Tdoc List
2020-04-28 12:43
TDoc | Title | Source | Type | For | Agenda | Avail | Treated | Decision | Wdrn | Replaced-by | Replaces |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
S3‑200600 | Agenda | WG Chair | agenda |
1Agenda and meeting objectives
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑200601 | eV2XARC-Security policy for unicast message in PC5 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200824 | |
S3‑200602 | eV2XARC-Security policy provisioning | Apple | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200603 | eV2XARC-Security establishment for user plane bearer | Apple | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200604 | eV2XARC-LCID clairification | Apple | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200605 | eV2XARC-Correction in 5.3.3.1.3.2 and 5.3.3.2.2 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200606 | AKMA-Derivation of the KAF | Apple | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200607 | AKMA-KAF refreshment | Apple | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑200815 | |
S3‑200608 | AKMA-Editorial on the 6.2 | Apple | pCR | Agreement |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200609 | AKMA-AAnF definition | Apple | pCR | Information |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200610 | AKMA-AKMA capability indication between UE and AF | Apple | pCR | Information |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200611 | UPIP-Update for solution#10 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200612 | TS 33.536 - Corrections | InterDigital, Inc., Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200613 | Authentication between network functions and the NRF in indirect communication | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200614 | Token-based authorization in Scenario D | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200615 | LS on 5G-GUTI reallocation after paging of a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode with suspend indication | C1-200967 | LS in |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑200616 | LS on Misalignment on HTTP connections for N32-c and on N32-f contexts termination | C4-200781 | LS in |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||
S3‑200617 | LS on Misalignments on N32-f context Id | C4-200782 | LS in |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||
S3‑200618 | Mandatory User Plane Integrity for 5G | GSMA | LS in |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200619 | Clarification on encryption requirements for AGF interfaces (N1, N2, N3) [WWC] | BBF | LS in |
2.6Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑200620 | LS to SA3 on NR V2X Security issues | R2-2001980 | LS in |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200621 | Response LS on Enhancing Location Information Reporting with Dual Connectivity | R3-201249 | LS in |
2.2Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200622 | Reply LS on AUSF role in slice specific authentication | S2-1910668 | LS in |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200623 | Reply LS on LS on PC5S and PC5 RRC unicast message protection | S2-1912002 | LS in |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200624 | Reply LS on PC5 unicast and groupcast security protection | S2-2000971 | LS in |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200625 | Reply LS on 5G-S-TMSI Truncation Procedure | S2-2001248 | LS in |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200626 | LS on enhancing location information reporting with Dual Connectivity | S2-2002422 | LS in |
2.2Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200627 | LS on uniqueness of PEI in certain FN-RG configurations | S3i200069 | LS in |
2.6Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑200628 | Reply LS on how the IWF obtains key material for interworking group and private communications | S6-192194 | LS in |
2.1Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑200629 | pCR to TR 33.853 move of network options from introduction to section 4 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200630 | pCR to TR33.853 (UPIP) - Addition of conclusions to section 7.2 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑200631 | pCR to TR 33.853 (UPIP): addition of new solution - used NR PDCP for LTE | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200632 | draft WID - Normative changes for UPIP | VODAFONE Group Plc | WID new | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200633 | CR to 33.501 - Update to User Plane Integrity Protection | VODAFONE Group Plc | CR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200634 | LS to RAN3 and CT1 on Updated User Plane Integrity Protection advice | VODAFONE Group Plc | LS out | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200635 | Cover sheet for TR 33.853 for Information | VODAFONE Group Plc | TS or TR cover | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200636 | minutes of UPIP confcall #1 on 2 April 2020 | VODAFONE Group Plc | report | Information |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200637 | minutes of confcall 2 on UPIP held 3 April 2020 | VODAFONE Group Plc | report | Information |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200638 | Discussion docuemnt on the approval of TR33.853 | VODAFONE Group Plc | discussion | Information |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑200639 | pCR to 33.853 (UPIP) - Correction to Key Issue 5 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200640 | AKMA Application Key Requirement | Futurewei | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200641 | eLCS NOTE Clarification | Futurewei | other | Approval |
2.2Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200642 | Emergency Services in eV2X | Futurewei | other | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200806 | |
S3‑200643 | UPIP Way Forward Discussion | Futurewei | discussion | Endorsement |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200644 | [33.180] R16 Fix first-to-answer | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | CR | Agreement |
2.1Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200645 | [33.179] R13 token scope fix | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | CR | Agreement |
2.1Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
YesConverted into a draftCR. Content approved.
