Tdoc List
2024-08-27 15:43
| Agenda | Topic | TDoc | Title | Source | Type | For | Avail | Treated | Decision | Wdrn | Replaced-by | Replaces |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Agenda and Meeting Objectives | S3‑242700 | Agenda | SA WG3 Chair | agenda | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
| S3‑242702 | Process for SA3#117 | SA WG3 Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242703 | Detail agenda planning for SA3#117 | SA WG3 Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243406 | ||||
| S3‑243406 | Detail agenda planning for SA3#117 | SA WG3 Chair | other | - | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑242703 | |||
| 2.1 | Previous SA3 meeting report/s and SA report | S3‑242701 | Report from SA3#116 | MCC | report | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
| S3‑242705 | Report to SA3 from SA | SA WG3 Chair | report | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242839 | SWG Discussion | SA3 Chair | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
YesOption 4 was the preferred option among the companies.
Cablelabs: when do we start with the LI report?
The SA3 Chair commented that LI would provide a report for the current meeting, but the form of the report (tdoc or oral) was to be discussed.
Vodafone: there are meeting reports in SA3-LI, we could incorporate them in the SA3 reports.
Puneet (SA Chair) asked how many present companies were attending the present meeting. A few hands were raised. The SA chair commented that their ToR may have to be reviewed. The IPR reminders should be read at the start of every meeting (the SA3-LI chair confirmed that this was being done). A report of the SWG meeting needed to be provided and presented at TSG level (showing contributions, number of attendees, and so on).
Alex (SA3-LI Chair) commented that the MCC report could be provided easily.They added that LI was given to SA3 as a decision of PCG. The SA Chair commented that treated contributions needed to be public information, more transparency was needed. The SA3-Li Chair replied that the Portal provided all the necessary information on contributions and attendance.
The SA Chair commented that the SA3 Chair should have a full view on SA3-Li activities in case the SA3-LI was not available in the TSG meeting, in order to answer any questions. The SA3 Chair commented that he didn’t attend the meetings and couldn’t have this full view. The SA3-Li Chair commented that he was the only LI representative in Plenaries but he couldn’t attend all meetings. Any questions directed to SA3-LI could be answered offline if the SA3 Chair needed help.
It was endorsed to maintain the current structure between SA3 and SA3-LI adding the necessary report on SA3-LI activities on a particular agenda item in the SA3 agenda.
It was commented that the SA3-LI CRs could also be agreed during the SA3 meeting as it was done in the past.
| noted | No | ||||
| 2.2 | SA3-LI report | |||||||||||
| 3 | Reports and Liaisons from other Groups | S3‑242710 | LS on Resource content filters | C4-241339 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
| S3‑243040 | Reply LS to CT4 on Resource content filters | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243217 | Reply LS on Resource content filter | Samsung | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243678 | |||
| S3‑243678 | Reply LS on Resource content filter | Samsung | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243217 | |||
| S3‑243279 | Reply-LS on LS on Resource content filters | Nokia | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243678 | ||||
| S3‑242719 | LS on the use of TLS with QUIC in ATSSS context | S2-2405459 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑243042 | Discussion about Rel-18 ATSSS | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
YesHuawei: enough to say that TLS is supported after removing the editor's note.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242959 | Reply LS on the use of TLS with QUIC in ATSSS context | Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242733 | Recent attack on polynomial based MACs with short tag | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
| S3‑242767 | Discussion on polynomial based MACs with short Tag | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Approval | Yes |
YesKDDI had issues with observation 1 and they needed clarification with observation 5.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242768 | Reply LS on Polynomial based MACs with short Tag | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242706 | Response to S3-240886 LS on the introduction of the domain ""ipxnetwork.org"" | GSMA 5GMRR | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
| S3‑242780 | LS on aggregation and other N32 topics in the context of mediated roaming | BSI (DE) | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243676 | |||
| S3‑243676 | LS on aggregation and other N32 topics in the context of mediated roaming | BSI (DE) | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242780 | |||
| S3‑242931 | LS on Discrepancy between GSMA and 3GPP specifications on 5G Roaming over Roaming Intermediaries | CableLabs | LS out | Approval | Yes |
YesThe Chair queried if there was anything expected from SA to do here. Nokia replied that SA should be aware of the statement given to GSMA that new solutions are not allowed in this situation from 3GPP perspective.
Huawei: it's not clear what SA has to say to GSMA. SA already told GSMA that they needed to come to 3GPP to provide input contributions as LS exchanges were not the best way to work.
NTT-Docomo commented that GSMA had been invited to come to 3GPP twice already without any response.
Huawei: no harm in asking SA for guidance.
| revised | No | S3‑243677 | |||
| S3‑243677 | LS on GSMA non compliance with 3GPP specifications on 5G Roaming over Roaming Intermediaries | CableLabs | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242931 | |||
| S3‑242716 | Reply LS on security of IP transport over satellite transport links | R3-243955 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242725 | LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions | S2-2407350 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
| S3‑242721 | LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays | S2-2407207 | LS in | Yes |
YesInterdigital: we prefer Ericsson or Huawei's baseline for the response.
| postponed | No | |||||
| S3‑242732 | Reply LS on request clarification on mobile metaverse services | S6-242734 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑243000 | Draft LS to SA6 on obtaining user consent for the exposure of User Sensitive Information | Apple | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242824 | SA3 input to Reply LS on clarifications on consent management | Nokia | LS out | Yes |
YesHuawei, Ericsson: this may cause additional discussions and create confusion.
Apple was fine with the agreed version from Jeju meeting, not this version.
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑243366 | LS on obtaining user consent for the exposure of User Sensitive Information | S6a240323 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
| S3‑242727 | LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel | S4-241373 | LS in | Yes |
YesNokia, Ericsson, Qualcomm had some issues with the LS replies.
| postponed | No | |||||
| S3‑243407 | Reply to: LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel | China Mobile | LS out | approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243027 | Reply LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243407 | |||
| S3‑243232 | Reply LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel | China Mobile | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243407 | |||
| S3‑242730 | LS on Clarification related to Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF | S6-242714 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
| S3‑242898 | Reply LS to SA6 on Clarification related to Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
YesNTT-Docomo: the term trusted AF is not clear.
| revised | No | S3‑243408 | |||
| S3‑243408 | Reply LS to SA6 on Clarification related to Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑242898 | |||
| S3‑242723 | LS on Clarification of requirements for Ambient IoT | S2-2407231 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑243239 | Reply LS on Clarification of requirements for Ambient IoT | China Mobile | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242737 | LS on Support for Ambient IoT Security | SP-241016 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242753 | LS on RAN2 agreements and assumptions for Ambient IoT | R2-2406150 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242724 | LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture | S2-2407236 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
| S3‑243144 | Observations on and issues with NAS based solutions to Key Issue #1 of TR 33.700-32 "Authentication and Authorization of Human User ID" | Ericsson, CableLabs, NTT DOCOMO | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242852 | LS Replay on User Identities and Authentication Architecture | InterDigital Canada | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243558 | |||
| S3‑243558 | LS Replay on User Identities and Authentication Architecture | InterDigital Canada | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242852 | |||
| S3‑242891 | Reply LS to SA2 on User Identities and Authentication Architecture | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243558 | |||
| S3‑242903 | draft - Reply LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243558 | |||
| S3‑243145 | Reply LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture | Ericsson | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243558 | ||||
| S3‑243157 | Reply LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture | LG Electronics | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243558 | |||
| S3‑243251 | Reply LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture | OPPO | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243558 | |||
| S3‑243264 | [Draft] Reply LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture | Xiaomi Technology | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243558 | |||
| S3‑242939 | Reply LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture | Nokia | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243558 | |||
| S3‑243321 | Discussion on the User Identities LS from SA2 | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243322 | Reply LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243558 | ||||
| S3‑242718 | Reply LS on clarification on mobile metaverse services | S1-241351 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242713 | LS on RFC 9374, "DRIP Entity Tag (DET) for Unmanned Aircraft System Remote ID (UAS RID)" | IETF Drone Remote ID Protocol (DRIP) | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242714 | LS on RFC 9543, "A Framework for Network Slices in Networks Built from IETF Technologies" | IETF Traffic Engineering Architecture and Signaling Working Group (teas) | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242715 | LS on a Realization of Network Slices for 5G Networks Using Current IP/MPLS Technologies | IETF Traffic Engineering Architecture and Signaling Working Group (teas) | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242712 | LS on Registering JWT claims at IANA | CP-241308 | LS in | Yes |
YesThere were discussions whether this impacted SA3 specifications.
Cablelabs asked whether it was up to SA3 to register in IANA but the Chair replied that CT had the lead on this.
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242717 | LS on Avoiding Cross-TSG TEI | RP-241686 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242741 | Reply LS to SA3 on LI considerations for TR 33.757 | s3i240502 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
| S3‑242900 | [Draft] Reply LS on LI considerations for TR 33.757 | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243410 | |||
| S3‑243240 | Draft reply LS on LI considerations for TR 33.757 | China Mobile | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243410 | |||
| S3‑243410 | Reply LS on LI considerations for TR 33.757 | China Mobile | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243240 | |||
| S3‑242758 | Newly published data channel GSMA PRD TS.66 | GSMA | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
| S3‑243299 | Reply LS on Newly published data channel GSMA PRD TS.66 | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243411 | |||
| S3‑243411 | Reply LS on Newly published data channel GSMA PRD TS.66 | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243299 | |||
| S3‑243391 | LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication | C4-235577 | LS in | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | ||||
| S3‑242901 | draft - Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243412 | |||
| S3‑242902 | Clarifications for HONTRA procedure with respect to failure cases | ZTE | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243679 | |||
| S3‑243293 | Discussion about the HONTRA related responses from the AMF | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243294 | Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243412 | |||
| S3‑243412 | Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243294 | |||
| S3‑243295 | Clarifications for HONTRA procedure with respect to failure cases | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
| S3‑243679 | Clarifications for HONTRA procedure with respect to failure cases | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑242820 | Discussion on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Yes |
YesHuawei commented that the inventory may not complete. They added that SA3 wasn’t ready to start the study yet.
Nokia wanted to bring a SID for the next meeting. The Chair proposed to have some offline calls and have an agreement. A more thorough document needed to be produced.
Cablelabs: it is controversial whether symmetric encryption is impacted by PQC.
Qualcomm wasn’t sure that a SID would do something significant.
The Chair proposed to have a conference call before next meeting about this ropic.
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑243153 | LS on Masking of cryptographic keys in UE trace file from 3GPP core network entities | Ericsson | LS out | Yes |
YesNokia: comment with SA5 during this meeting, this has an impact on existing products.
Ericsson warned that keys would be exposed in the clear.
| revised | No | S3‑243696 | ||||
| S3‑243696 | LS on Masking of cryptographic keys in UE trace file from 3GPP core network entities | Ericsson | LS out | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243153 | |||
| S3‑242762 | TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur | InterDigital Communications | other | Information | Yes |
YesPublication of new or revised deliverables (incremental changes from the status reported at SA3#116)
• Published:
• TCG PC Client Reference Integrity Manifest Specification
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-PC-Client-Reference-Integrity-Manifest-Specification-Version-1.1-Revision-11_pub.pdf
• TCG Reference Integrity Manifest (RIM) Information Model
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-Reference-Integrity-Manifest-RIM-Information-Model-Version-1.1-Revision-1.0_pub.pdf
• Overview of TCG Technologies for Device Identification and Attestation
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Overview-of-TCG-Technologies-for-Device-Identification-and-Attestation-Version-1.0-Revision-1.39.pdf
• In public review:
• TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class (SSC):
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-Storage-Security-Subsystem-Class-SSC-Opal-Version-2.30-Revision-0.21_30July24.pdf
• TCG TPM Vendor ID Registry
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-TPM-Vendor-ID-Registry-Family-1.2-and-2.0-Version-1.07-Revision-0.02_16July24.pdf
• TCG EK Credential Profile for TPM Family 2.0; Level 0
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-EK-Credential-Profile-for-TPM-Family-2.0-Level-0-Version-2.6-Revision-23_16July24.pdf
• TCG OID Registry
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-OID-Registry-Version-1.00-Revision-0.74_10July24.pdf
• TCG PC Client Platform
TPM Profile Specification for TPM 2.0
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-PC-Client-Platform-TPM-Profile-for-TPM-2.0-Version-1.06-Revision-32_5April24.pdf
2. Meetings:
• TCG Members Meeting Hybrid F2F (Boston, MA, USA) – 28 – 31 October
• MP WG meets every Monday at 10-11 ET
• TMS WG meets every Monday and Friday at 12-13 ET
• CyRes WG meets every Wednesday at 11-12:30 ET
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242728 | Reply LS on GSMA OPG PRDs publication | S5-243436 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242729 | Reply LS on clarifications on consent management | S6-242504 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242731 | Reply LS on ECS Configuration Information | S6-242733 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242720 | Reply LS on ECS Configuration Information | S2-2406888 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242711 | Reply LS on N32-f N32-c correlation | C4-242393 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242707 | Reply LS on LS reply on LCS user plane connection binding to the UE | C1-243934 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242708 | Reply to LS on differentiating security materials used for PC5 direct discovery for 5G ProSe UE-to-network relay | C1-243949 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242709 | Reply LS on CAPIF extensibility | C3-243204 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242722 | LS on Clarifications related to User Identities | S2-2407219 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242726 | LS Reply on Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF | S2-2407354 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242734 | Reply LS on GSMA OPG PRDs publication | SP-240946 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242735 | Reply LS on data plane control by roaming hubs | SP-241014 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242736 | LS on Security considerations for MPQUIC | SP-241015 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242738 | Reply LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel | s3i240475 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242739 | Reply LS to SA2 on User Identities and Authentication Architecture | s3i240476 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242740 | Reply LS to SA2 on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions | s3i240477 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242756 | LS reply on LS on support of SSIM on eUICC | C6-240261 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242757 | Reply LS on Security Considerations for MPQUIC | IETF QUIC Working Group (QUIC) | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑243096 | Reply LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243559 | Reply LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑243256 | Reply LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243559 | |||
| S3‑243307 | LS Reply to LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243559 | |||
| S3‑243331 | reply LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243559 | |||
| S3‑243390 | LS reply to 3GPP Reply-LS on PQC Migration | GSMA | LS in | discussion | Yes |
YesIt was commented that SAGE should do the analysis for SA3. The Chair proposed an Lsout to SAGE since there was no agreement on whether the algorithms were really quantum safe. Ericsson commented that SA3 had already provided a response and there was no need to reopen the discussions just because there were doubts outside 3GPP.
