

CR-Form-v7

PSEUDO CHANGE REQUEST

⌘ **TR 33.cde** CR **CRNum** ⌘ rev - ⌘ Current version: **0.0.2** ⌘

For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.

Proposed change affects: | UICC apps ME Radio Access Network Core Network

Title:	⌘ Early IMS Solution – Alternative method (Annex A)		
Source:	⌘ Lucent		
Work item code:	⌘ Early IMS Solution	Date:	⌘
Category:	⌘ D	Release:	⌘ Rel-6+
	Use <u>one</u> of the following categories: F (correction) A (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release) B (addition of feature), C (functional modification of feature) D (editorial modification) Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP TR 21.900 .		Use <u>one</u> of the following releases: 2 (GSM Phase 2) R96 (Release 1996) R97 (Release 1997) R98 (Release 1998) R99 (Release 1999) Rel-4 (Release 4) Rel-5 (Release 5) Rel-6 (Release 6)

Reason for change:	⌘ The current TR does not clearly detail the pros and cons of the alternative solution included in ANNEX A.		
Summary of change:	⌘ Adds clarifications of the advantages as well as to the disadvantages associated with using HTTP Digest as an alternative method for Early IMS implementations.		
Consequences if not approved:	⌘ Operators are not presented with a complete description of an alternative method and the pros and cons associated with such a solution.		

Clauses affected:	⌘ Annex A								
Other specs affected:	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 20px; text-align: center;">Y</td> <td style="width: 20px; text-align: center;">N</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 20px; text-align: center;">Y</td> <td style="width: 20px; text-align: center;">N</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 20px; text-align: center;">N</td> <td style="width: 20px; text-align: center;">N</td> </tr> </table>	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Other core specifications Test specifications O&M Specifications	⌘
Y	N								
Y	N								
N	N								
Other comments:	⌘								



**3rd Generation Partners
Technical Specification Group Services and System
Aspects;
Security Aspects of Early IMS
(Release 6)**

The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP.

The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented.

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Contents

Foreword.....	5
Introduction	Error! Bookmark not defined.
1 Scope	Error! Bookmark not defined.
2 References	Error! Bookmark not defined.
3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations	Error! Bookmark not defined.
3.1 Definitions.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
3.2 Symbols	Error! Bookmark not defined.
3.3 Abbreviations.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
4 Background and motivation	Error! Bookmark not defined.
5 Requirements on interim solution	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6 Threat scenarios.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.1 Impersonation on IMS level using the user identity of an innocent user	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.2 IP spoofing.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.3 Combined threat scenario.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
7 Specification of interim IMS security	Error! Bookmark not defined.
7.1 Overview.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
7.2 Detailed specification.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
7.2.1 Update of mobile's IP address in HSS depending on PDP context state.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
7.2.2 Protection against IP address spoofing in GGSN	Error! Bookmark not defined.
7.2.3 Source IP address checking in the P-CSCF and S-CSCF	Error! Bookmark not defined.
7.2.3.1 P-CSCF mechanisms.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
7.2.3.2 S-CSCF mechanisms.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
7.2.4 Identification of terminals supporting the interim solution	Error! Bookmark not defined.
7.2.5 Message flows	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Annex A: Comparison with alternative approaches	5
Annex B: Change history	7

Foreword

This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal

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Annex A: Comparison with [an alternative approach](#) – HTTP Digest

An alternative approach is to use password-based authentication for early IMS implementations. For example, HTTP Digest ([IETF RFC 2617](#)) could be used for authenticating the IMS subscriber. This method would require a subscriber-specific password to be provisioned on the IMS terminal. Compared with the approach specified in section 7, password-based authentication has the following [advantages and](#) disadvantages:

[Advantages:](#)

- [Fully standardized and supported by RFC 3261 compliant implementations and therefore by 3GPP TS 24.229 compliant implementations \(SIP protocol mandates support of HTTP digest\)](#)
- [HTTP Digest enables access via multiple technologies \(e.g., WLAN\). The solution specified in section 7 is specific to GPRS access technology.](#)
- [HTTP Digest can support partial message integrity protection for those parts of the message used in the calculation of the WWW-Authenticate and authorization header field response directive values \(when qop=auth-int\).](#)
- [HTTP Digest implementations can employ methods to protect against replay attacks \(e.g., using server created nonce values based on user ID, time-stamp, private server key, or using one-time nonce values\)](#)

[Disadvantages:](#)

- ~~It~~ [HTTP Digest may](#) imposes restrictions on the type of charging schemes that can be adopted [by an operator](#). In particular, if a subscriber could find out his or her own password from an insecure implementation on the terminal, then he or she could share the IMS subscription with friends. This could impact revenue for the operator if bundled or partly subscription based tariffs are used rather than purely usage based tariffs. For example, a subscriber could take out a subscription for 100 instant messages and then share this with his or her friends. Although contractual obligations could be imposed on customers to prohibit this behaviour, in practice this would be difficult to enforce [without employing special protection mechanisms, e.g., disallow multiple binding to a single IP address](#). If charging were purely usage based, then there would be no incentive for the subscriber to do this, [therefore using HTTP Digest may ~~\(and not\)~~ impact on operator's revenue](#). The solution specified in section 7 is flexible in allowing a range of different charging models including bundled or partly subscription based tariffs.
- ~~HTTP Digest~~ [It](#) provides a weaker form of subscriber authentication [when](#) compared with the levels of authentication used for other services offered over 3GPP networks, where authentication is typically based directly or indirectly on the (U)SIM. [Subscription authentication depends, among other things, on the strength of the password used as well as on the password provisioning methods, such as bootstrapping passwords into the IMS capable terminal. A weak subscriber authentication, vulnerable to dictionary attacks.](#) ~~This~~ has implications on the reliability of charging, and on the level of assurance that can be given to the customer that their communications cannot be masqueraded. In the solution specified in section 7, authentication of the IMS subscriber is indirectly based on (U)SIM authentication at the GPRS level. The level of security is similar to that currently used for certain WAP services, where the user's MSISDN is provided by the GGSN to the WAP gateway. Security does not rely on the terminal securely storing any long-term secret information (e.g. passwords).

- HTTP Digest ~~Provisioning~~ provisioning is more complex since subscriber-specific information (i.e. passwords) must be installed or bootstrapped into ~~in~~ each IMS terminal ~~mobile~~.

Annex B: Change history

Change history							
Date	TSG #	TSG Doc.	CR	Rev	Subject/Comment	Old	New
29/6/04					First version based on input from S3-040264 and S3-040265.		0.0.1
8/7/04					Incorporates comments received at SA3#34.	0.0.1	0.0.2