3GPP TDocs (written contributions) at meeting
Meeting: S3-94 - 2019-01-28 to 2019-02-01, Kochi
meeting id: S3-94 (click id for more info on this meeting)Click on the Tdoc to open its file.
TDoc | Title | Source | Remarks |
---|---|---|---|
S3‑190000 | Agenda | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190001 | Report from last SA3 meeting/s | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190002 | SA3 Work Plan | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190003 | Report from last SA meeting | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190004 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190005 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190006 | Draft TR 33.xxx - Skeleton TR on User Plane Integrity Protection | Vodafone Group | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190007 | pCR to TR 33.853 - addition of scope | Vodafone GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190008 | draft skeleton document TR 33.935 - v001 - Detailed Long term key solutions | Vodafone GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190009 | Discussion document on the changes required to BEST for the authentication available on the 5G options | Vodafone GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190010 | CR to 33.163 - Addition of HSE to NR core authentication interface | Vodafone GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190011 | draft WID for Addition of HSE to 5G core interface for authentication (if required) | Vodafone GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190012 | CR to 33.834 - implementation of changes requested by edithelp | Vodafone GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190013 | CR to 33.841 - implementation of requested by edithelp | Vodafone GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190014 | Draft TR 33.xxx - Skeleton TR on User Plane Integrity Protection (updated after conf call) | Vodafone Group | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190015 | pCR to TR 33.853 - addition of scope (updated following conf call) | Vodafone GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190016 | Correcting TLS crypto profiles | Juniper Networks, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190017 | LTKUP: addition of solution 5 in TR 33.935 | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190018 | Cooperation on Generic Slice Template definition | GSMA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190019 | User Plane Security for 5GC Roaming | GSMA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190020 | LS on new 5G-GUTI allocation | C1-188921 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190021 | LS on protection of initial NAS messages | C1-188925 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190022 | Reply LS on Routing ID | S2-1813178 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190023 | Reply LS on Routing ID | C1-188979 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190024 | LS on EAS-C&U support | C3-186313 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190025 | LS on OAuth authorization flows supported for Northbound APIs | C3-187660 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190026 | LS on Nudr Sensitive Data Protection | C4-188524 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190027 | Clarification request on NF authorization in UE Reachability Notification Request procedure | C4-188603 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190028 | Response to 3GPP SA2 liaison S2-189038 on ‘general status of work’ | BBF | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190029 | Response to 3GPP SA2 liaison S2-1811575 on ‘general status of work’ | BBF | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190030 | Response to 3GPP SA2 liaison S2-1810989 on ‘Reply LS on devices behind 5G-RG accessing the 5GC’ | BBF | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190031 | Response to 3GPP SA2 liaison S2-1812643 | BBF | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190032 | Response to 3GPP SA2 on FN-RG authentication | BBF | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190033 | LS to 3GPP TSG-SA WG6 on Use of ITS Dedicated Spectrum within V2X UE | ETSI TC ITS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190034 | LS on DRB Integrity Protection | R2-1819080 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190035 | Reply LS on UP Integrity Protection for Small Data in Early Data Transfer | R3-187230 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190036 | Reply LS on inclusion of selected PLMN into the complete message | R3-187235 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190037 | LS on Security Result Exchange Between NG-RAN and SMF in DC | R3-187244 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190038 | Enforcement of maximum supported data rate for integrity protection | R3-187267 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190039 | GTP Recovery Counter & GSN node behaviou | GSMA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190040 | LS on Authentication for UEs not Supporting NAS | S2-1812600 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190041 | Reply LS on FN-RG authentication and related questions | S2-1812601 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190042 | LS on the security aspects of UE Capability ID | S2-1812607 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190043 | Reply LS on FS_5WWC conclusion of study work | S2-1812643 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190044 | LS on PC5 unicast and groupcast security protection | S2-1812896 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190045 | LS On Slice-Specific Secondary Authentication | S2-1813359 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190046 | LS response on API invoker onboarding | S6-181848 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190047 | Reply LS on Control Plane Solution for Steering of Roaming in 5GS | SP-181244 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190048 | TCG Progress Report | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190049 | [33.179] R13 Annex D.3.4.2 XSD correction | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190050 | [33.180] R14 Annex D.3.5.2 XSD correction (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190051 | [33.180] R15 Annex D.3.5.2 XSD correction (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190052 | [33.179] R13 IdMS interface security | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190053 | [33.180] R14 IdMS interface security (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190054 | [33.180] R15 IdMS interface security (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190055 | [33.179] R13 user service authorisation | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190056 | [33.180] R14 user service authorisation (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190057 | [33.180] R15 user service authorisation (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190058 | [33.180] R14 InK clarifications | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190059 | [33.180] R15 InK clarifications (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190060 | [33.180] R14 MCX identity clarifications | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190061 | [33.180] R15 MCX identity clarifications (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190062 | Adding Security Protection Requirement of Unicast RRC Messges | HUAWEI TECH. GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190063 | Security Solution for RRC UE capability transfer | HUAWEI TECH. GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190064 | Details of protecting gNB from RRC DoS attack | HUAWEI TECH. GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190065 | Corrections of messages names etc | HUAWEI TECH. GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190066 | LS to RAN2/3 on EDT data integrity protection | HUAWEI TECH. GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190067 | Adding Security Protection Requirement of Unicast RRC Messges | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190068 | Security Solution for