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**Security aspects of 3GPP support for advanced Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services**

(Release 16)

** 

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# Foreword

This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:

Version x.y.z

where:

x the first digit:

1 presented to TSG for information;

2 presented to TSG for approval;

3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.

y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.

z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.

In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings:

**shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something

**shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something

The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports.

The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document.

**should** indicates a recommendation to do something

**should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something

**may** indicates permission to do something

**need not** indicates permission not to do something

The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended.

**can** indicates that something is possible

**cannot** indicates that something is impossible

The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not".

**will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

**will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

**might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

In addition:

**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact

**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact

The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements.

# 1 Scope

The present document provides the security aspects for the 5G system to facilitate vehicular communications for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services. The architecture for these V2X services is described in TS 23.287 [2], which is based on the service requirements defined in TS 22.185 [3] and TS 22.186 [4].

# 2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.

- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.

- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".

[2] 3GPP TS 23.287: "Architecture enhancements for 5G System (5GS) to support Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services".

[3] 3GPP TS 22.185: "Service requirements for V2X services; Stage 1".

[4] 3GPP TS 22.186: "Enhancement of 3GPP support for V2X scenarios; Stage 1".

[5] 3GPP TS 33.185: "Security aspect for LTE support of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services".

[6] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system".

[7] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)".

[8] 3GPP TS 24.587: "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services in 5G System (5GS); Stage 3".

[9] 3GPP TS 38.323: "NR; Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) specification".

# 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations

This clause and its three subclauses are mandatory. The contents shall be shown as "void" if the TS/TR does not define any terms, symbols, or abbreviations.

## 3.1 Terms

For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

**example:** text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.

## 3.2 Symbols

For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:

<symbol> <Explanation>

## 3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

5GC 5G Core

L2 ID Layer 2 Identity

NR New Radio (5G)

V2X Vehicle-to-Everything

NRPEK NR PC5 Encryption Key

NRPIK NR PC5 Integrity Key

# 4 Overview of advanced V2X security architecture

## 4.1 General

The V2X architecture is described in TS 23.287 [2] which describes V2X communication over both the Uu reference point supported by E-UTRA connected to 5GC and/or NR connected to 5GC and PC5 reference point supported by E-UTRA and/or NR. The NR based PC5 reference point supports unicast, groupcast and broadcast modes (see TS 23.287 [2]).

The security for PC5 reference point supported by E-UTRA is given in TS 33.185 [5]. The security for the other cases is given in the present document.

# 5 Security for V2X over NR based PC5 reference point

## 5.1 General

This clause contains the security and privacy requirements and specifies procedures that can achieve the requirements for V2X over NR based PC5 reference point except those for PC5 over E-UTRA which are given in TS 33.185 [5].

## 5.2 Common security

### 5.2.1 General

This clause describes the security requirements and the procedures that are commonly applied for the all kinds of communication modes, i.e. unicast mode, groupcast mode and broadcast mode, which the NR based PC5 reference point supports.

### 5.2.2 Requirements

#### 5.2.2.1 Requirements for Cross-RAT control authorization indication

The 5G System shall provide means to manage the cross-RAT PC5 control authorization.

### 5.2.3 Procedures

#### 5.2.3.1 Cross-RAT PC5 control authorization indication

The procedures for the cross-RAT PC5 control authorization indication are specified in TS 23.287 [2] clause 6.5.

## 5.3 Security for unicast mode

### 5.3.1 General

This clause describes the security requirements and the procedures that can be specifically applied for the NR based PC5 unicast mode.

### 5.3.2 Requirements

#### 5.3.2.1 Requirements for securing the PC5 unicast link

The initiating UE shall establish a different security context for each receiving UE during the PC5 unicast link establishment.

PC5 unicast link security establishment between the initiating UE and each receiving UE shall be protected from man-in-the-middle attacks.

The system shall support confidentiality protection, integrity protection and replay protection of the user plane data of PC5 unicast.

The system shall support confidentiality protection, integrity protection and replay protection of signalling for PC5 unicast link.

The system shall support means of configuring the UEs on whether to use confidentiality protection and/or integrity protection for a particular PC5 unicast link.

User plane protection of the PC5 unicast link for a V2X service shall align with the PC5 user plane security policies of the communicating UEs.

#### 5.3.2.2 Identity privacy requirements for the PC5 unicast link

The 5G System shall provide means for mitigating trackability attacks on a UE during PC5 unicast communications.

The 5G System shall provide means for mitigating linkability attacks on a UE during PC5 unicast communications.

### 5.3.3 Procedures

#### 5.3.3.1 Securing the PC5 unicast link

##### 5.3.3.1.1 General

The NR based PC5 unicast communication procedures are described in TS 23.287 [2]. Clause 5.3.3.1 details how the security for this communication is established and used.

