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**Washington D.C., USA**

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3GPP TSG-T3 (USIM) Meeting #15  
San Diego, USA, 16-18 August, 2000

***Tdoc T3-000429***

## **Liaison Statement**

**Source:** T3  
**To:** S1  
**CC:** S3  
**Title:** Encrypted USIM-ME interface

T3 would like to inform S1 that 3G TS 22.101 still seems to contain a requirement which had been considered not necessary from a security point of view by SMG10.

Clause 13, 1<sup>st</sup> bullet point states that an encrypted terminal-UICC interface is a basic mandatory UE requirement.

This is in contrast to the statement expressed in the attached LS from SMG10 which was in response to a query from SMG9/UMTS.

If there are any new issues on this matter, T3 would be delighted to further discuss the matter. Otherwise, S1 is invited to consider whether the requirement can be removed from TS 22.101.

**ETSI SMG9 UMTS  
18 - 19 August, 1998  
Espoo, Finland**

**Tdoc SMG9 UMTS 98u027**

SMG10 meeting #3/98

Tdoc SMG10 98P229

Sophia Antipolis, 28 to 31 July 1998

**From: SMG10**

**To: SMG9-UMTS**

### **Liaison statement on Requirements for encryption on the USIM-ME interface**

SMG10-WPC has studied the report of the SMG9 UMTS meeting held in Sophia Antipolis, 28-30 April, 1998. The open question in section 9 on the necessity of encryption on the USIM-ME interface was noted.

SMG10 points out that an attacker that had access to the USIM-ME interface would also have access to the ME (assuming that the interface is a physical contact). Therefore there is little point in encrypting sensitive data on the USIM-ME interface unless this data is also encrypted or physically protected in the ME. Since physical protection for confidential data in the ME is not envisaged, data would typically only be encrypted on the USIM-ME interface in cases where the information does not need to be disclosed to the ME (i.e. the ME is not the sender or recipient and the data passes encrypted through the ME).

Further, SMG10 points out that the authenticity and integrity of sensitive data (for instance, application data that could change the operation of the USIM or ME) is often more important than the encryption of such data.

SMG10 has outlined its proposed requirements for protection of the USIM-ME interface in UMTS 33.21 (currently at version 0.1.3).