RRC UE capability transfer | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190069 | Security Requirement for Paging Messges | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190070 | Protection for Incoming Paging Message Based on Stored Security Context | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190071 | Avoiding UE connecting to fake base station during HO | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190072 | Corrections of messages names etc | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190073 | EDT UP IP handling of multiple PDCP PDUs | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190074 | Details of protecting gNB from RRC DoS attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190075 | Resolving Editor’s Note for solution #7 (clause 6.7) | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190076 | LS to RAN2/3 on EDT data integrity protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190077 | Update Solution #4 to use HASHUE-data as in TS33.401 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190078 | Clarification and correct clause reference for RNAU w/o context relocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190079 | New key issue: Protection of Line ID | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190080 | New key issue: TNAP mobility for trusted non-3GPP access | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190081 | Reply-LS on FN-RG authentication and related questions | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190082 | Reply-LS on FN-RG authentication and related questions | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190083 | Alignment with TS 23.502: Optimization of UDM selection in AUSF | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190084 | Correction to authentication step | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190085 | Reply LS on Nudr Sensitive Data Protection | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190086 | New solution: WLAN measurements from UEs | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190087 | New solution: Bluetooth measurements from UEs | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190088 | Resubmission of S3-183526 “WLAN positioning - new KI for the upcoming TR on FS_eLCS_Sec” | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190089 | Editorials and minor clarifications for clause 13.1 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190090 | Editorials and minor clarifications for clause 13.2 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190091 | Minimized kernel functions | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190092 | Minimized kernel functions | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190093 | Protection from buffer overflows | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190094 | Protection from buffer overflows | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190095 | Uunused software | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190096 | Uunused software | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190097 | No unsupported components | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190098 | No unsupported components | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190099 | Analysis of requirements on the AUSF in TS 33.501 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190100 | Name correction of the Nudm_SDM_Notification service operation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190101 | New Key Issue: UP integrity activation in EPS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190102 | Update to Study Item Description FS_SBA_Sec: Security for inter-PLMN user plane traffic (N9 reference point) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190103 | Reply LS on Interim conclusions for SA2 study on Radio Capabilities Signalling Optimisations (FS_RACS) | R2-1819206 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190104 | Update to KI#2.1 in TR 33.819 | InterDigital Europe. Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190105 | Update to Study Item Description FS_SBA_Sec: Security for inter-PLMN user plane traffic (N9 reference point) | Ericsson, Juniper Networks, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190106 | Reply LS on new 5G-GUTI allocation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190107 | Expectations and requirements for 256 bit algorithms | ETSI SAGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190108 | TR33848 Study on Virtualisation Skeleton | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190109 | TR33848 Introduction and Scope | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190110 | TR33848 Section 4 Background | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190111 | Evaluation text for solution #2 | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190112 | New key issue on user plane integrity protection in MR-DC scenarios | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190113 | New key issue on data rate limitation of integrity protection in UP DRB | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190114 | New Key Issue: Basic security requirements on SFSF message transport | Telekom Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190115 | New Key Issue: Protection of SFSF interfaces | Telekom Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190116 | Subscriber privacy: test data for SUCI computation | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190117 | Update to Study Item Description FS_SBA_Sec: Enhanced-SBA aspects | Telekom Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190118 | On the handling of invalid JSON patches in N32-f messages | Telekom Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190119 | Inter-PLMN N9 Security | Telekom Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190120 | New Test Case: Separation of cryptographic storage within the SEPP | Telekom Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190121 | New Test Case: Connection-specific scope of cryptographic material by IPX-providers | Telekom Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190122 | New Test Case: Precendence of preconfigured protection policies | Telekom Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190123 | New Test Case: Validating the common message formatting | Telekom Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190124 | CR Add UE trace to UE Authentication Get Service | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190125 | Discussion on providing AS security during RRC connection establishment to protect NSSAI | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190126 | Discussion on C1-188921 LS on GUTI Re-assignment | Nokia, Nokia Shangahi Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190127 | Key Issue for Fake Base Station | Intel Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190128 | New WID on providing the encryption of slice identity at the AS layer during RRC connection establishment procedure | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190129 | Discussion on Radio Capability indication LS S2-1812607 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190130 | Security Requirement for Key issue 2 | Intel Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190131 | EPC solution for RLOS access | Intel Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190132 | Discussion on SA2 LS on Slice Specific Authentication S2-1813359 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai-Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190133 | Solution for Slice Specific secondary authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shangahi Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190134 | Clarification on Establishment of a mapped security context during intersystem handover(N1 to S1) | Intel Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190135 | Clarification to the 5G-GUTI change during the NAS procedure. | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190136 | Clarification to the 5G-GUTI allocation during the Notification procedure. | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190137 | Clarification on Establishment of a