Tdoc List

2024-10-28 12:15

Agenda Topic TDoc Title Source Type For Avail Treated Decision Wdrn Replaced-by Replaces
1 Agenda and Meeting Objectives S3‑243800 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243802 Process for SA3#118 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243803 Detailed agenda planning SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
2 Meeting Reports                      
2.1 Previous SA3 meeting report/s and SA report S3‑243801 Report from last SA3 meeting MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243805 Report to SA3 from SA SA WG3 Vice Chair report   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244120  
    S3‑244120 Report to SA3 from SA SA WG3 Chair report   Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑243805
2.2 SA3-LI Report                      
3 Reports and Liaisons from other Groups S3‑243806 Recent attack on polynomial based MACs with short tag ETSI SAGE LS in   Yes
YesHuawei: no specific action for us, we can note it. The Chair replied that this would be like ignoring it. Nokia: SAGE doesn’t need response to this LS. Huawei: interested companies can take note of this. The LS is noted but SA3 will have internal discussions about it.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243808 LS on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure C1-245039 LS in   Yes
YesThe Chair commented: the LS will be postponed; for the next meeting, don't introduce new vulnerabilities in your new solutions, no new attack scenarios.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑243940 Discussion paper for CT1 LS on SUCI calculation failure Nokia discussion Discussion Yes
YesHuawei: introducing a mechanism in a legacy ssytem to handle an error case in 5G is a bit strange. NTT-Docomo: this relies on the UE identifying himself in the clear. The mechanisms discussed here in Apple's and Nokia's proposals don’t help at all to keep the UE identity private. Qualcomm: there should be a standardised way to deal with this but we don’t agree that these are the best ways to solve this. Ericsson preferred Apple's way. This was taken offline.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244183 Reply LS to CT1 on UE bahaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243809 LS on obtaining user consent for the exposure of User Sensitive Information S6a240323 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑244181 Reply LS to SA6 on Metaverse user consent Apple LS out   Yes
YesEricsson: this also involves CAPIF, besides the Metaverse agenda items.
 		revised No S3‑244306  
    S3‑244306 Reply LS to SA6 on Metaverse user consent Apple LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244181
    S3‑243812 LS reply to 3GPP Reply-LS on PQC Migration GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑243868 draft reply LS to GSMA on PQC migration Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesEricsson: no need to send an LS to SAGE.
 		merged No S3‑244307  
    S3‑244156 LS on 3GPP ReplyLS on PQC Migration Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out   Yes
YesNokia: The crypto inventory that we proposed was noted during the last meeting, so it’s a bit diffciult to pgrogress on this or mention it to GSMA. We need an agenda item specific for Post Quantum. Ericsson: these LS are not about migration plan, just a couple of questions. Nokia: they ask about security profiles, how we prioritise and so on. Huawei: lack of inventory and prioritisation in SA3 can be replied to GSMA.
 		merged No S3‑244307  
    S3‑244201 Draft_Reply-LS on PQC Migration Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244307  
    S3‑244307 Reply-LS on PQC Migration Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: it's a good idea to create this inventory of crypto algorithms. We could do it in a 900-series TR. Lot of external people are asking for this.
 		approved No   S3‑244201
    S3‑243816 Response LS to SA3 on architecture of NR Femto R3-244831 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243818 LS on AIML data collection RP-242389 LS in   Yes
YesNokia: postpone the response until Orlando. If we must send it now, we prefer Samsung's Ls.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑244136 Discussion on RAN plenary LS on AIML Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244137 Reply LS on AIML data collection Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
YesEricsson supported this LS or Samsung's.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244268 [draft] Reply LS on AIML data collection Samsung LS out Approval Yes
YesLenovo supported this LS. Huawei supported this LS as well.MITRE supported this LS.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244308 [draft] Reply LS on AIML data collection Samsung LS out Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243886 Discussion on AIML data collection vivo discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243887 LS on AIML data collection vivo LS out Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with this proposal.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243821 LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays S2-2407207 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑243835 Version 2.0 of 256-bit AICI. ETSI SAGE LS in   Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: We received an attack on MAC 5G paper. It should be taken into account.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243973 Reply LS on including the HPLMN ID in the PC5 discovery messages for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
No
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243836 LS on SG17 new work item ITU-T X.5Gsec-FMSC: Security requirements and guidelines for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence of IMT-2020 networks and beyond ITU-T LS in   Yes
YesIt was noted that noting the LS could give the impression that SA3 was ignoring it. Huawe: this is informative, no actions for SA3. Business as usual.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244224 Reply LS on including the HPLMN ID in the PC5 discovery messages for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay China Telecom Corporation Ltd. LS out   Yes
No
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243837 LS on SG17 new work item ITU-T TR.IMT2030-sec-con: ""Security Consideration for IMT2030 Networks"" ITU-T LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243838 LS on SG17 new work item TR.sa_RAN - Technical Report on ""Security Attacks in Radio Access Networks"" ITU-T LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑244309 Reply to: LS on SG17 new work item TR.sa_RAN - Technical Report on ""Security Attacks in Radio Access Networks"" Nokia LS out approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243807 LS on Establishment of new Focus Group on Artificial Intelligence Native for Telecommunication Networks (FG-AINN) ITU-T LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243839 LS on Way forward on working agreement #63 SP-241387 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243921 LS on 5G SA Roaming Anomaly Detection in the context of PRINS BSI (DE) LS out Approval Yes
YesHuawei: postpone to Orlando, this is maintenance. Ericsson: the mechanisms to enable PLMN-IDs don’t need to be standardised. Nokia: I'd like to know GSMA's opinion on the PLMN ID.
 		revised No S3‑244482  
    S3‑244482 LS on 5G SA Roaming Anomaly Detection in the context of PRINS BSI (DE) LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243921
    S3‑243856 TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. other Information Yes
YesPublication of new or revised deliverables (incremental changes from the status reported at SA3#117 • Published o TCG CPU to TPM Bus Protection Guidance for Active Attacks TCG CPU to TPM Bus Protection Guidance for Active Attacks | Trusted Computing Group o TCG ACPI Specification TCG ACPI Specification | Trusted Computing Group • Approved for publication o DICE Protection Environment Version 1.0 Revision 0.14 Meetings: • TCG Members Meeting Hybrid F2F (Boston, MA, USA) – 28 – 31 October • MP WG meets every Monday at 10-11 ET • TMS WG meets every Monday and Friday at 12-13 ET • CyRes WG meets every Wednesday at 11-12:30 ET
 		noted No    
    S3‑243867 draft reply LS to SA6 Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
No
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243819 Reply LS on Clarifications related to User Identities S1-242347 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243813 Reply LS on Clarification of requirements for Ambient IoT R1-2407364 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243822 LS Reply on ""A Realization of Network Slices for 5G Networks Using Current IP/MPLS Technologies"" S2-2408691 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243815 Reply LS on the Realization of Network Slices for 5G Networks Using Current IP/MPLS Technologies R3-244785 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243820 Reply LS on Clarification of requirements for Ambient IoT S1-242527 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243824 Reply LS on clarifications on consent management S2-2409440 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243826 Reply LS on KI#3 UE-Satellite-UE Communication Architectures S2-2409442 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243810 Reply LS on recursively defined JSON structures and reply to LS C4-241343 C4-243520 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243841 LS on maintaining specification consistency between GSMA and 3GPP on 5G roaming over roaming intermediaries. SP-241405 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243842 LS on Further Clarification for Ambient IoT Security SP-241419 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243843 Reply LS on CEN's requirements for eCall over IMS SP-241421 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243952 withdrawn Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval No
No
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑244034 Reply LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel China Mobile LS out   Yes
No
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑244157 LS reply on Issues related to Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
No
 		withdrawn Yes    
4 Work areas                      
4.1 Maintenance (Rel-15/16/17/18)                      
4.1.1 Security Assurance                      
4.1.2 Service Based Architecture                      
4.1.3 Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe                      
4.1.4 Mission Critical                      
4.1.5 Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G                      
4.1.6 Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS                      
4.1.7 Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services                      
4.1.8 Security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT                      
4.1.9 Security Aspects of eNPN                      
4.1.10 Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC                      
4.1.11 Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems                      
4.1.12 Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning                      
4.1.13 Security Aspects of eNA.                      
4.1.14 Modified PRINS for roaming service providers in 5G                      
4.1.15 All other maintenance topics (not listed above)                      
4.2 WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR). S3‑243853 Addition of UDR security requirements BSI (DE) CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑243869 Add specific UDR SCAS test cases for TS 33.530 BSI (DE) pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: failure cases are missing here. This was taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑244310 S3‑243419
    S3‑244310 Add specific UDR SCAS test cases for TS 33.530 BSI (DE) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑243869
    S3‑243870 Add an appendix of threats to the UDR BSI (DE) CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: this is related to the draft TS 33.530. We cannot agree it until the draft is ready. BSI confirmed that it was the intention to send the draft for approval in the next plenary. Nokia didn’t agree but they changed their mind and it was agreed.
