Tdoc List
2020-05-28 18:28
TDoc | Title | Source | Type | For | Agenda | Avail | Treated | Decision | Wdrn | Replaced-by | Replaces |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
S3‑200900 | Agenda | SA WG3 Chair | agenda |
1Agenda and Meeting Objectives
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑200901 | Report from SA3#97 | MCC | report |
2Meeting Reports
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑200902 | Report from SA3#98e | MCC | report |
2Meeting Reports
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑200903 | Report from SA3#98Bis-e | MCC | report |
2Meeting Reports
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑200904 | Process for SA3#99-e meeting | SA WG3 Chair | other |
1Agenda and Meeting Objectives
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200905 | LS on security consideration of performance measurement function protocol | C1-196940 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200906 | Reply LS on SUCI computation from an NSI | C1-200938 | LS in |
4.7Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200907 | Reply LS on sending CAG ID | C1-201027 | LS in |
4.7Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200908 | LS on manipulation of CAG Information element by a VPLMN | C1-202617 | LS in |
4.7Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200909 | LS on security context for 5GC to EPC mobility | C1-202666 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200910 | LS on selected EPS NAS algorithms for unauthenticated emergency sessions in 5GS | C1-202826 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200911 | PAP/CHAP and other point-to-point protocols usage in 5GS | C1-202933 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200912 | LS on Misalignment on HTTP connections for N32-c and on N32-f contexts termination | C4-200781 | LS in |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200913 | LS on Misalignments on N32-f context Id | C4-200782 | LS in |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200914 | Reply LS on Further clarifications on GLI/GCI and Line ID/ HFC_Identifier | C4-201220 | LS in |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200915 | LS on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple Serving Networks | C4-202348 | LS in |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200916 | Request for collaboration on migration planning of HSMs to support Quantum Safe Cryptography | ETSI TC CYBER | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200917 | LS on Generic Slice Template with Public Safety Feedback | TCCA | LS in |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200918 | Reply LS on Sending CAG ID in NAS layer | R2-1916349 | LS in |
4.7Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200919 | Reply LS on NPN clarifications | S1-193605 | LS in |
4.7Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200920 | LS on Sending CAG ID | S2-2001616 | LS in |
4.7Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200921 | LS on AMF Reallocation via RAN re-routing | S2-2001730 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200922 | LS on ARPF in UDICOM | C4-195553 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200923 | LS on 5G-GUTI reallocation after paging of a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode with suspend indication | C1-200967 | LS in |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200924 | Clarification on encryption requirements for AGF interfaces (N1, N2, N3) [WWC] | BBF | LS in |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200925 | LS on uniqueness of PEI in certain FN-RG configurations | S3i200069 | LS in |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑200926 | LS on Location information for SMS over IMS | S3i200161 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200927 | Reply LS on analytics support for energy saving | S5-201472 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200928 | Reply to LS on Resynchronisations | ETSI SAGE | LS in |
5.11Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH)
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑200929 | Observations and questions on 256-bit security goals | ETSI SAGE | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑200930 | Observations on ZUC-256 | ETSI SAGE | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑200931 | LS on ITU-T SG17 activity on V2X security | ITU-T SG17 | LS in |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200932 | LS on towards post-quantum symmetric and asymmetric cryptography in 5G | ITU-T SG17 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200933 | Reply LS to Transfer the study on service-based support for SMS in 5GC to CT WGs | SP-191362 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200934 | Editorial corrections to NDS/IP | Juniper Networks | CR |
4.26Other work areas
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201367 | ||
S3‑200935 | Editorial corrections to NDS/AF | Juniper Networks | CR |
4.26Other work areas
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201368 | ||
S3‑200936 | TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur | InterDigital Communications | other | Information |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200937 | Privacy Threat of Knpr ID | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201344 | |
S3‑200938 | Remediation for Privacy of Knpr ID Threat | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201344 | |
S3‑200939 | Clarifications related to link identifier messages | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201345 | |
S3‑200940 | Threat related to no authentication on N3IWF | China Telecommunications,Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.25Security Assurance Specification for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) (Rel- 17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200941 | Revise the solution details for Solution#2.5 in TR 33.846 | China Telecommunications,Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200942 | Reply LS on Questions on onboarding requirements | S2-2003216 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200943 | LS on SA WG2 status of MT-EDT in Rel-16 | S2-2003505 | LS in |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200944 | Reply LS to SA3 on FBS detection | R2-1914224 | LS in |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑200945 | Study on security aspects of the Disaggregated gNB Architecture | China Telecom, China Unicom, CATT, Xiaomi, vivo | SID new | Agreement |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201381 | |
S3‑200946 | Discussion on the Support of Multi-CU-UP connectivity in Rel-17 | China Telecomunication Corp. | discussion | Discussion |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200947 | Discussion on the Support of Multi-CU-UP connectivity in Rel-17 | China Telecomunication Corp. | discussion | Discussion |
5.16New study item proposals
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑200948 | Discussion on the Support of Multi-CU-UP connectivity in Rel-17 | China Telecomunication Corp. | discussion | Discussion |
5.16New study item proposals
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑200949 | Discussion on the Support of Multi-CU-UP connectivity in Rel-17 | China Telecomunication Corp. | discussion | Discussion |
5.16New study item proposals
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑200950 | Revision of null-scheme SUCI usage in 5G NR | T-Mobile USA Inc. | CR | Approval |
4.26Other work areas
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200951 | Discussion Paper - Countermeasures for Privacy of KNRP ID Threat | InterDigital Communications | discussion | Discussion |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| endorsed | No | ||
S3‑200952 | TS 33.536 - Security policy | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201342 | |
S3‑200953 | TR 33.836 - conclusion 4 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.13Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200954 | TR 33.836 - conclusion 9 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.13Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200955 | Discussion on AMF Reallocation via RAN re-routing | ZTE Corporation | discussion | Endorsement |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200956 | reply LS on AMF Reallocation via RAN re-routing | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200957 | reply LS on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple Serving Networks | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200958 | reply LS on security consideration of performance measurement function protocol | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200959 | Clarification for distribution of subscriber identities and security data in clause 6.3.1.2 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200960 | remove the EN in clause 13.2.3.6 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200961 | Discussion on Security of AMF re-allocation via direct NAS reroute | ZTE Corporation | discussion | Endorsement |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200962 | Security handling in registration with AMF re-allocation via direct NAS reroute | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200963 | Update the clause 4.2.6.2.4-R16 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑200964 | Update the clause 4.2.6.2.4-R15 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑200965 | AKMA key generation indication | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201369 | |
S3‑200966 | AKMA key push in clause 6.1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200967 | AKMA key push in clause 6.2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200968 | AKMA key push in clause 6.3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200969 | Derivation of Kaf | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201370 | |