NIST commented that they had published on their website that the algorithms were quantum safe.
| postponed | No | ||||
| S3‑243393 | Newly published data channel GSMA PRD TS.66 | GSMA | LS in | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑243394 | Version 2.0 of 256-bit AICI. | ETSI SAGE | LS in | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | ||||
| S3‑243402 | LS on security visibility for user or application | LS out | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei didn’t agree with sending this LS.
Ericsson didn’t agree with sending this LS either. Operator policies or regulation may be behind
Nokia didn’t support this LS either.
NTT-Docomo: only the first topic in the actions should be addressed to GSMA, but not formulated as a question.
Google: we have something described very clearly in the spec but that is not implemented correctly. GSMA could at least give some awareness.
GSMA DG is also concerned about this.
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑243409 | Discussion for LS S2-2407236 on User Identities | Interdigital | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| 4.1.1 | Security Assurance | S3‑242760 | UE Security Testing | BSI (DE) | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
YesBSI commented that this would not overlap with RAN5 conformance testing, this was related to security testing in the UE.
Nokia preferred to have a separate SCAS document, not to do it in RAN5.
Ericsson preferred to treat this offline. It wasn’t clear how the testing would differ from what was being done in RAN5.
Qualcomm preferred to have this in RAN5.
NTT-Docomo: RAN5 testing has a well established process, maybe they can have a security specific annex.
Samsung didn’t agree with having this in a new specification in SA3.
The Chair commented that it was not up to SA3 to make a decision on the testing in the UE since it was in the domain of RAN5, but this could be discussed further.
| noted | No | ||
| 4.1.2 | Service Based Architecture | S3‑243160 | Validation of the allowed slices in the access token request at NRF | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesHuawei and Nokia wanted some rewording.
Nokia: when NF not registered into the NRF, how is it dealt with?
| revised | No | S3‑243682 | |
| S3‑243682 | Validation of the allowed slices in the access token request at NRF | Ericsson,Nokia | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑243160 | |||
| S3‑243161 | Validation of the requested slices at NF service producer | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243683 | |||
| S3‑243683 | Validation of the requested slices at NF service producer | Ericsson,Nokia | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑243161 | |||
| S3‑243162 | Discussion on the NF consumer PLMN ID check | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
YesHuawei, Nokia needed more time to analise this.
| noted | No | ||||
| 4.1.3 | Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe | S3‑242876 | Add clarification on encryption operation for PC5 ProSe discovery | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
| S3‑242877 | Add clarification on encryption operation for PC5 ProSe discovery | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
| S3‑243350 | Emergency Service over UE-to-Network relay - PEI status check | Philips International B.V. | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑243383 | Emergency Service over UE-to-Network relay - PEI status check | Philips International B.V | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia: we don’t check the PEI in emergency calls.
Qualcomm: no need to check the PEI.
| not pursued | No | ||||
| 4.1.4 | Mission Critical | |||||||||||
| 4.1.5 | Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G | S3‑242904 | CR to update AKMA service disable procedure | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243413 | |
| S3‑242952 | AKMA API Name correction along with other editorial corrections | Nokia | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
| S3‑242953 | AAnF Providing VPLMN Id to AF | Nokia, | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesHuawei didn’t agree with this.
China Mobile needed some clarifications.
| not pursued | No | ||||
| S3‑243053 | update to AKMA service disabling | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesOverlapping with S3-242904.
Ericsson: can this be solved in CT groups?
Nokia: CT is not addressing this in their specs.
| revised | No | S3‑243413 | |||
| S3‑243413 | update to AKMA service disabling | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑243053 | |||
| S3‑243159 | Editorial correction for AKMA procedures | LG Electronics | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
| 4.1.6 | Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS | |||||||||||
| 4.1.7 | Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services | |||||||||||
| 4.1.8 | Security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT | |||||||||||
| 4.1.9 | Security Aspects of eNPN | S3‑243097 | Resolution of EN concerning the content of AN-parameters. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon, ZTE | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243405 | |
| S3‑243405 | CR resubmission - the content of AN-parameters | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑243097 | |||
| 4.1.10 | Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC | |||||||||||
| 4.1.11 | Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems | |||||||||||
| 4.1.12 | Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning | S3‑243265 | Completing the Privacy Check of n UEs for Service Exposure to Client UE | Xiaomi, OPPO, Phillips | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243684 | |
| S3‑243684 | Completing the Privacy Check of n UEs for Service Exposure to Client UE | Xiaomi, OPPO, Phillips | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑243265 | |||
| 4.1.13 | Security Aspects of eNA. | S3‑243064 | Correct the Federal Learning procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesEricsson only agreed with one change.
| revised | No | S3‑243414 | |
| S3‑243414 | Correct the Federal Learning procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesLeaving only the agreed change with Ericsson.
| agreed | No | S3‑243064 | |||
| S3‑243067 | Update procedure Security for AI/ML model storage and sharing in TS 33.501 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesNokia disagreed. CT4 solved this already.
| not pursued | No | ||||
| 4.1.14 | Modified PRINS for roaming service providers in 5G | S3‑242778 | Trust anchoring for N32-f/PRINS | BSI (DE) | CR | Decision | No |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑242822 | |
| S3‑242822 | Trust anchoring for N32-f/PRINS | Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Nokia | CR | Decision | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑242823 | S3‑242778 | ||
| S3‑242823 | Trust anchoring for N32-f/PRINS | Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Nokia | CR | Decision | Yes |
YesHuawei didn’t agree with this. They also added that as a new feature it should be addressed in Rel-19.
| not pursued | No | S3‑242822 | |||
| 4.1.15 | All other maintenance topics (not listed above) | S3‑242742 | UPU Header Security | Lenovo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
| S3‑242743 | Discussion paper on UPU Security and related header protection | Lenovo | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑243316 | Discussion on protecting header information in UPU | Qualcomm Incorporated, Vivo, Oppo | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242950 | Discussion paper of UPU implementation gaps | Nokia | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243317 | Protection of UPU header | Qualcomm Incorporated, Vivo, Oppo | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242951 | Enhancement in UPU procedure to protect UPU header | Nokia | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
| S3‑242761 | MPQUIC TLS Annex | Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd | CR | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | |||||
| S3‑242964 | MPQUIC TLS Annex | Intel, Nokia, Charter Communications, | CR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243415 | ||||
| S3‑243415 | MPQUIC TLS Annex | Intel, Nokia, Charter Communications, | CR | - | Yes |
YesMCC: this should be cat-B for Rel-19, no new features are allowed in Rel-18.
IT was commented that this was aligning with SA2.
MCC added that this should be cat-B and it may be discussed in Plenary. It was commented that SA2 had made this change recently.
| agreed | No | S3‑242964 | |||
| S3‑242831 | Correction to validation of usage of X.509 certificate procedure | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco, Huawei | CR | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | |||||
| S3‑242832 | Updates to the SBA certificate profile | Nokia, Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco, Ericsson | CR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243416 | ||||
| S3‑243181 | Editorials on updates to the SBA certificate profile | Nokia, Ericsson | CR | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | |||||
| S3‑243416 | Editorials on updates to the SBA certificate profile | Nokia, Ericsson | CR | - | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
| S3‑242843 | Supplementary on Solution #6: Collection of security related log data of NFs via DCCF | China Mobile Com. Corporation | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: not in scope of eNA. It's also an additional feature for Rel-18, it's frozen.Nokia supported this.
MCC: cover page issues.
| not pursued | No | ||||
| S3‑242905 | Message name correction to TS 33.501 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
| S3‑242949 | Discussion paper reauthentication via untrusted non 3GPP access | Nokia | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243047 | Adding the requirement of media confidentiality protection for IMS data channel | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesApple didn’t agree with this CR.
Nokia didn’t agree with the first change and the second change was not needed.
China Mobile: the reply LS depends on this CR.
| not pursued | No | ||||
| S3‑243048 | Replacing DCMF with MF | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243417 | |||
| S3‑243417 | Replacing DCMF with MF | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑243048 | |||
| S3‑243177 | Incorrect statements about 33.310 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
| S3‑243178 | Incorrect statements about 33.310 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
| S3‑243179 | Incorrect statements about 33.310 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
| S3‑243180 | Incorrect statements about 33.310 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
| S3‑243185 | SCPAC: Secondary Node key update for SCPAC | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesApple: better add a note instead of this new text.
MCC clarified that legacy CPAC already referred to pre-Rel-18 and mentioning Rel-17 was not needed.
| revised | No | S3‑243418 | |||
| S3‑243418 | SCPAC: Secondary Node key update for SCPAC | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑243185 | |||
| S3‑242785 | Supplementary on Solution #6: Collection of security related log data of NFs via DCCF | BSI (DE) | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑242842 | Supplementary on Solution #6: Collection of security related log data of NFs via DCCF | BSI (DE) | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| 4.2 | WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR). | S3‑242759 | Add specific UDR SCAS test cases for TS 33.530 | BSI (DE) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243419 | |
| S3‑243419 | Add specific UDR SCAS test cases for TS 33.530 | BSI (DE) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑242759 | |||
| S3‑242769 | Refinement of UDR security requirements | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | Yes |
YesBSI: unnecessary.
Ericsson also found this CR unnecessary.
This was taken offline.
| noted | No | |||||
| 4.3 | WID on SCAS for Rel-18 features on existing functions. | |||||||||||
| 4.4 | WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF). | S3‑243285 | Discussion on SS7/MAP interface at SMSF to define MAP filtering and protection requirements for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF | IIT Bombay | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
YesEricsson wondered whether this was introducing new requirements.
IIT Bombay: no new requirements are introduced, as stated in section 5.2.
| noted | No | ||
| S3‑243289 | Protection requirements on Map interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF | IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243420 | |||
| S3‑243420 | Protection requirements on Map interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF | IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑243289 | |||
| S3‑243292 | Filtering requirements on Map interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF | IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243685 | |||
| S3‑243685 | Filtering requirements on Map interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF | IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243292 | |||
| S3‑243312 | New clause on protection of Map interface in annexure to Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats specific to SMSF | IIT Bombay | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243314 | New clause on Map-based SS7 interface filtering in annexure to Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats specific to SMSF | IIT Bombay | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243315 | Minor additions/modifications for draft TS 33.529 | IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243363 | Security for Map-based SS7 interface | IIT Bombay | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: this is captured already in the non-SBA interfaces clause.
MCC: is this CR under the scope of the WID?
| not pursued | No | ||||
| S3‑243421 | Draft TS 33.529 | IIT Bombay | draft TS | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| S3‑243686 | Cover page TS 33.529 | IIT Bombay | TS or TR cover | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243701 | Living document for SMSF SCAS | IIT Bombay | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243702 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats specific to SMSF | IIT Bombay | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
| 4.5 | WID on Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms. | |||||||||||
| 4.6 | WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 19 | S3‑242763 | [MCXSec4] 33180 R19 MC Recording Server Introduction | Airbus | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesAirbus commented that SA6 was still discussing the topic so this has to be postponed depending on their progress.
| revised | No | S3‑243717 | |
| S3‑243717 | [MCXSec4] 33180 R19 MC Recording Server Introduction | Airbus | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑242763 | |||
| 4.7 | WID on Addition of Milenage-256 algorithm | S3‑242975 | Revised WID on Milenage-256 algorithm | THALES, IDEMIA | WID revised | Agreement | Yes |
YesTS 35.237 would need to be withdrawn after the next TSG.
| agreed | No | ||
| S3‑242977 | Selection of the option | THALES | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| endorsed | No | ||||
| S3‑242979 | Content of TR 35.234 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243422 | |||
| S3‑243422 | Content of TS 35.234 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242979 | |||
| S3‑242980 | Content of TS 35.235 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243423 | |||
| S3‑243423 | Content of TS 35.235 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242980 | |||
| S3‑242982 | Content of TS 35.236 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243424 | |||
| S3‑243424 | Content of TS 35.236 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242982 | |||
| S3‑243425 | Draft TS 35.234 | Thales | draft TS | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| S3‑243426 | Draft TS 35.235 | Thales | draft TS | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| S3‑243427 | Draft TS 35.236 | Thales | draft TS | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 4.8 | WID on 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols | S3‑243176 | Forbid insecure usage of aes-gcm and aes-gmac | Ericsson | other | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei didn’t agree with this. No hurry to do this.
| noted | No | ||
| S3‑243056 | update to the support of ESP encryption transforms in TS 33.210 | Huawei, HiSilicon | other | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia: RFC says should, why are we saying may here?
Huawei: there are other mechanisms.