mapped security context during intersystem handover(S1 to N1) | Intel Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190138 | Handling of SUCI de-concealment during registration retry procedure | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190139 | requirement of protection of broadcast messages | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190140 | Clarification on Handover message in Interworking | Intel Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190141 | requirement of protection of unicast messages | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190142 | Discussion about a new study on eV2X security | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190143 | New SID on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190144 | Reply LS on PC5 unicast and groupcast security protection | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190145 | Editorial pCR for PARLOS TR 33.815 | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190146 | ID-based solution in 5GFBS | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190147 | Credential-based solution in 5GFBS | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190148 | Key issue of network credential revocation consideration | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190149 | Key issue of UP IP performance | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190150 | Solution of improving efficiency of UP IP | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190151 | Align NAS connection identifier values | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190152 | Clarification on Registration procedure for mobility from EPS to 5GS over N26 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190153 | Handling of AMF redirection | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190154 | Authorization on northbound APIs | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190155 | Anti fake base station based on symmetric algorithm | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190156 | Solution on registration for mutual exclusive slices | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190157 | Key issue for acceleration of AKA procedure for low latency | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190158 | Solution on enhancement of handover with direct Xn tunnel for single user plan path | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190159 | Key issue for SUPI concealment | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190160 | Key issue for linkability when AUTN verification fails | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190161 | Solution on mitigation of large SUCI attack | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190162 | Solution for linkability issue | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190163 | New SID on 5G forward security | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190164 | New SID on IPsec enhancement to meet 5G data rate requirements | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190165 | Discussion on improving the efficiency of IPsec to meet 5G data rate requirements | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190166 | Solution on privacy protection of SUPI | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190167 | a skeleton of security aspects of 5G SRVCC to UTRAN | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190168 | Resovle Editor's note in Solution for bootstrapping authentication of AKMA | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190169 | Solution for Key freshness in AKMA | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190170 | New Conclusion for Small Data Transfer via NAS Signaling | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190171 | New Solution Security-Property-Group-based Mitigation for DDoS Attack Triggered by Malicious Applications on the UE | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190172 | Address EN in Key Issue 4 of Definition of Misbehaving UE | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190173 | New Key Issue for NAS based Redirection between Core Networks | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190174 | Clarification for section 6.10.2.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190175 | Clarification for UP security in option4&7 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190176 | claification on interworking case | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190177 | key update in multi-NAS scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190178 | Clarification on the UE selecting the 4G or 5G security protection method | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190179 | Add requirement to KI#2 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190180 | A new KI on the trust of W-5GAN | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190181 | Add evaulation to sloutlion 3 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190182 | add conclusion clauses | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190183 | Add conclusion to KI#1 | Huawei,Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190184 | Key Issue for encryption and integrity protection of assistance data | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190185 | Key Issue for encryption and integrity protection of location data | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190186 | Key Issue for integrity protection of privacy setting between UE and home network | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190187 | Solution for DDoS attack mitigation in CIoT | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190188 | Solution for integrity protection of privacy setting between UE and UDM | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190189 | Key Issue for protection against DDoS attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190190 | Security Solution for DDoS attack mitigation in the roaming scenarios between NPN and PLMN | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190191 | Editorial corrections in TS 33.117 R15 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190192 | Corrections on ng-ran keys | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190193 | New clause for intra ng-enb handover | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190194 | Clarifications CIOT security assumptions | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190195 | CIOT solution 6 improvement | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190196 | Roaming key issue for AKMA | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190197 | architecture solution for AKMA with non-standalone function | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190198 | URLLC solution for N3 tunnel redundancy | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190199 | URLLC solution for Key Issue 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190200 | URLLC solution for Key Issue 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190201 | A key issue on the long-term key and its related anchor key leakage | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190202 | A solution to slice authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190203 | A new KI on NSSAI protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190204 | Solutions to AMF key separation | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190205 | A solution to security features for NSaaS | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190206 | Security threats and requirement for KI #4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190207 | Considerations on network product class when using NFV technology | China Mobile, ZTE Corporation, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190208 | Evaluation text for solution #2 | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190209 | New key issue on user plane integrity protection in MR-DC scenarios | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190210 | New key issue on data rate limitation of integrity protection in UP DRB | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190211 | Discussion on Requirement for KDF Negotiation | NEC