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Sophia Antipolis, France

From: SA3

To: SA1, SA2

Title: Security for UE functional split

Contact: Guenther Horn
Guenther.horn@mchp.siemens.de
Phone: +49 89 636 41494

SA3 thanks SA1 and SA2 for their LSs sent in S1-011321 and S2-013067.

SA3 found some difficulties in interpreting the documents attached to these LSs, namely S1-011246 (Report on Service Requirements for UE Functionality Split (Release 5), and S2-012818, and asks for the following clarifications.

SA3's assumptions

SA3 assumes that all the call control and mobility management procedures involving network entities terminate in the MT. SA3 concludes from this that all security procedures involving network entities also terminate in the MT. It was not absolutely clear to SA3 whether any form of call control (e.g. a IMS SIP client) could also reside in the TE. The majority in SA3 assumed that this was not the case.

Only the MT has a UICC on which the USIM and/or the ISIM reside.

In particular, remote access from the TE to USIM or ISIM functionality in the UICC in the MT is not required. The majority of SA3 does not understand why communication by the MT with the UICC should be required on behalf of the TE for security purposes (section 6.3.1 bullet point 3 of the TR).

Questions to SA1 regarding S1-011246:

Is stage 2 and stage 3 work on UE functional split for Rel 5 or Rel 6 ? (The current 3GPP workplan (version 011011) lists this Feature as Rel 6, but the LS from S1 seems to suggest that it is Rel 5.)

Section 6.3.2 bullet point 11 (Access services and capabilities provided by the MT is a TE function) created some prolonged discussion. What precisely does it mean?

To what extent is access independence addressed in S1-011246? Can a MT only access GERAN and UTRAN, or may it also comprise the functionality of a WLAN station?

Plans for SA3 work on UE functional split

IF any SA3 work is required at all for Rel 5 (this was not clear to SA3, see the above question) and **IF** SA3's assumptions as described above can be confirmed then SA3 would like to proceed as follows:

- 1) no need is seen to modify the security procedures involving network entities specified in TS 33.102 for the CS and PS domains, and in TS 33.203 for the IMS.
- 2) A section "security for the local interface between the TE and the MT in UE functional split scenarios" would be added to TS 33.102. In this section, it would be pointed out what security features are required on this local interface. Security mechanisms would not be specified as

they would depend on the particular nature of this interface. The new section would also not attempt to assess security mechanisms available for technologies which may be used to realise this interface (e.g. Bluetooth, Wireless LAN). Given that the deadline for Rel 5 is very close even that goal is very ambitious, and as there have been no contributions on this subject in SA3 so far, it is not certain that it can be achieved.

- 3) Any work on the security aspects of UE functional split scenarios which goes beyond the work described in 2) is considered infeasible for Rel 5.

Actions

SA1 and SA2 are kindly asked to comment on SA3's assumptions and SA3's plans for future work and reply to SA3's questions.

Date of next SA3 meeting: 26 February – 1 March 2002, Bristol, UK