Tdoc List
2020-05-28 18:28
Agenda | Topic | TDoc | Title | Source | Type | For | Avail | Treated | Decision | Wdrn | Replaced-by | Replaces |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Agenda and Meeting Objectives | S3‑200900 | Agenda | SA WG3 Chair | agenda | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑200904 | Process for SA3#99-e meeting | SA WG3 Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201321 | Working assumptions | WG Chair | other | Presentation | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
2 | Meeting Reports | S3‑200901 | Report from SA3#97 | MCC | report | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑200902 | Report from SA3#98e | MCC | report | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑200903 | Report from SA3#98Bis-e | MCC | report | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑201320 | Report from last SA Plenary | WG Chair | report | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
3 | Reports and Liaisons from other Groups | S3‑200905 | LS on security consideration of performance measurement function protocol | C1-196940 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200909 | LS on security context for 5GC to EPC mobility | C1-202666 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑200910 | LS on selected EPS NAS algorithms for unauthenticated emergency sessions in 5GS | C1-202826 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑200911 | PAP/CHAP and other point-to-point protocols usage in 5GS | C1-202933 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑200916 | Request for collaboration on migration planning of HSMs to support Quantum Safe Cryptography | ETSI TC CYBER | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑200921 | LS on AMF Reallocation via RAN re-routing | S2-2001730 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑200922 | LS on ARPF in UDICOM | C4-195553 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑200926 | LS on Location information for SMS over IMS | S3i200161 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑200927 | Reply LS on analytics support for energy saving | S5-201472 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑200929 | Observations and questions on 256-bit security goals | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑200930 | Observations on ZUC-256 | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑200932 | LS on towards post-quantum symmetric and asymmetric cryptography in 5G | ITU-T SG17 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑200933 | Reply LS to Transfer the study on service-based support for SMS in 5GC to CT WGs | SP-191362 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑200936 | TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur | InterDigital Communications | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200942 | Reply LS on Questions on onboarding requirements | S2-2003216 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑200955 | Discussion on AMF Reallocation via RAN re-routing | ZTE Corporation | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200956 | reply LS on AMF Reallocation via RAN re-routing | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200958 | reply LS on security consideration of performance measurement function protocol | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200961 | Discussion on Security of AMF re-allocation via direct NAS reroute | ZTE Corporation | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200962 | Security handling in registration with AMF re-allocation via direct NAS reroute | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201009 | Reply LS on S3-200905/C1-196940-PMF security | Apple | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201010 | Discussion paper on PMF Protocol Security | Apple | discussion | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201012 | [DRAFT] Reply-LS on 256 bit algorithm candidates | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201030 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on ARPF in UDICOM | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201040 | AMF reallocation and slicing | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201041 | Reply LS on AMF Reallocation via RAN re-routing | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201069 | draft Reply LS on PMF protocol security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201490 | |||
S3‑201076 | draft Reply LS on AMF Re-allocation via RAN | Nokia | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201077 | Discussion on SA2 LS S2-2001730 AMF Re-allocation via RAN re-routing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201101 | Discussion paper on way forward with AMF reallocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201104 | LS reply to SA2 on AMF reallocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201109 | LS reply to on security context for 5GC to EPC mobility | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201453 | |||
S3‑201125 | LS reply on selected EPS NAS algorithms to CT1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201245 | Reply LS on ARPF in UDICOM | Nokia | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201471 | |||
S3‑201276 | Reply LS on 256 bit algorithm candidates | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201300 | Reply LS on selected EPS NAS algorithms for unauthenticated emergency sessions in 5GS | Samsung | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201301 | Discussion on the selected EPS NAS security algorithms | Samsung | discussion | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201365 | Reply LS to ITU-T Study Group 17 on towards post-quantum symmetric and asymmetric cryptography in 5G | SA3 | LS out | Information | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201453 | LS reply to on security context for 5GC to EPC mobility | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201109 | |||
S3‑201471 | Reply LS on ARPF in UDICOM | Nokia | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201245 | |||
S3‑201490 | Reply LS on PMF protocol security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201069 | |||
S3‑201328 | 256 bit algorithm candidates | ETSI SAGE | LS in | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | ||||
4 | Work Areas |   | ||||||||||
4.1 | Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15) | S3‑200912 | LS on Misalignment on HTTP connections for N32-c and on N32-f contexts termination | C4-200781 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200913 | LS on Misalignments on N32-f context Id | C4-200782 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑200915 | LS on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple Serving Networks | C4-202348 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑200957 | reply LS on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple Serving Networks | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200959 | Clarification for distribution of subscriber identities and security data in clause 6.3.1.2 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑200960 | remove the EN in clause 13.2.3.6 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201043 | Add reference to TS 24.301 for enclosed TAU request in the Registration Request | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201044 | Add reference to TS 24.301 for enclosed TAU request in the Registration Request | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201055 | Storage of KAUSF in the UE and AUSF, R15 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201056 | Storage of KAUSF in the UE and AUSF, R16 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201058 | Reply LS on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple Serving Networks | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201350 | |||
S3‑201072 | Discussion on NAS COUNT handling in 5G to 4G Handover | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201073 | Correcting 5G to 4G handover DL NAS COUNT mismatch | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201074 | Correcting 5G to 4G handover DL NAS COUNT mismatch | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201078 | Discussion on AS rekeying failure during Xn-Handover | CATT | discussion | Decision | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201079 | Clarification on AS rekeying failure-R15 | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201080 | Clarification on AS rekeying failure-R16 | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201089 | Clarification on IPX certificate acquirement in SEPP | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201090 | Clarification on IPX certificate acquirement in SEPP | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201110 | JSON object modification | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201111 | JSON object modification | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201112 | SUCI computation clarification | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201113 | SUCI computation clarification | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201119 | DP_for_LS on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple SNs | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201120 | LS reply to CT4 LS on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple SNs | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yesit was asked to be minuted: When the new Kausf replaces the old Kausf at the UE, needs to be clarified in SA3.
| revised | No | S3‑201350 | |||
S3‑201179 | Correction to security capability negotiation between SEPPs | Huawei, HiSilicon,China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201472 | |||
S3‑201180 | Correction to security capability negotiation between SEPPs | Huawei, HiSilicon,China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201473 | |||
S3‑201181 | Correction to initial EAP Authentication with an external AAA server | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201182 | Correction to initial EAP Authentication with an external AAA server | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201214 | Editorial changes to TS 33.501 R15 | Huawei, Hiliscon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201215 | Editorial changes to TS 33.501 R16 | Huawei, Hiliscon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201247 | Clarification to 5G AV | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201492 | |||
S3‑201248 | Clarification to SEAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201493 | |||
S3‑201252 | Several corrections to spec text | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201263 | shortResumeMAC-I calculation | Qualcomm Incorporated, Samsung, CATT, Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesIt was asked to minute the following: "Ericsson has agreed to this CR only for the sake of progress. In principle, Ericsson is disappointed that stage3 is implemented differently than stage2 and because of time crush, stage2 had to be retrofitted for alignment. In future, stage3 shall not deviate from stage2 without consultation.