S3‑200970 | Discussion on the format of A-TID | ZTE Corporation | discussion | Endorsement |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200971 | Define the A-TID format | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200972 | Key update renegotiation when Kaf expired in clause 6.4.2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200973 | Store AKMA subscription data in UDM | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201371 | |
S3‑200974 | Adding a definition for IAB-UE | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
4.14Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑200975 | Update the clause 5.3.3.1.4.3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201385 | |
S3‑200976 | Clean up of V2X TS | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200977 | New WID on Security Assurance Specification for Inter PLMN UP Security (IPUPS) | ZTE Corporation | WID new | Approval |
4.27New work item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201372 | |
S3‑200978 | Editorial correction to solution#12 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200979 | AKMA subscription data confirmation | CATT | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201450 | |
S3‑200980 | Definition of AKMA subscription data | CATT | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201393 | |
S3‑200981 | UDM functionality in clause 4.2 | CATT | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑200982 | UDM functionality in clause 4.2 | CATT | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑200983 | UDM functionality in clause 4.2 | CATT | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑200984 | Scope of SCAS_5G_N3IWF | China Unicom | pCR |
4.25Security Assurance Specification for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) (Rel- 17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑200985 | Skeleton of SCAS_5G_N3IWF | China Unicom | draft TS |
4.25Security Assurance Specification for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) (Rel- 17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑200986 | UDM functionality in clause 4.2 | CATT | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200987 | Update on RSA exponent requirement | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | CR |
4.193GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201399 | ||
S3‑200988 | Draft reply LS to RAN2 on reply LS to SA3 on FBS detection(R2-1914224/S3-200944) | Apple | LS out | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200989 | 5GFBS-Evaluation for solution#17 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200990 | 5GFBS-Conclusion of key issue#1-RRCResumeRequest | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200991 | 5GFBS-Evaluation for solution#7 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201475 | |
S3‑200992 | 5GFBS-Conclusion of key issue#3 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200993 | 5GFBS-Evaluation for solution#19 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200994 | 5GFBS-Solving EN on PKI implementation for solution #11 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200995 | 5GFBS-Solving EN on roaming issue for solution #11 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200996 | 5GFBS-Solving EN on key provisioning for solution #11 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200997 | 5GFBS-Adding Clarification on bidding down attack for solution #11 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200998 | 5GFBS-Solving EN on MitM attack for solution #11 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200999 | 5GFBS-Solving EN on interworking for solution #11 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201000 | 5GFBS-5GFBS-Addressing the EN on how to prevent UE camping on the FBS for solution#11 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201001 | 5GFBS-Notes of 5GFBS conference call on April 28th 2020 | Apple | report | Information |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201002 | AKMA-Clarification in text 6.2 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201394 | |
S3‑201003 | AKMA-KAF refreshment | Apple | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201446 | |
S3‑201004 | AKMA-Initiation of AKMA | Apple | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201395 | |
S3‑201005 | eV2XARC-PDCP COUNT check for PC5 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.13Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201006 | eV2XARC-LCID clarification | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.13Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services
| Yes |
YesIt was asked to be minuted: "No one objected that dynamically indication of mapping between LCID and BEARER sent by initiating UE using RRCreconfig SL is “not” ruled out for future releases like Rel-17".
| revised | No | S3‑201397 | |
S3‑201007 | eV2XARC-Security requirement for PC5 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.13Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201398 | |
S3‑201008 | UP IP-new solution on UP security policy activation | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201009 | Reply LS on S3-200905/C1-196940-PMF security | Apple | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201010 | Discussion paper on PMF Protocol Security | Apple | discussion | Agreement |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201011 | UE configuration for non-3GPP access | Ericsson LM | other | Approval |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201012 | [DRAFT] Reply-LS on 256 bit algorithm candidates | Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201013 | New WID on Study of certificate management for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) | Ericsson | SID new | Agreement |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201014 | Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG: TR 33.855 | Ericsson | TS or TR cover | Agreement |
5.1Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201480 | |
S3‑201015 | Aligning abbreviation of Service Communication Proxy with TS 23.501 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201016 | Clarification on SEPP role regarding the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot HTTP header | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201017 | Authentication in indirect communication scenarios | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201382 | |
S3‑201018 | Consumer-signed authorization codes for access token requests by/via the SCP | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201019 | The advantages of following existing RFCs | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201020 | Draft-CR as baseline for Token-based authorization for indirect communication with and without delegated discovery | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201386 | |
S3‑201021 | Token-based authorization using consumer-signed authorization codes | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201386 | |
S3‑201022 | [DRAFT] LS on security of eLCS | Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
4.8Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201023 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on false base station detection | Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201024 | PC5 SL - LCID and BEARER | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201025 | Solution for KI#1 – Authorization and Isolation of Authentication Data using existing specifications | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201026 | Solution for KI#2 – Protection of LTK access over Nudr | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201428 | |
S3‑201027 | Solution for KI#3 – Protection of LTK over Nudr | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201028 | Informative Annex: Deployment scenarios for end-to-end security | KPN | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201029 | Removal of ENs in section 4 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201030 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on ARPF in UDICOM | Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201031 | CR to 33.501 - Update to User Plane Integrity Protection | Deutsche Telekom | CR | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑200633 | |
S3‑201032 | UE caps protection using AS security in EPS Rel-16 | Ericsson | CR | Approval |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201439 | |
S3‑201033 | UE caps protection using AS security in 5GS Rel-16 | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201440 | |
S3‑201034 | Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG: TR 33.861, Version 1.6.0 | Ericsson | TS or TR cover | Agreement |
5.3Study on Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201035 | Further evaluation to Solution #25: Security solution for preventing Botnet Attacks from Improper CIOT Device Use | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201383 | |
S3‑201036 | Way forward for UE caps protection and NB-IoT Ues | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201037 | Major clean-up of TR | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201038 | DraftCR – Living document for supporting 5G CIoT security | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201441 | |
S3‑201039 | Way forward for remaining CIoT issues in Release 16 | Ericsson | discussion | Information |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201040 | AMF reallocation and slicing | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201041 | Reply LS on AMF Reallocation via RAN re-routing | Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201042 | [Draft CR] Input to MESSAGE when calculating ShortResumeMAC-I in RRC Connection Suspend and Resume | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201043 | Add reference to TS 24.301 for enclosed TAU request in the Registration Request | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201044 | Add reference to TS 24.301 for enclosed TAU request in the Registration Request | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201045 | Elliptic Curve Group Size | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.193GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201422 | |
