numbers to the figure for 5G AKA | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180397 | Registration state transitions in TS 33.501 | Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180398 | Add a new requirement in scenario when UE has multiple registration in different PLMNs | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180399 | Clause 6.3.4.2 Multiple Registration in same PLMN | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180400 | Clause 6.4.2.2 Multiple active NAS connections in same PLMN | Nokia,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180401 | Draft TS 33.122 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180402 | LMR interworking key management summary | Harris Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180403 | Security Procedure for CAPIF-2e reference point | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180404 | CAPIF security within PLMN Trust Domain | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180405 | Clarification of Introduction of REAR | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180406 | Draft TR 33.843 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180407 | Resolving Editor's Note and adding evaluation in clause 6.4.3 | KPN,Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180408 | Clarification of solution #7 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180409 | Add Evaluation for Solution #12 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180410 | Add Evaluation for Solution #13 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180411 | Conclusion for the Key Issues | Huawei, Hisilicon,KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180412 | Cover sheet TR 33.843 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180413 | [eMCSec] 33180 R15 Interworking key mgmt (InterSD) | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180414 | [FS_MC_Sec] 33880 Interworking eval (InterSD) | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180415 | Reply to: LS on Extension of USAT Application Pairing mechanism | Gemalto | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180416 | Adding references to the algorithm test data | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180417 | Clarification for TCP connection reuse | Ericsson Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180418 | Reply to: NESAS Pilot Findings and Recommendations to SA3 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180419 | Collection of changes based on feedback from GSMA SECAG - CR to 33.117v1 Rel.14 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180420 | Collection of changes based on feedback from GSMA SECAG - CR to 33.916v1 Rel.14 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180421 | Clause 6.4.5 Handling of NAS counts | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180422 | Corrections to clause 5.3 Requirements on the AMF | NEC Telecom MODUS Ltd.,Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180423 | UP policy | Huawei, Hisilicon,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180424 | Clause 6 (user plane security – conflict between RAN and CN) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180425 | Clause 6.7.3.0 (user plane and RRC security - initial AS security context establishment) | Ericsson,Huawei,HiSilicon,China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180426 | AS Security Negotiation and Activation | Huawei; HiSilicon,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180427 | Changes to TS 33.180 from SA3#90 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180428 | Signalling procedure for periodic local authentication | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180429 | Adding Forward & Backward Security definition | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180430 | pCR to TS 33.501 key identification | Huawei, Hisilicon,ZTE, CATT,Nokia,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180431 | Delete the mandatory implementation of NIA0 in gNB | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180432 | Adding requirements on CU-DU split based on the key derivation used | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180433 | Intra-gNB retaining AS keys exception | Huawei, Hisilicon, CMCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180434 | Clause 6.9.3 (horizontal K_AMF derivation at mobility registration update) | Ericsson,Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180435 | Procedures for security context transfer in idle mode mobility | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180436 | LS on the status of work on interfaces | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180437 | A key issue proposal on security capability for TR33.811 | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Moible, China Unicom, CATR, CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180438 | Draft TR 33.811 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180439 | Idle mode mobility from EPS to 5GS | Ericsson, Qualcomm,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180440 | Interworking; Idle mode mobility from 5G to 4G | Nokia,Qualcomm, Huawei,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180441 | pCR to provide a normative text for handover from 5GC to EPC | Qualcomm Incorporated,Nokia, NEC,Huawei,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180442 | Interworking: Handover from EPS to 5GS | Nokia, Qualcomm, NEC,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180443 | Mapping of security contexts during interworking between EPS and 5GS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180444 | Interworking with EPC without N26 interface in single-registration mode | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180445 | New UE requirement to store two 5G security contexts in TS 33.501 | Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180446 | Clarification on 5G security context | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180447 | Resolving editors notes in clause on key hierarchy | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180448 | Clean up the EN in 6.2.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180449 | Adding details of K’AMF to clause 6.2.1 | NEC Telecom MODUS Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180450 | Key distribution and key derivation scheme | Huawei, Hisilicon, | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180451 | Annex C (SUCI – ECIES profiles) | Ericsson,Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180452 | Storage of key material in the UE | Gemalto, IDEMIA,Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180453 | Clarification of security visibility | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180454 | Authorization of SN by UE - was S3-173125 | Nokia, LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180455 | Authentication for Untrusted Non-3GPP Access using EAP | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo, LG Electronics, Nokia, KPN, Broadcom, Brocade | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180456 | Requirements for UP and CP for the gNB | Huawei, Hisilicon, CMCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180457 | SUPI and LI | WG Chair | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180458 | Requirement on AMF related to LI | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180459 | Exception Sheet NAPS-Sec | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑180460 | Privacy requirement improvement related to using non null-scheme | CATT | imported from 3GU |
page generated from database: 2024-09-26 11:02:35