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201264 | shortResumeMAC-I calculation (rel-16 mirror) | Qualcomm Incorporated, Samsung, CATT, Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesIt was asked to minute the following: "Ericsson has agreed to this CR only for the sake of progress. In principle, Ericsson is disappointed that stage3 is implemented differently than stage2 and because of time crush, stage2 had to be retrofitted for alignment. In future, stage3 shall not deviate from stage2 without consultation.
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201272 | Clarification on the use of SUPI as the Identity in EAP-AKA’ key derivation | Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑200361 | |||
S3‑201273 | Clarification on the use of SUPI as the Identity in EAP-AKA’ key derivation | Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑200362 | |||
S3‑201280 | Reply LS on Calculation of ShortResumeMAC-I | Huawei, Hiliscon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201411 | S3‑201203 | ||
S3‑201281 | Handling of counter wrap around in UDM, R15 | Ericsson | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201282 | Handling of counter wrap around in UDM, R16 | Ericsson | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | ||||
S3‑201294 | Reply LS on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple Serving Networks | Samsung, Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201350 | |||
S3‑201322 | LS on Calculation of ShortResumeMAC-I | R2-2004265 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑201350 | LS reply to CT4 LS on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple SNs | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201120 | |||
S3‑201411 | Reply LS on Calculation of ShortResumeMAC-I | Huawei, Hiliscon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201489 | S3‑201280 | ||
S3‑201464 | LS Reply to LS on Misalignment on HTTP connections for N32-c and on N32-f contexts termination | Nokia | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201472 | Correction to security capability negotiation between SEPPs | Huawei, HiSilicon,China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201179 | |||
S3‑201473 | Correction to security capability negotiation between SEPPs | Huawei, HiSilicon,China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201180 | |||
S3‑201479 | Reply LS on Misalignments on N32-f context Id | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201484 | Reply to: LS on AS rekeying handling | CATT | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201327 | |||
S3‑201489 | Reply LS on Calculation of ShortResumeMAC-I | Huawei, Hiliscon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201411 | |||
S3‑201492 | Clarification to 5G AV | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑201247 | |||
S3‑201493 | Clarification to SEAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑201248 | |||
S3‑201325 | LS on AS rekeying handling | R3-202833 | LS in | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | ||||
S3‑201327 | Reply to: LS on AS rekeying handling | CATT | LS out | approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201484 | |||
4.2 | Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16) | S3‑200963 | Update the clause 4.2.6.2.4-R16 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑200964 | Update the clause 4.2.6.2.4-R15 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201086 | Clarification on confidential IEs replacement handling in original N32-f message | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201087 | Clarification on exposure of confidential IEs in N32-f message in 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201103 | Deleting test case on TEID uniqueness | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201105 | Clarification on test case on synchronization failure handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201347 | |||
S3‑201106 | Clarification on test case on RES* failure handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201348 | |||
S3‑201195 | Clarification about system handling during overload situtations | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201416 | |||
S3‑201196 | description modification for policy regarding consective failed login attempts | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201415 | |||
S3‑201197 | password structure clarification | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201198 | Clarification on the examples of the delay | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201199 | Update testcase in gNB SCAS | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201405 | |||
S3‑201200 | Update testcases in eNB SCAS | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201406 | |||
S3‑201225 | Remove mismatched threat references and test steps | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201418 | |||
S3‑201226 | Update to the test case of Storing of UE authentication status by UDM | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201227 | Test Case on Confidentiality of the Attributes not in Data-Type Encryption Policy | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201228 | Threat analysis on the attributes not in Data-Type Encryption Policy | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201229 | Update to the test case of NF discovery authorization for specific slice | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201420 | |||
S3‑201347 | Clarification on test case on synchronization failure handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201105 | |||
S3‑201348 | Clarification on test case on RES* failure handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201106 | |||
S3‑201405 | Update testcase in gNB SCAS | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201199 | |||
S3‑201406 | Update testcases in eNB SCAS | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201200 | |||
S3‑201407 | Remove mismatched threat references and test steps | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑201225 | |||
S3‑201415 | description modification for policy regarding consective failed login attempts | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201196 | |||
S3‑201416 | Clarification about system handling during overload situtations | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201195 | |||
S3‑201418 | Remove mismatched threat references and test steps | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201225 | |||
S3‑201420 | Update to the test case of NF discovery authorization for specific slice | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201229 | |||
4.3 | Mission Critical security (Rel-16) | S3‑201331 | [33.180] R16 Fix IdM client terminology | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201332 | [33.180] R16 Fix XML references | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201333 | [33.180] R16 TrK-ID and InK-ID indication | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201330 | [33.179] R13 token scope fix | Motorola Solutions | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
4.4 | Security aspects of single radio voice continuity from 5GS to UTRAN (Rel-16) |   | ||||||||||
4.5 | Enhancements for Security aspects of Common API Framework for 3GPP Northbound APIs (Rel-16) | S3‑201299 | Usage of TLS profiles for CAPIF | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
4.6 | Security of URLLC for 5GS (Rel-16) |   | ||||||||||
4.7 | Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (Rel-16) | S3‑200906 | Reply LS on SUCI computation from an NSI | C1-200938 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200907 | Reply LS on sending CAG ID | C1-201027 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑200908 | LS on manipulation of CAG Information element by a VPLMN | C1-202617 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑200918 | Reply LS on Sending CAG ID in NAS layer | R2-1916349 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑200919 | Reply LS on NPN clarifications | S1-193605 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑200920 | LS on Sending CAG ID | S2-2001616 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201116 | DraftCR_DDoS mitigation | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201121 | DP_protection_of_ allowed CAG list against_MITM_Attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201122 | LS on protection_of_ allowed CAG list against_mitm_Attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201414 | |||
S3‑201250 | 5G LAN ed note resolution | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201251 | TSC security policy enforcement | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201351 | LS on protection_of_ allowed CAG list against_mitm_Attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201414 | S3‑201122 | ||
S3‑201414 | LS on protection_of_ allowed CAG list against_mitm_Attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201351 | |||
S3‑201432 | Reply LS on SUCI computation from an NSI | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
4.8 | Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (Rel-16) | S3‑201022 | [DRAFT] LS on security of eLCS | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201083 | Way forward for the remaining eLCS issues in Release 16 | CATT | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201084 | Draft CR as a living baseline for 5GS LCS normative work | CATT | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201461 | |||
S3‑201217 | Add clarifications to the living CR | Huawei, Hiliscon | draftCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201279 | |||
S3‑201279 | Add clarifications to the living CR | Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson, CATT, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, AT&T, China Unicom | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201444 | S3‑201217 | ||
S3‑201444 | Add clarifications to the living CR | Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson, CATT, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, AT&T, China Unicom | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201279 | |||
S3‑201456 | CR for 5GS LCS normative work | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201482 | |||
S3‑201461 | Draft CR as a living baseline for 5GS LCS normative work | CATT | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201084 | |||