S3‑201046 | TLS 1.3 cipher suites | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.193GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201423 | |
S3‑201047 | Corrections on PKCS#1v1.5 padding and Elliptic Curves | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.193GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201419 | |
S3‑201048 | New SID on slice isolation security in the 5G System | Ericsson | SID new | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201049 | AKMA Architecture discussion | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201050 | pCR to TS 33.535: Store AKMA key material in AAnF | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201343 | |
S3‑201051 | pCR to TS 33.535: Optimization in AKMA key generation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201052 | Integration of GBA into 5GC | Ericsson | discussion | Information |
4.20Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201053 | Living document of Service Based Interfaces for GBA | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.20Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201477 | |
S3‑201054 | Living document of Service Based Interfaces for GBA Push | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.20Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201478 | |
S3‑201055 | Storage of KAUSF in the UE and AUSF, R15 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201056 | Storage of KAUSF in the UE and AUSF, R16 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201057 | Updates to solution #17 - resolving ENs | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201058 | Reply LS on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple Serving Networks | Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201350 | |
S3‑201059 | Conclusion on KI#6 | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201060 | Conclusion on KI#3 | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201061 | Conclusion on KI#7 | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201062 | Draft CR- Adding security requirements to NSSAAF | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201438 | |
S3‑201063 | Discussion on new SID for enhanced security to support new Non Public Network evolvement | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201064 | Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks | Ericsson, Interdigital | SID new | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201436 | |
S3‑201065 | Correction of SUPI in IKE_AUTH exchange | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo, Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201346 | |
S3‑201066 | Sending the IP address of TNGF to UE | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201067 | Living CR for Slice Specific Authentication and Authrorization clauses | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon, Ericsson, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, China Mobile, CATT, Interdigital | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑200807 | |
S3‑201068 | Draft TR 33.813 Study on Enhancement of Network Slice security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draft TR | Approval |
5.5Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing
| Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑194543 | |
S3‑201069 | draft Reply LS on PMF protocol security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201490 | |
S3‑201070 | Discussion on EN on sending S-NSSAI to AAA-S | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201071 | Deletion of EN in clause X.X.3 on sending S-NSSAI | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑201072 | Discussion on NAS COUNT handling in 5G to 4G Handover | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel | discussion | Endorsement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201073 | Correcting 5G to 4G handover DL NAS COUNT mismatch | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201074 | Correcting 5G to 4G handover DL NAS COUNT mismatch | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201075 | eNS Living CR showing separate NSSAAF and AAA-P | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201462 | |
S3‑201076 | draft Reply LS on AMF Re-allocation via RAN | Nokia | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201077 | Discussion on SA2 LS S2-2001730 AMF Re-allocation via RAN re-routing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201078 | Discussion on AS rekeying failure during Xn-Handover | CATT | discussion | Decision |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201079 | Clarification on AS rekeying failure-R15 | CATT | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201080 | Clarification on AS rekeying failure-R16 | CATT | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201081 | Client authentications in token-based authorization for indirect communication | CableLabs, Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Bell Labs | draftCR | Approval |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201386 | |
S3‑201082 | End to end authentication of NF in SBA | CableLabs, Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Approval |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201083 | Way forward for the remaining eLCS issues in Release 16 | CATT | other | Information |
4.8Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201084 | Draft CR as a living baseline for 5GS LCS normative work | CATT | draftCR | Approval |
4.8Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201461 | |
S3‑201085 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS | CATT | SID new | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201400 | |
S3‑201086 | Clarification on confidential IEs replacement handling in original N32-f message | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201087 | Clarification on exposure of confidential IEs in N32-f message in 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201088 | New SID: Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Unicom, CAICT, China Telecom, ZTE | SID new | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201354 | |
S3‑201089 | Clarification on IPX certificate acquirement in SEPP | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201090 | Clarification on IPX certificate acquirement in SEPP | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201091 | Skeleton for IMS SCAS TS 33.226 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.21Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201092 | Scope for IMS SCAS TS 33.226 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.21Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201093 | Trust mode in the eSBA | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201382 | |
S3‑201094 | Authorization in the Subscribe-Notify interaction scenarios | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201095 | Clarification on access token ownership verification | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201096 | eV2X: removing the UP security policy | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201097 | Update on the Subscribe-Notify Key issues and its conclusion | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.1Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201098 | Adding conclusion on KI #6.2 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201099 | Clarification on Handling of ICMP | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.26Other work areas
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201100 | Security requirements on NSSAAF | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201438 | |
S3‑201101 | Discussion paper on way forward with AMF reallocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201102 | Security requirements on AKMA Key Identifier | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201103 | Deleting test case on TEID uniqueness | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201104 | LS reply to SA2 on AMF reallocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201105 | Clarification on test case on synchronization failure handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201347 | |
S3‑201106 | Clarification on test case on RES* failure handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201348 | |
S3‑201107 | Security requirements on test case for type 1 GVNP | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201349 | |
S3‑201108 | Security requirements on test case for type 2 GVNP | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201357 | |
S3‑201109 | LS reply to on security context for 5GC to EPC mobility | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201453 | |
S3‑201110 | JSON object modification | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201111 | JSON object modification | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201112 | SUCI computation clarification | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201113 | SUCI computation clarification | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201114 | New solution for DDoS mitigation | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201115 | conclusion for KI#6.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201116 | DraftCR_DDoS mitigation | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.7Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201117 | DP_on_resolving_the_gaps_in_NSSAA_procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201118 | LS_on_resolving_the_gaps_in_NSSAA_procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201119 | DP_for_LS on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple SNs | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201120 | LS reply to CT4 LS on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple SNs | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yesit was asked to be minuted: When the new Kausf replaces the old Kausf at the UE, needs to be clarified in SA3.