 		agreed No    
4.3 WID on SCAS for Rel-18 features on existing functions.                      
4.4 WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF).                      
4.5 WID on Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms. S3‑244099 Discussion of new Features in Version2 of 256-bit Specifications Nokia discussion Discussion Yes
YesNiokia asked to be minuted: The next steps are first to discuss offline with ETSI SAGE about the description of the MODE parameter (see proposal#2), and second about the fact that the reference code has been shared for proving of the function but for performance reasons this needs to be adapted (see proposal#3). Another topic is related to the potential vulnerability of the polynomial function and the fact that now all three algorithms are based on the AEAD1. The outcome of the meeting will be presented in the next SA3 meeting.
 		noted No    
4.6 WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 19 S3‑243851 [MCXSec4] 33180 R19 MC Recording Server Introduction Airbus, Motorola Solutions CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: this depends on a CR being discussed this week in SA6. It was later seen that the SA6 CR was agreed.
 		agreed No    
4.7 WID on Addition of Milenage-256 algorithm                      
4.8 WID on 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols S3‑243908 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.501, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243909 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.210, Updates to cryprographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243910 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.310, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243911 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.203, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244311  
    S3‑244311 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.203, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243911
    S3‑244184 Editorial change on CryptoSP living document draft CR to TS 33203 Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244312  
    S3‑244312 Editorial change on CryptoSP living document draft CR to TS 33203 Apple other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244184
4.9 WID on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service phase 3                      
4.10 R19 SCAS WID S3‑243871 Clarification on TC_BVT_PORT_SCANNING BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei and Ericsson had concerns about this use case. Nokia agreed with the document.
 		revised No S3‑244313  
    S3‑244313 Clarification on TC_BVT_PORT_SCANNING BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑243871
    S3‑243987 Add new test case to 33.117 on recommended algorithms checking Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243988 Living document to Draft CR TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244505  
    S3‑244505 Living document to Draft CR TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243988
    S3‑243989 Living document to Draft TS 33.117 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
YesNo changes in this meeting.
 		approved No    
    S3‑243990 Living document to Draft TR 33.926 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
YesNo changes in this meeting.
 		approved No    
    S3‑243991 Living document to Draft TS 33.514 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
YesNo changes in this meeting.
 		approved No    
    S3‑243992 Add new test case to 33.117 on default using algorithms to test 4.2.3.2.4 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesNokia didn’t agree with this. Keysight didn’t agree with the examples given here.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243993 Discussion paper on algorithm checking in TS 33.117 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244126 Clarifying the threat for checking expiry of its own certificate Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244314 Clarifying the threat for checking expiry of its own certificate Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑244127 Clarification to the TS 33.551 living draft CR on own certificate expiry Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244128 Adding expiry time checking for peer certificates Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244315  
    S3‑244315 Adding expiry time checking for peer certificates Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244128
4.11 TEI19 topics (restricted to agreed topics only) S3‑243898 Addition of UDR security requirements BSI (DE) CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243899 Add an appendix of threats to the UDR BSI (DE) CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243902 Addition of UDR security requirements BSI (DE) draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243915 Add an appendix of threats to the UDR BSI (DE) draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑244202 Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, AT&T, Samsung, KDDI CR Agreement Yes
YesSamsung wanted to add a note that there are other possibilities apart from X.509. Huawei didn’t agree with the note in change 2. Huawei wanted to add a statement in the note in the next change on propietary interface being also a possibility to retrieve the key. Nokia: postpone till February. Ericsson commented that the freezing of Rel-19 was March, so postponing till then it would be too late. It should be treated next meeting. AT&T commented that this had been worked on for several meeting cycles already.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244203 Support iat claim in the access token Ericsson, AT&T, Charter Communications, Samsung CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244510  
    S3‑244510 Support iat claim in the access token Ericsson, AT&T, Charter Communications, Samsung CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244203
4.12 WID on Security aspects of NR mobility enhancement Phase 4 S3‑244079 Integrity protection of inter-CU LTM Cell Switch Command MAC CE OPPO other Approval Yes
YesEricsson: for all the proposals for this meeting, let's identify one particular direction for the solution so we can reply to RAN2 properly.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244103 LTM: New Solution for Protecting NCC in MAC CE using AS Security Context Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244104 LTM: New Solution for Protecting NCC in MAC CE using C-RNTI Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244039 Resolve the EN in Sol#3 ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244319  
    S3‑244319 Resolve the EN in Sol#3 ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244039
    S3‑244040 Resolve another EN in Sol#3 ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244038 add evaluation for Sol#3 ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244506  
    S3‑244506 add evaluation for Sol#3 ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244038
    S3‑243875 Address ENs in Solution 1 vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244320  
    S3‑244320 Address ENs in Solution 1 vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243875
    S3‑244178 LTM - Update solution#4 Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244321  
    S3‑244321 LTM - Update solution#4 Apple other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244178
    S3‑244179 LTM - Update solution#5 Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244322  
    S3‑244322 LTM - Update solution#5 Apple other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244179
    S3‑244228 Resolve EN on vertical/horizontal key derivation for solution #6 LG Electronics other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244229 Resolve EN on methods to deliver updated NCC for solution #6 LG Electronics other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244230 Resolve EN on the cases for change of security algorithm for solution #6 LG Electronics other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244323  
    S3‑244323 Resolve EN on the cases for change of security algorithm for solution #6 LG Electronics other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244230
    S3‑244231 Evaluation for solution #6 LG Electronics other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244256 Updates to Solution#7 Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243876 Correction on Evaluation of Solution 7 vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243950 Discussion paper on the selection of algorithm in LTM Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244101 LTM: Update to Solution 8 Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244102 LTM: Evaluation of Solution 8 Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243877 Discussion on Way Forward for Key Issue 1 of LTM vivo discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244255 Way forward for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
YesThe Chair commented that SA3 would not be choosing the solutions but just comment on the security part. SA3 needed to limit the back and forth in the discussions. Vivo had another solution assesment in tdoc 877. The Chair asked for a show of hands: - Support RRC message to provide updated NCC. Lenovo, Ericsson, Vivo, Huawei, Samsung, Nokia,Apple,Verizon,LG, DT - Based on MAC CE solution. Xiaomi, ZTE, OPPO, Apple Qualcomm: we didn’t agree on a key issue for MAC CE. It was commented that this MAC CE solution had a well known DoS vulnerability to the UE for a short time, so the security risk was minimal. For the LTM option the majority prefferred the RRC solution because it was already securely protected.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244257 Conclusion for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Samsung other Approval Yes
YesVivo and Qualcomm didn’t agree with principle A. Postpone and wait for RAN" feedback.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243878 LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM vivo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244131 Discussion on possible response to LTM LS Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244132 Progress update on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Qualcomm Incorporated LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243814 LS on security key update of inter-CU SCG LTM R2-2407602 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑243941 Security mechanism for the LTM case where CU is acting as SN and MN is unchanged Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243942 Security mechanism for the LTM case where CU is acting as MN and SN is unchanged Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244250 New solution for inter-CU SCG LTM CATT other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244258 Conclusion for inter-CU SCG LTM Samsung other Approval Yes
YesApple needed more details on the specific procedures, they didn’t agree with having it as a conclusion.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244100 Reply LS on security key update of inter-CU SCG LTM Xiaomi EV Technology LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244317  
    S3‑244317 Reply LS on security key update of inter-CU SCG LTM Xiaomi EV Technology LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244100
    S3‑244244 Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU SCG LTM CATT LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244180 LTM - WID revision Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243943 overall summary to the solutions in the living CR Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244318 overall summary to the solutions in the living CR Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑244254 Living document on NR mobility enhancement Samsung draftCR Information Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244324  
    S3‑244324 Living document on NR mobility enhancement Samsung draftCR Information Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244254
    S3‑244316 LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM Samsung LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.13 WID on Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication S3‑244129 Discussion on open issues of using FT under a TNGF Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, Hisilicon, Cablelabs discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243934 Discussion paper for Fast BSS mobility domain and TNGF domain Nokia, Charter discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243935 TNGF and TWIF solution Nokia, Charter other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244325  
    S3‑244130 Mobility under a TNGF Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, Hisilicon, Cablelabs other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244325  
    S3‑244325 Mobility under a TNGF Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, Hisilicon, Cablelabs other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244130
    S3‑243852 Security re-establishment for Trusted non-3GPP access Lenovo draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244325  
    S3‑243936 NSWO text alignment Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244507  
    S3‑244507 NSWO text alignment Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243936
    S3‑243933 Living CR for Non3GPPMobility Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244326  
    S3‑244326 Living CR for Non3GPPMobility Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243933
4.14 WID on Security for MonStra S3‑244253 Signaling Monitoring Requirements Vodafone, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Telefonica CR Approval Yes
YesConverted into a draft CR.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244490 Signaling Monitoring Requirements Vodafone, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Telefonica draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244280 discussion paper on Security for MonStra Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑244301 MonSTra: Monitoring of Signaling Traffic Functionality in 3GPP Ericsson, Nokia, Vodafone discussion Endorsement Yes
YesHuawei: we need SA5's input. Vodafone: SA5 is receiving the same proposal because SA mandated us to be fast. We are going in parallel. SA5 is responsible for the terminology, but they are not responsible for the security.