S3‑201482 | CR for 5GS LCS normative work | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201494 | S3‑201456 | ||
S3‑201494 | CR for 5GS LCS normative work | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201482 | |||
4.9 | Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16) | S3‑201015 | Aligning abbreviation of Service Communication Proxy with TS 23.501 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201016 | Clarification on SEPP role regarding the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot HTTP header | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201017 | Authentication in indirect communication scenarios | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201382 | |||
S3‑201018 | Consumer-signed authorization codes for access token requests by/via the SCP | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201019 | The advantages of following existing RFCs | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201020 | Draft-CR as baseline for Token-based authorization for indirect communication with and without delegated discovery | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201386 | |||
S3‑201021 | Token-based authorization using consumer-signed authorization codes | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201386 | |||
S3‑201081 | Client authentications in token-based authorization for indirect communication | CableLabs, Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Bell Labs | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201386 | |||
S3‑201082 | End to end authentication of NF in SBA | CableLabs, Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201093 | Trust mode in the eSBA | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201382 | |||
S3‑201094 | Authorization in the Subscribe-Notify interaction scenarios | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201095 | Clarification on access token ownership verification | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201128 | SBA Network Function certificate profile | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CommScope, Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201466 | |||
S3‑201129 | Authentication between Network Functions | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201382 | |||
S3‑201130 | Authentication between Network Function and NRF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201382 | |||
S3‑201233 | Validation of Access Token ownership requirement | Mavenir, Deutsche Telekom | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201234 | Clarification of Token-based authorization | Mavenir, Deutsche Telekom | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201235 | Clarification of Indirect Communication Mutual Authentication | Mavenir, Deutsche Telekom | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201382 | |||
S3‑201382 | Authentication in indirect communication scenarios | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, Hisilicon, Mavenir, CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201017 | |||
S3‑201386 | Token-based authorization for indirect communication | CableLabs, Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201081 | |||
S3‑201466 | SBA Network Function certificate profile | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CommScope, Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, Verizon, CableLabs | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201128 | |||
4.10 | Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16) | S3‑200965 | AKMA key generation indication | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201369 | |
S3‑200966 | AKMA key push in clause 6.1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200967 | AKMA key push in clause 6.2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200968 | AKMA key push in clause 6.3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑200969 | Derivation of Kaf | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201370 | |||
S3‑200970 | Discussion on the format of A-TID | ZTE Corporation | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200971 | Define the A-TID format | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200972 | Key update renegotiation when Kaf expired in clause 6.4.2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200973 | Store AKMA subscription data in UDM | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201371 | |||
S3‑200979 | AKMA subscription data confirmation | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201450 | |||
S3‑200980 | Definition of AKMA subscription data | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201393 | |||
S3‑200981 | UDM functionality in clause 4.2 | CATT | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑200982 | UDM functionality in clause 4.2 | CATT | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑200983 | UDM functionality in clause 4.2 | CATT | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑200986 | UDM functionality in clause 4.2 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201002 | AKMA-Clarification in text 6.2 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201394 | |||
S3‑201003 | AKMA-KAF refreshment | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201446 | |||
S3‑201004 | AKMA-Initiation of AKMA | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201395 | |||
S3‑201028 | Informative Annex: Deployment scenarios for end-to-end security | KPN | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201049 | AKMA Architecture discussion | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201050 | pCR to TS 33.535: Store AKMA key material in AAnF | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201343 | |||
S3‑201051 | pCR to TS 33.535: Optimization in AKMA key generation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201102 | Security requirements on AKMA Key Identifier | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201144 | Derivation of KAF | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201370 | |||
S3‑201145 | Removing Ens | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201146 | Discussion and working assumption on AKMA open issues | China Mobile | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201168 | Abbreviations | KPN | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201169 | Terminology corrections | KPN | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201188 | Kaf refresh procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201446 | |||
S3‑201189 | Derive Kakma and Kakma ID at the same time | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201190 | A-TID generation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201191 | Store A-TID in the UDM | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201277 | pCR : Derivation of A-TID | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201387 | |||
S3‑201278 | pCR : Refresh of KAF | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201283 | Discussion paper to support inclusion of GPSI in AKMA | Samsung | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201284 | Inclusion of GPSI in AKMA | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201285 | Storing A-KID in AUSF | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201286 | Key update procedure in AKMA | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201287 | Authorization of AF in AKMA | Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201450 | |||
S3‑201343 | pCR to TS 33.535: Store AKMA key material in AAnF | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201050 | |||
S3‑201353 | coversheet for TS 33.535 for approval | China Mobile Com. Corporation | TS or TR cover | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑201369 | AKMA key generation indication | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200965 | |||
S3‑201370 | Derivation of Kaf | ZTE Corporation, China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200969 | |||
S3‑201371 | Store AKMA subscription data in UDM | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200973 | |||
S3‑201387 | pCR : Derivation of A-TID | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201277 | |||
S3‑201390 | draft TS 33.535 v0.5.0 | China Mobile | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201393 | Definition of AKMA subscription data | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200980 | |||
S3‑201394 | AKMA-Clarification in text 6.2 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201002 | |||
S3‑201395 | AKMA-Initiation of AKMA | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201004 | |||
S3‑201445 | Kaf refresh procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑201188 | |||
S3‑201446 | Kaf refresh procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201188 | |||
S3‑201447 | Authorization of AF in AKMA | Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon,CATT | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑201448 | Authorization of AF in AKMA | Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon,CATT | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑201449 | Authorization of AF in AKMA | Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon,CATT | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑201450 | Authorization of AF in AKMA | Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon,CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201287 | |||
4.11 | Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16) | S3‑200923 | LS on 5G-GUTI reallocation after paging of a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode with suspend indication | C1-200967 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200943 | LS on SA WG2 status of MT-EDT in Rel-16 | S2-2003505 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201032 | UE caps protection using AS security in EPS Rel-16 | Ericsson | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201439 | |||
S3‑201033 | UE caps protection using AS security in 5GS Rel-16 | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201440 | |||
S3‑201036 | Way forward for UE caps protection and NB-IoT Ues | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201038 | DraftCR – Living document for supporting 5G CIoT security | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201441 | |||
