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The attached document contains a reviewed GBA-specification. The corrections aim at enhancing specification language, removing or changing incorrectly sounding specification text or correcting clear specification errors. A single comment points to a further necessary correction that can be tasked to the editor. Other comments may give the reasoning why a certain change has been performed.

3GPP TS 33.220 V1.0.0 (2003-12)

Technical Specification

**3rd Generation Partnership Project;
Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects;
Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA);
Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
(Release 6)**



The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPPTM) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP.

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Foreword

This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:

Version x.y.z

where:

- x the first digit:
 - 1 presented to TSG for information;
 - 2 presented to TSG for approval;
 - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.

1 Scope

The present document describes the security features and a mechanism to bootstrap authentication and key agreement for application security from the 3GPP AKA mechanism. Candidate applications to use this bootstrapping mechanism include but are not restricted to subscriber certificate distribution [5], etc. Subscriber certificates support services whose provision mobile operator assists, as well as services that mobile operator provides.

The scope of this specification includes a generic AKA bootstrapping function, an architecture overview and the detailed procedure how to bootstrap the credential.

Note~~Editor's note~~: The specification objects are scheduled currently in phases. For this specification release ~~first phase of standardisation~~, only the case is considered where bootstrapping server functionality and network application function are located in the same network as the HSS. In ~~specification releases later phases~~, other configurations may be considered.

2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

- [1] 3GPP TS 31.102: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Terminals; Characteristics of the USIM application".
- [2] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Security architecture".
- [3] Franks J., et al.: "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication", RFC 2617, June 1999.
- [4] A. Niemi, et al.: "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication Using Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)", RFC3310, September 2002.
- [5] 3GPP TS 33.221: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Support for Subscriber Certificates".
- [6] T. Dierks, et al.: "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246, January 1999.

3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

AK	Anonymity Key
AKA	Authentication and Key Agreement
BSF	Bootstrapping server functionality BSF is hosted in a network element under the control of an MNO.
BSP	BootStrapping Procedure
CA	Certificate Authority
CMP	Certificate Management Protocols
GAA	Generic Authentication Architecture
GBA	Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
HSS	Home Subscriber System
IK	Integrity Key
MNO	Mobile network operator
NAF	Operator-controlled N etwork A pplication function - F unctionality. NAF is hosted in a network element under the control of an MNO.
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standards
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
SCP	Subscriber Certificate Procedure
UE	User Equipment

4 Generic Bootstrapping Architecture

The 3GPP authentication infrastructure, including the 3GPP Authentication Centre (AuC), the USIM, and the 3GPP AKA protocol run between them, is a very valuable asset of 3GPP operators. It has been recognised that this infrastructure could be leveraged to enable application functions in the network and on the user side to communicate in situations where they would not be able to do so without the support of the 3GPP authentication infrastructure. Therefore, 3GPP can provide the "bootstrapping of application security" to authenticate the subscriber by defining a generic bootstrapping function based on AKA protocol.

4.1 Requirements and principles for bootstrapping

~~Editor's note: The description of AKA bootstrapping shall be added here.~~

- ~~The bootstrapping function shall not depend on the particular network application function.~~
- The server implementing the bootstrapping function needs to be trusted by the home operator to handle authentication vectors.
- The server implementing the network application function needs only to be trusted by the home operator to handle derived key material.
- It shall be possible to support network application functions in the operator's home network.
- The architecture shall not preclude the support of network application function in the visited network, or possibly even in a third network.
- To the extent possible, existing protocols and infrastructure should be reused.
- In order to ensure wide applicability, all involved protocols are preferred to run over IP.
- It shall be prevented that a security breach in one application server using the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture can be used by an attacker to mount successful attacks to the other application servers using the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture.

4.1.1 Access Independence

Bootstrapping procedure is access independent. Bootstrapping procedure requires IP connectivity from UE.

4.1.2 Authentication methods

Authentication method that is used to authenticate the bootstrapping function ~~shall~~**must** be dependent on cellular subscription. In other words, authentication to bootstrapping function shall not be possible without valid cellular subscription. Authentication shall be based on AKA protocol.

4.1.3 Roaming

The roaming subscriber shall be able to utilize the bootstrapping function in [the](#) home network.

~~Editor's note: For the first phase of standardisation, only the case is considered where bootstrapping server functionality and network application function are located in the same network as the HSS. In later phases, other configurations may be considered.~~

4.1.4 Requirements on Ub interface

The requirements for Ub interface are:

- The BSF shall be able to identify the UE.
- The BSF and the UE shall be able to authenticate each other based on AKA.
- The BSF shall be able to send a transaction identifier to [the](#) UE.