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200646 | [33.180] R16 Fix IdM client terminology | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | CR | Agreement |
2.1Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
YesConverted into a draftCR. Content approved.
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200647 | [33.180] R16 Fix XML references | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | CR | Agreement |
2.1Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
YesConverted into a draftCR. Content approved.
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200648 | [33.180] R16 TrK-ID and InK-ID indication | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | CR | Agreement |
2.1Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
YesConverted into a draftCR. Content approved.
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200649 | SA3 Reply LS on how the IWF obtains key material for interworking group and private communications | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | LS out | Agreement |
2.1Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200650 | SEAL Key Management procedure | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | pCR | Agreement |
2.9Security aspects of SEAL (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200835 | |
S3‑200651 | SEAL Key Management Request and Response messages | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | pCR | Agreement |
2.9Security aspects of SEAL (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200836 | |
S3‑200652 | AGF in 5GC trust domain | Juniper Networks, Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
2.6Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200653 | TS 33.536 - Clean up | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200654 | TS 33.536 - Common Security over NR PC5 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200823 | |
S3‑200655 | TS 33.536 - Security Policy for NR PC5 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200656 | TS 33.536 - Group ID conversion on NR PC5 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200657 | eNS Living CR Re-submission | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200658 | Slice Specific Authentication and Authrorization clauses | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200807 | |
S3‑200659 | draft_Reply LS to SA2 on AUSF role | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑200821 | |
S3‑200660 | Way forward on authentication and authorization in SBA | CableLabs | discussion | Endorsement |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200661 | TS 33.535 - Corrections | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200662 | Validation of Access Token ownership requirement | Mavenir,Deutsche Telekom | CR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200663 | Discussion End-2-End Access Token ownership validation | Mavenir,Deutsche Telekom | discussion | Endorsement |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200664 | end-2-end client authentication during Indirect communication | Mavenir,Deutsche Telekom | discussion | Endorsement |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200665 | Clarification of Token-based authorization | Mavenir,Deutsche Telekom | CR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200666 | Clarification of Indirect Communication Mutual Authentication | Mavenir,Deutsche Telekom | CR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yesagreement: NF to NRF auth could be based on direct mutual TLS or hop-by-hop TLS.
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200667 | Procedure to transfer UE capability for UEs without AS Security | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | discussion |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200668 | Security of RRC UE capability transfer procedure in 5G for CIoT optimisation | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | draftCR |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200669 | Update clause 4.1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200670 | Update the figure in clause 6.1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200671 | Update the procedure in clause 6.2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200672 | Store AUSF instance ID in UDM | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200673 | Defining AKMA key identifier for AKMA Anchor Key on demand procedures | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200674 | AKMA anchor Key push | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200675 | AKMA anchor Key update notification | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200676 | Processing of KAKMA failure from AUSF to AAnF | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200677 | Expire time in UE | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200678 | Derivation of KAF | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200679 | KAF update | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200680 | Adding a definition for IAB-UE | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
2.8Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
YesConverted into a draft CR.