| revised | No | S3‑201350 | |
S3‑201121 | DP_protection_of_ allowed CAG list against_MITM_Attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement |
4.7Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201122 | LS on protection_of_ allowed CAG list against_mitm_Attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
4.7Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201414 | |
S3‑201123 | NFV_SCAS_TC_VNF_Package_integrity | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201356 | |
S3‑201124 | NFV_SCAS_requirement_on_authorization_of_resource_management | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201352 | |
S3‑201125 | LS reply on selected EPS NAS algorithms to CT1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201126 | Security of RRC UE capability transfer procedure in 5G for CIoT optimisation | Intel China Ltd. | draftCR |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑201127 | UE capability transfer for AS security | Intel China Ltd. | discussion |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑201128 | SBA Network Function certificate profile | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CommScope, Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201466 | |
S3‑201129 | Authentication between Network Functions | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201382 | |
S3‑201130 | Authentication between Network Function and NRF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201382 | |
S3‑201131 | Adding security threats for GVNP | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201132 | Adding security functional requirements deriving virtualisation and related test cases for GVNP of type 1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201355 | |
S3‑201133 | Adding test case into clause 5.2.5.5.3.3.5 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201356 | |
S3‑201134 | Adding security requirements and related test cases for GVNP of type 2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201357 | |
S3‑201135 | Adding security functional requirements deriving virtualisation and related test cases for GVNP of type 2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201358 | |
S3‑201136 | Adding security requirements for GVNP of type 3 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201137 | Adding security functional requirements deriving virtualisation and related test cases for GVNP of type 3 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201359 | |
S3‑201138 | Adding generic assets, threats and requirements for virtualised network functions supporting SBA interfaces | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201139 | Adding improvement of SCAS and new security requirements | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201140 | Clarification to the Usage of KAUSF for Solution #2.2 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201474 | |
S3‑201141 | Complementary to key issue to mitigate the SUPI guessing attacks | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201142 | Revise the Evaluations for Solution 5 in TR 33.853 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201143 | Clean up of TR 33.835 | China Mobile | CR | Approval |
5.2Study on Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201144 | Derivation of KAF | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201370 | |
S3‑201145 | Removing Ens | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201146 | Discussion and working assumption on AKMA open issues | China Mobile | discussion | Endorsement |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201147 | Status of RFC 5448bis update | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion |
4.26Other work areas
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201148 | The skeleton of NWDAF SCAS | China Mobile Com. Corporation | draft TS | Approval |
4.24Security Assurance Specification for 5G NWDAF (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201149 | The scope of NWDAF SCAS TS | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval |
4.24Security Assurance Specification for 5G NWDAF (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201150 | Discussion paper for Rel17 SID on UAS | Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom, CATT | discussion | Decision |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201151 | Study on security aspects of UAS Remote Identification and Application | Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom, CATT | SID new | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201425 | |
S3‑201152 | Discussion paper for Rel17 SID on network slicing security | Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT | discussion | Discussion |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201153 | New SID on security aspects of network slicing - RAN and Phase 2 | Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT | SID new | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201154 | Address EN on whether to transmit NSSAI to AAA | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201155 | validity peirod of NSSAA results | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201156 | Serving network name in NSSAA | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201157 | Normative text for NSaaS | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201158 | Conclusion to KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201159 | Update to Solution 8 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201160 | Conclusion to KI#6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201161 | Discussion paper for eV2X groupcast privacy | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Endorsement |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201162 | Groupcast Privacy | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201163 | Group ID conversion | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201164 | Conclusion for Key Issue #2.2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201165 | Conclusion for Key Issue #2.3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201166 | Reply LS to RAN2 on FBS detection | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201167 | Clarification for solution 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201168 | Abbreviations | KPN | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201169 | Terminology corrections | KPN | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201170 | Key issue on Protection of the Milenage OPc value during storage in UDR | KPN, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201171 | Key issue on Protection of the Milenage OPc value during transfer out of UDR | KPN, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201172 | Key issue on Protection of the Milenage OP value during storage in UDR | KPN | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201362 | |
S3‑201173 | Key issue on Protection of the Milenage OP value during transfer out of UDR | KPN | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201364 | |
S3‑201174 | Key issue on Protection of the sequence number SQN during storage in UDR | KPN | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201175 | Key issue on Protection of the sequence number SQN during transfer out of UDR | KPN | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201176 | Skeleton of Security Assurance Specification for Service Communication Proxy (SECOP) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draft TS | Approval |
4.23Security Assurance Specification for Service Communication Proxy (SECOP) (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201373 | |
S3‑201177 | SCAS SECOP: Scope | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
4.23Security Assurance Specification for Service Communication Proxy (SECOP) (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201374 | |
S3‑201178 | SCAS SECOP: Introduction and General Approach | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
4.23Security Assurance Specification for Service Communication Proxy (SECOP) (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201375 | |
S3‑201179 | Correction to security capability negotiation between SEPPs | Huawei, HiSilicon,China Mobile | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201472 | |
S3‑201180 | Correction to security capability negotiation between SEPPs | Huawei, HiSilicon,China Mobile | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201473 | |
S3‑201181 | Correction to initial EAP Authentication with an external AAA server | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201182 | Correction to initial EAP Authentication with an external AAA server | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201183 | Correction to definition about the case of 'Temporary group call – user regroup'' | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.26Other work areas
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201184 | Secondary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201185 | Primary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201186 | AMF related parameters | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201187 | SID on introducing EVA in SCAS | Huawei, HiSilicon | SID new | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201188 | Kaf refresh procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201446 | |
S3‑201189 | Derive Kakma and Kakma ID at the same time | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201190 | A-TID generation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201191 | Store A-TID in the UDM | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201192 | Editoral Change to 33.501 on 5wwc | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201409 | |
S3‑201193 | The value of user ID used in 33.501 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201346 | |
S3‑201194 | living CR of 5wwc | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201410 | |
S3‑201195 | Clarification about system handling during overload situtations | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201416 | |
S3‑201196 | description modification for policy regarding consective failed login attempts | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201415 | |
S3‑201197 | password structure clarification | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201198 | Clarification on the examples of the delay | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201199 | Update testcase in gNB SCAS | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201405 | |
S3‑201200 | Update testcases in eNB SCAS | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201406 | |
S3‑201201 | Discussion on Unified Group Key Management | Huawei, Hiliscon | discussion | Discussion |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201202 | Study on Unified Group Key Management | Huawei, Hiliscon | SID new | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201203 | Reply LS on Calculation of ShortResumeMAC-I | Huawei, Hiliscon | LS out | Approval |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| No |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201280 | |
S3‑201204 | Address EN for Calculation of ShortResumeMAC-I for UP CIoT Optimisation | Huawei, Hisilicon, CATT, Qualcomm, Samsung | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201205 | Editorial Change of UP 5GS CIoT Optimisation | Huawei, Hiliscon | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201206 | LS to SA2 and RAN2 on questions of UP IP | Huawei, Hiliscon | LS out | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201207 | Modification on the Key issue #3 for UP IP | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201208 | UPIP: pCR for new solution to address UP IP support at full data rate | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201209 | UP IP: Conclusion for Key Issue #3 | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201210 | LS on Backward Compatibility of RRC Resume Request message Protection | Huawei, Hiliscon | LS out | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201211 | Discussion on security of 5MBS enhancemen | Huawei, Hiliscon | discussion | Discussion |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201212 | New SID: Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services | Huawei, Hiliscon | SID new | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201402 | |
S3‑201213 | Address the EN on the NAS procedure impact in Solution#2.4 | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201214 | Editorial changes to TS 33.501 R15 | Huawei, Hiliscon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201215 | Editorial changes to TS 33.501 R16 | Huawei, Hiliscon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201216 | Protection of UE radio capability transfer for CIoT UEs that only support CP optimization | Huawei, Hiliscon | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201217 | Add clarifications to the living CR | Huawei, Hiliscon | draftCR | Approval |
4.8Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (Rel-16)
| No |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201279 | |
S3‑201218 | A new solution to protect SQN | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201219 | NAS security based MIB/SIBs integrity protection | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201220 | Propose to protect the privacy of K_NRP ID | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201221 | Propose to protect Application Layer ID from privacy violations | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201222 | Signalling security mandatory activation for unicast | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
YesHuawei asked to be minuted: "Huawei and Hisilicon propose that the bidding down attacks caused by eV2X unprotected scenarios as feasible vulnerabilities. Huawei and Hisilicon propose to find solution(s) to mitigate the vulnerabilities."