S3‑201039 | Way forward for remaining CIoT issues in Release 16 | Ericsson | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201042 | [Draft CR] Input to MESSAGE when calculating ShortResumeMAC-I in RRC Connection Suspend and Resume | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201126 | Security of RRC UE capability transfer procedure in 5G for CIoT optimisation | Intel China Ltd. | draftCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201127 | UE capability transfer for AS security | Intel China Ltd. | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201203 | Reply LS on Calculation of ShortResumeMAC-I | Huawei, Hiliscon | LS out | Approval | No |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201280 | |||
S3‑201204 | Address EN for Calculation of ShortResumeMAC-I for UP CIoT Optimisation | Huawei, Hisilicon, CATT, Qualcomm, Samsung | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201205 | Editorial Change of UP 5GS CIoT Optimisation | Huawei, Hiliscon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201216 | Protection of UE radio capability transfer for CIoT UEs that only support CP optimization | Huawei, Hiliscon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201262 | Protection of UE radio capability transfer for UEs without AS security | Qualcomm Incorporated | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑200764 | |||
S3‑201292 | Reply LS on 5G-GUTI reallocation after paging of a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode with suspend indication | Samsung | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201439 | UE caps protection using AS security in EPS Rel-16 | Ericsson | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201032 | |||
S3‑201440 | UE caps protection using AS security in 5GS Rel-16 | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201033 | |||
S3‑201441 | DraftCR – Living document for supporting 5G CIoT security | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201038 | |||
S3‑201485 | Normative text for supporting 5G CIoT security | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201488 | |||
S3‑201488 | Normative text for supporting 5G CIoT security | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201485 | |||
4.12 | Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16) | S3‑200914 | Reply LS on Further clarifications on GLI/GCI and Line ID/ HFC_Identifier | C4-201220 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200924 | Clarification on encryption requirements for AGF interfaces (N1, N2, N3) [WWC] | BBF | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑200925 | LS on uniqueness of PEI in certain FN-RG configurations | S3i200069 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑201011 | UE configuration for non-3GPP access | Ericsson LM | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201065 | Correction of SUPI in IKE_AUTH exchange | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo, Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201346 | |||
S3‑201066 | Sending the IP address of TNGF to UE | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201192 | Editoral Change to 33.501 on 5wwc | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201409 | |||
S3‑201193 | The value of user ID used in 33.501 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201346 | |||
S3‑201194 | living CR of 5wwc | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201410 | |||
S3‑201302 | UE pre-configuration for non-3GPP access networks | THALES, ORANGE | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201303 | Correction of trust indication | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo, Thales | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201486 | |||
S3‑201346 | Correction of SUPI in IKE_AUTH exchange | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo, Ericsson, Huawei | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201065 | |||
S3‑201380 | Reply-LS on FN-RG authentication and related questions | Juniper | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201409 | Editoral Change to 33.501 on 5wwc | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201192 | |||
S3‑201410 | living CR of 5wwc | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201194 | |||
S3‑201417 | CR of 5WWC | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201486 | Correction of trust indication | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo, Thales, Broadcom | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201303 | |||
4.13 | Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16) | S3‑200917 | LS on Generic Slice Template with Public Safety Feedback | TCCA | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑201062 | Draft CR- Adding security requirements to NSSAAF | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201438 | |||
S3‑201067 | Living CR for Slice Specific Authentication and Authrorization clauses | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon, Ericsson, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, China Mobile, CATT, Interdigital | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑200807 | |||
S3‑201070 | Discussion on EN on sending S-NSSAI to AAA-S | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201071 | Deletion of EN in clause X.X.3 on sending S-NSSAI | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201075 | eNS Living CR showing separate NSSAAF and AAA-P | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201462 | |||
S3‑201100 | Security requirements on NSSAAF | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201438 | |||
S3‑201117 | DP_on_resolving_the_gaps_in_NSSAA_procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201118 | LS_on_resolving_the_gaps_in_NSSAA_procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201154 | Address EN on whether to transmit NSSAI to AAA | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201155 | validity peirod of NSSAA results | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201156 | Serving network name in NSSAA | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201157 | Normative text for NSaaS | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201438 | Draft CR- Adding security requirements to NSSAAF | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201062 | |||
S3‑201462 | eNS Living CR showing separate NSSAAF and AAA-P | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201075 | |||
4.14 | Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16) | S3‑200974 | Adding a definition for IAB-UE | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201265 | F1 security setup with certificate based IKEv2 authentication | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Intel | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201437 | S3‑200762 | ||
S3‑201266 | F1 security setup with PSK based IKEv2 authentication | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Intel | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201437 | S3‑200763 | ||
S3‑201267 | Security of dynamic PSK | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201293 | F1 interface security set-up procedure | Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE, T-Mobile, Mavenir, CableLabs, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Thales | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201437 | |||
S3‑201313 | Report on Rel-16 IAB open issues e-mail discussion | Samsung | report | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201334 | Editorial change to the security for IAB | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201335 | Add requirement for OAM to IAB ENDC | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201437 | F1 interface security set-up procedure | Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE, T-Mobile, Mavenir, CableLabs, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Thales, Intel, Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201293 | |||
4.15 | Security aspects of SEAL (Rel-16) | S3‑201291 | Clean-up: TS 33.434 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201396 | |
S3‑201396 | Clean-up: TS 33.434 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201291 | |||
S3‑201401 | Draft 33.434 v0.4.0 | Samsung | draft TS | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑201413 | Cover sheet TS 33.434 | Samsung | TS or TR cover | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
4.16 | Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16) | S3‑200931 | LS on ITU-T SG17 activity on V2X security | ITU-T SG17 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200937 | Privacy Threat of Knpr ID | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201344 | |||
S3‑200938 | Remediation for Privacy of Knpr ID Threat | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201344 | |||
S3‑200939 | Clarifications related to link identifier messages | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201345 | |||
S3‑200951 | Discussion Paper - Countermeasures for Privacy of KNRP ID Threat | InterDigital Communications | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| endorsed | No | ||||
S3‑200952 | TS 33.536 - Security policy | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201342 | |||
S3‑200975 | Update the clause 5.3.3.1.4.3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201385 | |||
S3‑200976 | Clean up of V2X TS | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201024 | PC5 SL - LCID and BEARER | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201096 | eV2X: removing the UP security policy | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201161 | Discussion paper for eV2X groupcast privacy | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201162 | Groupcast Privacy | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201163 | Group ID conversion | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201220 | Propose to protect the privacy of K_NRP ID | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201221 | Propose to protect Application Layer ID from privacy violations | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201222 | Signalling security mandatory activation for unicast | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei asked to be minuted: "Huawei and Hisilicon propose that the bidding down attacks caused by eV2X unprotected scenarios as feasible vulnerabilities. Huawei and Hisilicon propose to find solution(s) to mitigate the vulnerabilities."