Cisco: a Should in IETF is like a must under certain conditions.
| revised | No | S3‑243719 | |||
| S3‑243719 | update to the support of ESP encryption transforms in TS 33.210 | Huawei, HiSilicon | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243056 | |||
| S3‑243173 | Updating baseline of living document to 33.203 with content of the latest version of TS 33.203 | Ericsson | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243174 | Updating baseline of living document to 33.310 with content of the latest version of TS 33.310 | Ericsson | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243175 | Updating baseline of living document to 33.501 with content of the latest version of TS 33.501 | Ericsson | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242781 | Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.501, Updates to cryptographic profiles | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243428 | |||
| S3‑243428 | Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.501, Updates to cryptographic profiles | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | No |
YesThe content of these draftCRs (S3-243428, S3-243429, S3-243430, and S3-243430) is considered frozen and hence not subject to any further changes except the new statements deprecating cryptographic primitives. The intention is to give companies enough time and stable versions of the changes to check such statements internally. In case of no challenge in this (SA3#118, SA3#119) meeting cycle, the draftCRs are to be converted to CRs and agreed in SA3#119
| email approval | No | S3‑242781 | |||
| S3‑242782 | Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.210, Updates to cryprographic profiles | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243429 | |||
| S3‑243429 | Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.210, Updates to cryprographic profiles | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | No |
YesThe content of these draftCRs (S3-243428, S3-243429, S3-243430, and S3-243430) is considered frozen and hence not subject to any further changes except the new statements deprecating cryptographic primitives. The intention is to give companies enough time and stable versions of the changes to check such statements internally. In case of no challenge in this (SA3#118, SA3#119) meeting cycle, the draftCRs are to be converted to CRs and agreed in SA3#119
| email approval | No | S3‑242782 | |||
| S3‑242783 | Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.310, Updates to cryptographic profiles | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243430 | |||
| S3‑243430 | Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.310, Updates to cryptographic profiles | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | No |
YesThe content of these draftCRs (S3-243428, S3-243429, S3-243430, and S3-243430) is considered frozen and hence not subject to any further changes except the new statements deprecating cryptographic primitives. The intention is to give companies enough time and stable versions of the changes to check such statements internally. In case of no challenge in this (SA3#118, SA3#119) meeting cycle, the draftCRs are to be converted to CRs and agreed in SA3#119
| email approval | No | S3‑242783 | |||
| S3‑242784 | Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.203, Updates to cryptographic profiles | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243431 | |||
| S3‑243431 | Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.203, Updates to cryptographic profiles | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | No |
YesContent is declared stable.
| email approval | No | S3‑242784 | |||
| 4.9 | WID on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service phase 3 | S3‑243235 | Adding description of non-MSGin5G UE scenarios | China Mobile | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
| S3‑243236 | Living document of security aspects of MSGin5G service Ph3 | China Mobile | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243432 | |||
| S3‑243432 | Living document of security aspects of MSGin5G service Ph3 | China Mobile | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243236 | |||
| S3‑243433 | CR for living document TITLE TO BE PROVIDED BY CMCC | China Mobile | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
| 4.10 | R19 SCAS WID | S3‑242770 | Test Case on No Default Content | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243435 | ||
| S3‑243435 | Test Case on No Default Content | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242770 | |||
| S3‑242771 | Test Case on No Directory Listings | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | Yes |
YesEricsson: this looks like some kind of black box testing.
| revised | No | S3‑243436 | ||||
| S3‑243436 | Test Case on No Directory Listings | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | - | Yes |
YesIncorporating changes from BSI CR in S3-242973
| approved | No | S3‑242771 | |||
| S3‑242772 | Test Case on No Web Server Header Info | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243687 | ||||
| S3‑243687 | Test Case on No Web Server Header Info | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242772 | |||
| S3‑242773 | Test Case on No Web Server Error Pages Info | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243437 | ||||
| S3‑243437 | Test Case on No Web Server Error Pages Info | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | - | Yes |
YesIncorporates the content of the CR S3-242974 from BSI.
| approved | No | S3‑242773 | |||
| S3‑242774 | Test Case on No Web Server File Type Mappings | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243688 | ||||
| S3‑243688 | Test Case on No Web Server File Type Mappings | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242774 | |||
| S3‑242968 | Editorial Correction of TC_NO_SYSTEM_PRIVILEGES_WEB_SERVER | BSI (DE) | CR | Yes |
YesThe content will go to the living document in 3434.
| not pursued | No | |||||
| S3‑242970 | Clarification on TC_NO_CGI_OR_SCRIPTING_FOR_UPLOADS | BSI (DE) | CR | Yes |
YesThe content will go to the living document in 3434.
| not pursued | No | |||||
| S3‑242972 | Clarification on TC_ACCESS_RIGHTS_WEB_SERVER_FILES | BSI (DE) | CR | Yes |
YesThe content will go to the living document in 3434.
| not pursued | No | |||||
| S3‑242973 | Clarification on TC_NO_DIRECTORY_LISTINGS | BSI (DE) | CR | Yes |
YesThe content will go to the living document in 3434.
| not pursued | No | |||||
| S3‑242974 | Clarification on TC_NO_WEB_SERVER_ERROR_PAGES_INFORMATION | BSI (DE) | CR | Yes |
YesThe content will go to the living document in 3434.
| not pursued | No | |||||
| S3‑242976 | Clarification on TC_BVT_PORT_SCANNING | BSI (DE) | CR | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | |||||
| S3‑242978 | Removal of boiler plate texts in format of evidence | BSI (DE) | CR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243661 | ||||
| S3‑243661 | Removal of boiler plate texts in format of evidence | BSI (DE) | CR | - | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑242978 | |||
| S3‑242981 | Add UDM SCAS test case for checking the authentication verification of a synchronization failure message | BSI (DE) | CR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243029 | ||||
| S3‑243029 | Add UDM SCAS test case for checking the authentication verification of a synchronization failure message | BSI (DE) | CR | Yes |
YesHuawei asked to discuss it in the next meeting.
| not pursued | No | S3‑242981 | ||||
| S3‑243112 | Expired certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 | Huawei, HiSilicon,CAICT,CTCC, Nokia | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243113 | Peer certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 | Huawei, HiSilicon,CAICT,CTCC, Nokia | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243114 | Add threat to expired certificate checking at gNB | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243115 | Add threat to peer certificate checking at gNB | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243281 | Test Case for Intra-VNF Communication Interface | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesHuawei, Nokia: no requirement for this
| not pursued | No | ||||
| S3‑243403 | Remove unnecessary complexity from UDM test case | BSI | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243404 | Add an OAuth2.0 test case to check for the absence of an access token | BSI | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243434 | Living document for Rel-19 SCAS TS 33.117 | Huawei | draftCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| S3‑243438 | Draft CR TR 33.926 SCAS_5G_Maint | Huawei | draftCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| S3‑243439 | Draft CR TS 33.511 | Huawei | draftCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 4.11 | TEI19 topics (restricted to agreed topics only) | S3‑243163 | Support iat claim in the access token | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
| S3‑243164 | Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
| 4.12 | WID on Security aspects of NR mobility enhancement Phase 4 | S3‑242816 | Discussion on Impact Analysis for Inter-CU LTM | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
| S3‑242906 | Discussion on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases | ZTE Corporation | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242954 | Discussion Paper on Security Key Handling for Inter-CU LTM | Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242995 | LTM - Discussion paper on LTM security | Apple | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑243061 | discussion paper on LTM solutions | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243194 | Discussion on LTM from security perspective | Samsung | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243249 | Discussion on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases | OPPO | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243195 | Key issue for security aspects of inter-CU LTM | Samsung | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243522 | |||
| S3‑243522 | Key issue for security aspects of inter-CU LTM | Samsung | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243195 | |||
| S3‑243196 | Key issue for authenticity verification of Cell Switch Command | Samsung | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243523 | |||
| S3‑243523 | Key issue for authenticity verification of Cell Switch Command | Samsung | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑243196 | |||
| S3‑242798 | 1-Hop Forward Security Solution for LTM | vivo | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243524 | |||
| S3‑243524 | 1-Hop Forward Security Solution for LTM | vivo | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242798 | |||
| S3‑242817 | Discussion on Potential Solution for Inter-CU LTM | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242818 | Solution for Inter-CU LTM | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243525 | ||||
| S3‑243525 | Solution for Inter-CU LTM | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242818 | |||
| S3‑242908 | NCC synchronization solution for LTM | ZTE Corporation | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243526 | |||
| S3‑243526 | NCC synchronization solution for LTM | ZTE Corporation | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242908 | |||
| S3‑242997 | LTM - content on living CR - Candidate solution#1 | Apple | other | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243527 | ||||
| S3‑243527 | LTM - content on living CR - Candidate solution#1 | Apple | other | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242997 | |||
| S3‑242998 | LTM - content on living CR - Candidate solution#2 | Apple | other | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243528 | ||||
| S3‑243528 | LTM - content on living CR - Candidate solution#2 | Apple | other | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242998 | |||
| S3‑243158 | New solution for LTM security handling | LG Electronics | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243529 | |||
| S3‑243529 | New solution for LTM security handling | LG Electronics | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243158 | |||
| S3‑243197 | Solution for security aspects of inter-CU LTM | Samsung | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243530 | |||
| S3‑243530 | Solution for security aspects of inter-CU LTM | Samsung | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243197 | |||
| S3‑243268 | LTM: Solution on Rekeying Sychronization at Handover Completion | Xiaomi Technology | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243531 | |||
| S3‑243531 | LTM: Solution on Rekeying Sychronization at Handover Completion | Xiaomi Technology | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243268 | |||
| S3‑243330 | Fixing the RRC/PDCP anchor for inter-gNB LTM cell switches | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243532 | |||
| S3‑243532 | Fixing the RRC/PDCP anchor for inter-gNB LTM cell switches | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243330 | |||
| S3‑242907 | MAC CE integrity protection solution for LTM | ZTE Corporation | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243198 | Solution for verifying authenticity of cell switch command | Samsung | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243266 | LTM: New Solution for Protecting NCC in MAC CE using AS Security Context | Xiaomi Technology | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243267 | LTM: New Solution for Protecting NCC in MAC CE using C-RNTI | Xiaomi Technology | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243199 | Conclusion for inter-CU LTM | Samsung | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242819 | LS on Security Handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243666 | ||||
| S3‑243666 | LS on Security Handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | - | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑242819 | |||
| S3‑242996 | LTM - Reply LS to RAN2 on LTM progress | Apple | other | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243666 | ||||
| S3‑243193 | Living document on NR mobility enhancement | Samsung | draftCR | Information | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243689 | |||
| S3‑243689 | Living document on NR mobility enhancement | Samsung | draftCR | Information | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | S3‑243193 | |||
| 4.13 | WID on Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication | S3‑243326 | Discussion on normative solutions for KI#1 and KI#3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
| S3‑242744 | Security re-establishment for Trusted non-3GPP access | Lenovo | draftCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243641 | ||||
| S3‑242821 | Living document of the Non3GPPMobEnh study | Nokia | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243642 | |||
| S3‑243642 | Living document of the Non3GPPMobEnh study | Nokia | draftCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | S3‑242821 | |||
| S3‑243098 | DraftCR for TNAP and TWIF case | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243641 | |||
| S3‑243327 | Mobility under a TNGF | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243641 | |||
| S3‑243641 | Mobility under a TNGF | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑243327 | |||
| S3‑243328 | Mobility under a TWIF | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243329 | Informative text of using FT for NSWO | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243643 | |||
| S3‑243643 | Informative text of using FT for NSWO | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243329 | |||
| 5.1 | Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security | S3‑242815 | New Use case proposal for data exposure related to attacks on network slices | IRT, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243493 | |
| S3‑243493 | New Use case proposal for data exposure related to attacks on network slices | IRT, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242815 | |||
| S3‑243087 | Evaluation to Use case 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243494 | |||
| S3‑243494 | Evaluation to Use case 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243087 | |||
| S3‑242899 | Addressing EN in Use Case 5 | U.S. National Security Agency, Johns Hopkins University APL, OTD_US, MITRE-FFRDC | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243495 | |||
| S3‑243495 | Addressing EN in Use Case 5 | U.S. National Security Agency, Johns Hopkins University APL, OTD_US, MITRE-FFRDC | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242899 | |||
| S3‑243088 | Evaluation to Use case 5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243495 | |||
| S3‑242748 | Updates to Solution #2 | Lenovo, Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243496 | |||
| S3‑243496 | Updates to Solution #2 | Lenovo, Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242748 | |||
| S3‑242749 | Updates to Solution#1 | Lenovo, Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243497 | |||
| S3‑243497 | Updates to Solution#1 | Lenovo, Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242749 | |||
| S3‑242838 | KI#1, Solution #3 Updates: Data Collection | OTD_US, MITRE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243365 | |||
| S3‑243365 | KI#1, Solution #3 Updates: Data Collection | OTD_US, MITRE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243498 | S3‑242838 | ||
| S3‑243498 | KI#1, Solution #3 Updates: Data Collection | OTD_US, MITRE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243365 | |||
| S3‑243084 | Evaluation for solution 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243498 | |||
| S3‑243007 | EN removal for solution #4 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243499 | |||
| S3‑243499 | EN removal for solution #4 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243007 | |||
| S3‑243008 | Evaluation for solution #4 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243500 | |||
| S3‑243500 | Evaluation for solution #4 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243008 | |||
| S3‑243311 | Security Log Management specifications in O-RAN Alliance | Ericsson | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243308 | Update and evaluation for Solution #5 "Security log events collection for evaluation and monitoring" | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243501 | |||
| S3‑243501 | Update and evaluation for Solution #5 "Security log events collection for evaluation and monitoring" | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243308 | |||
| S3‑243085 | Evaluation for solution 5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243501 | |||
| S3‑242869 | New solution for KI #1 Data Collection using DCCF | MITRE-FFRDC | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243502 | |||
| S3‑243502 | New solution for KI #1 Data Collection using DCCF | MITRE-FFRDC | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242869 | |||
| S3‑243001 | New solution for data collection related to API security risks | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243503 | |||
| S3‑243503 | New solution for data collection related to API security risks | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243001 | |||
| S3‑243309 | New Solution to Key Issue #1: Using security log events, counters and protocol signaling monitoring | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243504 | |||
| S3‑243504 | New Solution to Key Issue #1: Using security log events, counters and protocol signaling monitoring | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243309 | |||
| S3‑242746 | Initial Conclusion to KI#1 | Lenovo, US National Security Agency, MITRE-FFRDC | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243505 | |||
| S3‑243505 | Initial Conclusion to KI#1 | Lenovo, US National Security Agency, MITRE-FFRDC, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, NTIA, Deutsche Telekom, T-Mobile US, BT, Charter Communications, Cablelabs, Peraton Labs, Intel, IRT Saint Exupery, Johns Hopkins University APL, Samsung, CISA ECD | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei didn’t agree with this contribution.There was some big impact associated with the word "requirement".