##### 5.3.3.1.2 Overview

###### 5.3.3.1.2.1 Key hierarchy

PC5 unicast link uses 4 different layers of keying material as shown in figure 5.3.3.1.2.1-1.



Figure 5.3.3.1.2.1-1: Key Hierarchy for PC5 unicast link

The different layers of keys are the following:

Long term credentials: These are the credentials that are provisioned into the UE(s) and form the root of the security of the PC5 unicast link. The credentials may include symmetric key(s) or public/private key pair depending on the particular use case. Authentication signalling (see clause 5.3.3.1.3.2) is exchanged between the UEs to derive the KNRP.

KNRP: This is a 256-bit root key that is shared between the two entities that communicating using NR PC5 unicast link. It may be refreshed by re-running the authentication signalling using the long-term credentials. In order to generate a KNRP-sess (the next layer of keys), nonces are exchanged between the UEs. KNRP may be kept even when the UEs have no active unicast communication session between them. The KNRP ID is used to identify KNRP.

KNRP-sess: This is the 256-bit key that is the root of the actual security context that is being used (or at least in the process of being established) to protect the transfer of data between the UEs. During activated unicast communication session between the UEs, the KNRP-sess may be refreshed by running the rekeying procedure. The actual keys (see next bullet) that are used in the confidentiality and integrity algorithms are derived directly from KNRP-sess. The 16-bit KNRP-sess ID identifies the KNRP-sess.

NOTE: A KNRP-sess ID with a zero value indicates no security is used and hence the UEs do not assign an all zero value of KNRP-sess ID when creating a security context.

NRPEK and NRPIK: The NR PC5 Encryption Key (NRPEK) and NR PC5 Integrity Key (NRPIK) are used in the chosen confidentiality and integrity algorithms respectively for protecting PC5-S signalling, PC5 RRC signalling, and PC5 user plane data. They are derived from KNRP-sess and are refreshed automatically every time KNRP-sess is changed.

###### 5.3.3.1.2.2 Security states

A UE may be in one of the three different security states with respect to another UE as follows:

Provisioned-security: This is where a UE just has its own long term keys.

Partial-security: This is where a UE has recently communicated with another UE and still has the KNRP that it used with the other UE, but no other derived keys.

Full-security: This is where a UE is actually communicating with another UE and has KNRP, KNRP-sess, NRPEK and NRPIK, the chosen confidentiality and integrity algorithms and PDCP counters used with each bearer.

Once a UE ends its unicast communication session with another UE, it shall delete KNRP-sess, NRPEK, and NRPIK, the choice of algorithms and the counters. It may also delete KNRP.

###### 5.3.3.1.2.3 High level flows for the security establishment

Figure 5.3.3.1.2.3-1 provides a high-level flow of a UE establishing a connection with other UE(s).



Figure 5.3.3.1.2.3-1: High-level flow of connection establishment

The flow proceeds as follow:

1. UE\_1 sends a Direct Communication Request. This message may be received by multiple UEs.

2a/3a/4a. UE\_2a choose to respond to the message and initiates the Direct Auth and Key Establishment procedure (if needed based on the credentials used to establish security – see clause 5.3.3.1.3) to generate the key KNRP. UE\_2a then runs the Direct Security Mode Command procedure with UE\_1 to establish the security based on that key KNRP. If this is successful, UE\_2a sends the Direct Communication Accept message.

2b. UE\_2b chooses not to respond the UE\_1

2c/3c/4c. UE\_2c responds to UE\_1 using the same sequence of messages as UE\_2a.

Each responder establishes a different security context with UE\_1 that is not known to the other UEs, i.e. the security context used between UE\_1 and UE\_2a is not known to UE\_2b and UE\_2c.

The Direct Communication Request is always sent unprotected and only contains enough information for a secure connection to be established with the other UE. Any information UE\_1 needs to send to the other UEs in order to establish the connection is included in the Direct Security Mode Complete message (sent as part of the Direct Security Mode procedure) from UE\_1 as this message is both confidentiality and integrity protected (see TS 23.287 [2]).

##### 5.3.3.1.3 Key establishment procedures

###### 5.3.3.1.3.1 General

Clause 5.3.3.1.3 provides the details on the establishment of KNRP. The long-term credentials and associated authentication method that are used to establish the keys used to protect the PC5 unicast link may either be specified in 3GPP specification or be a method described outside of 3GPP specifications. In the latter case, it is not practical for all cases to specify the signalling in individual IEs on the NR PC5 interface for all these applications, hence all the authentication is specified to be carried in a generic container (called Key\_Est\_Info in the following clause) on the NR PC5 interface. This allows, for example, an application to change the authentication method without affecting the NR PC5 interface.

###### 5.3.3.1.3.2 Key establishment

At each step of the flow (and the possible multiple times that step 2 can be run), the Key\_Est\_Info contains the different data that is required for key establishment. Such data is transparent to the PC5 layer, i.e. the PC5 layer does not need to understand the content of Key\_Est\_info.