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201223 | Clarification on procedures without security protection | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201454 | |||
S3‑201224 | Clarification on input parameters of Null protection algorithms | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201412 | |||
S3‑201253 | Resolving the editor’s note on the protection of messages | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200757 | |||
S3‑201254 | Privacy of K_NRP ID | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑200756 | |||
S3‑201255 | Proposal to resolve the Editor’s note of the size of COUNT | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200755 | |||
S3‑201256 | Leaving destination identity privacy to the application | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201424 | |||
S3‑201257 | Allocation of FC values for TS 33.356 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200350 | |||
S3‑201319 | LS response to SA3 on the security related issues for NR SL | R2-2004083 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑201326 | Reply to: LS response to SA3 on the security related issues for NR SL | CATT | LS out | approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201483 | |||
S3‑201336 | Clarifications related to link identifier update messages | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑201338 | draft TS 33.536 v1.2.0 | LG Electronics Inc. | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201340 | Presentation of TS 33.536 to TSG for approval | LG Electronics Inc. | TS or TR cover | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201342 | TS 33.536 - Security policy | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200952 | |||
S3‑201344 | Remediation for Privacy of KNRP ID Threat | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200938 | |||
S3‑201345 | Clarifications related to link identifier update messages | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200939 | |||
S3‑201385 | Update the clause 5.3.3.1.4.3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200975 | |||
S3‑201412 | Clarification on input parameters of Null protection algorithms | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201224 | |||
S3‑201424 | Leaving destination identity privacy to the application | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201256 | |||
S3‑201454 | Clarification on procedures without security protection | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201223 | |||
S3‑201483 | Reply to: LS response to SA3 on the security related issues for NR SL | CATT | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201326 | |||
4.17 | User Plane Gateway Function for Inter-PLMN Security (Rel-16) | S3‑201246 | Security entities at the perimeter of the 5G Core network | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Juniper | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201431 | |
S3‑201431 | Security entities at the perimeter of the 5G Core network | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Juniper | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201246 | |||
4.18 | Provision of Access to Restricted Local Operator Services by Unauthenticated UEs – Security Aspects (Rel-16) |   | ||||||||||
4.19 | 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols (Rel-16) | S3‑200987 | Update on RSA exponent requirement | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | CR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201399 | ||
S3‑201045 | Elliptic Curve Group Size | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201422 | |||
S3‑201046 | TLS 1.3 cipher suites | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201423 | |||
S3‑201047 | Corrections on PKCS#1v1.5 padding and Elliptic Curves | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201419 | |||
S3‑201399 | Update on RSA exponent requirement | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | CR | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200987 | ||||
S3‑201419 | Corrections on PKCS#1v1.5 padding and Elliptic Curves | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201047 | |||
S3‑201422 | Elliptic Curve Group Size | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201045 | |||
S3‑201423 | TLS 1.3 cipher suites | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201046 | |||
4.20 | Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17) | S3‑201052 | Integration of GBA into 5GC | Ericsson | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201053 | Living document of Service Based Interfaces for GBA | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201477 | |||
S3‑201054 | Living document of Service Based Interfaces for GBA Push | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201478 | |||
S3‑201477 | Living document of Service Based Interfaces for GBA | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201053 | |||
S3‑201478 | Living document of Service Based Interfaces for GBA Push | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201054 | |||
4.21 | Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17) | S3‑201091 | Skeleton for IMS SCAS TS 33.226 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201092 | Scope for IMS SCAS TS 33.226 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201433 | draft TS 33.226 v0.1.0 | Huawei Technologies Sweden AB | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
4.22 | Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17) | S3‑201315 | Add DTLS requirement to 33.117 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑201316 | Add inactivate scenario to gNB SCAS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑201408 | Add DTLS requirement | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201323 | |||
S3‑201323 | Add DTLS requirement | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201408 | |||
S3‑201324 | Add inactivate scenario to gNB SCAS | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
4.23 | Security Assurance Specification for Service Communication Proxy (SECOP) (Rel-17) | S3‑201176 | Skeleton of Security Assurance Specification for Service Communication Proxy (SECOP) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201373 | |
S3‑201177 | SCAS SECOP: Scope | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201374 | |||
S3‑201178 | SCAS SECOP: Introduction and General Approach | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201375 | |||
S3‑201373 | Skeleton of Security Assurance Specification for Service Communication Proxy (SECOP) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201176 | |||
S3‑201374 | SCAS SECOP: Scope | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201177 | |||
S3‑201375 | SCAS SECOP: Introduction and General Approach | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201178 | |||
S3‑201379 | draft TS 33.522 (v0.1.0) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
4.24 | Security Assurance Specification for 5G NWDAF (Rel-17) | S3‑201148 | The skeleton of NWDAF SCAS | China Mobile Com. Corporation | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201149 | The scope of NWDAF SCAS TS | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201389 | draft TS 33.521 v0.1.0 | China Mobile | draft TS | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
4.25 | Security Assurance Specification for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) (Rel- 17) | S3‑200940 | Threat related to no authentication on N3IWF | China Telecommunications,Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200984 | Scope of SCAS_5G_N3IWF | China Unicom | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑200985 | Skeleton of SCAS_5G_N3IWF | China Unicom | draft TS | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑201434 | Skeleton of SCAS_5G_N3IWF | China Unicom | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑201435 | draft TS 33.520 | China Unicom | draft TS | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
4.26 | Other work areas | S3‑200934 | Editorial corrections to NDS/IP | Juniper Networks | CR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201367 | ||
S3‑200935 | Editorial corrections to NDS/AF | Juniper Networks | CR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201368 | ||||
S3‑200950 | Revision of null-scheme SUCI usage in 5G NR | T-Mobile USA Inc. | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201099 | Clarification on Handling of ICMP | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201147 | Status of RFC 5448bis update | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201183 | Correction to definition about the case of 'Temporary group call – user regroup'' | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201304 | SUCI computation: implementers' test data for network specific identifier-based SUPI | THALES | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201363 | |||
S3‑201363 | SUCI computation: implementers' test data for network specific identifier-based SUPI | THALES | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201304 | |||
S3‑201367 | Editorial corrections to NDS/IP | Juniper Networks | CR | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200934 | ||||
S3‑201368 | Editorial corrections to NDS/AF | Juniper Networks | CR | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200935 | ||||
4.27 | New work item proposals | S3‑200977 | New WID on Security Assurance Specification for Inter PLMN UP Security (IPUPS) | ZTE Corporation | WID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201372 | |
S3‑201308 | draft WID - Normative changes for UPIP | VODAFONE Group Plc | WID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201455 | S3‑200632 | ||
S3‑201372 | New WID on Security Assurance Specification for Inter PLMN UP Security (IPUPS) | ZTE Corporation | WID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200977 | |||