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201223 | Clarification on procedures without security protection | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201454 | |
S3‑201224 | Clarification on input parameters of Null protection algorithms | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201412 | |
S3‑201225 | Remove mismatched threat references and test steps | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201418 | |
S3‑201226 | Update to the test case of Storing of UE authentication status by UDM | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201227 | Test Case on Confidentiality of the Attributes not in Data-Type Encryption Policy | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201228 | Threat analysis on the attributes not in Data-Type Encryption Policy | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201229 | Update to the test case of NF discovery authorization for specific slice | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201420 | |
S3‑201230 | Update to the critical assets of GVNP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201376 | |
S3‑201231 | Update to the threat analysis of software tampering | Nokia. Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201377 | |
S3‑201232 | Update to the requirements of VNF package integrity | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201378 | |
S3‑201233 | Validation of Access Token ownership requirement | Mavenir, Deutsche Telekom | draftCR | Approval |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201234 | Clarification of Token-based authorization | Mavenir, Deutsche Telekom | draftCR | Approval |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201235 | Clarification of Indirect Communication Mutual Authentication | Mavenir, Deutsche Telekom | draftCR | Approval |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201382 | |
S3‑201236 | VLAN introduction | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201470 | S3‑200375 |
S3‑201237 | Resolution of ed note on serving network name | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201469 | S3‑200376 |
S3‑201238 | KI on interworking NPN and PLMN - security req | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201468 | S3‑200377 |
S3‑201239 | KI on service continuity - threats and reqs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201481 | S3‑200378 |
S3‑201240 | Resolution of editors note on AAA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200379 | |
S3‑201241 | Threats and requirements on AAA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201467 | S3‑200380 |
S3‑201242 | Resolution of editor's note in solution 1 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200381 | |
S3‑201243 | Resolution of editor's note in solution 15 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200382 | |
S3‑201244 | UP security policy enforcement in 5GLAN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200383 | |
S3‑201245 | Reply LS on ARPF in UDICOM | Nokia | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201471 | |
S3‑201246 | Security entities at the perimeter of the 5G Core network | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Juniper | CR | Agreement |
4.17User Plane Gateway Function for Inter-PLMN Security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201431 | |
S3‑201247 | Clarification to 5G AV | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201492 | |
S3‑201248 | Clarification to SEAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201493 | |
S3‑201249 | SID on IIoT | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | SID new | Agreement |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201465 | |
S3‑201250 | 5G LAN ed note resolution | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement |
4.7Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201251 | TSC security policy enforcement | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement |
4.7Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201252 | Several corrections to spec text | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201253 | Resolving the editor’s note on the protection of messages | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200757 | |
S3‑201254 | Privacy of K_NRP ID | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑200756 | |
S3‑201255 | Proposal to resolve the Editor’s note of the size of COUNT | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200755 | |
S3‑201256 | Leaving destination identity privacy to the application | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201424 | |
S3‑201257 | Allocation of FC values for TS 33.356 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200350 | |
S3‑201258 | Proposed SID for Unmanned Aerial Systems | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | SID new | Agreement |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201425 | |
S3‑201259 | Proposed TR skeleton for Unmanned Aerial Systems | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201260 | Details from the SA2 UAS moderated e-mail discussion | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Information |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201261 | Correcting the S-NSSAI length in solution 10 in TR 33.813 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201426 | |
S3‑201262 | Protection of UE radio capability transfer for UEs without AS security | Qualcomm Incorporated | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑200764 | |
S3‑201263 | shortResumeMAC-I calculation | Qualcomm Incorporated, Samsung, CATT, Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
YesIt was asked to minute the following: "Ericsson has agreed to this CR only for the sake of progress. In principle, Ericsson is disappointed that stage3 is implemented differently than stage2 and because of time crush, stage2 had to be retrofitted for alignment. In future, stage3 shall not deviate from stage2 without consultation.
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201264 | shortResumeMAC-I calculation (rel-16 mirror) | Qualcomm Incorporated, Samsung, CATT, Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
YesIt was asked to minute the following: "Ericsson has agreed to this CR only for the sake of progress. In principle, Ericsson is disappointed that stage3 is implemented differently than stage2 and because of time crush, stage2 had to be retrofitted for alignment. In future, stage3 shall not deviate from stage2 without consultation.
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201265 | F1 security setup with certificate based IKEv2 authentication | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Intel | CR | Agreement |
4.14Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201437 | S3‑200762 |
S3‑201266 | F1 security setup with PSK based IKEv2 authentication | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Intel | CR | Agreement |
4.14Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201437 | S3‑200763 |
S3‑201267 | Security of dynamic PSK | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement |
4.14Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201268 | Evaluation on UE behavior on detection of false signature | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201269 | Evaluation on signing key management | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201270 | Solution #4 Evaluation (Enriched MR) | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201271 | Conclusion of Key Issue #2 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201272 | Clarification on the use of SUPI as the Identity in EAP-AKA’ key derivation | Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑200361 | |
S3‑201273 | Clarification on the use of SUPI as the Identity in EAP-AKA’ key derivation | Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑200362 | |
S3‑201274 | Security Aspects of DNS and ICMP | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201391 | |
S3‑201275 | Security Aspects of DNS and ICMP | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201392 | |
S3‑201276 | Reply LS on 256 bit algorithm candidates | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201277 | pCR : Derivation of A-TID | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201387 | |
S3‑201278 | pCR : Refresh of KAF | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201279 | Add clarifications to the living CR | Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson, CATT, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, AT&T, China Unicom | draftCR | Approval |
4.8Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201444 | S3‑201217 |
S3‑201280 | Reply LS on Calculation of ShortResumeMAC-I | Huawei, Hiliscon | LS out | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201411 | S3‑201203 |
S3‑201281 | Handling of counter wrap around in UDM, R15 | Ericsson | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201282 | Handling of counter wrap around in UDM, R16 | Ericsson | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | ||
S3‑201283 | Discussion paper to support inclusion of GPSI in AKMA | Samsung | discussion | Endorsement |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201284 | Inclusion of GPSI in AKMA | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201285 | Storing A-KID in AUSF | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201286 | Key update procedure in AKMA | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201287 | Authorization of AF in AKMA | Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201450 | |
S3‑201288 | Updates to Solution#19 on hash calculation | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201459 | |
S3‑201289 | Conclusion for Key issue#2 in FBS | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201290 | Way forward for Resumecause protection | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201291 | Clean-up: TS 33.434 | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
4.15Security aspects of SEAL (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201396 | |
S3‑201292 | Reply LS on 5G-GUTI reallocation after paging of a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode with suspend indication | Samsung | LS out | Approval |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201293 | F1 interface security set-up procedure | Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE, T-Mobile, Mavenir, CableLabs, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Thales | CR | Agreement |
4.14Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201437 | |
S3‑201294 | Reply LS on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple Serving Networks | Samsung, Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201350 | |