NOTE: The endpoint in the UEs that understands the contents of Key\_Est\_Info may be an application on the UEs. Between the PC5 layer and the application layer on the vehicles, the information contained in Key\_Est\_Info can be passed in an implementation-specific manner, e.g. as one block or several IEs.

Figure 5.3.3.1.3.2-1 shows the message flows for establishing security at PC5 using the key established at the layer above PC5. The need for both steps 2a and 2b (and the number of times both steps 2a and step 2b are run) depends on the authentication method being used.



**Figure 5.3.3.1.3.2-1: Message flow for the establishment of PC5 security key using a generic container**

The steps are as follows and apply to establishment of the initial key or rekeying:

1. In the case, UE\_1 determines it needs to establish a PC5 connection with another UE, UE\_1 sends the Direct Communication Request message and this message is received by UE\_2. In case of rekeying an existing connection with UE\_2, UE\_1 shall send a Direct Rekeying Request message to UE\_2 instead of Direct Communication Request. In both cases the Direct Communication Request message or the Direct Rekeying Request message shall include the Key\_Est\_Info.

2. This step is optional and may be run multiple times depending on the authentication method used.

a. UE\_2 shall send a Direct Auth and Key Establish message including the Key\_Est\_Info to UE\_1.

b. UE\_1 shall send respond with a Direct Auth and Key Establish Response message including the Key\_Est\_Info to UE\_2.

3. UE\_2 shall calculate (if not already done) KNRP. UE\_2 shall send a Direct Security Mode Command messages to UE\_1. These messages may include Key\_Est\_Info if need by the authentication method being used and shall contain MSB of KNRP ID. The MSB of KNRP ID are chosen so that they uniquely identify KNRP at UE\_2.

4. On receiving the Direct Security Mode Command, UE\_1 shall calculate (if not already done) KNRP based on Key\_Est\_Info (if provided). UE\_1 shall choose the LSB of KNRP ID so that they uniquely identify KNRP at UE\_1. UE\_1 shall form KNRP ID from the received MSB of KNRP ID and its chosen LSB of KNRP ID and shall store the complete KNRP ID with KNRP.

UE\_1 shall send a Direct Security Mode Complete message to UE\_2 which shall contain the LSB of KNRP ID. UE\_2 shall form KNRP ID from its chosen MSB of KNRP ID and the received LSB of KNRP ID and shall store the complete KNRP ID with KNRP.

##### 5.3.3.1.4 Security establishment procedures

###### 5.3.3.1.4.1 General

Clause 5.3.3.1.4.2 describes the security policy and how the UEs handle the policy. There are two different cases when an overall security context may be established; to set up a new connection and to re-key an ongoing connection. These cases are described in clauses 5.3.3.1.4.3 and 5.3.3.1.4.4 respectively. Clause 5.3.3.1.4.5 describes the establishment of security for a user plane bearer.

###### 5.3.3.1.4.2 Security policy

5.3.3.1.4.2.1 General

The PC5 unicast link shall support activation or deactivation of security based on the security policy similar to Uu, as defined in TS 33.501[6]. The security policy shall be provisioned for PC5 unicast link as well, as detailed in clause 5.3.3.1.4.2.2 of this document and handled as detailed in clause 5.3.3.1.4.2.3 of this document.

5.3.3.1.4.2.2 Procedure for security policy provisioning for PC5 unicast link

For selectively activating or deactivation the security of the PC5 unicast link, the PCF may provision the security policy per V2X service, during service authorization and information provisioning procedure as defined in TS 23.287 [2].

5.3.3.1.4.2.3 Security policy handling

For a NR PC5 unicast link, the UE shall be provisioned with the following:

The list of V2X services, e.g. PSIDs or ITS-AIDs of the V2X applications, with Geographical Area(s) and their security policy which indicates the following:

• Signalling integrity protection: REQUIRED/PREFERRED/NOT NEEDED

• Signalling confidentiality protection: REQUIRED/PREFERRED/NOT NEEDED

• User plane integrity protection: REQUIRED/PREFERRED/NOT NEEDED

• User plane confidentiality protection: REQUIRED/PREFERRED/NOT NEEDED

NOTE 1: No integrity protection on signalling traffic enables services that do not require security.

NOTE 2: While some V2X applications are similar to Emergency Services and may require similar security policies handling, such V2X applications are outside of the scope of 3GPP.

REQUIRED means the UE shall only accept the connection if a non-NULL confidentiality or integrity algorithm is used for protection of the traffic.

NOT NEEDED means that the UE shall only establish a connection with no security.

PREFFERED means that the UE may try to establish security but may will accept the connection with no security. One use of PREFERRED is to enable a security policy to be changed without updating all UEs at once.