S3‑201455 | draft WID - Normative changes for UPIP | VODAFONE Group Plc | WID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201308 | |||
5 | Studies |   | ||||||||||
5.1 | Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture | S3‑201014 | Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG: TR 33.855 | Ericsson | TS or TR cover | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201480 | |
S3‑201097 | Update on the Subscribe-Notify Key issues and its conclusion | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201480 | Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG: TR 33.855 | Ericsson | TS or TR cover | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201014 | |||
5.2 | Study on Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G | S3‑201143 | Clean up of TR 33.835 | China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
5.3 | Study on Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System | S3‑201034 | Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG: TR 33.861, Version 1.6.0 | Ericsson | TS or TR cover | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201035 | Further evaluation to Solution #25: Security solution for preventing Botnet Attacks from Improper CIOT Device Use | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201383 | |||
S3‑201037 | Major clean-up of TR | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201383 | Further evaluation to Solution #25: Security solution for preventing Botnet Attacks from Improper CIOT Device Use | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201035 | |||
S3‑201384 | Draft TR 33.861 | Ericsson | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.4 | Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations | S3‑200944 | Reply LS to SA3 on FBS detection | R2-1914224 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑200988 | Draft reply LS to RAN2 on reply LS to SA3 on FBS detection(R2-1914224/S3-200944) | Apple | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200989 | 5GFBS-Evaluation for solution#17 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200990 | 5GFBS-Conclusion of key issue#1-RRCResumeRequest | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200991 | 5GFBS-Evaluation for solution#7 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201475 | |||
S3‑200992 | 5GFBS-Conclusion of key issue#3 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200993 | 5GFBS-Evaluation for solution#19 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200994 | 5GFBS-Solving EN on PKI implementation for solution #11 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200995 | 5GFBS-Solving EN on roaming issue for solution #11 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑200996 | 5GFBS-Solving EN on key provisioning for solution #11 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑200997 | 5GFBS-Adding Clarification on bidding down attack for solution #11 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑200998 | 5GFBS-Solving EN on MitM attack for solution #11 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200999 | 5GFBS-Solving EN on interworking for solution #11 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201000 | 5GFBS-5GFBS-Addressing the EN on how to prevent UE camping on the FBS for solution#11 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201001 | 5GFBS-Notes of 5GFBS conference call on April 28th 2020 | Apple | report | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201023 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on false base station detection | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201057 | Updates to solution #17 - resolving ENs | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201166 | Reply LS to RAN2 on FBS detection | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201167 | Clarification for solution 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201210 | LS on Backward Compatibility of RRC Resume Request message Protection | Huawei, Hiliscon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201219 | NAS security based MIB/SIBs integrity protection | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201268 | Evaluation on UE behavior on detection of false signature | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201269 | Evaluation on signing key management | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201270 | Solution #4 Evaluation (Enriched MR) | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201271 | Conclusion of Key Issue #2 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201288 | Updates to Solution#19 on hash calculation | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201459 | |||
S3‑201289 | Conclusion for Key issue#2 in FBS | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201290 | Way forward for Resumecause protection | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201306 | pCR: Conclusion of Key issue#5 | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201309 | Delegated digital signing for mitigating false base stations | CableLabs, Apple, Intel, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, MITRE, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201463 | |||
S3‑201459 | Updates to Solution#19 on hash calculation | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201288 | |||
S3‑201463 | Delegated digital signing for mitigating false base stations | CableLabs, Apple, Intel, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, MITRE, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201309 | |||
S3‑201475 | 5GFBS-Evaluation for solution#7 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200991 | |||
S3‑201476 | TR33.809 | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.5 | Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing | S3‑200978 | Editorial correction to solution#12 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201059 | Conclusion on KI#6 | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201060 | Conclusion on KI#3 | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201061 | Conclusion on KI#7 | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201068 | Draft TR 33.813 Study on Enhancement of Network Slice security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑194543 | |||
S3‑201158 | Conclusion to KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201159 | Update to Solution 8 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201160 | Conclusion to KI#6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201261 | Correcting the S-NSSAI length in solution 10 in TR 33.813 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201426 | |||
S3‑201360 | draft TR on Study on Enhancement of Network Slicing | Nokia | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201361 | Cover Sheet for TR33.813 for presentation to SA | Nokia | TS or TR cover | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201426 | Correcting the S-NSSAI length in solution 10 in TR 33.813 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201261 | |||
5.6 | Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products | S3‑201107 | Security requirements on test case for type 1 GVNP | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201349 | |
S3‑201108 | Security requirements on test case for type 2 GVNP | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201357 | |||
S3‑201123 | NFV_SCAS_TC_VNF_Package_integrity | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201356 | |||
S3‑201124 | NFV_SCAS_requirement_on_authorization_of_resource_management | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201352 | |||
S3‑201131 | Adding security threats for GVNP | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201132 | Adding security functional requirements deriving virtualisation and related test cases for GVNP of type 1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201355 | |||
S3‑201133 | Adding test case into clause 5.2.5.5.3.3.5 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201356 | |||
S3‑201134 | Adding security requirements and related test cases for GVNP of type 2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201357 | |||
S3‑201135 | Adding security functional requirements deriving virtualisation and related test cases for GVNP of type 2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201358 | |||
S3‑201136 | Adding security requirements for GVNP of type 3 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201137 | Adding security functional requirements deriving virtualisation and related test cases for GVNP of type 3 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201359 | |||
S3‑201138 | Adding generic assets, threats and requirements for virtualised network functions supporting SBA interfaces | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201139 | Adding improvement of SCAS and new security requirements | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201230 | Update to the critical assets of GVNP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201376 | |||
S3‑201231 | Update to the threat analysis of software tampering | Nokia. Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201377 | |||
S3‑201232 | Update to the requirements of VNF package integrity | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201378 | |||
S3‑201349 | Security requirements on test case for type 1 GVNP | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201107 | |||
S3‑201352 | NFV_SCAS_requirement_on_authorization_of_resource_management | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201124 | |||
S3‑201355 | Adding security functional requirements deriving virtualisation and related test cases for GVNP of type 1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201132 | |||