ZTE, CATT and China Mobile objected to this contribution.
ORANGE didn’t object but it wasn’t clear for them what the following tasks would be.
The Chair declared the contents of this document as a working agreement.
| approved | No | S3‑242746 | |||
| S3‑242868 | Conclusions for Data Collection | MITRE-FFRDC, US National Security Agency | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242747 | Solution to KI#2 | Lenovo, US National Security Agency | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243611 | |||
| S3‑243611 | Solution to KI#2 | Lenovo, US National Security Agency | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242747 | |||
| S3‑242833 | Solution for enhancement of SBA access control decision mechanisms | Nokia | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243613 | ||||
| S3‑243613 | Solution for enhancement of SBA access control decision mechanisms | Nokia | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242833 | |||
| S3‑242867 | New solution for KI#2: Dynamic Security Policy Enforcement Framework | MITRE-FFRDC, Defense Information Systems Agency EM | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: this is like definiing an alternative authentication on top of what we have now. I suggest to remove the evaluaton.
| revised | No | S3‑243614 | |||
| S3‑243614 | New solution for KI#2: Dynamic Security Policy Enforcement Framework | MITRE-FFRDC, Defense Information Systems Agency EM | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242867 | |||
| S3‑243310 | New Solution to Key Issue #2: Policy enforcement using NRF configuration and short access token lifetime | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243615 | |||
| S3‑243615 | New Solution to Key Issue #2: Policy enforcement using NRF configuration and short access token lifetime | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243310 | |||
| S3‑242745 | Cleanup of TR | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243612 | Draft TR 33.794 | Motorola Mobility | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.2 | Study on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services phase 2 | S3‑243296 | Remove Editor's Note from KI#1: Third party specific user identities | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
| S3‑242872 | Update Sol3 on Support of Third Party specific User Identities in IMS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243616 | |||
| S3‑243616 | Update Sol3 on Support of Third Party specific User Identities in IMS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242872 | |||
| S3‑243022 | Addressing the ENs on dynamic name card details and exposure mechanisms of solution#4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243024 | Addressing the EN on details of determining the received Avatar ID of solution 5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243617 | |||
| S3‑243617 | Addressing the EN on details of determining the received Avatar ID of solution 5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243024 | |||
| S3‑243023 | Addressing the ENs on token related details and alignment of SA2 for solution#5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243618 | |||
| S3‑243618 | Addressing the ENs on token related details and alignment of SA2 for solution#5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243023 | |||
| S3‑243025 | Evaluation on Solution#5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243619 | |||
| S3‑243619 | Evaluation on Solution#5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243025 | |||
| S3‑243228 | Resolving EN in sol#6 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243620 | |||
| S3‑243620 | Resolving EN in sol#6 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243228 | |||
| S3‑243229 | Evaluation for sol#6 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243621 | |||
| S3‑243621 | Evaluation for sol#6 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243229 | |||
| S3‑242873 | Update Sol7 on Protect IMS DC based Avatar Communication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243622 | |||
| S3‑243622 | Update Sol7 on Protect IMS DC based Avatar Communication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242873 | |||
| S3‑242870 | Update sol9 on Secure IMS DC capability exposure | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243623 | |||
| S3‑243623 | Update sol9 on Secure IMS DC capability exposure | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242870 | |||
| S3‑243230 | New solution on avatar communication | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243624 | |||
| S3‑243624 | New solution on avatar communication | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243230 | |||
| S3‑243026 | A new solution on the security of IMS DC capability exposure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243625 | |||
| S3‑243625 | A new solution on the security of IMS DC capability exposure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243026 | |||
| S3‑243298 | New solution for KI#3: IMS DC capability exposure security based on existing specification | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243626 | |||
| S3‑243626 | New solution for KI#3: IMS DC capability exposure security based on existing specification | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243298 | |||
| S3‑243297 | Conclusion for KI#1: Third party specific user identities | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242871 | Conclusion for KI#3 on IMS DC capability exposure | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243656 | Draft TR 33.790 | Ericsson | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.3 | Study on security for PLMN hosting a NPN | S3‑242910 | Remove the EN in KI#1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
| S3‑243241 | Solve EN for Sol#1&5 of TR 33.757 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243467 | |||
| S3‑243467 | Solve EN for Sol#1&5 of TR 33.757 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243241 | |||
| S3‑243386 | Solve EN for sol#1&12 of TR 33.757 regarding SA3-LI | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia: LI impact to be solved in SA3-LI.
| approved | No | S3‑243242 | |||
| S3‑243082 | Evaluation for KI#1 and KI#2 on N4/SBA Security for solution 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243469 | |||
| S3‑243469 | Evaluation for KI#1 and KI#2 on N4/SBA Security for solution 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243082 | |||
| S3‑243356 | Resolution of EN concerning message inspection, filtering and topology hiding – solution 13. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243470 | Resolution of EN concerning message inspection, filtering and topology hiding – solution 13. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑243358 | Evaluation of solution 13 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243079 | Evaluation on the solution 13 for KI1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia didn’t agree with this evaluation.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243018 | Conclusion to KI#1 | China Telecomunication Corp.,ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243471 | |||
| S3‑243471 | Conclusion to KI#1 | China Telecomunication Corp.,ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑243018 | |||
| S3‑243171 | Conclusion for Key Issue #1 "Security for dedicated UPF interacting with PLMN through N4 interface" | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243471 | |||
| S3‑243205 | Conclusion for KI#1 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243471 | |||
| S3‑243360 | Conclusion to KI#1 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Johns Hopkins University APL | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243471 | |||
| S3‑242779 | Conclude LI impacts for PNI-NPN Solutions in TR 33.757 | Johns Hopkins University APL | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243471 | |||
| S3‑243021 | Addressing the EN and evaluation of Solution#4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243472 | Addressing the EN and evaluation of Solution#4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑243013 | Evaluation to solution#6 | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243473 | |||
| S3‑243473 | Evaluation to solution#6 | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243013 | |||
| S3‑243017 | Evaluation to solution#7 | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243474 | |||
| S3‑243474 | Evaluation to solution#7 | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243017 | |||
| S3‑243379 | Update sol#8 for wrong NF type handling | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243475 | |||
| S3‑243475 | Update sol#8 for wrong NF type handling | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243379 | |||
| S3‑243201 | Update to Solution#9 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243476 | |||
| S3‑243476 | Update to Solution#9 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243201 | |||
| S3‑243200 | Evaluation for solution#9 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243380 | Update sol#10 for message handling | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243477 | |||
| S3‑243477 | Update sol#10 for message handling | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243380 | |||
| S3‑242841 | Revision of two errors in TR 33.757 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243357 | Resolution of editors note concerning message inspection/filtering and topology hiding – solution 14. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243478 | |||
| S3‑243478 | Resolution of editors note concerning message inspection/filtering and topology hiding – solution 14. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243357 | |||
| S3‑243359 | Evaluation of solution 14 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243080 | Evaluation on the solution 14 for KI2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243020 | Conclusion to KI#2 | China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243479 | |||
| S3‑243479 | Conclusion to KI#2 | China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243020 | |||
| S3‑243172 | Conclusion for Key Issue #2 "Dedicated NFs interacting with PLMN through SBA interface" | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243479 | |||
| S3‑243206 | Conclusion for KI#2 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243479 | |||
| S3‑243361 | Conclusion to KI#2 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Johns Hopkins University APL | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243479 | |||
| S3‑243378 | Add conclusion to KI#2 | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243479 | |||
| S3‑242750 | Updates to Solution#11 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243480 | |||
| S3‑243480 | Updates to Solution#11 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242750 | |||
| S3‑242911 | Update the Sol#15 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243481 | |||
| S3‑243481 | Update the Sol#15 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242911 | |||
| S3‑242912 | Update the Sol#16 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243482 | |||
| S3‑243482 | Update the Sol#16 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242912 | |||
| S3‑243081 | Evaluation on the solution 17 for KI3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243483 | |||
| S3‑243202 | Update to solution#17 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243483 | |||
| S3‑243483 | Update to solution#17 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243202 | |||
| S3‑242909 | Conclusion to KI#3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243484 | |||
| S3‑243484 | Conclusion to KI#3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑242909 | |||
| S3‑243086 | Conclusion on KI3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesDiscussion whether normative work was needed.The support was 50% for both options.
| merged | No | S3‑243484 | |||
| S3‑243207 | Conclusion for KI#3 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243484 | |||
| S3‑242862 | New solution for KI#1: Analytics for Secure N4 interface with Security Gateway | MITRE-FFRDC, Defense Information Systems Agency EM | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243203 | Solution to enforce additional policy checks for NF Consumer in PNI-NPN | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: too late for solutions, we are reaching conclusions now and we need to follow the work plan.
The Chair commented that the Rapporteur shouldn’t deny the contribution as a rule.
Nokia supported the solution.
NSA supported the contribution as well.
| revised | No | S3‑243485 | |||
| S3‑243485 | Solution to enforce additional policy checks for NF Consumer in PNI-NPN | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243203 | |||
| S3‑243204 | Solution for SUPI privacy | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243690 | |||
| S3‑243690 | Solution for SUPI privacy | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei objected because this was changing the network architecture.
| noted | No | S3‑243204 | |||
| S3‑242754 | TR 33.757 correction of Term for PNI-NPN Operational domain | Johns Hopkins University APL | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242766 | Revision of two errors in TR 33.757 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑243242 | Solve EN for sol#1&12 of TR 33.757 regarding SA3-LI | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243386 | |||
| S3‑243468 | Draft TR 33.757 | China Telecom | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.4 | Study of ACME for Automated Certificate Management in SBA | S3‑243398 | Proposed solution for Secure Transport of Messages | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243662 | ||
| S3‑243662 | Proposed solution for Secure Transport of Messages | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243398 | ||||
| S3‑243397 | Proposed solution for certificate enrolment | Google, JHU APL | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243486 | |||
| S3‑243486 | Proposed solution for certificate enrolment | Google, JHU APL | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243397 | |||
| S3‑242854 | Solution on certificate revocation | Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco Systems, MITRE-FFRDC, US National Security Agency | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243487 | |||
| S3‑243487 | Solution on certificate revocation | Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco Systems, MITRE-FFRDC, US National Security Agency | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242854 | |||
| S3‑242892 | update to Sol#1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243488 | |||
| S3‑243488 | update to Sol#1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242892 | |||
| S3‑242893 | update to Sol#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243489 | |||
| S3‑243489 | update to Sol#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑242893 | |||
| S3‑242894 | overall evaluation for KI#1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243490 | |||
| S3‑243490 | overall evaluation for KI#1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑242894 | |||
| S3‑242895 | overall evaluation for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia, Huawei: we need to have a picture to know the benefits of a second framework.
NSA, NCSC questioned the vlaue of doing the comparison.
| revised | No | S3‑243491 | |||
| S3‑243491 | overall evaluation for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑242895 | |||
| S3‑243722 | Draft TR 33.776 | Cisco | draft TR | discussion | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.5 | Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256-bits | S3‑242777 | Proposed changes to the Conclusions | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
| S3‑242786 | Annexes on 256-bit security and backwards compatibility | KDDI Corporation, Cablelabs, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243647 | |||
| S3‑243647 | Annexes on 256-bit security and backwards compatibility | KDDI Corporation, Cablelabs, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242786 | |||
| S3‑242776 | Editorial Modifications | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243648 | |||
| S3‑243648 | Editorial Modifications | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242776 | |||
| S3‑242787 | pCR on Editorial cleanup | KDDI Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242788 | Presentation of Specification to TSG: TR 33.700-41 | KDDI Corporation | TS or TR cover | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243649 | |||
| S3‑243649 | Presentation of Specification to TSG: TR 33.700-41 | KDDI Corporation | TS or TR cover | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242788 | |||
| S3‑242914 | LS on assigning algorithm identifier values for 256-bit algorithms | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243655 | Draft TR 33.700-41 | KDDI | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.6 | Study on mitigations against bidding down attacks | S3‑243342 | Threat update for KI1 for MiBida | NTT DOCOMO INC.. | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
| S3‑243506 | Threat update for KI1 for MiBida | NTT DOCOMO INC.. | pCR | - | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑243385 | 33.701: Update to Solution 4 | Xiaomi EV Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242994 | MiBiDA - Update solution#10 | Apple | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243507 | ||||
| S3‑243507 | MiBiDA - Update solution#10 | Apple | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242994 | |||
| S3‑242965 | Solution #14 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243508 | |||
| S3‑243508 | Solution #14 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242965 | |||
| S3‑243362 | Removal of ENs to solution 14 in MiBiDA | NTT DOCOMO INC.. | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243508 | ||||
| S3‑242801 | New Solution Mitigation of Roaming Attack | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243509 | |||
| S3‑243509 | New Solution Mitigation of Roaming Attack | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242801 | |||
| S3‑243364 | New UE configuration based solution for MibidA | NTT DOCOMO INC.. | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243510 | ||||
| S3‑243510 | New UE configuration based solution for MibidA | NTT DOCOMO INC.. | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243364 | |||
| S3‑243215 | Conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.701 | Samsung, Ericsson, Nokia, Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243511 | |||
| S3‑242915 | conclusion for KI#1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243511 | |||
| S3‑243118 | Way forward | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243511 | |||
| S3‑243122 | Conclusion proposal | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243511 | |||
| S3‑243511 | Conclusion proposal | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesShow of hands for the Conclusion:
- Support: Vivo, Nokia, Google, Ericsson, Lenovo, Samsung, Huawei, Philips.