The handling of signalling security policy proceeds as follows

At initial connection, the initiating UE includes its signalling security policy in the Direct Communication Request message. The receiving UE(s) takes this into account when deciding whether to accept or reject the request and when deciding the agreed security policy to be sent back in the Direct Security Mode Command message. The initiating UE can reject the Direct Security Mode Command if the algorithm choice does not match its policy (see clause 5.3.3.1.4.3 for full details of the handling).

All the UP data of PC5 unicast link shall have the same security.

The handling of the user plane security policy proceeds as follows:

At initial connection, the UE that sent the Direct Communications Request shall include the user plane security policy for the service in the Direct Security Mode Complete message.

The receiving UE shall reject the Direct Communication Request when the following cases occur: 1) if the received user plane security policy had either confidentiality/integrity set to NOT NEEDED and its own corresponding policy is set to REQUIRED or, 2) if the received user plane security policy had either confidentiality/integrity set to REQUIRED and its own corresponding policy is set to NOT NEEDED.

Otherwise, the receiving UE may accept the Direct Communication Request. and the response message shall include the configuration of user plane confidentiality protection based on the agreed user plane security policy, set as follows:

1) User plane confidentiality protection set to off if the received user plane security policy had either confidentiality set to NOT NEEDED and/or its own user plane security policy for the service is set to NOT NEEDED; or

2) User plane confidentiality protection set to on if the received user plane security policy had either confidentiality set to REQUIRED and/or its own user plane security policy for the service its own corresponding policy is set to REQUIRED; or

3) User plane confidentiality protection set to off or on otherwise (i.e. when both the received user plane security policy and its own user plane security policy for the service had the confidentiality set to PREFERRED).

User plane integrity protection set following the same rules as confidentiality protection but based on the received and its own user plane integrity protection policy for the service.

At link modification for adding a new V2X service to an existing PC5 unicast link, if the signalling and user plane security policies of the new V2X service are satisfied by the security in use for the PC5 unicast link, the initiating UE shall send the Link Modification Request to the receiving UE. The receiving UE shall reject the Link Modification Request if the security in use does not match its signalling and user plane security policies for the new V2X service.

The V2X layer of the UE shall pass the security configurations to its AS layer. The security configurations are mutually agreed by both sides’ UEs, including the configuration of confidentiality and integrity protection.

###### 5.3.3.1.4.3 Security establishment during connection set-up

The clause describes how security is established during connection set-up. The signalling flow is shown in figure 5.3.3.1.4.3-1.

Figure 5.3.3.1.4.3-1: Security establishment at connection set-up

1. UE\_1 has sent a Direct Communication Request to UE\_2. This message shall include Nonce\_1 (for session key KNRP-sess generation), UE\_1 security capabilities (the list of algorithms that UE\_1 will accept for this connection), UE\_1’s signalling security policy and the most significant 8-bits of the KNRP-sess ID. These bits shall be chosen such that UE\_1 will be able to locally identify a security context that is created by this procedure. The message may also include a KNRP ID if the UE\_1 has an existing KNRP for the UE that it is trying to communicate with. The absence of the KNRP ID parameter indicates that UE\_1 does not have a KNRP for UE\_2. The message also contains Key\_Est\_Info (see subclause 5.3.3.1.3.2).

2. UE\_2 shall reject the Direct Communication Request if UE\_1's signalling security policy is "NOT NEEDED" while UE\_2's security policy is "REQUIRED". UE\_2 shall also reject the Direct Communication Request if UE\_1's signalling security policy is "REQUIRED" while UE\_2's security policy is "NOT NEEDED". UE\_2 may initiate a Direct Auth and Key Establish procedure with UE\_1. This is mandatory if the UE\_2 does not have the KNRP and KNRP ID pair indicated in step 1, and signalling is needed to establish the keys for the particular use case.

3. UE\_2 shall send the Direct Security Mode Command message to UE\_1. This message shall only contain the MSB and of KNRP ID and optionally Key\_Est\_Info if a fresh KNRP is to be generated (see clause 5.3.3.1.3). UE\_2 shall include Nonce\_2 to allow a session key to be calculated and the Chosen\_algs parameter to indicate which security algorithms the UEs will use to protect the data in the message. The Chosen-algs may only indicate the use of the NULL integrity algorithm if UE\_2’s signalling security policy has integrity as NOT NEEDED or PREFERRED. UE\_2 shall also return the UE\_1 security capabilities and UE\_1’s signalling security policy to provide protection against bidding down attacks. UE\_2 shall also include the least significant 8-bits of KNRP-sess ID in the messages. These bits are chosen so that UE\_2 will be able to locally identify a security context that is created by this procedure. UE\_2 shall calculate KNRP-Sess from KNRP and both Nonce\_1 and Nonce\_2 (see Annex A.3) and then derive the confidentiality and integrity keys based on the chosen algorithms (Annex A.2). UE\_2 shall integrity protect the Direct Security Mode Command before sending it to UE\_1. UE\_2 is then ready to receive both signalling and user plane traffic protected with the new security context. UE\_2 shall form the KNRP-sess ID from the most significant bits it received in step1 and least significant bits it sent in step3.