 		noted No    
5 Rel-19 Studies                      
5.1 Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security S3‑243998 Way forward for eZTS study Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
YesJohn Hopkins didn’t agree with this paper and the proposal in 4173. Huawei commented that SA asked SA3 to continue looking into this and this is what the paper was doing.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244173 Discussion and way forward for zero trust study China Mobile Com. Corporation discussion Endorsement Yes
YesMITRE commented that both 998 and 4173 didn’t really follow SA's guidelines. We havent even analyzed what needs to be done. Verizon: let's progress. CableLabs: these couple of contributions are going against what was said in Plenary.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243844 KI#1 Conclusion Alignment to SA Plenary Agreements Lenovo pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243845 KI#1 Conclusion Update Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244327  
    S3‑243931 eZTS KI 1 Conclusions MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244327  
    S3‑244327 eZTS KI 1 Conclusions MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243931
    S3‑243873 eZTS conclusion for security event data records Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244327  
    S3‑243999 Conclusion updates Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244327  
    S3‑244190 Data collection for security monitoring Ericsson draftCR Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244191 Updated conclusion for Key Issue #1 "Data exposure for security evaluation and monitoring" Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244327  
    S3‑243846 Solution#1 assumptions clarification Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei commented that this is one of the technical reasons why they objected standardising anything in the SBA layer. They didn’t object to this contribution.
 		approved No    
    S3‑243872 EN resolution in KI#1 Solution #3 "New Data Collection NFs" OTD_US pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243929 Solution #6 Update MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244328  
    S3‑244328 Solution #6 Update MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243929
    S3‑244000 Solution #5 updates Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244329  
    S3‑244329 Solution #5 updates Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244000
    S3‑244080 Solution 4 evaluation updates Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244330  
    S3‑244330 Solution 4 evaluation updates Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244080
    S3‑244081 Solution 7 evaluation updates Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244331  
    S3‑244331 Solution 7 evaluation updates Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244081
    S3‑244251 New WID on enablers for Zero Trust Security Motorola Mobility discussion Discussion Yes
YesHuawei: this is a WID proposal and we are too far from this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243847 Solution#9 Update Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244332  
    S3‑244332 Solution#9 Update Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243847
    S3‑243930 eZTS Sol 11 Evaluation MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244333  
    S3‑244333 eZTS Sol 11 Evaluation MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243930
    S3‑244075 Evaluation of solution #10 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: evaluation is incomplete.
 		revised No S3‑244334  
    S3‑244334 Evaluation of solution #10 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244075
    S3‑244192 Update Solution #12 "Policy enforcement using NRF configuration and short access token lifetime" Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243848 KI#2 Initial Conclusion Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244335  
    S3‑243932 eZTS KI 2 Conclusions MITRE-FFRDC, OTD_US pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244335  
    S3‑244193 Conclusion for Key Issue #2 "Security mechanisms for policy enforcement at the 5G SBA" Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia preferred the Lenovo or MITRE's proposals in tdocs 848 and 932.
 		revised No S3‑244335  
    S3‑244335 Conclusion for Key Issue #2 "Security mechanisms for policy enforcement at the 5G SBA" Ericsson, Lenovo, MITRE-FFRDC, OTD_US pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244193
    S3‑244252 Key Issue and Solution Mapping Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243811 Draft TR 33.794 Lenovo draft TR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.2 Study on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services phase 2 S3‑244194 Conclusion for KI#1: Third party specific user identities Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244092 Addressing the ENs on token and Avatar ID of Solution#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244399  
    S3‑244399 Addressing the ENs on token and Avatar ID of Solution#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244092
    S3‑244271 Resolving EN in solution #6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244400  
    S3‑244400 Resolving EN in solution #6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244271
    S3‑244272 Evaluation update on solution #6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244401  
    S3‑244401 Evaluation update on solution #6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244272
    S3‑244273 Updates to solution #7 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244402  
    S3‑244276 Address ENs of Sol7 on Protect IMS DC based Avatar Communication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244402  
    S3‑244402 Address ENs of Sol7 on Protect IMS DC based Avatar Communication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244276
    S3‑244097 conclusion to KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244093 Addressing the ENs on user interaction of Solution#10 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244403  
    S3‑244403 Addressing the ENs on user interaction of Solution#10 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244093
    S3‑244195 Update of Solution 11: IMS (DC) capability exposure security based on existing specification Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244094 conclusion to KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244196 New WID on security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 Ericsson, China Mobile WID new Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243817 Draft TR 33.790 Ericsson draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.3 Study on security for PLMN hosting a NPN S3‑243850 Updates to Solution#11 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: keep the editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑244336  
    S3‑244336 Updates to Solution#11 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑243850
    S3‑243955 Evaluation for Solution 11 to KI3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesSamsung: Serving network is irrelevant in this context. Nokia didn’t agree with the concept of Serving Network either.
 		merged No S3‑244336  
    S3‑244151 Resolution of EN concerning message inspection, filtering and topology hiding – solution 13. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244492  
    S3‑244492 Resolution of EN concerning message inspection, filtering and topology hiding – solution 13. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244151
    S3‑244152 Evaluation of solution 13 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244149 Resolution of editors note concerning mitigating denial of service and malfunction message inspection – solution 14. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244153 Evaluation of solution 14 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244036 Conclusion to KI#2 China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia, Samsung, Ericsson didn’t agree on a new entity. Nokia: extend what is standardised already.They agreed with the last part.
 		revised No S3‑244337  
    S3‑244337 Conclusion to KI#2 China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑244036
    S3‑244155 Conclusion to KI#2 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244337  
    S3‑244262 Conclusion update for KI#2 in TR 33.757 Samsung, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244337  
    S3‑244261 Conclusion update for KI#2 for DNS messages protection Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244337  
    S3‑244299 Update conclusion to KI#2 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244337  
    S3‑244035 Conclusion to KI#1 China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia disagreed with the new entity.
 		merged No S3‑244338  
    S3‑244154 Conclusion to KI#1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244338  
    S3‑244205 Conclusion for KI#1 Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244338  
    S3‑244338 Conclusion for KI#1 Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244205
    S3‑243900 Add LI impacts to Conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.757 Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244338  
    S3‑243954 conclusion to key issue#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244041 Conclusion to KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesSamsung didn’t agree with this conclusion.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244260 Conclusion for key issue#3 Samsung, Lenovo, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei had the opposite opinion in 954 hence didn’t agree with this conclusion.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243901 Add LI impacts to Conclusion for KI#3 in TR 33.757 Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia supported this. Huawei: a bit unusual to record this in a study. We need to follow LI requirements in all of our work and SA3-LI will always look into this.
 		revised No S3‑244339  
    S3‑244339 Add LI impacts to Conclusion for KI#3 in TR 33.757 Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑243901
    S3‑244204 New solution for KI#1: Re-use existing SMF/UPF functionality Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
YesZTE and Huawei proposed to note it. There was already consensus of normative work not needed. Samsung supported this. Nokia also supported this.