4.1.5 Requirements on Zh interface

The requirements for Zh interface are:

- The BSF shall be able to communicate securely with the subscriber's HSS.
- ~~Editor's note: this requirement is fulfilled automatically if BSF and HSS are in same operator's network.~~
- The BSF shall be able to send bootstrapping information request concerning a subscriber.
- The HSS shall be able to send authentication vectors to the BSF in batches.
- The HSS shall be able to send the subscriber's GAA profiles [information needed for security purposes](#) to the BSF.

~~Editor's note: the intention is not to send all the application specific profile information, but only the information needed for security purposes.~~

~~Editor's note: it's ffs how to proceed in the case where profile is updated in HSS after profile is forwarded. The question is whether this profile change should be propagated to BSF.~~

- No state information concerning bootstrapping shall be required in the HSS.
- All procedures over Zh interface shall be initiated by the BSF.
- It is preferred to reuse existing specifications if possible.
- The number of different interfaces to HSS should be minimized.

4.1.6 Requirements on Zn interface

The requirements for Zn interface are:

- Mutual authentication, confidentiality and integrity shall be provided.
- The BSF shall verify that the NAF is authorised.
- The NAF shall be able to send a key material request to the BSF.
- The BSF shall be able to send the requested key material to the NAF.
- The NAF shall be able to get the subscriber profile [information needed for security purposes](#) from BSF.

~~Editor's note: The intention is not to send all the application specific profile information, but only the information needed for security purposes.~~

~~Note~~Editor's note: [For this specification release, it is assumed that the NAF and the BSF are located in the same PLMN. In later phases NAF and the BSF may be in different operators' networks.](#)

~~In later phases there is an additional requirement that the NAF and the BSF may be in different operators' networks.~~

4.2 Bootstrapping architecture

4.2.1 Reference model

Figure 1 shows a simple network model of the entities involved in the bootstrapping approach, and the protocols used among them.




Figure 1: Simple network model for bootstrapping

~~Figure 2 illustrates a protocol stacks structure in network elements that are involved in bootstrapping of application security from 3G AKA and support for subscriber certificates.~~

~~Editor's note: The current protocol stack figure is placed here as a holder. The actual protocols will be defined later.~~




Figure 2: Protocol stack architecture

4.2.2 Network elements

4.2.2.1 Bootstrapping server function (BSF)

A generic bootstrapping server function (BSF) and the UE shall ~~mutually authenticate using~~ run HTTP digest the AKA protocol, and agree on session keys that are afterwards applied between UE and an operator-controlled network application function (NAF). The key material ~~shall~~ must be generated ~~specifically~~ for each NAF independently, that is, for each key uniquely identified by a transaction identifier and that is shared between a UE and a NAF there is a new run of HTTP Digest AKA over the Ub interface. The BSF can restrict the applicability of the key material to a defined set of NAFs by using a suitable key derivation procedure.

Editor's note: Key generation for NAF is ffs. Potential solutions may include:

- *Separate run of HTTP Digest AKA over Ub interface for each request of key material from a NAF*
- *Issues with key lifetime are ffs.*

4.2.2.2 Network application function (NAF)

After the bootstrapping has been completed, the UE and an operator-controlled network application function (NAF) can run some application specific protocol where the authentication of messages will be based on those session keys generated during the ~~mutual authentication b~~ protocol run between UE and BSF.

General assumptions for the functionality of an operator-controlled network application function (NAF):

~~— there is no previous security association between the UE and the NAF;~~

- NAF shall be able to locate and communicate securely with the subscriber's BSF;
- NAF shall be able to acquire ~~a~~ shared key material that was established between UE and the bootstrapping server function (BSF) over the Zn-interface. The run of the protocol over the Zn-interface may be triggered by ~~during an~~ running application-specific protocol run on the Ua-interface.

4.2.2.3 HSS

HSS shall store new parameters in subscriber profile related to the usage of bootstrapping function. Possibly also parameters related to the usage of some network application function are stored in HSS.

Editor's note: Needed new parameters are FFS.