4. On receiving the Direct Security Mode Command, UE\_1 shall first check that the received LSB of KNPR-sess ID is unique, i.e. has not been sent by another UE responding to this Direct Commuication Request. If the LSB of KNPR-sess ID is not unique, then UE\_1 shall respond with a Direct Security Mode Reject message including a cause value to specify that the LSB of KNPR-sess ID is not unique. The peer UE-2 receiving a Direct Security Mode Reject message shall inspect the cause value and, if the cause is related to the session identifier uniqueness then, the UE-2 shall generate a new LSB of KNPR-sess ID and reply to UE-1 again (i.e., UE-2 shall send a Direct Security Mode Command message with the new LSB of KNPR-sess ID). UE\_2 shall associate the new LSB of KNRP-sess ID with the security context that is created in step 3. UE-2 shall erase the former LSB of KNPR-sess ID from its memory. On receiving this new Direct Security Mode Command, UE\_1 shall process the message from the start of step 4.

If the LSB of KNPR-sess ID is unique, UE\_1 shall calculate KNRP-sess and the confidentiality and integrity keys in the same way as UE\_2. UE\_1 shall check that the returned UE\_1 security capabilities and UE\_1’s signalling security policy are the same as those it sent in step 1. UE\_1 shall also check the integrity protection on the message. UE\_1 shall only accept the NULL integrity algorithm if its security policy for signalling indicates that integrity protection is NOT NEEDED or PREFERRED. If both these checks pass, then UE\_1 is ready to send and receive signalling and user plane traffic with the new security context. UE\_1 shall send integrity protected and confidentiality protected (with the chosen algorithm which may be the null algorithm) Direct Security Mode Complete message to UE\_2. UE\_1 shall form the KNRP-sess ID from the most significant bits it sent in step1 and least significant bits it received in step3.

5. UE\_2 checks the integrity protection on the received Direct Security Mode Complete. If this passes, UE\_2 is now ready to send user plane data and control signalling protected with the new security context. UE\_2 deletes any old security context it has for UE\_1.

###### 5.3.3.1.4.4 Security establishment during re-keying

By rekeying, the UEs ensure fresh session keys KNRP-sess are used. Optionally the rekeying can also enforce refresh of KNRP. Either UE may rekey the connection at any time. This shall be done before the counter for a PDCP bearer repeats with the current keys. A rekeying operation shall refresh the KNRP-sess and NRPEK and NRPIK, and may refresh KNRP. A rekeying operation follows the flows given in figure 5.3.3.1.4.4-1.

Figure 5.3.3.1.4.4-1: Security establishment during rekeying

1. UE\_1 sends a Direct Rekey Request to UE\_2. This message shall include Nonce\_1 (for session key generation), UE\_1 security capabilities (the list of algorithms that UE\_1 will accept for this connection) and the most significant 8-bits of the KNRP-sess ID. These bits are chosen such that UE\_1 will be able to locally identify a security context that is created by this procedure. The message may also include a Re-auth Flag if UE\_1 wants to rekey KNRP. The message also contains Key\_Est\_Info (see subclause 5.3.3.1.3.2).

2. UE\_2 may initiate a Direct Auth Key Establish procedure with UE\_1. This is mandatory if UE\_1 included the Re-auth Flag and signalling is needed to establish KNRP.

3. This step is the same as step 3 in 5.3.3.1.4.3 except that the chosen integrity algorithm shall only be NULL if the NULL integrity algorithm is currently in use and UE\_1’s signalling security policy is not included in this message.

4. This step is the same as step 4 in 5.3.3.1.4.3 except that UE\_1 shall only accept the NULL integrity algorithm if the NULL integrity algorithm is currently in use and UE\_1 does not check the returned siganlling security policy (as it is not sent in this case).

5. This step is the same as step 5 in 5.3.3.1.4.3.

6. When UE\_1 receives message integrity protected with the new security context, it shall delete any old security context it has still stored for UE\_2.

###### 5.3.3.1.4.5 Security establishment for user plane bearers

The UEs handle the user plane security policies as described in clauses 5.3.3.1.4.2.3.

The UE initiating the establishment of a user plane bearer shall select an LCID whose associated value of Bearer for input to the security algorithms (see clauses 5.3.3.1.5.2 and 5.3.3.1.5.3) has not been used with the current keys, NRPEK and NRPIK. If this is not possible the UE shall initiate a re-keying (see clause 5.3.3.1.4.4) before establishing the user plane bearer.

When establishing or re-configuring the user plane bearer, the initiating UEs shall ensure the configuration of confidentiality and integrity protection in the PC5-RRC message matches the agreed UP security policies for thraffic that will be sent on the bearer. The confidentiality and integrity protection algorithms are same as those selected for protecting the signalling bearers.

