

CHANGE REQUEST

⌘ **33.234 CR 056** ⌘ rev **2** ⌘ Current version: **6.3.0** ⌘

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Proposed change affects: | UICC apps ME Radio Access Network Core Network

Title:	⌘ Threat of users accessing each other in link layer and corresponding security requirements of user traffic segregation.		
Source:	⌘ SA WG3		
Work item code:	⌘ WLAN	Date:	⌘ 22/01/2005
Category:	⌘ F	Release:	⌘ Rel-6
	Use <u>one</u> of the following categories: F (correction) A (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release) B (addition of feature), C (functional modification of feature) D (editorial modification) Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP TR 21.900 .		Use <u>one</u> of the following releases: Ph2 (GSM Phase 2) R96 (Release 1996) R97 (Release 1997) R98 (Release 1998) R99 (Release 1999) Rel-4 (Release 4) Rel-5 (Release 5) Rel-6 (Release 6) Rel-7 (Release 7)

Reason for change:	⌘ There is no description about threat of user accessing each other in link layer and corresponding security requirements of user traffic segregation in current specification.
Summary of change:	⌘ Adding threat of user accessing each other in link layer and security requirement of user traffic segregation. Some editorial corrections is also included.
Consequences if not approved:	⌘ Specification is not complete.

Clauses affected:	⌘ C.1, C.2.2.2										
Other specs affected:	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">Y</td> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">N</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> </table>	Y	N	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Other core specifications ⌘ Test specifications ⌘ O&M Specifications ⌘	
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Other comments:	⌘										

*** BEGIN OF CHANGE1 ***

C.1 Security for Public WLAN Access

These questions related to security in the 3GPP-WLAN architecture, must be addressed:

- What needs to be protected? i.e. what are the assets, and to whom are they valuable?
- What trust relations can be assumed? i.e. who can trust whom, and to what degree? The Trust Model is described in Annex B.
- What are possible attacks against the assets, how can they be performed, and what is done to detect/prevent them?

In section [3-C.2](#) the relevant ~~assents~~ assets and threats to those assets are identified. Section [4-C.3](#) contains examples of possible attacks. Countermeasures are not discussed in this ~~contribution~~ section but the threats and specific attacks should be taken into consideration when defining security mechanisms for 3GPP-WLAN interworking.

*** END OF CHANGE1 ***

*** BEGIN OF CHANGE2 ***

C.2.2.2 User Data and Privacy

The user expects that the data he sends/receives while accessing to WLAN services, ~~and~~ personal information (such as identity, which services he/she uses or where he/she is located at a given time) is kept away from unauthorised parties, and data stored in his/her WLAN UE is not accessed by unauthorized user.

The following threats are relevant:

- An attacker obtains the information that the user sends/receives while accessing to WLAN services. This includes user credentials transferred during the authentication phase, as well as any other data (e.g. documents) exchanged once the user has gained access to the WLAN services. The attacker might know or not who the user is;
- An attacker manipulates or substitutes the information that the user sends/receives while accessing to WLAN services. The attacker might know or not who the user is;
- An attacker analyses the information sent/received by users (even if it is mostly concealed) in order to derive some personal information about the users (such as which services they are using or where they are located at a given time).
- An attacker obtains information about the user (permanent identity etc.) and traces where and when the user has been accessing WLAN services.
- An attacker (also a legal user) accesses the user's WLAN UE in link layer without the user's permission.

In some situations, such as public hotspots, it is considered a real threat that users can access each other in link layer directly. It is recommended to segregate user traffic at AP and access controller in WLAN AN to protect assets of users and operator.

*** END OF CHANGE2 ***