 		approved No    
    S3‑244259 Solution for SUPI privacy Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244493  
    S3‑244493 Solution for SUPI privacy Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244259
    S3‑243823 Draft TR 33.757 China Telecom draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.4 Study of ACME for Automated Certificate Management in SBA S3‑243906 Solution for certificate renewal for ACME in 5G SBA Google Ireland Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244412  
    S3‑244412 Solution for certificate renewal for ACME in 5G SBA Google Ireland Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243906
    S3‑243907 A server-initiated ACME certificate renewal for 5G SBA Google Ireland Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243912 Solution proposal for key issue #7 Cisco Systems pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244413  
    S3‑244413 Solution proposal for key issue #7 Cisco Systems pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243912
    S3‑243904 Evaluation update for solution #5 (Using ACME protocol for certificate enrolment) Google Ireland Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243905 Evaluation update for solution #7 (Using ACME protocol for secure transport of messages) Google Ireland Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244014 Discussion paper for ACME Charter Communications, Inc discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243913 ACME and CMPv2 for ACM in SBA Cisco Systems, NCSC, Johns Hopkins University APL, Google discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243914 Conclusions for TR 33.776 Cisco Systems pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia preferred to have offline discussions before the next meeting and note this document. Huawei also disagreed with this conclusion and the analysis.
 		revised No S3‑244511  
    S3‑244511 Conclusions for TR 33.776 Cisco Systems pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243914
    S3‑244016 Conclusion on KI#6 certificate revocation Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244512  
    S3‑244512 Conclusion on KI#6 certificate revocation Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244016
    S3‑243825 Draft TR 33.776 Cisco draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.5 Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256-bits                      
5.6 Study on mitigations against bidding down attacks                      
5.7 Study on security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 2 S3‑244074 Overall Summary of solutions Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244382  
    S3‑244382 Overall Summary of solutions Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244074
    S3‑244042 Conclusion for KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244383  
    S3‑244073 Conclusion of Key issue #1 in TR 33.700-29 ChinaTelecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑244089 KI1 conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244383  
    S3‑244134 Proposed conclusions for key issues #1 & 2 for HSS in satellite Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244383  
    S3‑244383 Proposed conclusions for key issues #1 & 2 for HSS in satellite Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244134
    S3‑244185 Conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.700-29 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244383  
    S3‑244243 pCR to TR33.700-29 Conclusion of KI#1 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244383  
    S3‑244247 Conclusions KI#1 Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244384  
    S3‑244384 Conclusions KI#1 Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244247
    S3‑243944 conclusion to key issue#1 regarding split MME architecture Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244384  
    S3‑244110 Discussion on the S&F operation under the split MME architecture Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244111 Conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.700-29 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244384  
    S3‑244135 Proposed conclusions for key issue #1 & 2 for split MME deployment Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244384  
    S3‑244288 Conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.700-29 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243880 Conclusion for Key Issue#1 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244269 Conclusion on KI #1 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244384  
    S3‑243945 conclusion to key issue#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244112 Conclusion for KI#2 in TR 33.700-29 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244385  
    S3‑244385 Conclusion for KI#2 in TR 33.700-29 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244112
    S3‑244248 Conclusions K#2 Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244385  
    S3‑243994 Update to solution 23 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244386  
    S3‑244386 Update to solution 23 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243994
    S3‑244087 updates and evaluation to solution #30 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244388  
    S3‑244388 updates and evaluation to solution #30 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244087
    S3‑244088 updates and evaluation to solution #28 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244389  
    S3‑244389 updates and evaluation to solution #28 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244088
    S3‑244133 Clarifications on the IOPS enhancements in solution #3 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244390  
    S3‑244390 Clarifications on the IOPS enhancements in solution #3 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244133
    S3‑244249 Evaluation of Solution #30 Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244387  
    S3‑244387 Evaluation of Solution #30 Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244249
    S3‑244270 Updates to Solution #21 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244494  
    S3‑244494 Updates to Solution #21 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244270
    S3‑244275 Update to solution#4 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243879 New Solution on Mitigation of Security Issues of Unprotected NAS Reject vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244391  
    S3‑244391 New Solution on Mitigation of Security Issues of Unprotected NAS Reject vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243879
    S3‑243916 Alternatives to Solution #21 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244392  
    S3‑244392 Alternatives to Solution #21 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243916
    S3‑243917 Merger of Solutions #8 and #21 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244393  
    S3‑244393 Merger of Solutions #8 and #21 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243917
    S3‑243995 New solution for authentication on split MME architecture in S&F mode Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244396  
    S3‑244396 New solution for authentication on split MME architecture in S&F mode Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243995
    S3‑243949 discussion paper on NAS security in Split MME architecture Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243918 Merger of Solutions #9 and #21 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244394  
    S3‑244394 Merger of Solutions #9 and #21 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243918
    S3‑243919 Merger of Solutions #15 and #21 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244395  
    S3‑244395 Merger of Solutions #15 and #21 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243919
    S3‑244091 New solution on NAS secuity in split MME architecture Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244397  
    S3‑244397 New solution on NAS secuity in split MME architecture Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244091
    S3‑244225 New KI - security of backhaul communication over feeder link in generic regenerative mode Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244398 New KI - security of backhaul communication over feeder link in generic regenerative mode Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑244227 Solution to secure backhaul of generic regenerative architecture Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244398  
    S3‑243827 Draft TR 33.700-29 CATT draft TR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.8 Study on security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication                      
5.9 Study on security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G S3‑243903 AIoT authentication integrated with data transmission KPN discussion Discussion Yes
YesInterdigital, Huawei supported this. Ericsson queried about the two way handshake.They didn’t see any issue with that.KPN replied that whatever is specified in RAN should be looked into.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243881 Discussion on Design Principles for AIoT Authentication vivo discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244015 New solution for authentication in Ambient IoT service China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR   Yes
YesKPN didn’t agree with this solution. NTT-Docomo: bring this back in the next meeting after some offline discussions. A better description of the architecture is needed.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243948 solution on protection for inventory and command procedure Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesKPN: this assumes to have NONCE in the paging message.It needs to be checked with RAN. Nokia: we need to know more on how the Xauth token is calculated.
 		revised No S3‑244366  
    S3‑244366 solution on protection for inventory and command procedure Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243948
    S3‑244010 Solution for AIoT Authentication Based on 5G-AKA OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesKPN: add editor's note in the evaluation for message 7. NTT-Docomo: I wouldn’t like this solution in our network due to the impact on the UDM. Ericsson: there is no protection against replay attack. OPPO replied that the replay attack applies to all solutions, not only this one.
 		revised No S3‑244367  
    S3‑244367 Solution for AIoT Authentication Based on 5G-AKA OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244010
    S3‑244011 Evaluation for AIoT Authentication Based on 5G-AKA OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: note it, we need more info on what the solution does.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244047 New Sol for KI#5 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesApple: retrieve reade ID in step 7 is not clear. Ericsson found a problem in step 3. KPN: step 6 needs an editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑244368  
    S3‑244368 New Sol for KI#5 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244047
    S3‑244175 AIoT - Security solution on Authentication Apple pCR   Yes
YesNokia: step 4, step 10 need more clarifications. OPPO was fine with this solution in general. Ericsson: RES and XRES Computation are not using the same input.Not sure that Device ID needs to be sent in step 4. Qualcomm had also issues with step 4. KPN: is it possible to implement this in a low power device?
 		revised No S3‑244369  
    S3‑244369 AIoT - Security solution on Authentication Apple pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244175
    S3‑244235 pCR to TR33.713 New solution for device authentication and data CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson agreed with this solution. KPN: too much information sent in the messages. NTT-Docomo: impact on the UDM. Nokia agreed with NTT-Docomo on the UDM impact.
 		revised No S3‑244370  
    S3‑244370 pCR to TR33.713 New solution for device authentication and data CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244235
    S3‑243882 KI#5, New Sol: AIoT device authentication vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244449  
    S3‑244449 KI#5, New Sol: AIoT device authentication vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243882
    S3‑244121 Solution for Authentication and ID Privacy of AIoT devices with USIM on AIoT AS Layer Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
YesKPN: some expectations from the AiOT device, it requires some complexity not suitable for this kind of devices. Note the document. Huawei: too many interactions required here. Interdigital: we don’t know the architecture so the feasibility is unknown. Add an editor's note. Apple: the evaluation should be an editor's note. OPPO: focus on the authentication aspects, keep this solution in.
 		revised No S3‑244450  
    S3‑244450 Solution for Authentication and ID Privacy of AIoT devices with USIM on AIoT AS Layer Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244121
    S3‑244122 Solution for Authentication and ID Privacy of AIoT devices with USIM on AIoT Layer Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244451  
    S3‑244451 Solution for Authentication and ID Privacy of AIoT devices with USIM on AIoT Layer Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244122
    S3‑244123 Solution for Authentication and ID privacy of AIoT devices without USIM Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244452  
    S3‑244452 Solution for Authentication and ID privacy of AIoT devices without USIM Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244123
    S3‑243946 update to key issue#5 on authentication Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with this contribution.