Both UEs shall ensure that the user plane for each V2X service is only sent or received (e.g. dropped if received on a bearer with incorrect security) on user plane bearers with the necessary security.

##### 5.3.3.1.5 Protection of the PC5 unicast link

###### 5.3.3.1.5.1 General

Protection for the signalling and user plane data between the UEs is provided at the PDCP layer. As the security is not preserved through a drop of the connection, all signalling messages that need to be sent before security is established for a connection may be sent with no protection. The PC5-S signalling messages that can be sent and processed unprotected are given in TS 24.587 [8]. Once security is established for a connection all signalling messages for that connection are sent integrity protected and confidentiality protected with the chosen algorithms except the Direct Security Mode Command which is sent integrity protected only.

###### 5.3.3.1.5.2 Integrity protection

UEs shall implement NIA0, 128-NIA1 and 128-NIA2 and may implement 128-NIA3 for integrity protection of the unicast link. The algorithm identifiers from clause 5.11.1.2 of TS 33.501 [6] are reused for PC5-S, PC5-RRC, and PC5-U.

These integrity algorithms are as specified in TS 33.501 [6] and are reused with the following modifications:

- The key used is NRPIK;

- Direction is set to 1 for direct link signalling transmitted by the UE that sent the Direct Security Mode Command for this security context and 0 otherwise;

- Bearer[0] to Bearer[4] are set to 5 LSB of LCID;

- COUNT[0] to COUNT[31] are filled with counter value (see clause 6.3.5 of TS 38.323 [9]).

NOTE: The above input parameters do not apply to NIA0 as specified in Annex D.1 of TS 33.501 [6].

The receiving UE ensures that received protected signalling messages and user plane data that is integrity protected are not replayed.

###### 5.3.3.1.5.3 Confidentiality protection

UEs shall implement NEA0, 128-NEA1 and 128-NEA2 and may implement 128-NEA3 for ciphering of the unicast link. The algorithm identifiers from clause 5.11.1.1 of TS 33.501 [6] are reused for PC5-S, PC5-RRC, and PC5-U.

These ciphering algorithms are as specified in TS 33.501 [6] and are used with the following modifications:

- The key used in NRPEK;

- Direction is set as for integrity protection (see 5.3.3.1.5.2);

- Bearer[0] to Bearer[4] are set to 5 LSB of LCID;

- COUNT[0] to COUNT[31] are filled with counter value.

NOTE: The above input parameters do not apply to NIA0 as specified in Annex D.1 of TS 33.501 [6].

###### 5.3.3.1.5.4 Content of the PDCP packet

The Key ID and least significant bits of the counter are carried in the PDCP header, along with any MAC that is needed for integrity protection. The key ID is used to signal which security context is being used and shall be set to KNRP-sess ID.

This is illustrated in Figure 5.3.3.1.5.4-1.



**Figure 5.3.3.1.5.4-1: Security parameters in the PDCP header for NR based PC5 unicast mode**

#### 5.3.3.2 Identity privacy for the PC5 unicast link

##### 5.3.3.2.1 General

The link identifier update procedure given in TS 23.287 [2] is used to provide privacy for the identities in the unicast link. This procedure only provides privacy if a non-NULL confidentiality algorithm is selected. This means the messages in this procedure are sent confidentiality protected (i.e. using a non-NULL confidentiality algorithm) and hence the new identities agreed by the UEs are only known to the involved UEs. A three-way message exchange procedure is required with this procedure since both UEs need to change their identifiers during the same procedure and to allow these new values to be acknowledged before them being used. This procedure is used to preserve the privacy for the identities that are seen in the clear for an ongoing unicast connection.

NOTE: From a security point of view, it is assumed that the link identifier update procedure is used with a protected connection.

A separate privacy threat that allows to link two subsequent connections is caused by either the same KNRP ID or same partial KNRP ID value being sent in the Direct Communication Request message for subsequent connections. The Layer-2 link release procedure given in TS 23.287 [2] is used to provide privacy for the KNRP ID. The messages in the Layer-2 link release procedure are always sent protected and hence the new KNRP ID agreed by the UEs is only known to the involved UEs.

##### 5.3.3.2.2 Procedures

###### 5.3.3.2.2.1 Link identifier update

Figure 5.3.3.2.2-1 shows the flows for changing the identities of the UEs involved in PC5 unicast link. The figure only displays the security parameters (KNRP-sess ID)that are changed and the Layer-2 IDs but not the other parameters described in TS 23.287 [2].



Figure 5.3.3.2.2.1-1: Link identifier update procedure

The procedure proceeds with the following steps and provides additional handling on top of what is provided in TS 23.287 [2].

0. UE\_1 and UE\_2 are communicating via a unicast link and have established the security for the link.

1. UE\_1 decides to change its identifiers and sends a Link Identifier Update Request message to UE\_2 (see TS 23.287 [2]). In addition to the changed identifiers, UE\_1 shall include the MSB of KNRP-sess ID in the Link Identifier Update Request message. These bits shall be chosen so that they uniquely identify KNRP-sess at UE\_1.