Corporation, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190212 | Update to clause 4 to add KDF negotiation rationale | NEC Corporation, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190213 | New Key Issue on use of established keys for AKMA | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190214 | Solution for using established keys for AKMA | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190215 | Considerations on SECAM of the virtualized network products | China Mobile, ZTE Corporation, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190216 | CR to TR 33.841 regarding key derivation function | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190217 | Key issue regarding minimal computational cost when generating session anchor keys | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190218 | Key issue to ensure the correct routing of the data packets in the user plane | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190219 | Clarification on UE Parameters Update Data used for MAC computation | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190220 | Test Case: Mutual Authentication between Network Functions | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190221 | Key issue to ensure the security of session anchor keys | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190222 | Modificaiton on the NAS connection identifier for backward compatibility with LTE | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190223 | Key issue to mitigate the DDoS attacks on the UDM | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190224 | NAS counter clarification on interworking | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190225 | Test Case: Authorization of NF Serive Access | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190226 | Key issue to resist the linkability attacks | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190227 | Update on the token verification | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190228 | Proposed revision of solution 6 | China Mobile,ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190229 | Clarification on service authorization and token verification | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190230 | A key issue: Slice-specific Security in roaming | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190231 | Clarification on securing the procedure of idle mode mobility from 5GS to EPS over N26 interface | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190232 | Clarification on the Use of the SUPI in the Kamf Derivation | Huawei, Hisilicon,Nokia,Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190233 | SCAS SEPP: Introduction and general approach | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190234 | Clarification on the allocation of 5G-GUTI | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190235 | SCAS NRF: Introduction and general approach | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190236 | pCR to TR33.814 - Key issue for end-to-end LCS data security | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190237 | New KI: SUPI privacy protection across different security domains | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190238 | Dynamic UP security policy control solution for URLLC | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190239 | New KI: Access token handling between network slices | Huawei Technologies Sweden AB | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190240 | Test Case: Mutual Authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190241 | Solution for NPN network access via PLMN | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190242 | pCR to TR33.814 - Key issue for broadcast assistance data security | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190243 | New KI: Isolation of multiple NAS connections | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190244 | Test Case: NF Discovery Service Authorization | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190245 | New requirment for Authentication relay attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190246 | pCR to TR33.814 - Solution of provisioning keys for broadcast assistant data protection | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190247 | pCR to TR33.814 - Solution of ciphering algorithms | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190248 | New key issue: Key revocation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190249 | Protocol clarifications to solution 2 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190250 | Evaluation of solution 2 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190251 | New solution:Key revocation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190252 | New solution: Implicit Bootstrapping | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190253 | New solution: AKMA authentication via the control plane | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190254 | Corrections to RRC Inactive procedure.and RAN-based notification area update procedure. | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190255 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.6.2 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190256 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.7.3 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190257 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.7.4 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190258 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.8.1 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190259 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.8.2 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190260 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.9.2.1 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190261 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clauses 6.9.2.3.1 and 6.9.2.3.2 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190262 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clauses 6.9.3 and 6.9.4 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190263 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.9.5 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190264 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.11 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190265 | Updates to Solution #3: Security solution for MO SMS at AMF re-allocation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190266 | Updates to Solution #5: Security solution for small data included in initial NAS signalling at mobility | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190267 | Potential new security impact in Rel-16 for the selected CIoT solutions in SA2 TR 23.724 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190268 | Proposal for content to introduction clause | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190269 | Proposal for content to clause 4 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190270 | A new key issue for privacy protection of new parameters for CIoT included in NAS messages | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190271 | Solution for privacy protection of new parameters for CIoT included in NAS messages | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190272 | Solution for key separation based on slice authentication keys | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190273 | KI#2 in TR 33.809 – new requirement and solution for non-public networks | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190274 | KI#1 in TR 33.809 – a new NOTE for requirements | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190275 | KI#1 in TR 33.809 – new requirement and solution for UECapabilityInformation RRC message | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190276 | KI#1 in TR 33.809 – new requirement and solution for RRC Reject message | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190277 | KI#3 in TR 33.809 – updates to requriements and editorials | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190278 | KI#3 in TR 33.809 – new solution for enriched measurement reports | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190279 | KI#3 in TR 33.809 – conclusion on second requirement (reactive action) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190280 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 8 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190281 | Clarification to AKA parameter derivation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190282 | Multiple NAS connecions: mobility with horizontal KAMF derivation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190283 | Multiple active NAS connections in the same PLMN's serving network: common algorithm identifiers | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190284 | Clarification to the implementation requirement for the protectaion of the backhaul and sidehaul interfaces | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190285 | New key issue on the secure negotiation of the user plane integrity protection feature | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190286 | Update to KI#3 or KI#4 taking Dual Connectivity into considerations | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190287 | Evaluation to solution #1 and conclusion to key issue #3 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190288 | Evaluation on solution #2 and conclusion to key issue #3 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190289 | New key issue on UP security policy for the 5GLAN Group | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190290 | New security solution for handling UP security policy for a 5GLAN Group | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190291 | TR 33.819: new key issue on security and privacy aspects of service continuity and session continuity | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190292 | Skeleton for TR 33.846 on authentication enhancements | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190293 | Scope for the study on authentication enhancements (FS_AUTH_ENH) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190294 | New KI: Leakage of long-term key | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190295 | New solution: EAP-AKA´ PFS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190296 | Update on EAP-AKA´ PFS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190297 | Clarification to idle mode mobility from EPS to 5GS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190298 | EDT correction – input "S" to calculation of HASHUE-data and HASHeNB-data | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190299 | EDT correction – length of HASHUE-data and HASHeNB-data | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190300 | EDT correction – input to calculation of shortResumeMAC-I | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190301 | EDT correction – clarification of NOTE about no-integrity protection for non-EDT data | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190302 | LS on EDT security | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190303 | Key issue on linkability attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190304 | Update on Key issue #2.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190305 | Response LS on Authentication for UEs not Supporting NAS | Lenovo (Beijing) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190306 | Solution for 5GC access from WLAN UEs that do not support NAS | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190307 | Security Assurance Requirement and Test for authorization handling in the NF | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190308 | Solution for Key Issue #7: Key refreshing for protection of small data | Lenovo, Motorla Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190309 | Solution for partial UP IP considering UE limitations | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190310 | SCAS: UDM-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190311 | SCAS: AMF-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190312 | Security Assurance Requirements and Tests for the Security Functionalities Provided by UPF | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190313 | Security Assurance Requirement and Test for NRF | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190314 | New Key Issue: Subscription identifier exposure outside 3GPP network | Ericsson India Private Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190315 | Removing the test case on Kseaf handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190316 | New solution - Battery efficient AKMA | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190317 | Requirement and test cases for SMF | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190318 | New KI: Access token handling between network slices | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190319 | Key Issue on access to 5GC from a non-3GPP device over Wireline 5G Cable Access Network | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190320 | Key Issue on NAS termination in TWIF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190321 | Editorial corrections in CAPIF TS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190322 | Key Issue on SUCI format for legacy FN-RG devices that access 5G over wireline network | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190323 | Key Issue on Authorization of IPTV subsystem | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190324 | Key Issue on security of TNGF mobility using EAP Reauthentication Protocol (ERP) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190325 | Key Issue on NAS termination for registered FN-RGs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190326 | New KI: Interworking between AKMA and GBA | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190327 | Allocating new 5G-GUTI during the MO service request procedure | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190328 | Key Issue on security of the Tn interface between TNGFs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190329 | Key Issue on access to 5GC from non-3GPP device over Trusted WLAN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190330 | Conclusion for Key Issue #9 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190331 | pCR to Solution #1 to include child SA creation for user plane data protection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190332 | FN-RG registration to 5GC | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190333 | Access to 5GC via Trusted WLAN for UEs w/o NAS support | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190334 | 5G-RG connecting to 5GC via Wireline Access (W-5GAN) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190335 | 5G-RG connecting to 5GC via NG-RAN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190336 | Vertical - Key Issue on Authentication of a UE for Non-public network | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190337 | Vertical - Key Issue on credential storage for Non-public network | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190338 | Vertical - Requirements to Key Issue on Authentication of a UE for Non-public network | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190339 | Vertical - solution on EAP authentication framework | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190340 | Vertical - solution on EAP-TLS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190341 | Vertical - solution on EAP-TTLS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190342 | Vertical - Conclusion on authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190343 | Vertical - Discussion of WID for 5GS Vertical_LAN_SEC | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190344 | WID proposal for 5GS Vertical_LAN_SEC | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190345 | Correction to clause 14.2.1 | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190346 | New KI on Privacy aspects for NPN | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190347 | New Solution on Privacy aspects for NPN | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190348 | New Solution for Redundant data protection | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190349 | New KI on Supporting low latency during Re-attach procedure | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190350 | Solution to