 		revised No S3‑244453  
    S3‑244453 update to key issue#5 on authentication Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesConcerns from Ericsson: is the editor's note about deployment? Add this in the clarification. The Chair commented that last minute arguments to object was not acceptable, but Ericsson disagreed doing this.
 		approved No   S3‑243946
    S3‑244012 Resolving ENs for AIoT KI#5 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244453  
    S3‑244208 Updating KI#5 Authentication in Ambient IoT service Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244454  
    S3‑244454 Updating KI#5 Authentication in Ambient IoT service Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: if we agree on a requirement we usually avoid detailed descriptions of the threats. NTT-Docomo: we don’t want to give a description on how to perform it but this is high level enough.
 		approved No   S3‑244208
    S3‑244238 pCR to TR33.713 Update key issue#5 for updating threats and requirements CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244453  
    S3‑243885 KI#4, New Sol: Communication Security of intermediate UE interacting with AIoT device vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: all solutions to key issue 4 should be noted. There was no security requirement submitted before the deadline. Huawei: we will see the same solutions coming again, this is not a very productive way to progress.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244125 Solution on Protection of transmitted information Sony pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244456  
    S3‑244456 Solution on Protection of transmitted information Sony pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: No security requirements before submissions and we are approving solutions now.
 		approved No   S3‑244125
    S3‑244139 A new solution for end-to-end security protection of command Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244457  
    S3‑244457 A new solution for end-to-end security protection of command Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244139
    S3‑243947 update to key issue#4 on information protection Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244455  
    S3‑244455 update to key issue#4 on information protection Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesNTT had issues with this document. Huawei: integrity and confidentiality protection is a trivial requirement for AIoT devices. Ericsson: all the remaining documents are solutions for this requirement.
 		approved No   S3‑243947
    S3‑244009 Update KI#4 for Command OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244455  
    S3‑244113 Update to KI#4 in TR 33.713 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244455  
    S3‑244150 Update to KI#4 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244455  
    S3‑244176 AIoT - KI update on communication security Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244455  
    S3‑244186 Update KI #4 for Inventory OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244455  
    S3‑244207 AIoT: Security threats for KI#4 on protection of information during AIoT service communication Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244455  
    S3‑244237 pCR to TR33.713 Update key issue#4 for adding threats and requirements CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244455  
    S3‑244115 New solution on disabling operation procedure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244458  
    S3‑244458 New solution on disabling operation procedure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244115
    S3‑244187 Solution on disabling operation procedure for AIoT services OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital commented that the procedure was complex, lots of messages.
 		revised No S3‑244459  
    S3‑244459 Solution on disabling operation procedure for AIoT services OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesAdding editor's notes to address comments from Nokia and Qualcomm.
 		approved No   S3‑244187
    S3‑244240 Solution on Disabling Enabling OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244460  
    S3‑244460 Solution on Disabling Enabling OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244240
    S3‑244246 Solution#1 update - Addressing ENs Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244508  
    S3‑244508 Solution#1 update - Addressing ENs Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244246
    S3‑244287 Evaluation of solution#1 Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244509  
    S3‑244509 Evaluation of solution#1 Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244287
    S3‑244044 Add the evaluation for the Sol#2 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244046 Resolve the EN in the Sol#2 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244467  
    S3‑244467 Resolve the EN in the Sol#2 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244046
    S3‑244114 New solution on authorization of intermediate node for Ambient IoT services Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244468  
    S3‑244468 New solution on authorization of intermediate node for Ambient IoT services Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244114
    S3‑244214 New solution to key issue #2: Authorization for 5G Ambient IoT services Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244469  
    S3‑244469 New solution to key issue #2: Authorization for 5G Ambient IoT services Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244214
    S3‑243854 An update for Key Issue #2: Authorization for 5G Ambient IoT Services InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243855 Solution for Lightweight AIoT ID privacy InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244470  
    S3‑244470 Solution for Lightweight AIoT ID privacy InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243855
    S3‑243874 Solution for AIoT ID ephemeral security context InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244477  
    S3‑244477 Solution for AIoT ID ephemeral security context InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243874
    S3‑244007 Sol on AIoT device ID privacy protection using anonymous key OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244478  
    S3‑244478 Sol on AIoT device ID privacy protection using anonymous key OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244007
    S3‑244008 Sol on temporary ID based AIoT device privacy protection OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244479  
    S3‑244479 Sol on temporary ID based AIoT device privacy protection OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244008
    S3‑244043 New solution on KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244480  
    S3‑244480 New solution on KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244043
    S3‑244124 Solution on Privacy Protection for AIoT device Sony pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244138 A new solution for privacy protection of AIoT device identifier Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: add an editor's note about the anonimity of the key.
 		revised No S3‑244483  
    S3‑244483 A new solution for privacy protection of AIoT device identifier Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244138
    S3‑244177 AIoT - Security solution on Privacy protection Apple pCR   Yes
YesInterdigital: impact on the network needs to be evaluated here. NTT-Docomo didn’t see how this worked.
 		revised No S3‑244484  
    S3‑244484 AIoT - Security solution on Privacy protection Apple pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244177
    S3‑244213 New solution to KI#3 Privacy by protecting AIoT device identifiers Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: SUCI is a well defined parameter, so it is confusing to name it that way. Qualcomm supported this. Lenovo: how is the paging done? Ericsson replied that it was up to SA2 to decided this, but Lenovo preferred to have an editor's note on the paging details.
 		revised No S3‑244485  
    S3‑244485 New solution to KI#3 Privacy by protecting AIoT device identifiers Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244213
    S3‑244236 pCR to TR33.713 New solution for protecting Device IDs in inventory scenarios CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244486  
    S3‑244486 pCR to TR33.713 New solution for protecting Device IDs in inventory scenarios CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244236
    S3‑244245 New solution - Ambient IoT ID privacy Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: keyless hashing? If not, how does the network know the key? Add an editor's note about it.
 		revised No S3‑244487  
    S3‑244487 New solution - Ambient IoT ID privacy Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244245
    S3‑244274 New solution on protecting AIoT ID Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244488  
    S3‑244488 New solution on protecting AIoT ID Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244274
    S3‑243883 New Key Issue on Exposure of Inventory Device Quantity vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesOPPO disagreed with this key issue. Inerdigital: an attack like this is possible, not sure if worthy of being a key issue. Huawei: remove requirements.
 		revised No S3‑244489  
    S3‑244489 New Key Issue on Exposure of Inventory Device Quantity vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243883
    S3‑243884 New Sol: Protection on quantity of AIoT devices during Inventory vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244209 New key issue for Authenticated and authorized access to devices in Ambient IoT via 3GPP core Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesConcerns from Sony and KPN.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244210 New key issue for application layer authentication in Ambient IoT Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesConcerns from Sony and KPN.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244211 New key issue for secure storage in AIoT devices Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244365  
    S3‑244365 New key issue for secure storage in AIoT devices Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia objected to this. OPPO: reformullate the key issue.