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200681 | Update the Annex M.2.4 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
2.8Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200682 | Adding some abbreviations to V2X TS | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200683 | Update the clause 5.3.3.1.2.3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200825 | |
S3‑200684 | Update clause 5.3.3.2.2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200828 | |
S3‑200685 | Clean up of V2X TS | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200686 | Trust mode in the eSBA | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200687 | eSBA: Discussion on the subscribe/notify issue | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200688 | Authorization in the Subscribe-Notify interaction scenarios | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200689 | Clarification on NF consumer instance ID verification | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200690 | eV2X: Resolving EN on policy definition | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200691 | eV2X: Resolving EN on security policy handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200692 | eV2X: Resolving EN on the choice of security notification message | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200693 | eV2X: Clarification on the security policy provisioning | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200694 | F1 interface security set-up procedure | Samsung, Thales, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE | CR | Agreement |
2.8Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200695 | Proposed solution for UP IP issues in GSMA LS | Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200696 | UP integrity protection for UP Signalling messages | Samsung | CR |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | |||
S3‑200697 | Integrity protection of DNS messages | Samsung | CR |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | |||
S3‑200698 | Draft CR as a living baseline for 5GS LCS normative work | CATT | draftCR | Approval |
2.2Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200699 | Reduced overhead for UP IP for 5G RAN_conclusion | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200700 | Conclusion to Key Issue #5 | Samsung | pCR |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200701 | Reply LS on 5G-GUTI reallocation after paging of a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode with suspend indication | Samsung | LS out |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200702 | Removing ENs in Draft CR as a living baseline for 5GS LCS normative work | CATT | draftCR | Approval |
2.2Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200703 | Discussion paper to support AKMA progress | Samsung | discussion |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200704 | AKMA key ID derivation | Samsung | pCR |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200705 | Key update procedure | Samsung | pCR |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200706 | KAF derivation and refresh | Samsung | pCR |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200707 | Authorization of AF in AKMA | Samsung | pCR |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200708 | LS reply to RAN WG2 LS on NR V2X Security issues | CATT | LS out | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200820 | |
S3‑200709 | Adding additional AF functionality in clause 4.2.2 | CATT | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200826 | |
S3‑200710 | Adding UDM functionality in clause 4.2 | CATT | pCR |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑200711 | Adding UE functionality in clause 4.2 | CATT | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200712 | The details of the AKMA service subscription information confirmation | CATT | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200713 | Update Requirement on clause 4.3.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200714 | Lifetime of Kakma ID | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200715 | Kakma ID format | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200814 | |
S3‑200716 | Kakma and Kakma ID derivation | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200717 | Store Kakma ID in the UDM | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200718 | AUSF selection | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200719 | Add a new clause on AKMA key re-keying | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200815 | |
S3‑200720 | Add clarifications to the living CR | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
2.2Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200721 | editorial change to IAB architecture | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
2.8Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200722 | Security handling for UP data protection for UP CIoT 5GS Opmitization | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200723 | Discussion on protection of UE radio capability | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Discussion |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200724 | Deriving AKMA Application key for a specific AF via NEF | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑200815 | |
S3‑200725 | Update to deriving AKMA Application key for a specific AF | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200816 | |
S3‑200726 | AUSF function in AKMA | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200817 | |
S3‑200727 | Discussion on the functionality of Key ID in PDCP header for NR PC5 unicast communication | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200728 | V2X signalling security mandatory activation for unicast | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200729 | Draft LS on the security context index field in PDCP header for NR PC5 unicast | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200730 | Clarification for V2X layer passing security configurations to AS layer | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200819 | |
S3‑200731 | Add requirement for OAM to IAB ENDC | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
2.8Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200732 | Draft LS on security of eLCS | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