4.2.2.4 UE

The required new functionalities from [the](#) UE are:

- the support of HTTP Digest AKA protocol;
- the capability to derive new key material to be used with the protocol over Ua interface from CK and IK; and
- support of NAF specific application protocol(s). ~~(see [5]).~~

4.2.3 Reference points

4.2.3.1 Ub interface

The reference point Ub is between the UE and the BSF. ~~The functionality is radio access independent and can be run in both CS and PS domains.~~

~~Editor's note: The solution for CS domain is ffs.~~

4.2.3.1.1 Functionality

Reference point Ub provides mutual authentication between the UE and the BSF ~~entities~~. It allows the UE to bootstrap the session keys based on the 3G infrastructure. ~~The session key as result of key agreement functionality, is used to support further applications e.g. certificate issuer.~~

4.2.3.1.2 Protocol

Ub interface is in format of HTTP Digest AKA, which is specified in [4]. It is based on the 3GPP AKA [2] protocol ~~that requires information from USIM and/or ISIM.~~ The interface to the USIM is as specified for 3G [1].

4.2.3.2 Ua interface

Ua interface is the application protocol which is secured using the key~~s~~ material agreed between UE and BSF as a result of the run of HTTP Digest AKA over Ub interface. For instance, in the case of support for subscriber certificates [5], it is a protocol, which allows the user to request certificates from the NAF. In this case [the](#) NAF would be the PKI portal.

4.2.3.3 Zh interface

Zh interface is used between the BSF and the HSS to allow the BSF to fetch the required authentication information and subscriber profile information from the HSS. The interface to the 3G Authentication Centre is HSS-internal, and it need not be standardised as part of this architecture.

4.2.3.4 Zn interface

Zn interface is used by the NAF to fetch the key material agreed during previous HTTP Digest AKA protocol run over Ub interface from the BSF. It may also be used to fetch subscriber profile information from [the](#) BSF.

4.3 Procedures

This chapter specifies in detail the format of the bootstrapping procedure that is further utilized by various applications. It contains the AKA authentication procedure with [the](#) BSF, and latter the key material generation procedure.

4.3.1 Initiation of bootstrapping

When a UE wants to interact with ~~a~~ NAF, but it does not know if [the](#) bootstrapping procedure is required, it shall contact [the](#) NAF for further instructions (see figure 3).




Figure 3: Initiation of bootstrapping

1. UE starts communication over Ua interface with the NAF without any bootstrapping related parameters.
2. If the NAF requires bootstrapping but the request from UE does not include bootstrapping related parameters, NAF replies with a bootstrapping initiation message. The form of this indication may depend on the particular Ua interface and is ~~as specified in the relevant stage 3-specifications.~~

~~Editor's note: The numbers of the relevant stage 3- specifications shall be added here. If the protocol over Ua interface is based on HTTP, then NAF can initiate the bootstrapping procedure by using HTTP status codes (e.g. 401 Unauthorized).~~

4.3.2 Bootstrapping procedures

When a UE wants to interact with an NAF, and it knows that [the](#) bootstrapping procedure is needed, it shall first perform a bootstrapping authentication (see figure 4). [The specifications of the AKA protocol in \[2\] and the HTTP digest AKA protocol in \[4\] apply.](#)

Note: The main steps from these protocols are repeated in the following for the convenience of the reader. In case of any potential conflict, the specifications in [2] and [4] take precedence.

~~Editor's note: Zh interface related procedure will be added here in future development. It may re-use Cx interface that is specified in TS-29.228.~~

Otherwise, the UE shall perform a bootstrapping authentication only when it has received bootstrapping initiation required message or a key update indication from the NAF (cf. subclause 4.3.3).




Figure 4: The bootstrapping procedure

1. The UE sends an HTTP request towards the BSF.
2. BSF retrieves the user profile and one or a whole batch of a challenge, i.e. the Authentication Vectors (AV) (AV = RAND||AUTN||XRES||CK||IK) over the Zh interface from the HSS.
3. Then BSF forwards the RAND and AUTN to the UE in the 401 message (without the CK, IK and XRES). This is to demand the UE to authenticate itself.
4. The UE calculates the message authentication code (MAC) so as to verify the challenge from authenticated network; the UE also calculates CK, IK and RES. This will result in session keys IK and CK in both BSF and UE.
5. The UE sends request again, with the Digest AKA RES as the response to the BSF.
6. If the RES equals to the XRES that is in the AV, the UE is authenticated.
7. BSF generates key material Ks by concatenating CK and IK. ~~Ks is used to derive the key material Ks_NAF. Ks_NAF is used for securing the Ua interface.~~
8. The BSF shall send 200 OK message and shall supply a transaction identifier to the UE to indicate the success of the authentication. The BSF may also supply the parameter *n* used to determine the NAF_Id_n (cf. [bullet 12](#)

~~below previous bullet~~) to the UE over the Ub interface. If the parameter n is not supplied then no key derivation is performed, i.e. $K_s = K_{s_NAF}$.