 		noted No   S3‑244211
    S3‑244212 New Key Issue on Amplification of resource exhaustion by exploiting AIoT Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesLenovo didn’t agree with this key issue. Huawei: we have group paging in MBMS and we don’t address this kind of issue there. Apple: we can capture this problem even if we find simpler solutions. Interdigital found it useful to capture this. This was left open.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244045 Clean up for TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244206 AIoT: Security assumptions in the 5G system Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: this doesn’t read as an assumption.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244242 Interim Conclusion on KI#2 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm didn agree with the document. Nokia: too early for this but the general principle is fine.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243828 Draft TR 33.713 OPPO draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.10 Study on security aspects of Usage of User Identities S3‑243860 Additional conclusions for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244407  
    S3‑244407 Additional conclusions for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑243860
    S3‑244018 TR 33.700-32 Conclusion for Key Issue#3 InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244408  
    S3‑244408 TR 33.700-32 Conclusion for Key Issue#3 InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑244018
    S3‑244072 Conclusion of KI#3 in TR 33.700-32 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244407  
    S3‑243861 conclusions for KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244409  
    S3‑243862 conclusions for KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244409  
    S3‑244017 TR 33.700-32 Conclusion for Key Issue#1 and Key Issue#2 InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244409  
    S3‑244033 Concluding KI1 and KI2 in UIA DOCOMO Communications Lab. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244409  
    S3‑244409 Concluding KI1 and KI2 in UIA DOCOMO Communications Lab. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244033
    S3‑244048 add conclusion to KI1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244409  
    S3‑244049 add conclusion to KI2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244409  
    S3‑244105 33.700-32: Evaluation of Solution 26 and Conclusion on KI#1 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244410  
    S3‑244410 33.700-32: Evaluation of Solution 26 and Conclusion on KI#1 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244105
    S3‑244106 33.700-32: Evaluation of Solution 27 and Conclusion on KI#2 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244411  
    S3‑244411 33.700-32: Evaluation of Solution 27 and Conclusion on KI#2 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244106
    S3‑243859 Sol#5 update to address EN Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243996 Evaluation on sol#23 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243997 Evaluation on sol#25 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244090 Update and evaluation on solution 24 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243829 Draft TR 33.700-32 Interdigital draft TR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.11 Study on UAS security enhancement S3‑243857 new solution on UUAA for USS changeover Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244426  
    S3‑244426 new solution on UUAA for USS changeover Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243857
    S3‑244174 Update for solution 5 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244378  
    S3‑244378 Update for solution 5 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244174
    S3‑244189 Update for solution 6 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244379  
    S3‑244379 Update for solution 6 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244189
    S3‑244216 Evaluation for solution 5 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244380  
    S3‑244380 Evaluation for solution 5 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244216
    S3‑244220 Evaluation for solution 6 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244381  
    S3‑244381 Evaluation for solution 6 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244220
    S3‑243858 conclusions for KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244427  
    S3‑244019 TR 33.759 Conclusion for Key Issue#1 InterDigital Communications, Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244427  
    S3‑244427 TR 33.759 Conclusion for Key Issue#1 InterDigital Communications, Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244019
    S3‑244223 Conclusion for KI#1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244427  
    S3‑244226 New WID on UAS security enhancements Ericsson WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243830 Draft TR 33.759 Ericsson draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.12 Study on security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 S3‑244119 Reply LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244371  
    S3‑244140 reply LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244371  
    S3‑244371 reply LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244140
    S3‑243972 Reply LS on security considerations for 5G ProSew multi-hop relays Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244371  
    S3‑244222 Reply LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays China Telecom Corporation Ltd. LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244371  
    S3‑243967 Update the evaluation of solution 5 in TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: editor's note not resolved. Ericsson and Qualcomm had also some issues. It was left open.
 		revised No S3‑244481  
    S3‑244481 Update the evaluation of solution 5 in TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243967
    S3‑244117 Update to solution #8 in TR 33.743 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: leave the editor's note on steps 3 - 6. Interdigital: no alignment with SA2 here.
 		revised No S3‑244372  
    S3‑244372 Update to solution #8 in TR 33.743 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244117
    S3‑244199 Update Solution#4 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: description in the note should be captured in the evaluation. We are not sure this is algined with SA2. Huawei: this is not aligned with SA2. Interdigital: Need for end to end security is not justfied.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244373 Update Solution#4 Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑244116 Update to solution #7 in TR 33.743 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244513  
    S3‑244513 Update to solution #7 in TR 33.743 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244116
    S3‑244144 Updating evaluations to solution #9 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244374  
    S3‑244374 Updating evaluations to solution #9 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesAddressing comments from Ericsson.
 		approved No   S3‑244144
    S3‑244145 Updating evaluations to solution #7 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244513  
    S3‑244197 Update Solution#2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesXiaomi had issues with this contribution.
 		revised No S3‑244496  
    S3‑244496 Update Solution#2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244197
    S3‑244198 Update Solution#3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244497  
    S3‑244497 Update Solution#3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244198
    S3‑244141 A new solution for multi-hop U2N relay communication security Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244498  
    S3‑244498 A new solution for multi-hop U2N relay communication security Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244141
    S3‑243966 Discussion on multi-hop U2NW relay solutions and way forward for the conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243968 Conclusion to KI#1 - multi-hop U2NW discovery Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244375  
    S3‑244375 Conclusion to KI#1 - multi-hop U2NW discovery Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑243968
    S3‑243969 Conclusion to KI#1 - multi-hop U2NW link setup Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244376  
    S3‑244020 TR 33.743 Conclusion for Key Issue#1 InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244376  
    S3‑244376 TR 33.743 Conclusion for Key Issue#1 InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑244020
    S3‑244118 Conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.743 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244376  
    S3‑244218 Conclusion of KI#1 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244376  
    S3‑244142 Conclusion of KI#1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with this document.
 		merged No S3‑244376  
    S3‑244239 pCR to TR33.743 Conclusion of KI#1 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244375  
    S3‑243970 Conclusion to KI#2 - multi-hop U2U discovery Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244377  
    S3‑243971 Conclusion to KI#2 - multi-hop U2U link setup Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244377  
    S3‑244221 Conclusion of KI#2 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244377  
    S3‑244241 pCR to TR33.743 Conclusion of KI#2 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244377  
    S3‑244143 Conclusion of KI#2 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244377  
    S3‑244377 Conclusion of KI#2 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244143
    S3‑243965 Terminology alignment of TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243831 Draft TR 33.743 Huawei draft TR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.13 Study on security aspects of AIML enhancements S3‑243953 Resolve EN on solution 1 for kI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t think that removing the editor's note was justified.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243890 Address ENs in solution #14 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244438  
    S3‑244438 Address ENs in solution #14 vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesMCC commented that there was no need to convert it into a NOTE since this was still a reminder of work to be done with SA2.
 		approved No   S3‑243890
    S3‑244232 LMF authorization for AI/ML model retrieval from NWDAF Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesVivo: add user consent and permission, since SA2 includes this in their work.
 		revised No S3‑244439  
    S3‑244439 LMF authorization for AI/ML model retrieval from NWDAF Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244232
    S3‑243939 solution 3 update Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: roles are clear in SA2.
 		revised No S3‑244499  
    S3‑244499 solution 3 update Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243939
    S3‑243888 Address ENs in solution #4 vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: the second editor's note should stay.This needs further evaluation.
 		revised No S3‑244440  
    S3‑244440 Address ENs in solution #4 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243888
    S3‑244233 Resolve ENs for Solution#5 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244234 Update Solution #5 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244495  
    S3‑244495 Update Solution #5 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244234
    S3‑244084 Evaluation of solution 6 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244441  
    S3‑244441 Evaluation of solution 6 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244084
    S3‑244085 Resolution of EN on solution 6 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243960 update on solution 9 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: no agreement in SA2 for this sample alignment procedure. Add an editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑244442  
    S3‑244442 update on solution 9 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243960
    S3‑243961 Resolution of EN on solution 9 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243889 Address ENs in Solution #10 vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: keep the second editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑244443  
    S3‑244443 Address ENs in Solution #10 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243889
    S3‑243922 Discussion paper on privacy protection in sample alignment InterDigital Communications discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243920 Solution of Privacy protection in VFL InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244444  
    S3‑244444 Solution of Privacy protection in VFL InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243920
    S3‑243891 Address ENs in Solution #15 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244445  
    S3‑244445 Address ENs in Solution #15 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243891
    S3‑243959 Resolution of EN on solution 15 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244445  
    S3‑243951 conclusion to key issue#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244500  
    S3‑244500 conclusion to key issue#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243951
    S3‑244289 Conclusion for Key Issue#1 of TR 33.784 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243892 Discussion on basic conclusion of key issue#2 vivo, China Mobile discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243893 Basic Conclusion for key issue#2 vivo, China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244446  
    S3‑244446 Basic Conclusion for key issue#2 vivo, China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243893
    S3‑243937 KI2 conclusion Nokia pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244446  
    S3‑244086 K#2 Conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244446  
    S3‑244290 Conclusion for Key Issue#2 of TR 33.784 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244446  
    S3‑243894 Conclusion for Key Issue#2 on NEF security requirement vivo, China Mobile, China Unicom, China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243895 Discussion on Wayforward for Key Issue 3 of AIML vivo discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243896 Conclusion for key Issue#3 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244514  
    S3‑244514 Conclusion for key Issue#3 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243896
    S3‑243956 conclusion to key issue#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244447  
    S3‑244447 conclusion to key issue#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243956
    S3‑244071 Conclusion on KI#3 VFL privacy OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244447  
    S3‑243897 LS to SA2 on Security Requirement on Restricting Exposure of UE ID for Sample Alignment vivo LS out Approval Yes
YesNokia, Ericsson: this is not needed. It’s a SA2 issue.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244006 Conclusion on KI#4 VFL communication security OPPO, vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244448  
    S3‑243938 KI4 conclusion Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244448  
    S3‑243957 conclusion to key issue#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244448  
    S3‑244448 conclusion to key issue#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243957
