CR-Form-v7

CHANGE REQUEST

⌘	**33.234 CR 029**	⌘**rev**	**-**	⌘	Current version:	**6.2.0**	⌘

*For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.*

Proposed change affects: | UICC apps⌘ ☐ ME **X** Radio Access Network ☐ Core Network **X**

Title:	⌘	Clarification on Deletion of Temporary IDs
Source:	⌘	Samsung
Work item code:⌘	WLAN	***Date:*** ⌘ 23/06/2004

Category:	⌘ **F**	***Release:*** ⌘ Rel-6

Use one of the following categories:
    F *(correction)*
    A *(corresponds to a correction in an earlier release)*
    B *(addition of feature),*
    C *(functional modification of feature)*
    D *(editorial modification)*
Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP TR 21.900.

Use one of the following releases:
    2   *(GSM Phase 2)*
    R96   *(Release 1996)*
    R97   *(Release 1997)*
    R98   *(Release 1998)*
    R99   *(Release 1999)*
    Rel-4   *(Release 4)*
    Rel-5   *(Release 5)*
    Rel-6   *(Release 6)*

Reason for change:	⌘	Temporary IDs should not be deleted untill the EAP Authentication process completes, as the IDs are passed again in the EAP Authentication procedure to detect MITM attack.
Summary of change:⌘		The same temporary IDs are used when the AAA server request again to detect MITM attack
Consequences if not approved:	⌘	If AAA server request for the ID again, then the WLAN-UE cannot pass the same ID as it marked as deleted.
Clauses affected:	⌘	5.1.6

		Y	N		
Other specs	⌘		X	Other core specifications	⌘
Affected:			X	Test specifications	
			X	O&M Specifications	
Other comments:	⌘				

*** BEGIN SET OF CHANGES ***

5.1.6 User Identity Privacy in WLAN Access

User identity privacy (Anonymity) is used to avoid sending any cleartext permanent subscriber identification information which would compromise the subscriber's identity and location on the radio interface, or allow different communications of the same subscriber on the radio interface to be linked.
User identity privacy is based on temporary identities (pseudonyms or re-authentication identities). The procedures for distributing, using and updating temporary identities are described in ref. [4] and [5]. Support of this feature is mandatory for implementation in the network and WLAN-UE. The use of this feature is optional in the network, but mandatory in the WLAN-UE.

The AAA server generates and delivers the temporary identity and/or the re-authentication identity to the WLAN-UE as part of the authentication process. The WLAN-UE shall not interpret the temporary identity; it shall just store the received identifier and use it at the next authentication. Clause 6.4 describes a mechanism that allows the home network to include the user's identity (IMSI) encrypted within the temporary identity.

When the WLAN-UE receives one temporary identity issued by the AAA server, it shall use it in the next authentication. The WLAN-UE can only use the permanent identity when there is no temporary identity available in the WLAN-UE. A temporary identity is available for use when it has been received in last authentication process. Temporary identities received in earlier authentication processes have to be cleared in the WLAN-UE or marked ~~so that they can only be used once~~ as "deleted" after the completion of the ongoing EAP procedure (whether success or failure) so that they can only be used for one EAP procedure. If during the ongoing EAP procedure an EAP-REQUEST/AKA-identity or EAP-REQUEST/SIM-start is received by the WLAN UE, the same identity that has been used in the EAP/Response/Identity message has to be used as mentioned in the clause 6.1.1.1 and clause 6.1.2.1. If the WLAN-UE does not receive any new temporary identity during a re-authentication procedure, the WLAN-UE shall use a previously unused pseudonym, if available, for the next full re-authentication attempt.

If the WLAN-UE receives from the AAA server more than one temporary identity (a pseudonym and a re-authentication identity), in the next authentication procedure, it will use the re-authentication identity, so that the AAA server is able to decide either to go on with a fast re-authentication or to fallback to a full re-authentication (by requesting the pseudonym to the WLAN-UE). This capability of decision by the AAA server is not possible if the WLAN-UE sends the pseudonym, since the AAA server is not able to request the re-authentication identity if it decides to change to fast re-authentication.

For tunnel establishment in scenario 3, fast re-authentication may be used for speed up the procedure. In this case, the WLAN-UE shall use the fast re-authentication identities (as long as the re-authentication identity has been received in the last authentication process).
An exception is when the full authentication is being performed for tunnel establishment in scenario 3, in which case the IMSI may be sent even if identity privacy support was activated by the home network. In this situation, the authentication exchange is performed in a protected tunnel which provides encryption and integrity protection, as well as replay protection.

NOTE: There exist the following risks when sending the IMSI in the tunnel set-up procedure:

· the protected tunnel is encrypted but not authenticated at the moment of receiving the user identity (IMSI). The IKEv2 messages, when using EAP, are authenticated at the end of the EAP exchange. So in case of a man-in-the-middle attack the attacker could be able to see the IMSI in clear text, although the attack would eventually fail at the moment of the authentication;

· the IMSI would be visible for the PDG, which in roaming situations may be in the VPLMN. This is not a significant problem if the home network operator trusts the PDGs owned by the visited network operators.

To avoid user traceability, the user should not be identified for a long period by means of the same temporary identity. On the other hand, the AAA server should be ready to accept at least two different pseudonyms, in case the WLAN-UE fails to receive the new one issued from the AAA server. The mechanism described in Clause 6.4 also includes facilities to maintain more than one allowed pseudonym.

If identity privacy is used but the AAA server cannot identify the user by its pseudonym, the AAA server requests the user to send its permanent identity. This represents a breach in the provision of user identity privacy. It is a matter of the operator's security policy whether to allow clients to accept requests from the network to send the cleartext permanent identity. If the client rejects a legitimate request from the AAA server, it shall be denied access to the service.

Editor's note: The use of PEAP with EAP/AKA and EAP/SIM is currently under consideration. If PEAP is used, the temporary identity privacy scheme provided by EAP/AKA and EAP/SIM is not needed.

*** END SET OF CHANGES ***