S3‑201356 | Adding test case into clause 5.2.5.5.3.3.5 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201133 | |||
S3‑201357 | Adding security requirements and related test cases for GVNP of type 2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201134 | |||
S3‑201358 | Adding security functional requirements deriving virtualisation and related test cases for GVNP of type 2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201135 | |||
S3‑201359 | Adding security functional requirements deriving virtualisation and related test cases for GVNP of type 3 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201137 | |||
S3‑201376 | Update to the critical assets of GVNP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201230 | |||
S3‑201377 | Update to the threat analysis of software tampering | Nokia. Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201231 | |||
S3‑201378 | Update to the requirements of VNF package integrity | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201232 | |||
S3‑201388 | draft TR 33.818 v0.7.0 | China Mobile | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
5.7 | Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services | S3‑201098 | Adding conclusion on KI #6.2 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201114 | New solution for DDoS mitigation | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201115 | conclusion for KI#6.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201164 | Conclusion for Key Issue #2.2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201165 | Conclusion for Key Issue #2.3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201236 | VLAN introduction | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201470 | S3‑200375 | ||
S3‑201237 | Resolution of ed note on serving network name | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201469 | S3‑200376 | ||
S3‑201238 | KI on interworking NPN and PLMN - security req | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201468 | S3‑200377 | ||
S3‑201239 | KI on service continuity - threats and reqs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201481 | S3‑200378 | ||
S3‑201240 | Resolution of editors note on AAA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200379 | |||
S3‑201241 | Threats and requirements on AAA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201467 | S3‑200380 | ||
S3‑201242 | Resolution of editor's note in solution 1 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200381 | |||
S3‑201243 | Resolution of editor's note in solution 15 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200382 | |||
S3‑201244 | UP security policy enforcement in 5GLAN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑200383 | |||
S3‑201467 | Threats and requirements on AAA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201241 | |||
S3‑201468 | KI on interworking NPN and PLMN - security req | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201238 | |||
S3‑201469 | Resolution of ed note on serving network name | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201237 | |||
S3‑201470 | VLAN introduction | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201236 | |||
S3‑201481 | KI on service continuity - threats and reqs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201239 | |||
5.8 | Study on LTKUP Detailed solutions | S3‑201311 | pCR to TR33.935 - Addition of Diffie - Helman Key agreements section | Vodafone GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑191482 | |
S3‑201312 | Cover sheet for TR 33.935 LTKUP | VODAFONE Group Plc | TS or TR cover | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201451 | TR 33.935 v0.3.0 | VODAFONE Group Plc | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.9 | Study on User Plane Integrity Protection | S3‑201008 | UP IP-new solution on UP security policy activation | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201031 | CR to 33.501 - Update to User Plane Integrity Protection | Deutsche Telekom | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑200633 | |||
S3‑201142 | Revise the Evaluations for Solution 5 in TR 33.853 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201206 | LS to SA2 and RAN2 on questions of UP IP | Huawei, Hiliscon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201207 | Modification on the Key issue #3 for UP IP | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201208 | UPIP: pCR for new solution to address UP IP support at full data rate | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201209 | UP IP: Conclusion for Key Issue #3 | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201274 | Security Aspects of DNS and ICMP | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201391 | |||
S3‑201275 | Security Aspects of DNS and ICMP | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201392 | |||
S3‑201295 | Protection of DNS messages | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201296 | UP integrity protection for UP Signalling messages | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201457 | |||
S3‑201297 | Integrity Protection for UP Signalling messages | Samsung | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201298 | Conclusion to Key Issue #5 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201305 | pCR to TR 33.853 (UPIP): addition of new solution - use NR PDCP for LTE | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201427 | S3‑200631 | ||
S3‑201307 | LS to RAN2 and CT1 on Updated User Plane Integrity Protection advice | VODAFONE Group Plc | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201452 | |||
S3‑201310 | Cover sheet for TR 33.853 for Information | VODAFONE Group Plc | TS or TR cover | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200635 | |||
S3‑201314 | pCR to 33.853 (UPIP) - Correction to Key Issue 5 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201421 | S3‑200639 | ||
S3‑201317 | Reduced overhead for UP IP for 5G RAN updates and conclusion | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201366 | |||
S3‑201318 | Draft TR 33.853 | VODAFONE Group Plc | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑201366 | Reduced overhead for UP IP for 5G RAN updates and conclusion | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201317 | |||
S3‑201391 | Security Aspects of DNS and ICMP | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201442 | S3‑201274 | ||
S3‑201392 | Security Aspects of DNS and ICMP | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201443 | S3‑201275 | ||
S3‑201421 | pCR to 33.853 (UPIP) - Correction to Key Issue 5 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201314 | |||
S3‑201427 | pCR to TR 33.853 (UPIP): addition of new solution - use NR PDCP for LTE | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201305 | |||
S3‑201429 | Rapporteurs minutes for UPIP (agenda 5.9) | VODAFONE Group Plc | report | Information | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201458 | |||
S3‑201430 | TR33853v090 | VODAFONE Group Plc | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201442 | Security Aspects of DNS and ICMP | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201391 | |||
S3‑201443 | Security Aspects of DNS and ICMP | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201392 | |||
S3‑201452 | LS to SA2 and CT1 on Updated User Plane Integrity Protection advice | VODAFONE Group Plc | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201487 | S3‑201307 | ||
S3‑201487 | LS to SA2 and CT1 on Updated User Plane Integrity Protection advice | VODAFONE Group Plc | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201452 | |||
S3‑201457 | UP integrity protection for UP Signalling messages | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑201296 | |||
S3‑201458 | Rapporteurs minutes for UPIP (agenda 5.9) up to commenting deadline | VODAFONE Group Plc | report | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑201429 | |||
S3‑201329 | Illustrative flow for the proposal in the CR S3-201296 | Samsung | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
5.10 | Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation |   | ||||||||||
5.11 | Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) | S3‑200928 | Reply to LS on Resynchronisations | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑200941 | Revise the solution details for Solution#2.5 in TR 33.846 | China Telecommunications,Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201140 | Clarification to the Usage of KAUSF for Solution #2.2 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201474 | |||
S3‑201141 | Complementary to key issue to mitigate the SUPI guessing attacks | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201213 | Address the EN on the NAS procedure impact in Solution#2.4 | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201218 | A new solution to protect SQN | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201460 | Draft TR 33.846 | Ericsson Japan K.K. | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201474 | Clarification to the Usage of KAUSF for Solution #2.2 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201140 | |||
5.12 | Study on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul |   | ||||||||||
5.13 | Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services | S3‑200953 | TR 33.836 - conclusion 4 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200954 | TR 33.836 - conclusion 9 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201005 | eV2XARC-PDCP COUNT check for PC5 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201006 | eV2XARC-LCID clarification | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesIt was asked to be minuted: "No one objected that dynamically indication of mapping between LCID and BEARER sent by initiating UE using RRCreconfig SL is “not” ruled out for future releases like Rel-17".
