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TECHNICAL HIGHLIGHTS


                                                              AUTHENTICATION AND

                                                              KEY MANAGEMENT FOR
                                                              APPLICATIONS (AKMA) IN 5G


                                                              By Suresh Nair, 3GPP Working
                                                              Group SA3 Chair, Saurabh Khare &
                                                              Jing Ping (Nokia)




          3GPP have introduced many novel security features in 5G. These   Applications (AKMA)’, to enable applications to leverage the
          security features address the need to enhance the existing   authentication of the UE performed by the PLMN and to use it
          4G security in different domains, such as access stratum   for further authentication and authorization by an application
          (AS) between the UE and the base station or the Non Access   and to bootstrap the necessary application security keys to
          Stratum (NAS) between the UE and the AMF, secure the PLMN   the UE.
          5G Core interface involving multiple network Functions (NFs)   A full description of the AKMA feature is not intended here. Only
          which use a Service Based Architecture (SBA) interface or the   a short description of the feature and its unique benefits are
          end to end interface between the UE and the UDM.  3GPP also   briefly mentioned. A full technical specification is contained in
          defined security procedures for new industry segments and   3GPP TS 33.535.
          vertical markets such as Network Slicing, Non Public Networks
          (NPN), inter PLMN roaming, etc. One of the new security
          features defined is  ‘Authentication and Key Management for


             Primary Authentication of the UE and AKMA:                                 KAUSF

          When a UE registers with the PLMN for the first time, the   AUSF                                  ME
          network performs a primary authentication of the UE. Only   HPLMN             KAKMA
          after the successful primary authentication of the UE, the UE is   AAnF                           ME
          authorized for additional network services. 3GPP has specified
          two protocols 5G-AKA and EAP-AKA’  for primary authentication,                KAF
          both of which can be executed over 3GPP access and non-     AF                                    ME
          3GPP access. In the primary authentication, the subscription
          credentials and the shared secret stored in the USIM of the UE                 Figure-1: AKMA key heirarchy
          and the same stored in the UDM/UDR of the operator network
          is verified. Please note that in 5G, unlike in earlier 3G and 4G, the   from the KAUSF. The radio connection between the UE and the
          subscription permanent identifier SUPI is encrypted and sent to   base station is secured using the derived access stratum (AS)
          the UDM/UDR as a concealed subscription permanent identifier   keys and the connection between the UE and core network
          (SUCI). At the end of a successful primary authentication, the   is secured using the derived non access stratum (NAS) keys.
          UE is admitted to network and the connection is secured using   The availability of the key KAUSF at the AUSF and the UE, as a
          the derived session keys. In 5G, a new security network function,   result of the successful primary authentication has become an
          Authentication Server Function (AUSF) has been introduced in   advantage since this key could be used to generate further keys
          the 5G core (5GC) to manage the UE authentication using the   that could be bootstrapped to secure different applications.
          SUCI or the SUPI and to manage the root session key KAUSF.   AKMA key hierarchy as specified in TS 33.535 is shown in figure-1.
          The AUSF stores the root session key KAUSF and further keys are
          derived from this key. The UE and network derive further keys


                     From the key KAUSF, an AKMA specific key KAKMA is derived. To secure individual applications,
                                    an application specific key KAF is derived from the KAKMA.



                                                                  AKMA Architecture:
             UDM                      UDM
                                                              In 4G, 3GPP defined the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
            N13                       N13
                 N61N     62               N61                (GBA) in TS 33.220 to bootstrap keys to secure the application
             AUSF    AAnF     AF      AUSF       AAnF  AF
                                                              between the UE and an application server, after authenticating
            N12                       N12       N63
                                                     N33      the UE using LTE-AKA protocol. A similar approach is taken in
             AMF               Ua*    AMF               Ua*
                                            N1   NEF          AKMA, but because of the 5G core service-based architecture, the
                      N1
            N2                        N2                      AKMA architecture becomes entirely different compared to GBA.
            (R)AN            UE       (R)AN            UE
                      (a)                      (b)            Figure-2: AKMA Architecture in reference point representation
                                                              for (a) internal AFs and (b) external AFs
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