- No support, NTT-Docomo, Xiaomi, Thales, Apple, ORANGE, CableLAbs, ZTE
| revised | No | S3‑243691 | S3‑243122 | ||
| S3‑243691 | Conclusion proposal | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243511 | |||
| S3‑242992 | MiBiDA - Conclusions | Apple | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243511 | ||||
| S3‑242966 | Conclusion for KI#1 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243511 | |||
| S3‑242799 | Discussion on Conclusion to Address Attack in MiBiDA | vivo | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242800 | Conclusion for key issue #1 | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243511 | |||
| S3‑243269 | 33.701: Addition to Overall Summary | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242916 | Overall summary update | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242993 | MiBiDA - Update overall summary | Apple | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑243120 | Updates to overall summary | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243659 | |||
| S3‑243659 | Updates to overall summary | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243120 | |||
| S3‑243119 | Conference call minutes | Huawei, HiSilicon | report | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243395 | Evaluation to Solution #1 | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243657 | ||||
| S3‑243657 | Evaluation to Solution #1 | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243395 | ||||
| S3‑243396 | Evaluation to Solution #4 | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
| S3‑243557 | Draft TR 33.701 | Huawei | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| S3‑243692 | Cover sheet TR 33.701 | Huawei | TS or TR cover | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| 5.7 | Study on security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 2 | S3‑242764 | LS on reply to LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions | Nokia | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243533 | |
| S3‑243533 | LS on reply to LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions | Nokia | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242764 | |||
| S3‑243250 | Draft LS on reply to LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions | CATT | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243319 | Security of Satellite Store & Forward Solutions | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243320 | Reply LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243533 | ||||
| S3‑242918 | Update the Clause 4 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242919 | Update the KI#1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243534 | |||
| S3‑243534 | Update the KI#1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242919 | |||
| S3‑242846 | An Update for Solution #21: Remediation of unauthenticated (D)DOS in S&F | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243535 | |||
| S3‑243535 | An Update for Solution #21: Remediation of unauthenticated (D)DOS in S&F | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242846 | |||
| S3‑242847 | An Update for the Evaluation of Solution #21 | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243536 | |||
| S3‑243536 | An Update for the Evaluation of Solution #21 | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242847 | |||
| S3‑242920 | Evaluation for Solution #13 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243537 | |||
| S3‑243537 | Evaluation for Solution #13 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242920 | |||
| S3‑242971 | Evaluation of solution #13 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243537 | |||
| S3‑243348 | Evaluation of Solution#13 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesS3-243537
| merged | No | ||||
| S3‑242967 | Evaluation of solution #1 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242969 | Evaluation of solution #2 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242985 | Remove ENs and update evaluation in Solution #12 | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243539 | |||
| S3‑243539 | Remove ENs and update evaluation in Solution #12 | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242985 | |||
| S3‑243002 | Solution 6 update with evaluation | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243538 | |||
| S3‑243538 | Solution 6 update with evaluation | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243002 | |||
| S3‑243003 | Solution 22 updates with EN removal | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243005 | Solution 22 updates with evaluation | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243540 | |||
| S3‑243540 | Solution 22 updates with evaluation | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243005 | |||
| S3‑243073 | Evaluates to solution#22 of TR 33.700-29 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243540 | |||
| S3‑243349 | Evaluation of Solution#22 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243540 | |||
| S3‑243035 | Evaluation update on solution 9 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243057 | Resolution of EN on solution 18 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243693 | |||
| S3‑243693 | Resolution of EN on solution 18 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243057 | |||
| S3‑243058 | Evaluation update on solution 18 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243541 | |||
| S3‑243541 | Evaluation update on solution 18 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243058 | |||
| S3‑243218 | Evaluation of solution#7 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243542 | |||
| S3‑243542 | Evaluation of solution#7 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243218 | |||
| S3‑243219 | Resolving EN of solution#8 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243543 | |||
| S3‑243543 | Resolving EN of solution#8 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243219 | |||
| S3‑243220 | Evaluation of solution#8 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243544 | |||
| S3‑243544 | Evaluation of solution#8 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243220 | |||
| S3‑243234 | Update solution 5 | China Mobile, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243545 | |||
| S3‑243545 | Update solution 5 | China Mobile, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243234 | |||
| S3‑243253 | Update to solution #15 in TR 33.700-29 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243254 | Update to solution #16 in TR 33.700-29 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243318 | Addition to solution #3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243694 | |||
| S3‑243694 | Addition to solution #3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243318 | |||
| S3‑243072 | Removing ENs and adding evaluation in Sol#19 of TR 33.700-29 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243695 | |||
| S3‑243695 | Removing ENs and adding evaluation in Sol#19 of TR 33.700-29 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243072 | |||
| S3‑243222 | Resolving EN of solution#25 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243546 | |||
| S3‑243546 | Resolving EN of solution#25 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243222 | |||
| S3‑243223 | Evaluation of solution#25 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243547 | |||
| S3‑243547 | Evaluation of solution#25 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243223 | |||
| S3‑243255 | Update to solution #17 in TR 33.700-29 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243548 | |||
| S3‑243548 | Update to solution #17 in TR 33.700-29 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243255 | |||
| S3‑243221 | Update to solution#24 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243549 | |||
| S3‑243549 | Update to solution#24 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243221 | |||
| S3‑243224 | Update to solution#26 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243550 | |||
| S3‑243550 | Update to solution#26 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243224 | |||
| S3‑242865 | pCR to TR33.700-29 New solution on anti DoS attacks and privacy protection for S&F operations | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243551 | |||
| S3‑243551 | pCR to TR33.700-29 New solution on anti DoS attacks and privacy protection for S&F operations | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242865 | |||
| S3‑243033 | Security protection based on AKA procedure in S&F operation with a full CN onboard the satellite | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243552 | |||
| S3‑243552 | Security protection based on AKA procedure in S&F operation with a full CN onboard the satellite | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243033 | |||
| S3‑243233 | New solution of Authentication and authorization in S&F based on onboard EPC | China Mobile, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243553 | |||
| S3‑243553 | New solution of Authentication and authorization in S&F based on onboard EPC | China Mobile, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243233 | |||
| S3‑243034 | Interim GUTI privacy protection based on pseudonym UE IDs | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243554 | |||
| S3‑243554 | Interim GUTI privacy protection based on pseudonym UE IDs | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243034 | |||
| S3‑242988 | New key issue for satellite switching with re-synchronization in regenerative architecture | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242956 | Discussion Paper FSAT Solutions | Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242917 | Conclusion for KI#1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242955 | Conclusion of Key Issue 1 | Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | |||||
| S3‑243045 | Conclusion of Key issue #1 in TR 33.700-29 | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | |||||
| S3‑243152 | Conclusion for KI#1 | THALES | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑243555 | Draft TR 33.700-29 | CATT | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.8 | Study on security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication | S3‑242932 | Agreed pCR of the last meeting Mobike | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
| S3‑242935 | Discussion paper for Fast BSS details from 802.11 specs | Nokia | discussion | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243667 | |||
| S3‑243667 | Discussion paper for Fast BSS details from 802.11 specs | Nokia | discussion | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑242935 | |||
| S3‑242837 | Further conclusion for Key issue #1 | Charter Communications, Inc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243697 | |||
| S3‑243697 | Further conclusion for Key issue #1 | Charter Communications, Inc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242837 | |||
| S3‑242934 | LS on clarification on trusted non 3GPP access technologies | Nokia | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242933 | KI1 and KI3 conclusion update | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243644 | |||
| S3‑243644 | KI1 and KI3 conclusion update | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242933 | |||
| S3‑243101 | Remove ENs to KI#1 and KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243644 | |||
| S3‑243323 | Updating the conclusion to KI#1 and KI#3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243644 | |||
| S3‑242937 | KI2 and KI4conclusion update | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243645 | |||
| S3‑243645 | KI2 and KI4conclusion update | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242937 | |||
| S3‑243100 | new conclusion to KI#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243645 | |||
| S3‑242936 | Discussion paper for Fast BSS based NSWO solution | Nokia | discussion | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243099 | new conclusion to KI#4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243646 | |||
| S3‑243324 | Proposed conclusion for KI#4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243646 | |||
| S3‑243646 | Proposed conclusion for KI#4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243324 | |||
| S3‑242938 | TR editorial correction | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243102 | Update evaluation to solution 9 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243103 | Update evaluation to solution 12 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243104 | Update evaluation to solution 13 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243105 | Update evaluation to solution 16 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243106 | Update evaluation to solution 18 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243107 | Update evaluation to solution 19 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243108 | Update evaluation to solution 20 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243225 | Resolving EN in sol#9 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243226 | Resolving EN in sol#12 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243227 | Resolving EN in sol#19 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243660 | Draft TR 33.702 | Nokia | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| S3‑243698 | Cover sheet TR 33.702 | Nokia | TS or TR cover | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| 5.9 | Study on security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G | S3‑243121 | Updates to the assumption clause | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243492 | |
| S3‑243492 | Updates to the assumption clause | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243121 | |||
| S3‑242859 | pCR to TR 33.713 Add new security assumptions for Clause 4 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesORANGE: this is too premature, let's see every key issue and solutions. I need to see the authentication clarified first and come back to this later.
Thales disagreed with the contribution and agreed with ORANGE.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243284 | Assumption on AIoT Device | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesORANGE: this is premature. Sotring long term credentials means that we have them, we havent decided about this yet.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242963 | New Key Issue | THALES, ORANGE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243165 | AIoT: Security assumptions in the 5G system | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesORANGE proposed to leave the first bullet.
China Mobile: let's note it because there was no agreement about this in the last meeting.
Qualcomm didn’t agree with the first bullet.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243238 | Architecture and Security Assumptions for AIoT services | China Mobile, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesInterdigital, Qualcomm, Nokia and Ericsson disagreed.
Interdigital: too early to make this assumption. What is meant with "access" here? Just remove the text after "normal UE".
Nokia: what about the non UICC credentials?
Apple: we don’t object to have the UICC in the AioT device. If the AioT is a new type of UE we should not have this statement here.
ORANGE: this clause is useless. Let's do it through the usual key issue discussion. China Mobile supported this.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243237 | Discussion on security assumption | China Mobile, CAICT | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242961 | UICC support for Ambient IoT Service | THALES, ORANGE | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
YesInterdigital: asking RAN to ask CT6?
Nokia supported sending the LS but to ETSI SET.
NTT-Docomo agreed with Interdigital and they added that some devices may support non volatile storage. This meant no authentication.
ORANGE: first decide if we need an authentication to the network, then how then we can send an LS when we understand where we are going.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242922 | Update the KI#1 in TR 33.713 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242845 | An update for Key Issue #2: Authorization for 5G Ambient IoT Services | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242860 | pCR to TR33.713 Update key issue#4 for adding threats and requirements | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243278 | Update KI#4 for Command | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243355 | Update to KI#4 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242983 | Update KI on protection of information during AIoT service communication | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243059 | update to the key issue on the protection of information during AIoT service | Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom, Vivo, Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243169 | AIoT: Security threats for KI on protection of information during AIoT service communication | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242991 | AIoT - New KI for Ambient IoT on communication security | Apple | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | |||||
| S3‑242861 | pCR to TR33.713 New key issue on authentication of AIoT Devices | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242990 | AIoT - New KI for Ambient IoT on Authentication | Apple | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | |||||
| S3‑243060 | New Key Issue for Authentication in Ambient IoT service | Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom, Vivo, Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesThere were 17 supporting companies.
Thales,Nokia and Idemia opposed to the implication that the current requirements were not enough for AIoT devices.
NTT-Docomo: what do we mean by the network? Is it everything? Application layer? It's unclear and this requirement will not help us in our discussions.
Companies objecting to the contribution: Thales, NTT-Docomo, IDEMIA, Qualcomm.
| revised | No | S3‑243680 | |||
| S3‑243680 | New Key Issue for Authentication in Ambient IoT service | Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom, Vivo, Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNTT-Docomo asked to be minuted the following:
NTT DOCOMO objects to putting in the first line of the security requirement, as it is unclear what kind of solutions could fulfil this requirement and which kind of solutions don't fulfil this requirement.
It is also unclear whether the requirement together with the leeway provided by the final editor's note can be fulfilled by solutions that would only perform authentication with a reader UE, or with an application server outside the 5G system.
Supporters of the contribution on the header page.
Thales, IDEMIA, Ericsson objected to this contribution.
The Chair commented that similar discussions happened in SA1 and that they were preparing an LS. A joint conference call would be possible to try to make some progress. ORANGE commented that SA1 didn’t deal with architecture issues.
The Chair declared the contents of this document as a working agreement.
Phillips that approving this document meant a larger number of contributions for the next meeting addressing the solutions of this key issue.
NTT-Docomo commented that the planned Time Units had been exceeded already and needed to be re-planned.
| approved | No | S3‑243060 | |||
| S3‑243286 | KI on authentication related to inventory use case | OPPO | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑243280 | New KI on AIoT Authentication of Command Use Case | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243166 | New key issue for connectivity authentication in Ambient IoT | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243168 | New key issue for Authenticated and authorized access to devices in Ambient IoT via 3GPP core | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243354 | KI Authentication and identity of type 1 and 2 devices | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243167 | New key issue for application layer authentication in Ambient IoT | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242802 | New Key Issue on Exposure of Inventory Device Quantity | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242921 | Clean up for TR 33.713 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242984 | Solution on disabling operation procedure for AIoT services | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243054 | solution on protection for disabling device operation | Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia: password sent in clear text?It needs to be clarified. Evaluation is FFS.
