

## CHANGE REQUEST

⌘ **TS 33.220** CR **CRNum** ⌘ rev **-** ⌘ Current version: **V 0.2.0** ⌘

For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.

**Proposed change affects:** UICC apps  ME  Radio Access Network  Core Network

<b>Title:</b>	⌘ The NAF id in bootstrapping procedure		
<b>Source:</b>	⌘ Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.		
<b>Work item code:</b>	⌘ GBA	<b>Date:</b>	⌘ 16-01-2004
<b>Category:</b>	⌘ <b>F</b>	<b>Release:</b>	⌘ Rel-6
	Use <u>one</u> of the following categories: <b>F</b> (correction) <b>A</b> (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release) <b>B</b> (addition of feature), <b>C</b> (functional modification of feature) <b>D</b> (editorial modification) Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP <a href="#">TR 21.900</a> .		Use <u>one</u> of the following releases: 2 (GSM Phase 2) R96 (Release 1996) R97 (Release 1997) R98 (Release 1998) R99 (Release 1999) Rel-4 (Release 4) Rel-5 (Release 5) Rel-6 (Release 6)

<b>Reason for change:</b>	⌘ The section 4.2.2.1 of TS 33.220 includes the text “ The BSF can restrict the applicability of the key material to a defined set of NAFs” . In bootstrapping procedure, the step 8, the ok message will supply the Transaction Identifier and parameter <i>n</i> to UE. the UE and BSF use parameter <i>n</i> to decide the inputing parameter NAF_id_ <i>n</i> to the key derivation. If the parameter <i>n</i> is not supplied then no key derivation is performed. In the bootstrapping procedure, the UE doesn't provide the information of NAF that it wants to talk to, so the BSF doesn't know which NAF will be applied and, then BSF can't determine the parameter <i>n</i> . There also is an incorrct reference in step 8.
<b>Summary of change:</b>	⌘ In bootstrapping procedure , the UE provides BSF with the Identity of NAF that it wants to connect to.
<b>Consequences if not approved:</b>	⌘ The BSF can't determine the parameter <i>n</i> for key derivation

<b>Clauses affected:</b>	⌘ 4.3.2										
<b>Other specs Affected:</b>	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">Y</td> <td style="padding: 2px;">N</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="padding: 2px;"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="padding: 2px;"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="padding: 2px;"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> </table>	Y	N	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Other core specifications ⌘ Test specifications ⌘ O&M Specifications ⌘	
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<b>Other comments:</b>	⌘										


\*\*\*\*\*Begin of change \*\*\*\*\*

### 4.3.2 Bootstrapping procedures

When a UE wants to interact with an NAF, and it knows that bootstrapping procedure is needed, it shall first perform a bootstrapping authentication (see Figure 1)

**Editor's notes: Zh interface related procedure will be added here in future development. It may re-use Cx interface that is specified in TS 29.228.**

Otherwise, the UE shall perform a bootstrapping authentication only when it has received bootstrapping initiation required message or a key update indication from the NAF (cf. subclause 4.3.3).



**Figure 1: The bootstrapping procedure**

1. The UE sends an HTTP request towards the BSF. [The request message includes the user identity and the NAF identity to which the UE wants to connect.](#)
2. BSF retrieves the user profile and a challenge, i.e. the Authentication Vector (AV, AV = RAND||AUTN||XRES||CK||IK) over Zh interface from the HSS.
3. Then BSF forwards the RAND and AUTN to the UE in the 401 message (without the CK, IK and XRES). This is to demand the UE to authenticate itself.
4. The UE calculates the message authentication code (MAC) so as to verify the challenge from authenticated network; the UE also calculates CK, IK and RES. This will result in session keys IK and CK in both BSF and UE.
5. The UE sends request again, with the Digest AKA RES as the response to the BSF.
6. If the RES equals to the XRES that is in the AV, the UE is authenticated.

7. BSF generates key material Ks by concatenating CK and IK. Ks is used to derive the key material Ks\_NAF. Ks\_NAF is used for securing the Ua interface.
8. The BSF shall send 200 OK message and shall supply a transaction identifier to the UE to indicate the success of the authentication. The BSF may also supply the parameter *n* used to determine the NAF\_Id\_n (cf. ~~previous~~ following bullet) to the UE over the Ub interface. [The BSF should determine the parameter n according the NAF identity and the defined set of NAFs.](#) If the parameter *n* is not supplied then no key derivation is performed, i.e. Ks = Ks\_NAF.
9. The key material Ks is generated in UE by concatenating CK and IK. The Ks is used to derive the key material Ks\_NAF. Ks\_NAF is used for securing the Ua interface.

Ks\_NAF is computed as  $Ks\_NAF = KDF(Ks, \text{key derivation parameters})$ , where KDF is a suitable key derivation function, and the key derivation parameters include the user's IMSI, the NAF\_Id\_n and RAND. The NAF\_Id\_n consists of the *n* rightmost domain labels in the DNS name of the NAF, separated by dots (*n*= 1, ..., 7). For *n* = 0, NAF\_Id\_n equals the full DNS name of the NAF. The next bullet specifies how the UE obtains *n*.

NOTE: This note gives an example how to obtain the NAF\_Id\_n: if the DNS name of the NAF is "server1.presence.bootstrap.operator.com", and *n* = 3, then NAF\_Id\_n = "bootstrap.operator.com".

**Editor's note: the definition of the KDF and the possible inclusion of further key derivation parameters is left to ETSI SAGE.**

\*\*\*\*\*End of change\*\*\*\*\*