3GPP TSG SA WG3 Security — S3#13   **S3-000365**

23-26 May, 2000

Yokohama, Japan

3GPP TSG CN Working Group 4   **N4-000363**
CN4#02 Meeting,
Rotenburg, Germany
22 - 26 May 2000

Source: 3GPP CN4[1]

Title: Liaison statement to SA3 on GTP signalling security

CN4, as the successors to CN2 Subgroup B, are responsible for the maintenance of the GPRS Tunnelling Protocol specification, TS 29.060. CN2 Subgroup B and CN4 have been working for the past 6 months on security for core network (MAP and GTP) signalling, in response to an urgent request from S3.

CN2 Subgroup B sent a liaison statement (N2B000445, a copy of which is attached) to S3 to ask for advice on S3's requirements for GTP signalling security. Specifically, is IPSec **the** protection mechanism to be used for GTP signalling, or is IPSec **a** protection mechanism to be used for GTP signalling?

The current CN4 meeting is the last opportunity for CN4 to produce the necessary CR to TS 29.060 if it is to be presented for approval at CN #8 in June. SA3 are therefore asked to give this matter their urgent consideration, and reply to CN4 so that the CR can be drafted and reviewed before this meeting closes on 26 May.

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Source: N2

Title: Liaison statement to S3 on GTP signalling security

TSG-N2 have drafted and agreed a change request to TS 29.060 to indicate the security mechanism which is used to protect GTP signalling. This change request (Tdoc N2B000446, attached) indicates that IP security is used to protect GTP signalling, and makes normative reference to TS 33.102.

In the discussion of the CR to TS 29.060, it was identified that this CR has to be linked to a CR to TS 33.102 to specify the use of IP security to protect GTP signalling. Although the CR to TS 29.060 was approved by N2, and will be presented to CN #7 for approval, final approval depends on the approval by SA of the corresponding CR to TS 33.102. S3 will therefore need to prepare the CR to TS 33.102 and have it approved by SA in order for the protection of GTP signalling to be regarded as complete.

Another issue which was identified in the discussion in N2 was that GTP signalling between a Release 99 node and a pre-Release 99 node will not be protected, because the pre-Release 99 node will not have implemented IP security. Instead, the communication will be unprotected, as currently specified for pre-Release 99 GTP signalling. S3 are asked to take note of this fact.