ORANGE: step 8, no way to access the UDM without being authenticated.
OPPO: this doesn’t address all of key issue 1.Permanent disable is part of the requirement.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243261 | New solution on disabling operation procedure | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243287 | Solution on Disabling Enabling | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243681 | Solution on Disabling Enabling | OPPO | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑243346 | Solution#1 update - Addressing ENs | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242923 | Update the Sol#2 in TR 33.713 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243170 | Authorization of AIoT capable UE in topology 2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243263 | New solution on authorization of intermediate node for Ambient IoT services | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243282 | Solution for Intermediate UE Authorization | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243387 | Solution for Authentication, Authorization of AIoT devices with USIM on AIoT AS Layer | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243388 | Solution for Authentication, Authorization of AIoT devices with USIM on AIoT Layer | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243389 | Solution for Authentication, Authorization and ID privacy of AIoT devices without USIM | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242797 | Solution on Privacy Protection for AIoT device | Sony | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242844 | Solution for Lightweight AIoT ID privacy | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242863 | pCR to TR33.713 New solution for protecting Device IDs in inventory scenarios | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242924 | New solution on KI#3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242989 | AIoT - Security solution on privacy | Apple | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | |||||
| S3‑243288 | Solution on temporary ID based AIoT device privacy protection | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243290 | Solution on AIoT device ID privacy protection using anonymous key | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243340 | A new solution for privacy protection of AIoT device identifier | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243345 | New solution - Ambient IoT ID privacy | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243351 | New solution for protecting AIoT ID | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242805 | New solution on Communication Security of intermediate UE interacting with AIoT device | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242864 | pCR to pCR to TR33.713 New solution for message protection in command scenarios | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243055 | solution on protection for inventory and command procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243262 | New solution on security protection method for Ambient IoT services | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243341 | A new solution for end-to-end security protection of command | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242804 | New solution on Authentication for AIoT Device | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243283 | Solution for AIoT Lightweight Authentication Based on 5G-AKA | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242803 | New solution on Protection on Quantity of AIoT Devices during Inventory | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑242866 | Discussion on Ambient IoT Device Resource Limitation | Xidian University | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
| S3‑243699 | Draft TR 33.713 | OPPO | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.10 | Study on security aspects of Usage of User Identities | S3‑242752 | Updates to Solution #1 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson: remove the reference to the LS.
Interdigital:remove the term application level.
| revised | No | S3‑243466 | |
| S3‑243466 | Updates to Solution #1 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242752 | |||
| S3‑242850 | TR 33.700-32 update solution #2 | InterDigital Canada | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243440 | |||
| S3‑243440 | TR 33.700-32 update solution #2 | InterDigital Canada | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242850 | |||
| S3‑242851 | TR 33.700-32 update solution #3 | InterDigital Canada | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243441 | |||
| S3‑243441 | TR 33.700-32 update solution #3 | InterDigital Canada | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242851 | |||
| S3‑242884 | Sol#5 update to address ENs | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243442 | |||
| S3‑243442 | Sol#5 update to address ENs | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242884 | |||
| S3‑242885 | Sol#5 evaluation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243443 | |||
| S3‑243443 | Sol#5 evaluation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242885 | |||
| S3‑242925 | address the ENs in Solution#4 clause 6.4.2.1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242926 | address the EN in Solution#4 clause 6.4.2.2 with user_ID activation | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242927 | address the EN in Solution#4 clause 6.4.2.3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242928 | add evaluation to Solution#4 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243444 | |||
| S3‑243444 | add evaluation to Solution#4 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242928 | |||
| S3‑242940 | Enhancing solution 15 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243446 | |||
| S3‑243446 | Enhancing solution 15 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242940 | |||
| S3‑243037 | Addressing the EN on Human User authentication of through NAS procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243038 | Evaluation to solution 6 to address KI#1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson: not sure if it addresses all security requirements. Last paragraph may not be needed.
| revised | No | S3‑243447 | |||
| S3‑243447 | Evaluation to solution 6 to address KI#1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243038 | |||
| S3‑243142 | Update of Solution #9: Clarification and removal of Editor's Notes | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243448 | |||
| S3‑243448 | Update of Solution #9: Clarification and removal of Editor's Notes | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243142 | |||
| S3‑243143 | Update of Solution #9: Resolution of Editor's Note on protection of user ID | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243449 | |||
| S3‑243449 | Update of Solution #9: Resolution of Editor's Note on protection of user ID | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243143 | |||
| S3‑243208 | Resolution of ENs on user initiated procedure in Solution#16 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243209 | Resolution of ENs on Network triggered procedure in Solution#16 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243210 | Evaluation for solution#16 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: impact on UE and network needs to be captured.
Ericsson: capture interaction with the human user.
| revised | No | S3‑243450 | |||
| S3‑243450 | Evaluation for solution#16 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243210 | |||
| S3‑243270 | 33.700-32: Update to Solution 8 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243451 | |||
| S3‑243451 | 33.700-32: Update to Solution 8 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243270 | |||
| S3‑243271 | 33.700-32: Update to Solution 22 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243452 | |||
| S3‑243452 | 33.700-32: Update to Solution 22 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesMCC: refer to SA2 TR in the note instead of naming a SA2 architecture or procedure.
| approved | No | S3‑243271 | |||
| S3‑243344 | Solution#10 update - Addresing EN | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243453 | |||
| S3‑243453 | Solution#10 update - Addresing EN | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243344 | |||
| S3‑242886 | Sol#19 update to address ENs | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243454 | |||
| S3‑243454 | Sol#19 update to address ENs | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242886 | |||
| S3‑242887 | Sol#19 evaluation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242941 | Enhancing solution 18 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242942 | evaluation of solution 18 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242943 | Enhancing solution 17 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243455 | |||
| S3‑243455 | Enhancing solution 17 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242943 | |||
| S3‑243116 | Add evaluation to solution 20 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesInterdigital: there are two requirements in key issue 2, clarify that the first requirement is addressed.
ORANGE: NAS confidentiality needs to be activated.
| revised | No | S3‑243456 | |||
| S3‑243456 | Add evaluation to solution 20 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243116 | |||
| S3‑243146 | Update of Solution #11: Resolving Editor's Notes on further clarification | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243147 | Update of Solution #11: Resolve Editor's Note on mobility | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242751 | Updates to Solution #14 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243457 | |||
| S3‑243457 | Updates to Solution #14 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242751 | |||
| S3‑242888 | Sol#21 update to address ENs | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242889 | Sol#21 evaluation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243458 | |||
| S3‑243458 | Sol#21 evaluation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242889 | |||
| S3‑243313 | Addressing ENs in solution #12 in TR 33.700-32 | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243459 | |||
| S3‑243459 | Addressing ENs in solution #12 in TR 33.700-32 | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesMCC: add reference to SA2 TR in the evaluation.
| approved | No | S3‑243313 | |||
| S3‑243381 | Update solution #13 in TR 33.700-32 | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Yes |
YesORANGE: it addresses a key issue that doesn’t exist.
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑243036 | User ID privacy protection based on EAP-TLS protocol using pseudonym mechanism | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243460 | |||
| S3‑243460 | User ID privacy protection based on EAP-TLS protocol using pseudonym mechanism | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243036 | |||
| S3‑243128 | New solution for user authentication with EAP-PSK | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243129 | New Solution on user authentication with user certificate of KI1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia: remove evaluation.
| revised | No | S3‑243461 | |||
| S3‑243461 | New Solution on user authentication with user certificate of KI1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesIncorporating ORANGE comments on step 0 referring to UICC provisioning.
| approved | No | S3‑243129 | |||
| S3‑243272 | 33.700-32: New Solution on User Authentication with Credential Derived by UIMF | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesThales: Provision keys for non-3GPP devices is out of scope.
| revised | No | S3‑243462 | |||
| S3‑243462 | 33.700-32: New Solution on User Authentication with Credential Derived by UIMF | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243272 | |||
| S3‑243273 | 33.700-32: New Solution on Privacy Protection for UIP Exposure | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: aliign with SA2 terminology, not SA6's. Remove the evaluation.
| revised | No | S3‑243463 | |||
| S3‑243463 | 33.700-32: New Solution on Privacy Protection for UIP Exposure | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243273 | |||
| S3‑243049 | Discussion paper on privacy issue associated with user id | Nokia | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243050 | KI2 update | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yesinterdigital: threat is fine, but the third requirement is already covered.
Huawei: Don’t mix provacy and user consent issues.
ORANGE: requirements are solution specific.
| revised | No | S3‑243464 | |||
| S3‑243464 | KI2 update | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑243050 | |||
| S3‑243382 | Update the Key issue #3 in TR 33.700-32 | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Yes |
YesInterdigital: too late for this key issue, SA2 has concluded on this particular issue of non 3GPP devices.
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑242856 | Conclusion for KI#3 in TR 33.700-32 | CableLabs, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei disagreed, they had an alternate proposal in 890. They said that SA2 could not conclude on a security issue.
| revised | No | S3‑243465 | |||
| S3‑243465 | Conclusion for KI#3 in TR 33.700-32 | CableLabs, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242856 | |||
| S3‑242890 | Conclusions for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243465 | |||
| S3‑242944 | concluding KI3 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243465 | |||
| S3‑243148 | Conclusion for Key Issue #3 (authentication and authorization of non-3GPP device behind UE/5G-RG) | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243465 | |||
| S3‑243291 | Proposed conclusion for KI 1 for user authentication | NTT DOCOMO INC., Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesInterdigital: Not complying with the service requirement.
Apple,ORANGE, CableLabs and Qualcommsupported this conclusion.
Huawei and Nokia disagreed with this conclusion.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243445 | Draft TR 33.700-32 | Interdigital | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.11 | Study on UAS security enhancement | S3‑243150 | Mapping of solutions to key issues | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
| S3‑242878 | key issue for no transmit zones | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243151 | Solution for multiple USS case | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243604 | |||
| S3‑243604 | Solution for multiple USS case | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243151 | |||
| S3‑243668 | Solution for multiple USS case using token | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242848 | TR 33.759 update solution #1 | InterDigital Canada | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243605 | |||
| S3‑243605 | TR 33.759 update solution #1 | InterDigital Canada | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242848 | |||
| S3‑242879 | Sol#2 update to address ENs | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243672 | |||
| S3‑243672 | Sol#2 update to address ENs | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242879 | |||
| S3‑242881 | Sol#3 update to address ENs | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243673 | |||
| S3‑243673 | Sol#3 update to address ENs | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242881 | |||
| S3‑242880 | Sol#2 evaluation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243674 | |||
| S3‑243674 | Sol#2 evaluation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242880 | |||
| S3‑242882 | Sol#3 evaluation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243675 | |||
| S3‑243675 | Sol#3 evaluation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242882 | |||
| S3‑242883 | Sol#4 evaluation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242849 | TR 33.759 conclusion KI #1 | InterDigital Canada | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243603 | Draft TR 33.759 | Ericsson | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.12 | Study on security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 | S3‑243182 | Resolve the EN in Key issue #1 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesQualcomm: what's the meaning of end to end security here?
Xiaomi: end to end security is not needed.
Interdigital: this is contradicting the security threat assumptions. Huawei supported this.
| noted | No | ||
| S3‑243306 | Resolve EN in KI#1: Security for multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesQualcomm: this proposal and China Telecom's are not aligned with regards to the end ot end security.
Interdigital didn’t understand the threat.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243043 | Conclusion of KI#2 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243573 | |||
| S3‑243573 | Conclusion of KI#2 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesQualcomm didn’t agree.
| noted | No | S3‑243043 | |||
| S3‑243184 | Conclusion of KI#1 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242853 | TR 33.743 update solution #1 | InterDigital Canada | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243663 | |||
| S3‑243663 | TR 33.743 update solution #1 | InterDigital Canada | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242853 | |||
| S3‑243091 | Update solution#5 to add security establishment with more than one intermediate relays | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243090 | Resolve ENs in solution#5 of TR 33.743 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243560 | |||
| S3‑243560 | Resolve ENs in solution#5 of TR 33.743 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243090 | |||
| S3‑243092 | Evaluates to solution#5 of TR 33.743 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243561 | |||
| S3‑243561 | Evaluates to solution#5 of TR 33.743 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243092 | |||
| S3‑243183 | update solution #6 in TR 33.743 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesInterdigital: intermediate relay is out of coverage the connection to the network may not be possible.
Xiaomi: not aligned with SA2 assumption.
Qualcomm: we don’t agree with the threat.
| revised | No | S3‑243562 | |||
| S3‑243562 | update solution #6 in TR 33.743 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243183 | |||
| S3‑243258 | Update to solution #8 in TR 33.743 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243563 | |||
| S3‑243563 | Update to solution #8 in TR 33.743 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243258 | |||
| S3‑243260 | Add the evaluation of solution #8 in TR 33.743 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243564 | |||
| S3‑243564 | Add the evaluation of solution #8 in TR 33.743 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243260 | |||
| S3‑243302 | Resolve EN in Solution#4: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay communication | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesQualcomm: we don’t see the need for end to end security. We don’t agree with the reason.