99. The key material K_s is generated in UE by concatenating CK and IK.

10. Both UE and BSF use K_s to derive the key material K_{s_NAF} . K_{s_NAF} is used for securing the Ua interface.
~~The K_s is used to derive the key material K_{s_NAF} . K_{s_NAF} is used for securing the Ua interface.~~

11. K_{s_NAF} is computed as $K_{s_NAF} = \text{KDF}(K_s, \text{key derivation parameters})$, where KDF is a suitable key derivation function, and the key derivation parameters include the user's IMSI, the NAF_Id_n and RAND.

12. The NAF_Id_n consists of the n rightmost domain labels in the DNS name of the NAF, separated by dots ($n=1, \dots, 7$). For $n=0$, NAF_Id_n equals the full DNS name of the NAF. The next bullet specifies how the UE obtains n .

NOTE: This note gives an example how to obtain the NAF_Id_n: if the DNS name of the NAF is "server1.presence.bootstrap.operator.com", and $n=3$, then NAF_Id_n = "bootstrap.operator.com".

Editor's note: ~~The definition of the KDF and the possible inclusion of further key derivation parameters will be supplied by~~ The definition of the KDF and the possible inclusion of further key derivation parameters will be supplied by ~~is left to ETSI SAGE and will be included in Annex B (normative) to this specification.~~

4.3.3 Procedures using bootstrapped Security Association

After UE is authenticated with the BSF, every time the UE wants to interact with an NAF the following steps are executed as depicted in figure 5.

UE starts communication over Ua interface with the NAF

- In general, UE and NAF will not yet share the key(s) required to protect Ua interface. If they already do, there is no need for NAF to retrieve the key(s) over Zn interface.
- If the NAF shares a key with the UE, but an update of that key is needed then it sends a suitable key update request to the UE and terminates the protocol used over Ua interface. The form of this indication may depend on the particular protocol used over Ua interface (cf. clause 4.3.1 and is ff).
- ~~It is assumed that~~ The UE supplies sufficient information a transaction identifier over the Ua interface to the NAF, e.g. a transaction identifier, to allow the NAF to retrieve specific key material from BSF.
- The UE derives the keys required to protect the protocol used over Ua interface from the key material, as specified in clause 4.3.2.

NOTE-1: The UE may adapt- the key material K_{s_NAF} to the specific -needs of the Ua interface. This adaptation is outside the scope of this specification.

NAF starts communication over Zn interface with BSF


- The NAF requests key material corresponding to the ~~information~~ transaction identifier supplied by the UE to the NAF ~~(e.g. a transaction identifier) in the start of the protocol~~ used over Ua interface.
- The BSF derives the keys required to protect the protocol used over Ua interface from the key material K_s and the key derivation parameters, as specified in clause 4.3.2, and supplies to NAF the requested key material K_{s_NAF} . If the key identified by the transaction identifier supplied by the NAF is not available at the BSF, the BSF shall indicate this in the reply to the NAF. The NAF then indicates a key update request to the UE.

NOTE-2: The NAF ~~shall~~ may adapt the key material K_{s_NAF} to the specific needs of the Ua interface in the same way as the UE did. This adaptation is outside the scope of this specification.

NAF continues with the protocol used over the Ua interface with UE.

Once the run of the protocol used over Ua interface is completed the purpose of bootstrapping is fulfilled as it enabled UE and NAF to use Ua interface in a secure way.

Editor's note: Message sequence diagram presentation and its details will be finalized later.



MAC represents all credentials **msg** is appl. specific dataset
Prof is application specific part of user profile

Figure 5: The bootstrapping usage procedure

Annex A (informative): Generic secure message exchange using HTTP Digest Authentication

A.1 Introduction

~~Editor's note: This annex describes how HTTP Digest Authentication can be used between UE and any NAF where the protocol over Ua interface is based on HTTP messaging. The protocol over Ua interface may depend upon the final choice of scheme made by SA-WG3 and this will need to be reviewed later by SA-WG3.~~

HTTP Digest Authentication ~~model~~ can also be used as a generic authentication and integrity protection method towards any new NAF. ~~If a new NAF uses BSF-based security association, it could use this generic method~~ [The Generic Bootstrapping architecture specified in this document enables the NAF and the UE to mutually authenticate the UE \(and UE authenticate the NAF\) each other](#) and integrity protect any payload being transferred between NAF and UE. As a generic method, it will speed up the specification of new NAFs since the authentication and message integrity protection part of Ua interface are taken care of by HTTP Digest Authentication. It will also ease the implementation of ~~GB~~[BSF](#)-based authentication in NAFs because there would be one well-defined way to do it.