S3‑201295 | Protection of DNS messages | Samsung | CR | Agreement |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑201296 | UP integrity protection for UP Signalling messages | Samsung | CR | Agreement |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201457 | |
S3‑201297 | Integrity Protection for UP Signalling messages | Samsung | discussion | Endorsement |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201298 | Conclusion to Key Issue #5 | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201299 | Usage of TLS profiles for CAPIF | Samsung | CR | Agreement |
4.5Enhancements for Security aspects of Common API Framework for 3GPP Northbound APIs (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201300 | Reply LS on selected EPS NAS algorithms for unauthenticated emergency sessions in 5GS | Samsung | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201301 | Discussion on the selected EPS NAS security algorithms | Samsung | discussion | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201302 | UE pre-configuration for non-3GPP access networks | THALES, ORANGE | CR | Approval |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201303 | Correction of trust indication | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo, Thales | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201486 | |
S3‑201304 | SUCI computation: implementers' test data for network specific identifier-based SUPI | THALES | CR | Approval |
4.26Other work areas
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201363 | |
S3‑201305 | pCR to TR 33.853 (UPIP): addition of new solution - use NR PDCP for LTE | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201427 | S3‑200631 |
S3‑201306 | pCR: Conclusion of Key issue#5 | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201307 | LS to RAN2 and CT1 on Updated User Plane Integrity Protection advice | VODAFONE Group Plc | LS out | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201452 | |
S3‑201308 | draft WID - Normative changes for UPIP | VODAFONE Group Plc | WID new | Approval |
4.27New work item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201455 | S3‑200632 |
S3‑201309 | Delegated digital signing for mitigating false base stations | CableLabs, Apple, Intel, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, MITRE, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201463 | |
S3‑201310 | Cover sheet for TR 33.853 for Information | VODAFONE Group Plc | TS or TR cover | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200635 | |
S3‑201311 | pCR to TR33.935 - Addition of Diffie - Helman Key agreements section | Vodafone GmbH | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on LTKUP Detailed solutions
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑191482 | |
S3‑201312 | Cover sheet for TR 33.935 LTKUP | VODAFONE Group Plc | TS or TR cover | Agreement |
5.8Study on LTKUP Detailed solutions
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201313 | Report on Rel-16 IAB open issues e-mail discussion | Samsung | report |
4.14Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑201314 | pCR to 33.853 (UPIP) - Correction to Key Issue 5 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201421 | S3‑200639 |
S3‑201315 | Add DTLS requirement to 33.117 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.22Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑201316 | Add inactivate scenario to gNB SCAS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.22Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑201317 | Reduced overhead for UP IP for 5G RAN updates and conclusion | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Agreement |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201366 | |
S3‑201318 | Draft TR 33.853 | VODAFONE Group Plc | draft TR |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑201319 | LS response to SA3 on the security related issues for NR SL | R2-2004083 | LS in |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑201320 | Report from last SA Plenary | WG Chair | report | Information |
2Meeting Reports
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201321 | Working assumptions | WG Chair | other | Presentation |
1Agenda and Meeting Objectives
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201322 | LS on Calculation of ShortResumeMAC-I | R2-2004265 | LS in |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑201323 | Add DTLS requirement | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.22Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201408 | |
S3‑201324 | Add inactivate scenario to gNB SCAS | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.22Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201325 | LS on AS rekeying handling | R3-202833 | LS in | Discussion |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | ||
S3‑201326 | Reply to: LS response to SA3 on the security related issues for NR SL | CATT | LS out | approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201483 | |
S3‑201327 | Reply to: LS on AS rekeying handling | CATT | LS out | approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201484 | |
S3‑201328 | 256 bit algorithm candidates | ETSI SAGE | LS in | discussion |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | ||
S3‑201329 | Illustrative flow for the proposal in the CR S3-201296 | Samsung | discussion | Information |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201330 | [33.179] R13 token scope fix | Motorola Solutions | CR | Agreement |
4.3Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201331 | [33.180] R16 Fix IdM client terminology | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement |
4.3Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201332 | [33.180] R16 Fix XML references | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement |
4.3Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201333 | [33.180] R16 TrK-ID and InK-ID indication | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement |
4.3Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201334 | Editorial change to the security for IAB | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.14Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201335 | Add requirement for OAM to IAB ENDC | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.14Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201336 | Clarifications related to link identifier update messages | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑201337 | Background infos for IIoT study proposal | Nokia Germany | discussion | Presentation |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201338 | draft TS 33.536 v1.2.0 | LG Electronics Inc. | draft TS | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201339 | draft TR 33.836 v0.6.0 | LG Electronics Inc. | draft TR |
5.13Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑201340 | Presentation of TS 33.536 to TSG for approval | LG Electronics Inc. | TS or TR cover | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201341 | Presentation of TR 33.836 to TSG for approval | LG Electronics Inc. | TS or TR cover | Approval |
5.13Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201342 | TS 33.536 - Security policy | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200952 | |
S3‑201343 | pCR to TS 33.535: Store AKMA key material in AAnF | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201050 | |
S3‑201344 | Remediation for Privacy of KNRP ID Threat | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200938 | |
S3‑201345 | Clarifications related to link identifier update messages | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200939 | |
S3‑201346 | Correction of SUPI in IKE_AUTH exchange | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo, Ericsson, Huawei | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201065 | |
S3‑201347 | Clarification on test case on synchronization failure handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201105 | |
S3‑201348 | Clarification on test case on RES* failure handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201106 | |
S3‑201349 | Security requirements on test case for type 1 GVNP | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201107 | |
S3‑201350 | LS reply to CT4 LS on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple SNs | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201120 | |
S3‑201351 | LS on protection_of_ allowed CAG list against_mitm_Attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
4.7Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201414 | S3‑201122 |
S3‑201352 | NFV_SCAS_requirement_on_authorization_of_resource_management | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201124 | |
S3‑201353 | coversheet for TS 33.535 for approval | China Mobile Com. Corporation | TS or TR cover |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑201354 | New SID: Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Unicom, CAICT, China Telecom, ZTE | SID new | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201088 | |
S3‑201355 | Adding security functional requirements deriving virtualisation and related test cases for GVNP of type 1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201132 | |
S3‑201356 | Adding test case into clause 5.2.5.5.3.3.5 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201133 | |
S3‑201357 | Adding security requirements and related test cases for GVNP of type 2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201134 | |
S3‑201358 | Adding security functional requirements deriving virtualisation and related test cases for GVNP of type 2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201135 | |
S3‑201359 | Adding security functional requirements deriving virtualisation and related test cases for GVNP of type 3 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201137 | |
S3‑201360 | draft TR on Study on Enhancement of Network Slicing | Nokia | draft TR | Approval |
5.5Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201361 | Cover Sheet for TR33.813 for presentation to SA | Nokia | TS or TR cover | Approval |
5.5Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201362 | Key issue on Protection of the Milenage OP value during storage in UDR | KPN | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201172 | |
S3‑201363 | SUCI computation: implementers' test data for network specific identifier-based SUPI | THALES | CR | Approval |
4.26Other work areas
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201304 | |
S3‑201364 | Key issue on Protection of the Milenage OP value during transfer out of UDR | KPN | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201173 | |
S3‑201365 | Reply LS to ITU-T Study Group 17 on towards post-quantum symmetric and asymmetric cryptography in 5G | SA3 | LS out | Information |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201366 | Reduced overhead for UP IP for 5G RAN updates and conclusion | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Agreement |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201317 | |