2. UE\_2 shall choose the LSB of KNRP-sess ID so that they uniquely identify KNRP-sess at UE\_2. UE\_2 shall form the new KNRP-sess ID from the MSB received from UE\_1 and the LSB that UE\_2 chose. UE\_2 shall associate the new KNRP-sess ID with the updated Layer-2 IDs (see TS 23.287 [2]) and shall use this new KNRP-sess ID when it uses the updated Layer-2 IDs. In addition to its updated identifiers, UE\_2 shall send the LSB of KNRP-sess ID to UE\_1 along with the received MSB of KNRP-sess ID and other identifiers received from UE\_1 in the Link Identifier Update Response message. UE\_1 shall check that the returned MSB of KNRP-sess ID is identical to the one sent in step 1.

3. UE\_1 shall form the new KNRP-sess ID from the LSB received from UE\_2 and the MSB chosen by UE\_1 (in step 1). UE\_1 shall associate the new KNRP-sess ID with the updated Layer-2 IDs (see TS 23.287 [2]) and shall use this new KNRP-sess ID when it uses the updated Layer-2 IDs. UE\_1 shall send the Link Identifier Update Ack message to UE\_2 including the LSB of KNRP-sess ID and other identifiers received from UE\_2. UE\_2 shall check that the returned LSB of KNRP-sess ID are identical to the one sent in step 2.

###### 5.3.3.2.2.2 Layer-2 link release

Figure 5.3.3.2.2.2-2 shows the message flows for changing the KNRP ID of the UEs involved in PC5 unicast link to remediate the privacy threat for the KNRP ID. This message flow is based on the Layer-2 link release procedure provided in clause 6.3.3.3 of TS 23.287 [2]. The messages in the Layer-2 link release procedure are always sent protected and hence the new KNRP ID agreed by the UEs is only known to the involved UEs. The new KNRP ID is used on a subsequent unicast link establishment procedure (see clause 5.3.3.1.4.3).



Figure 5.3.3.2.2.2-2: Layer-2 link release procedure

0. UE\_1 and UE\_2 have a unicast link established as described in TS 23.287 [2].

1. UE\_1 sends a Disconnect Request message to UE\_2 in order to release the layer-2 link (see TS 23.287 [2]). UE\_1 shall include the MSB of KNRP ID in the Disconnect Request message. These bits shall be chosen so that they uniquely identify KNRP at UE\_1.

2. UE\_2 shall choose the LSB of KNRP ID so that they uniquely identify KNRP at UE\_2. UE\_2 shall form the new KNRP ID from the MSB received from UE\_1 and the LSB that UE\_2 chose. UE\_2 may use this new KNRP ID when it reconnects with UE\_1. UE\_2 shall send the LSB of KNRP ID to UE\_1 in the Disconnect Response message. Upon reception of the Disconnect Response message, UE\_1 shall form the new KNRP ID from the LSB received from UE\_2 and the MSB that was chosen by UE\_1 (in step 1). UE\_1 may use this new KNRP ID when it reconnects with UE\_2.

## 5.4 Security for groupcast mode

### 5.4.1 General

This clause describes the security requirements and the procedures that can be specifically applied for the groupcast mode over the NR PC5 interface.

### 5.4.2 Requirements

#### 5.4.2.1 Requirements for securing the NR based PC5 groupcast mode

There are no requirements for securing the NR based PC5 reference point for groupcast mode.

#### 5.4.2.2 Identity privacy requirements for the NR based PC5 groupcast mode

The 5G System shall protect against linkability attacks on Layer-2 ID and IP address for groupcast mode.

The 5G System shall protect against trackability attacks on Layer-2 ID and IP address for groupcast mode.

### 5.4.3 Procedures

#### 5.4.3.1 Securing the NR based PC5 groupcast mode

There are no particular procedures defined for securing the NR based PC5 groupcast mode.

#### 5.4.3.2 Identity privacy procedures for the PC5 groupcast mode

The below privacy procedures follow the privacy mechanism defined in TS 33.185 [5] for V2X LTE which is intended to mitigate against the threat of tracking the UE by an attacker based on its used source identities.

The UE shall change and randomize its source Layer-2 ID and source IP address including IP prefix (if used) when the V2X application indicates that the Application Layer ID has changed. The UE may change and randomize its source Layer-2 ID and source IP address including IP prefix (if used) at other times (e.g. see clause 5.6.1.1 in TS 23.287 [2]). The UE shall provide an indication to the V2X application layer whenever the source Layer-2 ID and/or source IP address are changed.

NOTE: There are no additional procedures defined for privacy of destination Layer-2 ID in this release.

## 5.5 Security for broadcast mode

### 5.5.1 General

This clause describes the security requirements and the procedures that can be specifically applied for the broadcast mode over the NR PC5 interface.