A.2 Generic protocol over Ua interface description

[Editor's note: a cross-check with the corresponding stage 3 spec TS 24.cde shall be performed in order to avoid duplication.](#)

The sequence diagram in figure A.1 describes the generic secure message exchange with HTTP Digest Authentication. The conversation may take place inside a server-authenticated TLS [6] tunnel in which case TLS handshake has taken place before step 1.

In step 1, UE sends an empty HTTP request to a NAF. In step 2, NAF responds with HTTP response code 401 "Unauthorized" which contains a WWW-Authenticate header. The header instructs the UE to use HTTP Digest Authentication with a bootstrapped security association. Quality of protection (qop) attribute is set to "auth-int" meaning that the payload of the following HTTP requests and responses should integrity protected. The realm attribute contains two parts. The first part is a constant string "3GPP-bootstrapping" instructing the UE to use a bootstrapped security association. The second part is the DNS name of the NAF.

In step 3, the UE shall verify that the second part of the realm attribute does in fact correspond to the server it is talking to. In particular, if the conversation is taking place inside a server-authenticated TLS tunnel, the UE shall verify that the server name in the server's TLS certificate matches the server name in the realm attribute of the WWW-Authenticate header. The UE generates client-payload containing the message it wants to send to the server. Then it will generate the HTTP request by calculating the Authorization header values using the transaction identifier (~~base64 encoded~~) it received from the BSF as username and the session key Ks_ [NAF](#) (~~base64 encoded~~) as the password, and send the request to NAF in step 4.

When NAF receives the request in step 5, it will verify the Authorization header by fetching the session key Ks_ [NAF](#) from the bootstrapping server using Zn interface and the transaction identifier. After successful retrieval, NAF calculates the corresponding digest values using K, and compares the calculated values with the received values in the Authorization header. The NAF shall also verify that the DNS name in the realm attribute matches its own. If the conversation is taking place inside a server-authenticated TLS tunnel, the NAF shall also verify that this DNS name is the same as that of the TLS server. If the verification succeeds, the incoming client-payload request is taken in for further processing. Thereafter, the NAF will generate a HTTP response containing the server-payload it wants to send back to the client in step 6. The NAF may use session key Ks_ [NAF](#) to integrity protect and authenticate the response.

In step 7, UE receives the response and verifies the Authentication-Info header. If the verification succeeds, the UE can accept the server-payload for further processing.

Additional messages can be exchanged using steps 3 through 7 as many times as is necessary. The following HTTP request and responses ~~shall~~ be constructed according to [3] (e.g., nc parameter ~~shall~~ be incremented by one with each new HTTP request made by UE).




Figure A.1: Generic secure message exchange using HTTP Digest Authentication and bootstrapped security association

Annex B [\(normative\)](#)

[Specification of the key derivation function KDF](#)

To be supplied by ETSI SAGE and added here when complete

[Annex C \(informative\):](#)

Change history

Change history							
Date	TSG #	TSG Doc.	CR	Rev	Subject/Comment	Old	New
2003-10	SA3#30				New draft TS: Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA). Extracted from 33.109 clause 4 and Annex B.		0.1.0
2003-10	SA3#30	S3-030537			New interface names.		0.1.0
2003-10	SA3#30	S3-030538			Requirements for Ub and Zh interfaces added.	0.1.0	0.1.1
2003-10	SA3#30	S3-030545			NAF initiated bootstrapping added	0.1.0	0.1.1
2003-10					Imported Zn interface requirements from SSC TS.	0.1.0	0.1.1
2003-11	SA3#31	S3-030728			Bootstrapping procedure: merging of last two messages	0.1.1	0.2.0
2003-11	SA3#31	S3-030793			Key separation	0.1.1	0.2.0
2003-11	SA3#31	S3-030794			Removal of application specific user profile requirements from GBA	0.1.1	0.2.0
2003-11					Annex A: changed "session key K" to "session key Ks"	0.1.1	0.2.0
2003-12	SP-22	SP-030583	-	-	Presentation to TSG SA#22 for Information	0.2.0	1.0.0