| revised | No | S3‑201397 | |||
S3‑201007 | eV2XARC-Security requirement for PC5 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201398 | |||
S3‑201339 | draft TR 33.836 v0.6.0 | LG Electronics Inc. | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑201341 | Presentation of TR 33.836 to TSG for approval | LG Electronics Inc. | TS or TR cover | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201397 | eV2XARC-LCID clarification | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201006 | |||
S3‑201398 | eV2XARC-Security requirement for PC5 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201007 | |||
5.14 | Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication | S3‑201025 | Solution for KI#1 – Authorization and Isolation of Authentication Data using existing specifications | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201026 | Solution for KI#2 – Protection of LTK access over Nudr | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201428 | |||
S3‑201027 | Solution for KI#3 – Protection of LTK over Nudr | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201029 | Removal of ENs in section 4 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201170 | Key issue on Protection of the Milenage OPc value during storage in UDR | KPN, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201171 | Key issue on Protection of the Milenage OPc value during transfer out of UDR | KPN, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201172 | Key issue on Protection of the Milenage OP value during storage in UDR | KPN | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201362 | |||
S3‑201173 | Key issue on Protection of the Milenage OP value during transfer out of UDR | KPN | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201364 | |||
S3‑201174 | Key issue on Protection of the sequence number SQN during storage in UDR | KPN | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201175 | Key issue on Protection of the sequence number SQN during transfer out of UDR | KPN | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201184 | Secondary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201185 | Primary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201186 | AMF related parameters | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201362 | Key issue on Protection of the Milenage OP value during storage in UDR | KPN | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201172 | |||
S3‑201364 | Key issue on Protection of the Milenage OP value during transfer out of UDR | KPN | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201173 | |||
S3‑201403 | Primary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑201404 | Primary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201185 | |||
S3‑201428 | Solution for KI#2 – Protection of LTK access over Nudr | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201026 | |||
S3‑201491 | TR 33.845 version 0.3.0 | VODAFONE Group Plc | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.15 | Other study areas |   | ||||||||||
5.16 | New study item proposals | S3‑200945 | Study on security aspects of the Disaggregated gNB Architecture | China Telecom, China Unicom, CATT, Xiaomi, vivo | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201381 | |
S3‑200946 | Discussion on the Support of Multi-CU-UP connectivity in Rel-17 | China Telecomunication Corp. | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑200947 | Discussion on the Support of Multi-CU-UP connectivity in Rel-17 | China Telecomunication Corp. | discussion | Discussion | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑200948 | Discussion on the Support of Multi-CU-UP connectivity in Rel-17 | China Telecomunication Corp. | discussion | Discussion | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑200949 | Discussion on the Support of Multi-CU-UP connectivity in Rel-17 | China Telecomunication Corp. | discussion | Discussion | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑201013 | New WID on Study of certificate management for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) | Ericsson | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201048 | New SID on slice isolation security in the 5G System | Ericsson | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201063 | Discussion on new SID for enhanced security to support new Non Public Network evolvement | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201064 | Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks | Ericsson, Interdigital | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201436 | |||
S3‑201085 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS | CATT | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201400 | |||
S3‑201088 | New SID: Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Unicom, CAICT, China Telecom, ZTE | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201354 | |||
S3‑201150 | Discussion paper for Rel17 SID on UAS | Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom, CATT | discussion | Decision | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201151 | Study on security aspects of UAS Remote Identification and Application | Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom, CATT | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑201425 | |||
S3‑201152 | Discussion paper for Rel17 SID on network slicing security | Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201153 | New SID on security aspects of network slicing - RAN and Phase 2 | Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201187 | SID on introducing EVA in SCAS | Huawei, HiSilicon | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201201 | Discussion on Unified Group Key Management | Huawei, Hiliscon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201202 | Study on Unified Group Key Management | Huawei, Hiliscon | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201211 | Discussion on security of 5MBS enhancemen | Huawei, Hiliscon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201212 | New SID: Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services | Huawei, Hiliscon | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201402 | |||
S3‑201249 | SID on IIoT | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201465 | |||
S3‑201258 | Proposed SID for Unmanned Aerial Systems | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201425 | |||
S3‑201259 | Proposed TR skeleton for Unmanned Aerial Systems | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201260 | Details from the SA2 UAS moderated e-mail discussion | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201337 | Background infos for IIoT study proposal | Nokia Germany | discussion | Presentation | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201354 | New SID: Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Unicom, CAICT, China Telecom, ZTE | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201088 | |||
S3‑201381 | Study on security aspects of the Disaggregated gNB Architecture | China Telecom, China Unicom, CATT, Xiaomi, vivo | SID new | Approval | Yes |
YesAgreed with one sustained objection from Futurewei.
| agreed | No | S3‑200945 | |||
S3‑201400 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS | CATT | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201085 | |||
S3‑201402 | New SID: Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services | Huawei, Hiliscon | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201212 | |||
S3‑201425 | Proposed SID for Unmanned Aerial Systems | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201258 | |||
S3‑201436 | Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks | Ericsson, Interdigital | SID new | Approval | Yes |
YesAgreed with three sustained objections from IDEMIA, ORANGE and Thales.
| agreed | No | S3‑201064 | |||
S3‑201465 | SID on IIoT | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital, Verizon, CMCC, BMWi, Huawei, HiSilicon, Samsung, Ericsson | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201249 | |||
6 | Any Other Business |   |