S3‑201367 | Editorial corrections to NDS/IP | Juniper Networks | CR |
4.26Other work areas
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200934 | ||
S3‑201368 | Editorial corrections to NDS/AF | Juniper Networks | CR |
4.26Other work areas
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200935 | ||
S3‑201369 | AKMA key generation indication | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200965 | |
S3‑201370 | Derivation of Kaf | ZTE Corporation, China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200969 | |
S3‑201371 | Store AKMA subscription data in UDM | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200973 | |
S3‑201372 | New WID on Security Assurance Specification for Inter PLMN UP Security (IPUPS) | ZTE Corporation | WID new | Approval |
4.27New work item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200977 | |
S3‑201373 | Skeleton of Security Assurance Specification for Service Communication Proxy (SECOP) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
4.23Security Assurance Specification for Service Communication Proxy (SECOP) (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201176 | |
S3‑201374 | SCAS SECOP: Scope | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
4.23Security Assurance Specification for Service Communication Proxy (SECOP) (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201177 | |
S3‑201375 | SCAS SECOP: Introduction and General Approach | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
4.23Security Assurance Specification for Service Communication Proxy (SECOP) (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201178 | |
S3‑201376 | Update to the critical assets of GVNP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201230 | |
S3‑201377 | Update to the threat analysis of software tampering | Nokia. Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201231 | |
S3‑201378 | Update to the requirements of VNF package integrity | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201232 | |
S3‑201379 | draft TS 33.522 (v0.1.0) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draft TS | Approval |
4.23Security Assurance Specification for Service Communication Proxy (SECOP) (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201380 | Reply-LS on FN-RG authentication and related questions | Juniper | LS out | Approval |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201381 | Study on security aspects of the Disaggregated gNB Architecture | China Telecom, China Unicom, CATT, Xiaomi, vivo | SID new | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
YesAgreed with one sustained objection from Futurewei.
| agreed | No | S3‑200945 | |
S3‑201382 | Authentication in indirect communication scenarios | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, Hisilicon, Mavenir, CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom | CR | Agreement |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201017 | |
S3‑201383 | Further evaluation to Solution #25: Security solution for preventing Botnet Attacks from Improper CIOT Device Use | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201035 | |
S3‑201384 | Draft TR 33.861 | Ericsson | draft TR | Approval |
5.3Study on Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201385 | Update the clause 5.3.3.1.4.3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200975 | |
S3‑201386 | Token-based authorization for indirect communication | CableLabs, Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201081 | |
S3‑201387 | pCR : Derivation of A-TID | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201277 | |
S3‑201388 | draft TR 33.818 v0.7.0 | China Mobile | draft TR |
5.6Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑201389 | draft TS 33.521 v0.1.0 | China Mobile | draft TS |
4.24Security Assurance Specification for 5G NWDAF (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑201390 | draft TS 33.535 v0.5.0 | China Mobile | draft TS | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201391 | Security Aspects of DNS and ICMP | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201442 | S3‑201274 |
S3‑201392 | Security Aspects of DNS and ICMP | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201443 | S3‑201275 |
S3‑201393 | Definition of AKMA subscription data | CATT | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200980 | |
S3‑201394 | AKMA-Clarification in text 6.2 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201002 | |
S3‑201395 | AKMA-Initiation of AKMA | Apple | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201004 | |
S3‑201396 | Clean-up: TS 33.434 | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
4.15Security aspects of SEAL (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201291 | |
S3‑201397 | eV2XARC-LCID clarification | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.13Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201006 | |
S3‑201398 | eV2XARC-Security requirement for PC5 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.13Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201007 | |
S3‑201399 | Update on RSA exponent requirement | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | CR |
4.193GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200987 | ||
S3‑201400 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS | CATT | SID new | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201085 | |
S3‑201401 | Draft 33.434 v0.4.0 | Samsung | draft TS |
4.15Security aspects of SEAL (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑201402 | New SID: Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services | Huawei, Hiliscon | SID new | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201212 | |
S3‑201403 | Primary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑201404 | Primary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201185 | |
S3‑201405 | Update testcase in gNB SCAS | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201199 | |
S3‑201406 | Update testcases in eNB SCAS | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201200 | |
S3‑201407 | Remove mismatched threat references and test steps | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑201225 | |
S3‑201408 | Add DTLS requirement | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.22Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201323 | |
S3‑201409 | Editoral Change to 33.501 on 5wwc | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201192 | |
S3‑201410 | living CR of 5wwc | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201194 | |
S3‑201411 | Reply LS on Calculation of ShortResumeMAC-I | Huawei, Hiliscon | LS out | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201489 | S3‑201280 |
S3‑201412 | Clarification on input parameters of Null protection algorithms | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201224 | |
S3‑201413 | Cover sheet TS 33.434 | Samsung | TS or TR cover |
4.15Security aspects of SEAL (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑201414 | LS on protection_of_ allowed CAG list against_mitm_Attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
4.7Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201351 | |
S3‑201415 | description modification for policy regarding consective failed login attempts | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201196 | |
S3‑201416 | Clarification about system handling during overload situtations | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201195 | |
S3‑201417 | CR of 5WWC | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201418 | Remove mismatched threat references and test steps | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201225 | |
S3‑201419 | Corrections on PKCS#1v1.5 padding and Elliptic Curves | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.193GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201047 | |
S3‑201420 | Update to the test case of NF discovery authorization for specific slice | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201229 | |
S3‑201421 | pCR to 33.853 (UPIP) - Correction to Key Issue 5 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201314 | |
S3‑201422 | Elliptic Curve Group Size | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.193GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201045 | |
S3‑201423 | TLS 1.3 cipher suites | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.193GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201046 | |
S3‑201424 | Leaving destination identity privacy to the application | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201256 | |
S3‑201425 | Proposed SID for Unmanned Aerial Systems | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | SID new | Agreement |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201258 | |
S3‑201426 | Correcting the S-NSSAI length in solution 10 in TR 33.813 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201261 | |
S3‑201427 | pCR to TR 33.853 (UPIP): addition of new solution - use NR PDCP for LTE | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201305 | |
S3‑201428 | Solution for KI#2 – Protection of LTK access over Nudr | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201026 | |
S3‑201429 | Rapporteurs minutes for UPIP (agenda 5.9) | VODAFONE Group Plc | report | Information |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201458 | |
S3‑201430 | TR33853v090 | VODAFONE Group Plc | draft TR | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201431 | Security entities at the perimeter of the 5G Core network | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Juniper | CR | Agreement |
4.17User Plane Gateway Function for Inter-PLMN Security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201246 | |
S3‑201432 | Reply LS on SUCI computation from an NSI | Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
4.7Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201433 | draft TS 33.226 v0.1.0 | Huawei Technologies Sweden AB | draft TS | Approval |
4.21Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201434 | Skeleton of SCAS_5G_N3IWF | China Unicom | pCR |
4.25Security Assurance Specification for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) (Rel- 17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑201435 | draft TS 33.520 | China Unicom | draft TS |
4.25Security Assurance Specification for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) (Rel- 17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑201436 | Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks | Ericsson, Interdigital | SID new | Approval |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
YesAgreed with three sustained objections from IDEMIA, ORANGE and Thales.