2.2Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200733 | way forward on Calculation of shortResumeMAC-I | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Decision |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200734 | Address EN for Calculation of ShortResumeMAC-I for UP 5GS CIoT Optimisation | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200735 | Draft LS to RAN2 and RAN3 inputs for ShortResumeMAC-I Calculation for UP 5GS CIoT Optimisation | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200736 | Draft Reply LS on 5G-S-TMSI Truncation Procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200737 | Discussion on endorsement for UP IP | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200738 | Draft LS on UP IP | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200739 | AKMA AF key request via NEF | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200803 | |
S3‑200740 | AKMA Architecture considerations | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200741 | pCR to TS 33.535: Update of the AKMA procedures | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200742 | Discussion paper on eV2X groupcast privacy | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Endorsement |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200743 | Adding privacy procedures for V2X group cast communication | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200744 | [Draft CR] Input to MESSAGE when calculating ShortResumeMAC-I in RRC Connection Suspend and Resume | Ericsson | draftCR | Agreement |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200745 | UPIP: pCR for new solution of UP IP in EPS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200832 | |
S3‑200746 | UPIP: pCR for new solution for option 5 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200833 | |
S3‑200747 | Way forward for UE caps protection and NB-IoT Ues | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200748 | UE caps protection using AS security in EPS Rel-16 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200749 | UE caps protection using AS security in 5GS Rel-16 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200750 | Resolving ENs in Draft CR | Ericsson | draftCR | Agreement |
2.2Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200751 | [DRAFT] LS on security of eLCS | Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
2.2Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200752 | ERP for TNAP mobility | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | CR | Approval |
2.6Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200753 | Resolving the Editors’ Note on policy name in V2X TS | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200754 | Proposal to finalise UP security policy in V2X | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200755 | Proposal to resolve the Editor’s note of the size of COUNT | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200756 | Privacy of K_NRP ID | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200757 | Resolving the editor’s note on the protection of messages | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200758 | Using the old security context for processing received re-transmissions | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200759 | Proposal for the Editor’s note on groupcast privacy | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200760 | Interworking between EPS and 5GS when UP IP is supported in EPS | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200761 | Using existing algorithm IEs to indicate support UP IP with an eNB | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200762 | F1 security setup with certificate based IKEv2 authentication | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Intel | CR | Agreement |
2.8Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200763 | F1 security setup with PSK based IKEv2 authentication | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Intel | CR | Agreement |
2.8Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200764 | Protection of UE radio capability transfer for UEs without AS security | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑200357 | |
S3‑200765 | Way forward for UE radio capability protection without AS security | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Approval |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200766 | On the GSMA LS on UP IP | Qualcomm Incorporated, vivo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200767 | Proposed solution for UP IP issues in GSMA LS | Qualcomm Incorporated, vivo | discussion | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200768 | Proposed conclusion for Key Issue #6 in TR 33.853 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑194338 | |
S3‑200769 | pCR : Requirements on AKMA Key Identifier | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200812 | S3‑200365 |
S3‑200770 | pCR : AKMA Temporary UE Identifier | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200771 | Correction of FC values | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200830 | |
S3‑200772 | CR to TS 33.220-FC value allocations for AKMA | China Mobile | CR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑200773 | Removing obsolete Editor’s Notes in TS 33.535 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200774 | Derivation of KAF | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200775 | Meeting minutes of AKMA conference call on 31st March | China Mobile | other | Information |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200776 | Addessing EN on transmitting NSSAI to AAA | China Mobile | draftCR | Approval |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200777 | LS on transformation of S-NSSAI during NSSAA | China Mobile | LS out | Approval |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200778 | DraftCR – Living document for supporting 5G CIoT security | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200779 | N5CW: editorial correction | THALES, ORANGE | draftCR | Approval |
2.6Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200780 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on AUSF role in slice specific authentication | Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑200821 | |
S3‑200781 | DraftCR – Replacing AUSF with AAA-IWF for NSSAA procedures | Ericsson, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, China Mobile, CATT | draftCR | Approval |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑200807 | |
S3‑200782 | Discussion paper on the role of AUSF during NSSAA | Ericsson, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, China Mobile, CATT | discussion | Endorsement |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yesagreement: new NF for NSSAA.