    S3‑243832 Draft TR 33.784 China Mobile draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.14 Study on EdgeComputing S3‑244095 Addressing the ENs on brute force and synchronization of Solution#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244428  
    S3‑244428 Addressing the ENs on brute force and synchronization of Solution#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244095
    S3‑244285 enhancement in solution 3 for KI#2.1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244429  
    S3‑244429 enhancement in solution 3 for KI#2.1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244285
    S3‑244286 fixing ENs in solution 4 for KI#2.1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244161 Resolving ENs in solution #6 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244430  
    S3‑244430 Resolving ENs in solution #6 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244161
    S3‑244162 Evaluation of solution #6 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244431  
    S3‑244431 Evaluation of solution #6 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244162
    S3‑244266 Update to solution#7 in TR 33.749 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244432  
    S3‑244432 Update to solution#7 in TR 33.749 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244266
    S3‑244267 Update to solution#8 in TR 33.749 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244501  
    S3‑244501 Update to solution#8 in TR 33.749 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244267
    S3‑244170 A new solution for KI#2.1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244502  
    S3‑244502 A new solution for KI#2.1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244170
    S3‑244096 conclusion to KI#2.1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244433  
    S3‑244433 conclusion to KI#2.1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑244096
    S3‑244283 evaluation summary of solutions for KI#2.1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244284 conclusion for KI#2.1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244433  
    S3‑244163 Security requirements for KI#1.1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244434  
    S3‑244052 Update the KI#1.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244434  
    S3‑244434 Update the KI#1.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244052
    S3‑244051 New solution for KI#1.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244435  
    S3‑244435 New solution for KI#1.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244051
    S3‑244164 A new solution for KI#1.1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244436  
    S3‑244436 A new solution for KI#1.1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑244164
    S3‑244165 Conclusion for KI#1.1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244437  
    S3‑244281 discussion paper for KI#1.1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244282 evaluation and conlcusion for KI#1.1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244437  
    S3‑244437 evaluation and conlcusion for KI#1.1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244282
    S3‑244050 Clean up for TR 33.749 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243833 Draft TR 33.749 China Unicom draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.15 Study on security aspects for Multi-Access S3‑244188 Update of Solution #5: UE authentication and traffic protection in ATSSS-Lite Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244200 Update of Solution #5: Discussion on UPF exposure Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesIt was commented that the TR was considered closed in content and no further input should be added. The TR was to be sent for approval in the next TSG meeting. CableLabs commented that this was considered a correction. They had serious concerns on the contents of 420. Ericsson commented that this content had been approved in the last meeting (where CableLabs was present), and had not been implemented by mistake.
 		approved No    
    S3‑243840 Draft TR 33.754 Ericsson draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.16 Study on 5GS enhancements for Energy Saving S3‑243924 Update on Key Issue 1 related to security aspects on user consent for energy information collection IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244503  
    S3‑244503 Update on Key Issue 1 related to security aspects on user consent for energy information collection IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243924
    S3‑243926 Update on Key Issue 2 related to security aspects on user consent for energy information exposure IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244504  
    S3‑244504 Update on Key Issue 2 related to security aspects on user consent for energy information exposure IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243926
    S3‑243928 Discussion on security overhead for collecting and exposing energy information IIT Bombay discussion Endorsement Yes
YesNokia: a bit late for this. Huawei: beyond the scope of the study, but you can bring a revised SID. We would also need more justificaiton.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243923 Update of Solution #1: Solution reusing existing interfaces and security mechanisms for energy related information collection IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243925 New solution for security aspects on user consent for policy update based on energy information IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243927 New solution for security aspects on user consent for energy information exposure/retrieval IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243958 Update to sol#3 for KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244404  
    S3‑244404 Update to sol#3 for KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243958
    S3‑243962 Resolve EN to Sol#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244405  
    S3‑244405 Resolve EN to Sol#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243962
    S3‑243963 Resolve EN to Sol#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243964 Resolve EN to KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244147 Regional legislation compliance in relation to collection user information. Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244215 Resolve EN in Solution#1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244217 Conclusion for KI#1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244219 Conclusion for KI#2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244146 Correction of references Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244406  
    S3‑244148 Update of SID schedule Nokia SID revised Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244171 Editorial updates Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244406  
    S3‑244406 Editorial updates Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244171
    S3‑244172 Overview Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244302 Draft TR 33.766 Ericsson,Nokia draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.17 Study on security aspects of 5G NR Femto S3‑244001 LS on NR Femto GW for aggregating user plane traffic Charter Communications, Inc LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244002 Discussion paper: Observations on TR 38.799 Study on additional topological enhancements for NR Charter Communications, Inc discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243974 address EN to KI#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244414  
    S3‑244414 address EN to KI#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243974
    S3‑244053 Change the EN to a NOTE in KI#4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244414  
    S3‑243975 address EN to KI#9 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244005 Editorial updates to KI#9 descriptions Charter Communications, Inc pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244415  
    S3‑244415 Editorial updates to KI#9 descriptions Charter Communications, Inc pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244005
    S3‑244054 Update Sol#1 to address the EN ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244003 Updates for solution #3 to address the needs for KI#9 Charter Communications, Inc pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244416  
    S3‑244416 Updates for solution #3 to address the needs for KI#9 Charter Communications, Inc pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244003
    S3‑244082 Updates for solution 5 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244083 Solution 6 updates Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243984 add evaluation to solution#8 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243985 add evaluation to solution#9 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243986 add evaluation to solution#11 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243976 New solution to KI#3 and conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244417  
    S3‑244055 Add a solution to KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244417  
    S3‑244417 Add a solution to KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244055
    S3‑244013 New solution for key issue 3 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243978 New solution to KI#4 and conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244418  
    S3‑244418 New solution to KI#4 and conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243978
    S3‑243981 New solution to KI#7 and conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244419  
    S3‑244419 New solution to KI#7 and conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243981
    S3‑244056 Add conclusions to KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244420  
    S3‑244420 Add conclusions to KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244056
    S3‑243977 conclusion to KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244421  
    S3‑244057 Add conclusions to KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244421  
    S3‑244421 Add conclusions to KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244057
    S3‑244058 Add conclusions to KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244059 Add conclusions to KI#4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244422  
    S3‑244422 Add conclusions to KI#4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244059
    S3‑243979 conclusion to KI#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244423  
    S3‑244060 Add conclusions to KI#5 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244423  
    S3‑244423 Add conclusions to KI#5 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244060
    S3‑243980 conclusion to KI#6 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244424  
    S3‑244061 Add conclusions to KI#6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244424  
    S3‑244424 Add conclusions to KI#6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244061
    S3‑244062 Add conclusions to KI#7 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243982 conclusion to KI#8 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244425  
    S3‑244063 Add conclusions to KI#8 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244425  
    S3‑244425 Add conclusions to KI#8 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244063
    S3‑243983 conclusion to KI#9 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244004 Discussion paper on access to local services for Femto Charter Communications, Inc discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244098 New key issue for Security and privacy aspects of local access Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244064 Draft WID on security aspects of 5G NR Femto ZTE Corporation other Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244303 Draft TR 33.745 ZTE draft TR discussion Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.18 Study on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services S3‑244067 Update KI #1 in TR 33.721 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244065 Resolve the EN in the Sol#1 in TR 33.721 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244471  
    S3‑244471 Resolve the EN in the Sol#1 in TR 33.721 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244065
    S3‑244066 Update evaluation for Sol#1 in TR 33.721 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244472  
    S3‑244472 Update evaluation for Sol#1 in TR 33.721 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244066
    S3‑244107 33.721: Evaluation of Solution 4 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244278 Solution for KI#2 on Privacy of user sensitive information Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244473  
    S3‑244473 Solution for KI#2 on Privacy of user sensitive information Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244278
    S3‑244279 Solution for KI#3 on Security aspects of digital asset container in 5G Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244474 Solution for KI#3 on Security aspects of digital asset container in 5G Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑244263 Solution for digital asset request validation Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244475  
    S3‑244475 Solution for digital asset request validation Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244518 S3‑244263
    S3‑244518 Solution for digital asset request validation Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244475
    S3‑244108 33.721: Update to Key Issue 4 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244476  
    S3‑244109 33.721: New Solution for Key Issue 4 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244277 update KI#4 on Authentication and authorization of digital representation Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244476  
    S3‑244476 update KI#4 on Authentication and authorization of digital representation Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244277
    S3‑244304 Draft TR 33.721 Samsung draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.19 Study on security aspects of CAPIF Phase 3 S3‑244298 Add scope for the TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243866 draft reply LS to SA6 on CAPIF phase 3 security considerations Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244340  
    S3‑244021 LS-out Reply to LS on CAPIF phase 3 security considerations Nokia LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244340  
    S3‑244037 reply LS on CAPIF phase 3 security considerations ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244340  
    S3‑244182 Reply LS to SA6 on CAPIF security consideration Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244340  
    S3‑244296 Reply LS on CAPIF phase 3 security considerations Xiaomi communications LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244340  
    S3‑244340 Reply LS on CAPIF phase 3 security considerations Xiaomi communications LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244296
    S3‑244169 LS on terminology alignment between SA6 and SA3 Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244516  
    S3‑244516 LS on terminology alignment between SA6 and SA3 Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244169
    S3‑244168 Update to KI#1 for fixing the terminology Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson preferred the term permission but most companies preferred authorization. The definion for resource owner authorization was under discussion. It was agreed to use the term resource owner authorization.