| agreed | No | S3‑201064 | |
S3‑201437 | F1 interface security set-up procedure | Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE, T-Mobile, Mavenir, CableLabs, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Thales, Intel, Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.14Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201293 | |
S3‑201438 | Draft CR- Adding security requirements to NSSAAF | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201062 | |
S3‑201439 | UE caps protection using AS security in EPS Rel-16 | Ericsson | CR | Approval |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201032 | |
S3‑201440 | UE caps protection using AS security in 5GS Rel-16 | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201033 | |
S3‑201441 | DraftCR – Living document for supporting 5G CIoT security | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201038 | |
S3‑201442 | Security Aspects of DNS and ICMP | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201391 | |
S3‑201443 | Security Aspects of DNS and ICMP | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201392 | |
S3‑201444 | Add clarifications to the living CR | Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson, CATT, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, AT&T, China Unicom | draftCR | Approval |
4.8Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201279 | |
S3‑201445 | Kaf refresh procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑201188 | |
S3‑201446 | Kaf refresh procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201188 | |
S3‑201447 | Authorization of AF in AKMA | Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon,CATT | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑201448 | Authorization of AF in AKMA | Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon,CATT | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑201449 | Authorization of AF in AKMA | Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon,CATT | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑201450 | Authorization of AF in AKMA | Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon,CATT | pCR | Approval |
4.10Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201287 | |
S3‑201451 | TR 33.935 v0.3.0 | VODAFONE Group Plc | draft TR | Approval |
5.8Study on LTKUP Detailed solutions
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201452 | LS to SA2 and CT1 on Updated User Plane Integrity Protection advice | VODAFONE Group Plc | LS out | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201487 | S3‑201307 |
S3‑201453 | LS reply to on security context for 5GC to EPC mobility | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201109 | |
S3‑201454 | Clarification on procedures without security protection | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201223 | |
S3‑201455 | draft WID - Normative changes for UPIP | VODAFONE Group Plc | WID new | Approval |
4.27New work item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201308 | |
S3‑201456 | CR for 5GS LCS normative work | CATT | CR | Approval |
4.8Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201482 | |
S3‑201457 | UP integrity protection for UP Signalling messages | Samsung | CR | Agreement |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑201296 | |
S3‑201458 | Rapporteurs minutes for UPIP (agenda 5.9) up to commenting deadline | VODAFONE Group Plc | report | Information |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑201429 | |
S3‑201459 | Updates to Solution#19 on hash calculation | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201288 | |
S3‑201460 | Draft TR 33.846 | Ericsson Japan K.K. | draft TR | Approval |
5.11Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201461 | Draft CR as a living baseline for 5GS LCS normative work | CATT | draftCR | Approval |
4.8Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201084 | |
S3‑201462 | eNS Living CR showing separate NSSAAF and AAA-P | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201075 | |
S3‑201463 | Delegated digital signing for mitigating false base stations | CableLabs, Apple, Intel, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, MITRE, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201309 | |
S3‑201464 | LS Reply to LS on Misalignment on HTTP connections for N32-c and on N32-f contexts termination | Nokia | LS out | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201465 | SID on IIoT | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital, Verizon, CMCC, BMWi, Huawei, HiSilicon, Samsung, Ericsson | SID new | Agreement |
5.16New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201249 | |
S3‑201466 | SBA Network Function certificate profile | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CommScope, Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, Verizon, CableLabs | CR | Agreement |
4.9Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201128 | |
S3‑201467 | Threats and requirements on AAA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201241 | |
S3‑201468 | KI on interworking NPN and PLMN - security req | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201238 | |
S3‑201469 | Resolution of ed note on serving network name | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201237 | |
S3‑201470 | VLAN introduction | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201236 | |
S3‑201471 | Reply LS on ARPF in UDICOM | Nokia | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201245 | |
S3‑201472 | Correction to security capability negotiation between SEPPs | Huawei, HiSilicon,China Mobile | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201179 | |
S3‑201473 | Correction to security capability negotiation between SEPPs | Huawei, HiSilicon,China Mobile | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201180 | |
S3‑201474 | Clarification to the Usage of KAUSF for Solution #2.2 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201140 | |
S3‑201475 | 5GFBS-Evaluation for solution#7 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200991 | |
S3‑201476 | TR33.809 | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | draft TR | Approval |
5.4Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201477 | Living document of Service Based Interfaces for GBA | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.20Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201053 | |
S3‑201478 | Living document of Service Based Interfaces for GBA Push | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.20Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201054 | |
S3‑201479 | Reply LS on Misalignments on N32-f context Id | Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201480 | Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG: TR 33.855 | Ericsson | TS or TR cover | Agreement |
5.1Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201014 | |
S3‑201481 | KI on service continuity - threats and reqs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement |
5.7Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201239 | |
S3‑201482 | CR for 5GS LCS normative work | CATT | CR | Approval |
4.8Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201494 | S3‑201456 |
S3‑201483 | Reply to: LS response to SA3 on the security related issues for NR SL | CATT | LS out | Approval |
4.16Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201326 | |
S3‑201484 | Reply to: LS on AS rekeying handling | CATT | LS out | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201327 | |
S3‑201485 | Normative text for supporting 5G CIoT security | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Agreement |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201488 | |
S3‑201486 | Correction of trust indication | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo, Thales, Broadcom | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201303 | |
S3‑201487 | LS to SA2 and CT1 on Updated User Plane Integrity Protection advice | VODAFONE Group Plc | LS out | Approval |
5.9Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201452 | |
S3‑201488 | Normative text for supporting 5G CIoT security | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Agreement |
4.11Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201485 | |
S3‑201489 | Reply LS on Calculation of ShortResumeMAC-I | Huawei, Hiliscon | LS out | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201411 | |
S3‑201490 | Reply LS on PMF protocol security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201069 | |
S3‑201491 | TR 33.845 version 0.3.0 | VODAFONE Group Plc | draft TR | Approval |
5.14Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201492 | Clarification to 5G AV | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑201247 | |
S3‑201493 | Clarification to SEAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑201248 | |
S3‑201494 | CR for 5GS LCS normative work | CATT | CR | Approval |
4.8Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201482 |