Xiaomi: don’t delete the first editor's note, no alignment with SA2.
| revised | No | S3‑243565 | |||
| S3‑243565 | Resolve EN in Solution#4: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay communication | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243302 | |||
| S3‑243305 | Evaluation of Solution#4: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay communication | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243566 | |||
| S3‑243566 | Evaluation of Solution#4: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay communication | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243305 | |||
| S3‑243335 | Updates to solution #10 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243336 | Addressing ENs in solution #10 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243337 | Adding an evaluation to solution #10 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243709 | |||
| S3‑243709 | Adding an evaluation to solution #10 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243337 | |||
| S3‑243093 | Evaluates to solution#4 of TR 33.743 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243568 | |||
| S3‑243568 | Evaluates to solution#4 of TR 33.743 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243093 | |||
| S3‑243094 | Evaluates to solution#6 of TR 33.743 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243670 | |||
| S3‑243670 | Evaluates to solution#6 of TR 33.743 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243094 | |||
| S3‑243095 | Evaluates to solution#1 of TR 33.743 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243663 | |||
| S3‑243257 | Update to solution #7 in TR 33.743 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesQualcomm didn’t agree with the first editor's note removal.
| revised | No | S3‑243569 | |||
| S3‑243569 | Update to solution #7 in TR 33.743 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243257 | |||
| S3‑243259 | Add the evaluation of solution #7 in TR 33.743 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243710 | |||
| S3‑243710 | Add the evaluation of solution #7 in TR 33.743 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243259 | |||
| S3‑243300 | Resolve ENs in Solution #2: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model A | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243706 | |||
| S3‑243706 | Resolve ENs in Solution #2: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model A | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243300 | |||
| S3‑243303 | Evaluation of Solution #2: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model A | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243707 | |||
| S3‑243707 | Evaluation of Solution #2: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model A | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243303 | |||
| S3‑243332 | Updates on solution #9 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243333 | Addressing ENs in solution #9 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243570 | |||
| S3‑243570 | Addressing ENs in solution #9 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243333 | |||
| S3‑243334 | Adding an evaluation to solution #9 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243571 | |||
| S3‑243571 | Adding an evaluation to solution #9 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243334 | |||
| S3‑243301 | Resolve EN in Solution #3: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model B | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243572 | |||
| S3‑243572 | Resolve EN in Solution #3: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model B | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243301 | |||
| S3‑243304 | Evaluation of Solution #3: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model B | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243708 | |||
| S3‑243708 | Evaluation of Solution #3: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model B | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243304 | |||
| S3‑243015 | Update EN in solution#13 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243711 | |||
| S3‑243711 | Update EN in solution#13 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243015 | |||
| S3‑243019 | Evaluation of solution#13 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243712 | |||
| S3‑243712 | Evaluation of solution#13 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243723 | S3‑243019 | ||
| S3‑243723 | Evaluation of solution#13 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243712 | |||
| S3‑243089 | Resolve EN and evaluate to Sol#11 for multi-hop U2U security establishment | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243669 | |||
| S3‑243669 | Resolve EN and evaluate to Sol#11 for multi-hop U2U security establishment | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243089 | |||
| S3‑243338 | Updates on solution #14 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243339 | Add an evaluation to solution #15 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243231 | pCR to TR33.743 Update clause 3.1 and clause 3.3 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243248 | pCR to TR33.743 Update clause 4 to standardize the use of terminology | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243041 | Conclusion of KI#1 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑243567 | Draft TR 33.743 | Huawei | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.13 | Study on security aspects of AIML enhancements | S3‑242807 | Update on Key Issue#1 | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
| S3‑243574 | Update on Key Issue#1 | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑243051 | Update the security threats of Key Issue #2: Authorization mechanism of selection of VFL participants in the VFL group | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243705 | |||
| S3‑243705 | Update the security threats of Key Issue #2: Authorization mechanism of selection of VFL participants in the VFL group | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243051 | |||
| S3‑242945 | KI3 update | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242806 | Update on Key Issue#4 | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243575 | |||
| S3‑243575 | Update on Key Issue#4 | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242806 | |||
| S3‑243074 | Update KI#4 : Security of communication data used in VFL training process | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243575 | |||
| S3‑243187 | Update KI#4 of TR 33.784 | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243575 | |||
| S3‑242808 | New solution on KI#1 Authorization for LCS Data Storage and Retrieval | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson: No conclsuon of storage in ADRF in SA2. WE don’t agree.
| revised | No | S3‑243576 | |||
| S3‑243576 | New solution on KI#1 Authorization for LCS Data Storage and Retrieval | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242808 | |||
| S3‑242929 | update to Solution#2 LMF authorization | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243577 | |||
| S3‑243065 | Resolution of EN on solution 1 for KI#1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson didn’t agree with the contribution.
| revised | No | S3‑243703 | |||
| S3‑243703 | Resolution of EN on solution 1 for KI#1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑243065 | |||
| S3‑242946 | Enhancing solution 3 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243578 | |||
| S3‑243578 | Enhancing solution 3 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242946 | |||
| S3‑242809 | EN Address for Solution#4 Authorization of VLF member selection | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243579 | |||
| S3‑243579 | EN Address for Solution#4 Authorization of VLF member selection | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242809 | |||
| S3‑243189 | Resolve one EN for Solution#5 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243580 | |||
| S3‑243580 | Resolve one EN for Solution#5 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243189 | |||
| S3‑243191 | Resolve other EN for Solution#5 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243031 | Addressing the EN on the authorization mechanism through NRF and NEF for AF outside the PLMN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia, Ericsson, Vivo: keep the editor's note.
| revised | No | S3‑243581 | |||
| S3‑243581 | Addressing the EN on the authorization mechanism through NRF and NEF for AF outside the PLMN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243031 | |||
| S3‑243370 | Resolve ENs for sol#7 | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243582 | |||
| S3‑242792 | Add notes to section 6.7 in TR 33.784 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243713 | |||
| S3‑243582 | Resolve ENs for sol#7 | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243370 | |||
| S3‑243713 | Add notes to section 6.7 in TR 33.784 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242792 | |||
| S3‑243371 | Resolve ENs for sol#8 | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243583 | |||
| S3‑243583 | Resolve ENs for sol#8 | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243371 | |||
| S3‑242826 | A new solution for AIML Data Privacy Protection | InterDigital New York | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson, Huawei disagreed.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243063 | Resolution of EN on solution 9 for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia: solution seems too complex, the management of these groups.
China Mobile: not aligned with SA2.
| revised | No | S3‑243584 | |||
| S3‑243584 | Resolution of EN on solution 9 for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243063 | |||
| S3‑243244 | Solve EN for solution#9 to align with SA2 | China Mobile, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243584 | |||
| S3‑242811 | Update for Solution#10 Privacy of Simple alignment | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243585 | |||
| S3‑243585 | Update for Solution#10 Privacy of Simple alignment | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242811 | |||
| S3‑243245 | Solve EN for solution#10 to align with SA2 | China Mobile, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243052 | Resolve the EN and update Solution #11 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: keep the editor's note, still under discussion in SA2.
Vivo wanted to remove it.
| revised | No | S3‑243586 | |||
| S3‑243586 | Resolve the EN and update Solution #11 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243052 | |||
| S3‑243077 | Evaluation on the solution 11 for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243587 | |||
| S3‑243587 | Adding Enn on the solution 11 for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243077 | |||
| S3‑243186 | Remove ENs and add evaluation in solution #12 | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243588 | |||
| S3‑243588 | Remove ENs and add evaluation in solution #12 | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243186 | |||
| S3‑243243 | Solve EN for solution#12 to align with SA2 | China Mobile, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242795 | New Solution to KI#4: Privacy preserving scheme for exchanging training data when AF acting as VFL server | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242827 | A new solution of security protection for VFL entity communication | InterDigital New York | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242814 | New solution on Reusing SBA to Protect Communication Data in Training Process | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243589 | |||
| S3‑243075 | Solution to KI#4 : Security of communication data used in VFL training process | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243589 | |||
| S3‑243589 | Solution to KI#4 : Security of communication data used in VFL training process | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243075 | |||
| S3‑243188 | Reusing the exsiting security mechanism for VFL communication data | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243589 | |||
| S3‑243062 | Evaluation on solution 1 for KI#1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243704 | |||
| S3‑243704 | Evaluation on solution 1 for KI#1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243062 | |||
| S3‑243367 | Add evaluation for sol#2 | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243577 | |||
| S3‑243577 | Add evaluation for sol#2 | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243367 | |||
| S3‑242947 | Solution 3 evaluation | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243590 | |||
| S3‑243590 | Solution 3 evaluation | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242947 | |||
| S3‑242810 | Evaluation for Solution#4 Authorization of VLF member selection | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243591 | |||
| S3‑243591 | Evaluation for Solution#4 Authorization of VLF member selection | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242810 | |||
| S3‑243190 | Evaluation of Solution#5 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: disagree with deleting the editor's note.
| revised | No | S3‑243592 | |||
| S3‑243592 | Evaluation of Solution#5 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243190 | |||
| S3‑243032 | Evaluation to the solution on an authorization mechanism through NRF and NEF for AF outside the PLMN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243593 | |||
| S3‑243593 | Evaluation to the solution on an authorization mechanism through NRF and NEF for AF outside the PLMN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243032 | |||
| S3‑243368 | Add evaluation for sol#7 | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243594 | |||
| S3‑243594 | Add evaluation for sol#7 | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243368 | |||
| S3‑243369 | Add evaluation for sol#8 | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243595 | |||
| S3‑243595 | Add evaluation for sol#8 | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243369 | |||
| S3‑243066 | Evaluation on solution 9 for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243596 | |||
| S3‑243596 | Evaluation on solution 9 for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243066 | |||
| S3‑243076 | Evaluation on the solution 10 for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243597 | |||
| S3‑243597 | Evaluation on the solution 10 for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243076 | |||
| S3‑243078 | Evaluation on the solution 12 for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242812 | Conclusion Skeleton for AIML_SEC | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: this is not needed. China Mobile and Nokia agreed.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242948 | KI2 conclusion | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson didn’t agree with the conclusion.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242813 | Conclusion for KI4 | vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243192 | Conclusion on KI#4 | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242840 | Editorial correction to section 6.4 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243246 | Terms alignment with SA2 | China Mobile, vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243247 | Add abbreviations on TR 33.784 | China Mobile, vivo, CAICT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242755 | Editorial correction to section 6.4 | CMDI | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑242765 | Editorial correction to section 6.4 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑243392 | Draft TR 33.784 | China Mobile | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.14 | Study on EdgeComputing | S3‑242825 | A solution for Key Issue #2.1: Secure retrieval of 5G system UE IDs | InterDigital New York | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243627 | |
| S3‑242828 | Solution for security retrieval of 5G UE Id and privacy related information | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243628 | |||
| S3‑243628 | Solution for security retrieval of 5G UE Id and privacy related information | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242828 | |||
| S3‑242829 | Solution for secure retrieval of 5G UE privacy related information based on AKMA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243629 | |||
| S3‑243629 | Solution for secure retrieval of 5G UE privacy related information based on AKMA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242829 | |||
| S3‑242999 | MEC - Soltuion on EEC provided Information authentication | Apple | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243630 | ||||
| S3‑243630 | MEC - Soltuion on EEC provided Information authentication | Apple | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242999 | |||
| S3‑243028 | A new solution on authorizing AF to retrieve UE ID | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243627 | |||
| S3‑243627 | A new solution on authorizing AF to retrieve UE ID | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243028 | |||
| S3‑243123 | Resolution of ENs on solution 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243631 | |||
| S3‑243631 | Resolution of ENs on solution 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243123 | |||
| S3‑243124 | Evaluation on solution 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243632 | |||
| S3‑243632 | Evaluation on solution 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243124 | |||
| S3‑243149 | New solution for EEC provided information verification: UE ID token | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243633 | |||
| S3‑243633 | New solution for EEC provided information verification: UE ID token | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243149 | |||
| S3‑243216 | Solution for IP address verification | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243634 | |||
| S3‑243634 | Solution for IP address verification | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243216 | |||
| S3‑243343 | Solution for IP address verification using access token | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243635 | |||
| S3‑243635 | Solution for IP address verification using access token | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243343 | |||
| S3‑242830 | New KI on Security aspects related to enhancements of EAS and local UPF (re)selection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243665 | ||||
| S3‑243665 | New KI on Security aspects related to enhancements of EAS and local UPF (re)selection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242830 | |||
| S3‑243039 | Conclusion on the security releted with 5G System Enhancements for Edge Computing | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243721 | Draft TR 33.749 | Huawei | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.15 | Study on security aspects for Multi-Access | S3‑243044 | Update of Solution #5: UE authentication and traffic protection in ATSSS-Lite | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
| S3‑243598 | Update of Solution #5: UE authentication and traffic protection in ATSSS-Lite | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243046 | |||
| S3‑243046 | Update of Solution #5: Discussion on UPF exposure | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia: too late to bring this when we are going to close the TR.
| revised | No | S3‑243598 | |||
| S3‑243068 | Address EN for solution 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243069 | Add evaluation to solution 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243600 | |||
| S3‑243600 | Add evaluation to solution 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243069 | |||
| S3‑243070 | Address EN for solution 6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243601 | |||
| S3‑243601 | Address EN for solution 6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243070 | |||
| S3‑243071 | Add evaluation to solution 6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243347 | Update to new SID on security aspects for Multi-Access (DualSteer + ATSSS Ph-4) | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesCableLabs didn’t want to add new issues. A new study can be brought later to address this.
Huawei didn’t agree to update it either. They added that in SA2 was not clear the scenario of two USIMs in the UE.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242962 | Discussion on Dual steer device and AKMA procedure | NEC Corporation | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
YesCableLabs: this should be a new study.
Ericsson: SA2 may reject this work, we don’t agree.