### 5.5.2 Requirements

#### 5.5.2.1 Requirements for securing the NR based PC5 broadcast mode

There are no requirements for securing the NR based PC5 reference point for broadcast mode.

#### 5.5.2.2 Identity privacy requirements for the NR based PC5 broadcast mode

The 5G System shall protect against linkability attacks on Layer-2 ID and IP address for broadcast mode.

The 5G System shall protect against trackability attacks on Layer-2 ID and IP address for broadcast mode.

### 5.5.3 Procedures

#### 5.5.3.1 Securing the NR based PC5 broadcast mode

There are no particular procedures defined for securing the NR based PC5 broadcast mode.

#### 5.5.3.2 Identity privacy procedures for the NR based PC5 broadcast mode

These procedures for the privacy of source Layer-2 ID and source IP address are the same as that given in clause 5.4.3.2 for the source identities in the UE.

# 6 Security for V2X over Uu reference point

## 6.1 General

This clause contains the security and privacy requirements and procedures that meet the requirements over Uu connectivity with 5G core network.

## 6.2 Requirements

There are no additional security or privacy requirements for V2X beyond those given in TS 33.501 [6] for Uu connectivity with 5G core network.

## 6.3 Procedures

There are no additional security or privacy procedures of V2X beyond those given in TS 33.501 [6] for Uu connectivity with 5G core network.

NOTE 1: The specification does not provide technical solutions to address any privacy concerns specific to V2X service that require privacy for a UE being attached to the network, or that due to the data traversing the network in Uu mode. However, there are general privacy principles applicable outside of 3GPP scope; data minimization and user consent if privacy impacting data collection is unavoidable for providing the V2X service.

Annex A (normative):  
Key derivation functions

# A.1 KDF interface and input parameter construction

## A.1.1 General

This annex specifies the use of the Key Derivation Function (KDF) specified in TS 33.220 [7] for the current specification. This annex specifies how to construct the input string, S, to the KDF (which is input together with the relevant key). For each of the distinct usages of the KDF, the input parameters S are specified below.

## A.1.2 FC value allocations

The FC number space used is controlled by TS 33.220 [7].

# A.2 Calculation of NRPEK and NRPIK

When calculating an NRPIK or NRPEK from KNRP-sess, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [7]:

- FC = 0x7E

- P0 = 0x00 if NRPEK is being derived or 0x01 if NRPIK is being derived

- L0 = length of P0 (i.e. 0x00 0x01)

- P1 = algorithm identity

- L1 = length of algorithm identity (i.e. 0x00 0x01)

The algorithm identity shall be set as described in TS 33.501 [6].

The input key shall be the 256-bit KNRP-sess.

For an algorithm key of length n bits, where n is less or equal to 256, the n least significant bits of the 256 bits of the KDF output shall be used as the algorithm key.

# A.3 Calculation of KNRP-sess from KNRP

When calculating KNRP-sess from KNRP, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [7]:

- FC = 0x7F

- P0 = Nonce\_1

- L0 = length of Nonce\_1 (i.e. 0x00 0x10)

- P1 = Nonce\_2

- L1 = length of Nonce\_2 (i.e. 0x00 0x10)

The input key shall be the 256-bit KNRP.

Annex B (informative):  
Change history

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Change history** | | | | | | | |
| **Date** | **Meeting** | **TDoc** | **CR** | **Rev** | **Cat** | **Subject/Comment** | **New version** |
| 2019-11 | SA3-97 | S3-194526 | - | - | - | Skeleton presented for approval at SA3 #97 | 0.1.0 |
| 2019-11 | SA3-97 | S3-194625 | - | - | - | Agreed pCR implemented: S3-194312, S3-194613, S3-194615 | 0.2.0 |
| 2020-03 | SA3-98e | S3-200440 | - | - | - | Agreed pCR implemented: S3-200087, S3-200088, S3-200108, S3-200211-r2, S3-200241, S3-200342-r4, S3-200345-r6, S3-200346-r2, S3-200347-r10, S3-200348-r3, S3-200349-r1, S3-200350, S3-200352-r3 | 0.3.0 |
| 2020-04 | SA3-98-bis-e | S3-200822 | - | - | - | Agreed pCR implemented: S3-200601-r2, S3-200605, S3-200612, S3-200806, S3-200653, S3-200823, S3-200682, S3-200683-r1, S3-200684-r2, S3-200685, S3-200690, S3-200730-r1 | 1.1.0 |
| 2020-05 | SA3-99e | S3-201338 |  |  |  | Agreed pCR implemented: S3-201344(S3-200938-r2), S3-201345(S3-200939-r7), S3-201342(S3-200952-r6), S3-200975-r1, S3-200976, S3-201006-r1, S3-201007-r1, S3-201224-r1, S3-201253, S3-201255, S3-201256-r1 | 1.2.0 |