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200783 | UE pre-configuration for non-3GPP access networks | THALES, ORANGE | draftCR | Approval |
2.6Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200784 | AUSF role in slice-specific authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Endorsement |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200785 | draft LS to SA2 on AUSF roles | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑200821 | |
S3‑200786 | draft CR on AUSF roles | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑200807 | |
S3‑200787 | draft CR on sending NSSAI to AAA | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200788 | draft CR on miscellaneous items | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Agreement |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑200807 | |
S3‑200789 | Destination L2 privacy | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200790 | Discussion paper on security policy | Apple | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑200791 | eLCS privacy discussion on way forward | NTT DOCOMO | discussion | Endorsement |
2.2Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200792 | Token based authorization in model D - Scenario 1 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200793 | Process for SA3#98bis-e meeting | Ericsson LM | other | Information |
1Agenda and meeting objectives
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200794 | Token based authorization in model D - Scenario 2 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200795 | Authentication between Network Functions | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200796 | Authentication between NRF and NF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200797 | Access token ownership in Direct communication scenarios | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200798 | Access token ownership in Indirect communication scenarios | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200799 | Token based authorization in model D | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑200800 | SBA Network Function certificate profile | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200801 | Discussion paper on authentication for indirect communication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement |
2.3Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200802 | 5G_eLCS - meeting minutes conf-call on eLCS Privacy Protection | Nanjing Ericsson Panda Com Ltd | report | Information |
2.2Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑200803 | AKMA AF key request via NEF | Ericsson, Huawei | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200739 | |
S3‑200804 | Draft TR 33.853 v0.8.0 | VODAFONE Group Plc | draft TR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| No |
No
| reserved | No | ||
S3‑200805 | Emergency Services in eV2X | Futurewei | other | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑200642 | |
S3‑200806 | Emergency Services in eV2X | Futurewei, InterDigital, Inc. | other | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200642 | |
S3‑200807 | Living CR for Slice Specific Authentication and Authrorization clauses | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon, Ericsson, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, China Mobile, CATT, Interdigital | draftCR | Approval |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200658 | |
S3‑200808 | [33.179] R13 token scope fix | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | draftCR | Agreement |
2.1Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200809 | [33.180] R16 Fix IdM client terminology | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | draftCR | Agreement |
2.1Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200810 | [33.180] R16 Fix XML references | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | draftCR | Agreement |
2.1Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200811 | [33.180] R16 TrK-ID and InK-ID indication | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | draftCR | Agreement |
2.1Mission Critical security (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200812 | pCR : Requirements on AKMA Key Identifier | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200769 | |
S3‑200813 | Kakma ID format | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑200814 | Kakma ID format | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200715 | |
S3‑200815 | Add a new clause on AKMA key re-keying | Huawei, Hisilicon,Apple | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200719 | |
S3‑200816 | Update to deriving AKMA Application key for a specific AF | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200725 | |
S3‑200817 | AUSF function in AKMA | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200726 | |
S3‑200818 | Living CR for 5WWC | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR |
2.6Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑200819 | Clarification for V2X layer passing security configurations to AS layer | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200730 | |
S3‑200820 | LS reply to RAN WG2 LS on NR V2X Security issues | CATT | LS out | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200708 | |
S3‑200821 | LS to SA2 on AUSF roles | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
2.7Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200785 | |
S3‑200822 | draft_TS 33.536 v1.1.0 | LG Electronics Inc. | draft TS | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200823 | TS 33.536 - Common Security over NR PC5 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200654 | |
S3‑200824 | eV2XARC-Security policy for unicast message in PC5 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200601 | |
S3‑200825 | Update the clause 5.3.3.1.2.3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200683 | |
S3‑200826 | Adding additional AF functionality in clause 4.2.2 | CATT | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200709 | |
S3‑200827 | Draft 33.434 v0.3.0 | Samsung | draft TS |
2.9Security aspects of SEAL (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑200828 | Update clause 5.3.3.2.2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200684 | |
S3‑200829 | Adding a definition for IAB-UE | ZTE Corporation | draftCR | Agreement |
2.8Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200830 | Correction of FC values | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200771 | |
S3‑200831 | draft TS 33.535 v0.4.0 | China Mobile | draft TS | Approval |
2.4Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200832 | UPIP: pCR for new solution of UP IP in EPS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200745 | |
S3‑200833 | UPIP: pCR for new solution for option 5 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
2.11Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200746 | |
S3‑200834 | LS on Specifying the PC5-S messages that can be processed without protection | Qualcomm Incorpotated | LS out | Approval |
2.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑200835 | SEAL Key Management procedure | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | pCR | Agreement |
2.9Security aspects of SEAL (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200650 | |
S3‑200836 | SEAL Key Management Request and Response messages | Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. | pCR | Agreement |
2.9Security aspects of SEAL (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑200651 | |
S3‑200837 | CIoT UE caps confcall rapporteur notes | Ericsson | discussion | Information |
2.5Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No |