Nokia didn’t support it either. SA2 hasn’t decided yet about DualSteer devices so we cannot approve it.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242960 | Update to New SID on security aspects for Multi-Access (DualSteer + ATSSS Ph-4) | NEC Corporation | SID revised | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑241191 | ||||
| S3‑242857 | Conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.754 | CableLabs, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243602 | |||
| S3‑242858 | Conclusion for KI#2 in TR 33.754 | CableLabs, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243602 | |||
| S3‑242957 | Cleanup TR 33.754 Introduction | Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
| S3‑242958 | Cleanup TR 33.754: Key issues | Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243602 | ||||
| S3‑243602 | Cleanup TR 33.754: Key issues | Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242958 | |||
| S3‑243372 | Conclusions for KI#1 and KI#2 | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243602 | |||
| S3‑243599 | Draft TR 33.754 | Intel | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| S3‑243714 | Cover sheet TR 33.754 | Intel | TS or TR cover | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| 5.16 | Study on 5GS enhancements for Energy Saving | S3‑243125 | Update KI2 about privacy of exposure energy related information | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243607 | |
| S3‑243352 | Resolution of EN concerning privacy. | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243607 | |||
| S3‑243607 | Resolution of EN concerning privacy. | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243352 | |||
| S3‑242986 | Update of Solution #1: Solution reusing existing interfaces and security mechanisms for energy related information collection | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia: SA2 hasn’t concluded yet. Further evaluation is needed.
| revised | No | S3‑243608 | |||
| S3‑243608 | Update of Solution #1: Solution reusing existing interfaces and security mechanisms for energy related information collection | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242986 | |||
| S3‑243083 | solution related to KI2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson: lot of stuff in the scope of SA2 that needs to be removed.
Nokia supported Ericsson. They asked to remove the evaluation.
MCC: the note should be an editor's note.
| revised | No | S3‑243609 | |||
| S3‑243609 | solution related to KI2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243083 | |||
| S3‑243141 | Solution mapping | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243610 | |||
| S3‑243610 | Solution mapping | Ericsson,Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243141 | |||
| S3‑243353 | Update of mapping table | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243610 | |||
| S3‑243606 | Drraft TR 33.766 | Ericsson | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.17 | Study on security aspects of 5G NR Femto | S3‑242987 | Evaluation to solution#2 in TR 33.745 | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243512 | |
| S3‑243512 | Evaluation to solution#2 in TR 33.745 | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242987 | |||
| S3‑243004 | update to Solution#1 ownership security | ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243513 | |||
| S3‑243513 | update to Solution#1 ownership security | ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243004 | |||
| S3‑243016 | Updates for solution #4 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243514 | |||
| S3‑243514 | Updates for solution #4 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243016 | |||
| S3‑242794 | New Solution to KI#7: Verify and authorise direct connections between 5G NR Femtos | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243515 | |||
| S3‑243515 | New Solution to KI#7: Verify and authorise direct connections between 5G NR Femtos | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242794 | |||
| S3‑243011 | New Solution for Security of 5G NR Femto Ownership | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243516 | |||
| S3‑243516 | New Solution for Security of 5G NR Femto Ownership | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243011 | |||
| S3‑243012 | New Solution for Femto Owner one time registration with operator network | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243517 | |||
| S3‑243517 | New Solution for Femto Owner one time registration with operator network | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243012 | |||
| S3‑243014 | New Solution for Support of 5G Femto location security | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243519 | |||
| S3‑243519 | New Solution for Support of 5G Femto location security | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243014 | |||
| S3‑243109 | hosting party authentication using EAP-AKA’ | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243110 | Security solution for backhaul link between 5G NR Femto and 5GC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243520 | |||
| S3‑243520 | Security solution for backhaul link between 5G NR Femto and 5GC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243110 | |||
| S3‑243111 | Security solution for link between 5G NR Femto and 5G NR Femto MS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑242790 | Add notes to KI#4 in TR 33.745 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242796 | New KI on Requirements for traffic monitoring and anomaly behavior analysis of 5G Femto | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243521 | |||
| S3‑243521 | New KI on Requirements for traffic monitoring and anomaly behavior analysis of 5G Femto | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑242796 | |||
| S3‑242835 | pCR on KI for 5GS Core network topology hiding from 5G Femto deployments | Charter Communications, Inc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑241110 | |||
| S3‑243009 | New key issue for detection of malicious 5G NR Femto | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243010 | New key issue for privacy aspects of MRL | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243006 | add conclusions to KI#1 ownership security | ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243518 | Alignment of terminology of 5G femto | Nokia | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243556 | Draft TR 33.745 | ZTE | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.18 | Study on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services | S3‑243211 | Discussion paper on metaverse | Samsung | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
| S3‑243126 | New key issue on security aspect of digital asset container in 5G | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243650 | |||
| S3‑243650 | New key issue on security aspect of digital asset container in 5G | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243126 | |||
| S3‑243212 | Key issue on authentication and authorization of digital representation | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243651 | |||
| S3‑243276 | 33.721: Key Issue on Authentication and Authorization of Avatar | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243651 | |||
| S3‑243651 | 33.721: Key Issue on Authentication and Authorization of Avatar | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243276 | |||
| S3‑243274 | 33.721: Resolve Editor’s Notes in Key Issue 2 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243715 | |||
| S3‑243715 | 33.721: Resolve Editor’s Notes in Key Issue 2 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243274 | |||
| S3‑242930 | Evaluation for Solution #1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243652 | |||
| S3‑243652 | Evaluation for Solution #1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242930 | |||
| S3‑242874 | Solution for KI#1 on Authorization supporting spatial localization service | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243653 | |||
| S3‑243653 | Solution for KI#1 on Authorization supporting spatial localization service | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242874 | |||
| S3‑242875 | Solution for KI1 on Authorization of spatial anchor services with multiple VAL-S | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243654 | |||
| S3‑243654 | Solution for KI1 on Authorization of spatial anchor services with multiple VAL-S | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑242875 | |||
| S3‑243127 | New solution for KI#1 using Attribute-Based Authorization for the consumers | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243664 | |||
| S3‑243664 | New solution for KI#1 using Attribute-Based Authorization for the consumers | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243213 | Solution for digital asset request validation | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243275 | 33.721: New Solution for Key Issue 2 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243720 | Draft TR 33.721 | Samsung | other | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 5.19 | Study on security aspects of CAPIF Phase 3 | S3‑243134 | New key issue for CAPIF interconnection | Ericsson, Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243638 | |
| S3‑243639 | New key issue for CAPIF interconnection | Ericsson, Nokia | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑243154 | New key issue about CAPIF interconnection in TR 33.700-22 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd., Xiaomi | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243638 | |||
| S3‑243638 | New key issue about CAPIF interconnection in TR 33.700-22 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd., Xiaomi,Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243154 | |||
| S3‑243384 | Additional requirements for Key issue on CAPIF interconnection security | Nokia | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243638 | ||||
| S3‑242896 | key issue on CAPIF-8 security procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243636 | |||
| S3‑242897 | key issue on authorization of fine granularity access control | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243636 | |||
| S3‑243139 | Key issue on security of resource owner permission management | Ericsson, Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243636 | |||
| S3‑243636 | Key issue on security of resource owner authorization management | Ericsson, Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243139 | |||
| S3‑243155 | New key issue about CAPIF-8 security in TR 33.700-22 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243636 | |||
| S3‑243156 | New key issue about Service API invocation authorization with resource owner consent in TR 33.700-22 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243636 | |||
| S3‑243377 | New KI_Key issue on security of resource owner consent management | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243636 | |||
| S3‑243137 | New key issue for accessing UE resources by an application on another UE | Ericsson, Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑243640 | |||
| S3‑243376 | New KI_Key issue on API invoker on one UE accessing resources owned by another UE | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243640 | |||
| S3‑243640 | New KI_Key issue on API invoker on one UE accessing resources owned by another UE | Xiaomi Communications,Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243376 | |||
| S3‑243135 | New solution for CAPIF interconnection | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243136 | New key issue for nested API invocation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
| S3‑243138 | Solution for accessing UE resources by an application on another UE | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243140 | Solution for managing resource owner permission | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243214 | Solution for security aspects of CAPIF interconnection | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243252 | Key Issue on Authenticating multiple API invokers of the same Resource Owner | Nokia | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243700 | ||||
| S3‑243700 | Key Issue on Authenticating multiple API invokers of the same Resource Owner | Nokia | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243252 | |||
| S3‑243373 | add high-level architectures for TR 33.700-22 | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243716 | |||
| S3‑243716 | add high-level architectures for TR 33.700-22 | Xiaomi Communications,Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243373 | |||
| S3‑243374 | add scope for TR 33.700-22 | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243375 | draft_TR 33.700-22 skeleton FS_CAPIF_Ph3-sec | Xiaomi Communications | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑243637 | |||
| S3‑243637 | draft_TR 33.700-22 skeleton FS_CAPIF_Ph3-sec | Xiaomi Communications | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑243375 | |||
| S3‑243658 | Draft TR 33.700-22 | Xiaomi | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
| S3‑243718 | Draft TR 33.700-22 | Ericsson | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
| 6 | New Study/Work item proposals | S3‑242775 | Adaptation of 256-bit algorithm for AS and NAS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
| S3‑242791 | Algorithm identifier values for 256-bit algorithms | KDDI Corporation | draftCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242913 | introduction of 256-bit encryption and integrity protection algorithms in TS 33.501 | ZTE Corporation | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242789 | New WID on supporting 256-bit ciphering and integrity protection algorithms | KDDI Corporation | WID new | Approval | Yes |
YesThe Chair asked whether there was any work expected apart from the CRs. KDDI answered that was all.
Qualcomm: too early, I would like to see more progress on the algorithm first. We are still waiting for the algorithms to be published.
Nokia: we need this WID. We also need to figure out the labelling according to the version 2.0 of the algorithms that were just submitted by SAGE.
OPPO: optional support but mandatory for Mes in Rel-19? The Chair commented that the decision to male it deployable would come later.
Qualcomm: we need to see the specs to figure out how to introduce the changes coming from version 2.0.
The Chair commented that there was no rush to agree on this WID now.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242793 | (Draft) LS on 256-bit algorithm identifiers | KDDI Corporation | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑242834 | Discussion of enhancements for SNPN cellular hotspots | Cisco Systems, Intel | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑242066 | |||
| S3‑242836 | Study on Security Aspects of Interconnect of SNPN | Cisco Systems, Intel | SID new | Approval | Yes |
YesCableLabs supported this work.We have a SA1 requirement on this.
Ericsson and Huawei had some issues. There would be no SA2 work following the requirement of SA1. Not up only for 3GPP but in the scope of other SDOs.
ORANGE found misalignment with SA1 in the wording. The study was going beyond what SA1 was doing.
MITRE supported the WID. Ericsson retired their objection.
Cisco didn’t find any technical reasoning against the objections.
| noted | No | S3‑242061 | |||
| S3‑242855 | New WID on Security for MonStra | Vodafone, Telefonica, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | WID new | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson,CableLAbs supported this.
Chinia Telecom: sending a copy of signalling traffic to an external system is not acceptable.
Huawei: there was a similar function in LTE, There are other options with less network impact.
Vodafone: how the copy is created is not to be standardised. The monitoring system is external to the 5G core.
NSA supported this work as well.
Verizon: interfaces will be standardised?
Ericsson: this concerns SA5 as well. Operational troubleshooting, monitoring systems and so on have always been used, since long ago. The encryption has now complicated the process. Nokia agreed with this.
KPN and ORANGE supported this WID.
NTT-Docomo: who decides the granularity of the authorization for the external monitoring systems? This needs to be clear to avoid endless discussions.
| revised | No | S3‑243671 | |||
| S3‑243671 | New WID on Security for MonStra | Vodafone, Telefonica, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | WID new | Approval | Yes |
YesNTT wondered how this WID would be contained.
Ericsson suggested to work offline prior to the meeting to agree on a living document.
Huawei wondered if TS 33.501 would be the right place for this.
| agreed | No | S3‑242855 | |||
| S3‑243030 | New WID on Security for PLMN hosting a NPN | China Telecomunication Corp., , ZTE | WID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243117 | New WID Proposal on Mitigations on Bidding Down Attack | Huawei, HiSilicon | WID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243130 | New WID on specification of alternative example f5* (f5**) function | Ericsson | WID new | Agreement | Yes |
YesNokia, Huawei: postpone to the next meeting. Huawei proposed to use an existing spec instead of creating a separate specification. Ericsson answered that
Thales supported the WID and pointed out that this was the third time already that the WID was presented.
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243131 | Skeleton of specification of alternative example f5* (f5**) function | Ericsson | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243132 | pCR to f5** specification TS | Ericsson | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243133 | Presentation of specification of alternative example f5* (f5**) function | Ericsson | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243277 | New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Container-based Products | Ericsson | WID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
| S3‑243325 | Update of WID on Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication | Qualcomm Incorporated | WID revised | Agreement | Yes |
YesIt was clarified that this would not bring any new work.
| agreed | No | SP‑240653 | |||
| S3‑243399 | Rejecting security mode by the UE | discussion | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑243400 | New mini WID on rejecting insecure security algorithms in NAS SMC procedure | WID new | Agreement | Yes |
YesORANGE and Ericsson didn’t support the WID, China Mobile either. They didn’t agree with the action taken by the UE.
NTT_Docomo didn’t support it either.
Google: all we want is a mechanism for the UE to reject an insecure connection.
Apple supported the WID.
Ericsson, China Mobile, Vivo, ORANGE objected to the WID.
| noted | No | |||||
| S3‑243401 | Rejecting insecure security algorithms in NAS SMC procedure | discussion | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
| 7 | CVD and research | |||||||||||
| 8 | Any Other Business | S3‑242704 | SA3 meeting calendar | SA WG3 Chair | other | Yes |
YesORANGE: select locations where there are enoguh number of hotels available near the conference center.
Thales: consider also sanitary conditions. October in Hyderabad is not the best time.
ORANGE: meeting locations must be easy and secure.
| noted | No |