 		revised No S3‑244515  
    S3‑244515 Update to KI#1 for fixing the terminology Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244168
    S3‑243863 new solution for KI1.1 - CAPIF-8 security Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244341  
    S3‑244341 new solution for KI1.1 - CAPIF-8 security Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243863
    S3‑244068 Solution for key issue 1.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244076 New solution for KI#1.1 CAPIF-8 reference point China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244342  
    S3‑244342 New solution for KI#1.1 CAPIF-8 reference point China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244076
    S3‑243864 new solution for KI1.2 - resource owner authorized revocation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244343  
    S3‑244343 new solution for KI1.2 - resource owner authorized revocation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243864
    S3‑243849 Solution to KI#1 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244344  
    S3‑244344 Solution to KI#1 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243849
    S3‑244078 New solution for KI#1.2 resource owner authorization management China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244345  
    S3‑244345 New solution for KI#1.2 resource owner authorization management China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244078
    S3‑244028 RO consent management Nokia pCR   Yes
YeslLenovo: other groups use user consent and here I see the term permissions being used everywhere. Nokia commented that once the term was agreed they would change the term permission.
 		revised No S3‑244346  
    S3‑244346 RO consent management Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244028
    S3‑244291 Resource owner triggered revocation procedure Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: remove evaluation.
 		revised No S3‑244347  
    S3‑244347 Resource owner triggered revocation procedure Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244291
    S3‑244292 Resource owner authentication and authorization mechanism Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: remove evaluation.
 		revised No S3‑244348  
    S3‑244348 Resource owner authentication and authorization mechanism Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244292
    S3‑243865 new solution for KI1.3 - resource-level and api-level authorization and revocation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesLenovo: evaluation TBD. Xiaomi: Authorization level defined by SA6? Nokia answered that auth token aspects belonged to SA3.
 		revised No S3‑244349  
    S3‑244349 new solution for KI1.3 - resource-level and api-level authorization and revocation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243865
    S3‑244027 KI1.3 Solution on scope enhancing Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244350  
    S3‑244350 KI1.3 Solution on scope enhancing Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244027
    S3‑244167 Update to KI#1.2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: we prefer not to introduce new key issues or additional use cases.
 		revised No S3‑244351  
    S3‑244351 Update to KI#1.2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244167
    S3‑243834 LS on CAPIF phase 3 security considerations S6-243764 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑244166 Solution for key issue #1.2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244352  
    S3‑244352 Solution for key issue #1.2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244166
    S3‑244022 KI2 Solution on security method retrieval in CAPIF interconnect Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244353  
    S3‑244353 KI2 Solution on security method retrieval in CAPIF interconnect Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244022
    S3‑244023 KI2 Solution on authentication aspect in CAPIF interconnect requesting security information from another CCF Nokia pCR   Yes
YesLenovo proposed an editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑244354  
    S3‑244354 KI2 Solution on authentication aspect in CAPIF interconnect requesting security information from another CCF Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244023
    S3‑244024 KI2 Solution on authentication aspect in CAPIF interconnect when API invoker has not included CCF information Nokia pCR   Yes
YesEricsson suggested to remove the evaluation.
 		revised No S3‑244355  
    S3‑244355 KI2 Solution on authentication aspect in CAPIF interconnect when API invoker has not included CCF information Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244024
    S3‑244025 KI2 Solution on authorization token request handling in CAPIF interconnect Nokia pCR   Yes
YesEricsson: remove evaluation from this and all documents.Lenovo proposed an editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑244356  
    S3‑244356 KI2 Solution on authorization token request handling in CAPIF interconnect Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244025
    S3‑244026 KI2 Solution on mapping an API invoker authorization request to the correct CCF in CAPIF interconnect Nokia pCR   Yes
YesXiaomi: step 1 -5 not aligned with existing authorization call flow. An editor's note is needed. Ericsson supported this. Lenovo proposed adding an editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑244357  
    S3‑244357 KI2 Solution on mapping an API invoker authorization request to the correct CCF in CAPIF interconnect Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244026
    S3‑244070 Solution for key issue 2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244077 New solution for KI#2 CAPIF interconnection China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244358  
    S3‑244358 New solution for KI#2 CAPIF interconnection China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244077
    S3‑244158 New solution for CAPIF interconnection Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244359  
    S3‑244359 New solution for CAPIF interconnection Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244158
    S3‑244264 Solution for security aspects of CAPIF interconnection Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244360  
    S3‑244360 Solution for security aspects of CAPIF interconnection Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244264
    S3‑244293 API invoker authentication mechanism in CAPIF interconnection scenarios Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244361  
    S3‑244361 API invoker authentication mechanism in CAPIF interconnection scenarios Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244293
    S3‑244294 API invoker authorization mechanism in CAPIF interconnection scenarios Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244362  
    S3‑244362 API invoker authorization mechanism in CAPIF interconnection scenarios Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244294
    S3‑244295 Security method negotiation mechanism in CAPIF interconnection scenarios Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244363  
    S3‑244363 Security method negotiation mechanism in CAPIF interconnection scenarios Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244295
    S3‑244300 Solution to KI#2 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244364  
    S3‑244364 Solution to KI#2 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244300
    S3‑244159 Solution for accessing UE resources by an application on another UE Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244160 Solution for nested API invocation Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244461  
    S3‑244461 Solution for nested API invocation Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244160
    S3‑244265 Authorization for Nested API invocation Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244462  
    S3‑244462 Authorization for Nested API invocation Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesAdding an editor's note as proposed by Vivo.
 		approved No   S3‑244265
    S3‑244029 KI5 Solution on authenticating multiple API invokers of the same RO Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244463  
    S3‑244463 KI5 Solution on authenticating multiple API invokers of the same RO Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244029
    S3‑244297 Shared information based authentication and authorization mechanism for multiple API invokers Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244030 KI on Onboarding security issue Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244464  
    S3‑244464 KI on Onboarding security issue Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑244030
    S3‑244031 Solution on validation of correct GPSI in API invoker information Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244465  
    S3‑244465 Solution on validation of correct GPSI in API invoker information Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑244031
    S3‑244032 Editorial - Streamlining interconnect KI details Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑244466  
    S3‑244466 Editorial - Streamlining interconnect KI details Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244032
    S3‑244069 Clean up for TR 33.700-22 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑244466  
    S3‑244305 Draft TR 33.700-22 Ericsson draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
6 New Study/Work item proposals                      
7 CVD and research                      
8 Any Other Business S3‑243804 SA3 meeting calendar SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244491 Rel-20 Planning SA3 WG Chair other discussion Yes
YesHuawei: we should have a conference call to discuss this. Avoid doing it like 5G. NTT-Docomo: topics will depend on the other groups. AT&T: 6G security authentication would be a good priority topic for a 6G study. Apple: companiies will need time to evaluate this, a conference call would help but we don’t have time to provide input for the Orlando meeting. The Chair commented that some input was required for the TSG meeting in December. A conference call before the Orlando meeting would be definitely held. The Chair clarified that the 5G advanced workshop would take place the first day of the TG Plenary in December. The conference call on this topic was decided to be on the 30th October, 13.00 - 14.00 UTC. It was clarified that the input was on logistics, no SIDs or WIDs.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244517 Rel-19 meetings for SA3 SA3 WG Chair other discussion Yes
YesE-meeting in January, targeting for two or three agenda items only. The Chair will ask in Plenary in December for this online meeting. The topics will be decided in the Orlando meeting.
 		noted No