KI#9 Key separation for AKMA AFs | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190351 | Updating key issue#3 for network detection of nearby fake base station | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190352 | New solution for preventing UE from attaching to a false base station | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190353 | New solution for protecting the System Information Block | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190354 | Updating Access Token Response to include token expiration time and scope | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190355 | SN Id and SNN clarification | Ericsson India Private Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190356 | New WID on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190357 | Security framework for the NR integrated access backhaul | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190358 | Correction on RRC states terminology usage | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190359 | Requirement on security of unprotected unicast messages | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190360 | Solution on security of RRC Reject messages | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190361 | Requirement on security of unprotected unicast messages | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190362 | Solution for AS security during RRC Idle mode | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190363 | New WID on Enhancements for Security aspects of Common API Framework | Samsung, China Telecom, China Unicom, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190364 | P-CR for PARLOS evaluation clause | SPRINT Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190365 | Non-3GPP Access: Correcting Connection Identifier | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190366 | Key issue on Multiple and Separate credentials for PLMN and NPN network | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190367 | Discussion paper on N9 firewall for inter-PLMN GTP-U filtering | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190368 | Protecting small data at idle mobility using the Registration Complete message | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190369 | Proposed key issue on binding key to network identity for standalone non-public networks | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190370 | Proposed key issue on key hierarchy for non-public networks | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190371 | Proposed solution on binding key to network identity for standalone non-public networks | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190372 | Handling the non-3GPP security context at mobility on the 3GPP access | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190373 | Discussion on the incoming SA2 on security aspects of UE Capability ID | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190374 | Draft response LS on the security aspects of UE Capability ID | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190375 | Modifying AKA to provide freshness for the protection of SQN in the case of re-synchronisations | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190376 | Adding MACS as an input parameter to the calculation of AK* to provide freshness | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190377 | Solution for PARLOS based on emergency call procedures | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190378 | CR on NAS connection id for NAS MAC calculation | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190379 | CR on clarification on N2 handover | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190380 | CR - clarification on key handling in handover | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190381 | Key Issue MITM attacks | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190382 | Solution for small data at idle mode mobility | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190383 | SUPI Type clarification | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190384 | Input encoding for ECIES protection schemes | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190385 | pCR: Reusing KAUSF for AKMA | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190386 | pCR: New KI: Efficient handling of PDCP discardTimer expiry on the UE Uplink | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190387 | pCR: New KI: Ability to prioritize certain PDCP packets on the UE uplink | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190388 | pCR: New KI: Integrity Algorithm independence | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190389 | P-CR for editors note in PARLOS manual roaming clause | SPRINT Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190390 | PARLOS TR cover sheet for plenary presentation | SPRINT Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190391 | Removal of editor’s note in solution #1 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190392 | draft SID for User Identities and Authentication | Vodafone GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190393 | New proposal on the length of password and other clarifications | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190394 | LS on the need to update home network public key and key ID during Routing indicator update | C1-190377 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190395 | LS on mandating 5G-GUTI allocation after network triggered service request | C1-190380 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190396 | LS on securing warning messages in ePWS | C1-190393 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190397 | Clarification on the allocation of 5G-GUTI | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190398 | Comment on S3-190116 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190399 | Discussion on providing AS security during RRC connection establishment to protect slice identity | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190400 | Discussion on incoming CT1 LS on update of Routing Indicator (S3-190394) | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190401 | [Late contribution] Discussion on dealing with Routing ID update LSes | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190402 | 128-EIA3 maximum message size | ETSI SAGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190403 | Expectations and requirements for 256 bit algorithms | ETSI SAGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190404 | Interception of voice services over new radio in a 5GS environment | S3i190057 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190405 | Reply to: LS on the security aspects of UE Capability ID | Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190406 | Reply to: LS on securing warning messages in ePWS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190407 | Reply to: Expectations and requirements for 256 bit algorithms | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190408 | User Plane Security for 5GC Roaming | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190409 | LS on User Plane Security for 5GC Roaming | BT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190410 | Reply to: LS on new 5G-GUTI allocation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190411 | Reply to: LS on Nudr Sensitive Data Protection | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190412 | Reply to: LS on Security Result Exchange Between NG-RAN and SMF in DC | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190413 | Reply to: LS on the need to update home network public key and key ID during Routing indicator update | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190414 | Reply to: LS on mandating 5G-GUTI allocation after network triggered service request | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190415 | Clarification on the allocation of 5G-GUTI | Huawei, Hisilicon,Nokia,Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190416 | Clarification on the Use of the SUPI in the Kamf Derivation | Huawei, Hisilicon,Nokia,Nokia Shanghai Bell,Qualcomm,Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190417 | LS Response on Enforcement of maximum supported data rate for integrity protection | S2-1812600 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190418 | Reply LS on Interim conclusions for SA2 study on Radio Capabilities Signalling Optimisations (FS_RACS) | S2-1901303 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190419 | LS Response on Security Result Exchange Between NG-RAN and SMF in DC | S2-1901386 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190420 | Allocating new 5G-GUTI during the MO service request procedure | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190421 | CR on clarification on N2 handover | Qualcomm Incorporated,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190422 | Non-3GPP Access: Correcting Connection Identifier | Samsung,ZTE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190423 | Correction on RRC states terminology usage | Samsung,Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190424 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.8.1 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190425 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.8.2 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190426 | Corrections on ng-ran keys | Huawei, HiSilicon,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190427 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.7.3 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190428 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.7.4 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190429 | Corrections to RRC Inactive procedure.and RAN-based notification area update procedure. | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190430 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.9.2.1 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190431 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clauses 6.9.3 and 6.9.4 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190432 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.9.5 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190433 | Clarification for section 6.10.2.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190434 | Clarification for UP security in option4&7 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190435 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 8 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190436 | Multiple active NAS connections in the same PLMN's serving network: common algorithm identifiers | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190437 | claification on interworking case | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190438 | NAS counter clarification on interworking | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190439 | Editorials and minor clarifications for clause 13.2 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190440 | Clarification on service authorization and token verification | Huawei, Hisilicon, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190441 | SN Id and SNN clarification | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190442 | New WID on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190443 | a skeleton of security aspects of 5G SRVCC to UTRAN | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190444 | [33.180] R14 Annex D.3.5.2 XSD correction (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190445 | [33.180] R15 Annex D.3.5.2 XSD correction (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190446 | [33.180] R14 IdMS interface security (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190447 | [33.180] R15 IdMS interface security (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190448 | [33.180] R14 InK clarifications | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190449 | [33.180] R15 InK clarifications (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190450 | [33.180] R14 MCX identity clarifications | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190451 | [33.180] R15 MCX identity clarifications (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190452 | Reply to: LS on OAuth authorization flows supported for Northbound APIs | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190453 | Reply to: LS on EAS-C&U support | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190454 | LS to RAN2/3 on EDT data integrity protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190455 | EDT correction – length of HASHUE-data and HASHeNB-data | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190456 | Protection from buffer overflows | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190457 | Protection from buffer overflows | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190458 | Editorial corrections in TS 33.117 R15 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190459 | Editorial corrections | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190460 | New SID on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190461 | New WID on Enhancements for Security aspects of Common API Framework | Samsung, China Telecom, China Unicom, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190462 | New SID on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190463 | Reply LS on PC5 unicast and groupcast security protection | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190464 | Update to Study Item Description FS_SBA_Sec: Enhanced-SBA aspects | Telekom Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190465 | EDT UP IP handling of multiple PDCP PDUs | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190466 | Editorial pCR for PARLOS TR 33.815 | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190467 | Draft TR 33.815 | Sprint | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190468 | Solution for PARLOS based on emergency call procedures | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190469 | P-CR for PARLOS evaluation clause | SPRINT Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190470 | Proposal for content to introduction clause | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190471 | Draft TR 33.861 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190472 | Proposal for content to clause 4 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190473 | Clarifications CIOT security assumptions | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190474 | Address EN in Key Issue 4 of Definition of Misbehaving UE | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190475 | New Key Issue for NAS based Redirection between Core Networks | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190476 | A new key issue for privacy protection of new parameters for CIoT included in NAS messages | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190477 | A new KI on NSSAI protection | Huawei, HiSilicon,NEC,Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190478 | Clarification on the UE selecting the 4G or 5G security protection method | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190479 | Evaluation text for solution #2 | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190480 | Updates to Solution #3: Security solution for MO SMS at AMF re-allocation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190481 | Updates to Solution #5: Security solution for small data included in initial NAS signalling at mobility | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190482 | Details of protecting gNB from RRC DoS attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190483 | Solution for small data at idle mode mobility | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190484 | Protecting small data at idle mobility using the Registration Complete message | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190485 | New Solution Security-Property-Group-based Mitigation for DDoS Attack Triggered by Malicious Applications on the UE | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190486 | Solution for DDoS attack mitigation in CIoT | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190487 | Output of SCAS offline session | Deutsche Telekom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190488 | Solution for Key Issue #7: Key refreshing for protection of small data | Lenovo, Motorla Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190489 | New Conclusion for Small Data Transfer via NAS Signaling | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190490 | Conclusion for Key Issue #9 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190491 | Cover sheet TR 33.861 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190492 | Draft TR 33.819 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190493 | Solution for NPN network access via PLMN | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190494 | TR 33.819: new key issue on security and privacy aspects of service continuity and session continuity | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190495 | Key issue on Multiple and Separate credentials for PLMN and NPN network | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190496 | Proposed key issue on key hierarchy for non-public networks | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190497 | Proposed key issue on binding key to network identity for standalone non-public networks | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190498 | New key issue on UP security policy for the 5GLAN Group | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190499 | New security solution for handling UP security policy for a 5GLAN Group | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190500 | LS on naming issues with SUPI | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190501 | EUTRA connected to 5GC: clause 6.6.2 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190502 | LS on clarification on UE trace definition | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190503 | New proposal on the length of password and other clarifications | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190504 | New proposal on the length of password and other clarification | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190505 | New proposal on the length of password and other clarification | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190506 | FN-RG registration to 5GC | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190507 | Solution for 5GC access from WLAN UEs that do not support NAS | Nokia, Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190508 | SCAS: UDM-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190509 | Draft TS 33.514 | NEC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190510 | Draft TS 33.512 | Deutsche Telekom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190511 | New Test Case: Separation of cryptographic storage within the SEPP | Telekom Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190512 | SCAS SEPP: Introduction and general approach | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190513 | Draft TS 33.518 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190514 | Authorization on northbound APIs | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190515 | Draft 33.517 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190516 | Draft TS 33.519 | ZTE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190517 | Update to clause 4 to add KDF negotiation rationale | NEC Corporation, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190518 | Reply-LS on FN-RG authentication and related questions | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190519 | Response LS on Authentication for UEs not Supporting NAS | Lenovo (Beijing) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190520 | Key Issue on NAS termination in TWIF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190521 | Draft TR 33.807 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190522 | Key Issue on SUCI format for legacy FN-RG devices that access 5G over wireline network | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190523 | Key Issue on NAS termination for registered FN-RGs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190524 | 5G-RG connecting to 5GC via Wireline Access (W-5GAN) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190525 | 5G-RG connecting to 5GC via NG-RAN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190526 | Draft TR 33.835 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190527 | Roaming key issue for AKMA | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190528 | New key issue: Key revocation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190529 | Protocol clarifications to solution 2 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190530 | New solution:Key revocation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190531 | New solution: Implicit Bootstrapping | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190532 | Updating key issue#3 for network detection of nearby fake base station | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190533 | Solution for Slice Specific secondary authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shangahi Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190534 | A solution to slice authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190535 | Security threats and requirement for KI #4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190536 | A new KI on NSSAI protection | Huawei, HiSilicon,NEC,Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190537 | A solution to security features for NSaaS | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190538 | New KI: Access token handling between network slices | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190539 | Draft TR 33.813 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190540 | Security Assurance Requirement and Test for authorization handling in the NF | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190541 | Key issue for acceleration of AKA procedure for low latency | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190542 | New KI on Supporting low latency during Re-attach procedure | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190543 | Update to KI#3 or KI#4 taking Dual Connectivity into considerations | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190544 | Draft TR 33.825 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190545 | New Solution for Redundant data protection | NEC Corporation,Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190546 | URLLC solution for Key Issue 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190547 | Evaluation to solution #1 and conclusion to key issue #3 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190548 | Evaluation on solution #2 and conclusion to key issue #3 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190549 | URLLC solution for N3 tunnel redundancy | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190550 | draft TR 33.853 | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190551 | New key issue on the secure negotiation of the user plane integrity protection feature | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190552 | Draft TR 33.809 | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190553 | Requirement on security of unprotected unicast messages | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190554 | KI#1 in TR 33.809 – new requirement and solution for UECapabilityInformation RRC message | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190555 | Solution on security of RRC Reject messages | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190556 | key update in multi-NAS scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon,Qualcomm,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190557 | Input encoding for ECIES protection schemes | Qualcomm Incorporated,IDEMIA,Gemalto | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190558 | Solution for using established keys for AKMA | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190559 | LS on PLMN-ID verification | Deutsche Telekom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190560 | Draft agenda SA3_94 AdHoc | WG Vice Chair (Qualcomm) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190561 | draftCR General aspects in TS 33.117 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190562 | Draft TR 33.814 | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑190563 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
page generated from database: 2024-09-26 11:02:35