Tdoc List

2024-03-01 15:22

Agenda Topic TDoc Title Source Type For Avail Treated Decision Wdrn Replaced-by Replaces
1 Agenda and Meeting Objectives S3‑240200 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240203 Process for SA3#115 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240204 Detailed agenda planning for SA3#115 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240827  
    S3‑240827 Detailed agenda planning for SA3#115 SA WG3 Chair other - No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑240204
2 Meeting Reports S3‑240201 Report from SA3#114e-AdHoc MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240202 Report from SA3#113 MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240826  
    S3‑240826 Report from SA3#113 MCC report - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240202
    S3‑240206 Report to SA3 from SA SA WG3 Chair report   Yes
YesThe Chair clarified that one-to-one outgoing LS (e.g. CVD) don’t need to include SA. Erisson: the outgoing LS from SA3 in slide 5 was a different number.
 		noted No    
3 Reports and Liaisons from other Groups S3‑240214 LS on service authorization for/to partner MC system C1-239502 LS in   Yes
YesMotorola: we need to wait for SA6's reply. They can agree to delete the procedure or keep it. SA3's action depends on what they do.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240947 Reply to: LS on service authorization for/to partner MC system Motorola Solutions LS out approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240251 LS on evaluating security aspects for MC services over MC gateway UE S6-233821 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240651 LS reply to LS on evaluating security aspects for MC services over MC gateway UE Nokia. Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240828  
    S3‑240633 Reply LS on evaluating security aspects for MC services over MC gateway UE Ericsson, Motorola Solutions LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240828  
    S3‑240828 Reply LS on evaluating security aspects for MC services over MC gateway UE Ericsson, Motorola Solutions LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240633
    S3‑240215 LS on Issues related to user consent for retrieving data stored in the ADRF/NWDAF C3-235567 LS in   Yes
YesNokia: Answer from SA2 fixes the problem already, no response needed. If there is a need we prefer the reply in 724.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240243 Reply LS on Issues related to user consent for retrieving data stored in the ADRF/NWDAF S2-2401584 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240503 Reply LS on Issues related to user consent for retrieving data stored in the ADRF/NWDAF Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240829  
    S3‑240829 Reply LS on Issues related to user consent for retrieving data stored in the ADRF/NWDAF Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240503
    S3‑240724 Reply LS on Issues related to user consent for retrieving data stored in the ADRF/NWDAF Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240829  
    S3‑240216 LS on Authorization of NF service consumer for data collection via DCCF C3-235594 LS in   Yes
YesNokia preferred Huawei's version.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240549 Reply LS on authorization the CCA of the new Data Consumer Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240830  
    S3‑240830 Reply LS on authorization the CCA of the new Data Consumer Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240549
    S3‑240693 Reply LS on Authorization of NF service consumer for data collection via DCCF Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240830  
    S3‑240217 Reply LS on CAPIF extensibility C3-235619 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240218 Reply LS on CAPIF extensibility C3-240155 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240228 Response LS to 3GPP CT3 on CAPIF extensibility ETSI ISG MEC LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240219 Reply LS on Decorated NAI format for 5G-NSWO for SNPN Scenarios C4-235479 LS in   Yes
YesEricsson: no need to reply.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240787 Reply LS to reply LS on Decorated NAI format for 5G-NSWO for SNPN Scenarios Xiaomi Communications LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240220 LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication C4-235577 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑240354 LS reply on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240831  
    S3‑240533 Reply LS to CT4 on home network triggered re-authentication Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240831  
    S3‑240831 Reply LS to CT4 on home network triggered re-authentication Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑240533
    S3‑240783 Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240831  
    S3‑240459 CR on the failure cases in home network triggered re-authentication ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240854  
    S3‑240558 Clarification on alignment of message and failure cause in HONTRA Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240854  
    S3‑240460 Draft - Reply LS on home network triggered re-authentication ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240831  
    S3‑240854 Clarification on alignment of message and failure cause in HONTRA Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑240558
    S3‑240222 Reply LS on including Source and Destination Interface Type for Indirect DL Data Forwarding Tunnel related N4 requests C4-235681 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240223 Quantum Safe Cryptographic Protocol Inventory ETSI TC CYBER LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑240265 LS regarding the publication of the Post Quantum Cryptography – Guidelines for Telecom Use Cases document in Feb 24 GSMA LS in   Yes
YesHuawei: let's respond with the current status but we really don’t have a timeline for this. Ericsson: there is a misconception that the asymmetric keys will be impacted by quantum computers. The Chair suggested to have a conference call on this issue before the next meeting.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑240658 LS on Quantum Safe Cryptographic Protocol Inventory Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240659 Discussion on Quantum Safe Cryptography Protocol Inventory Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240692 LS on 3GPP studies for PQC Migration GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑240224 LS from TSG IMSDCAS to 3GPP SA3 on the data channel application authorization to access DCMTSI client in terminal signalling services and the general security principles that should apply GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240557 Reply LS on the data channel application authorization to access DCMTSI client in terminal signalling services and the general security principles that should apply Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240832  
    S3‑240567 Reply LS to GSMATSG IMSDCAS Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240832  
    S3‑240832 Reply LS to GSMATSG IMSDCAS Apple LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240567
    S3‑240714 Reply LS on the data channel application authorization to access DCMTSI client in terminal signalling services and the general security principles that should apply China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240832  
    S3‑240255 LS from NG to 3GPP SA3-LI on Lawful Interception of IMS Data Channel GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240226 Comments from ETSI TC CYBER on GSMA Solutions for Monitoring of Encrypted 5GS Signaling Traffic ETSI TC CYBER LS in   Yes
YesThe Chair commented that this was not an issue for SA3. He suggested to host a conference call to clairify this to all parties involved (GSMA, SA5, TC CYBER) and that SA3 would not take leadership of this activity. Ericsson: SA5 could take the lead but they would need support from SA3.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240249 Reply LS to LS to 3GPP re Monitoring of Encrypted 5GS Signalling Traffic S5-238140 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240253 Reply LS to GSMA on Monitoring of Encrypted 5GS Signalling Traffic SP-231668 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240401 Reply LS to 3GPP TSG SA on Monitoring of Encrypted 5GS Signalling Traffic Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240402 5G SBA encrypted signaling monitoring in 3GPP Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240227 LSout on ""Certificate Management"" ETSI ISG NFV LS in   Yes
YesNokia: little to do with what we are doing in 3GPP. Mostly out of scope. We prefer NTT-Docomo's answer. Huawei also preferred this reply. CableLabs also agreed with NTT-Docomo's reply.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240400 Reply LS to ETSI ISG NFV on Certificate Management Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240833  
    S3‑240480 Draft - Reply LS on Certificate Management NTT DOCOMO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240833  
    S3‑240833 Draft - Reply LS on Certificate Management NTT DOCOMO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240480
    S3‑240229 LS to 3GPP SA3 re Definition of Term ‘Network Product Class’ GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240308 draft Reply LS on the Term definition Network Product Class Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240839  
    S3‑240513 Reply LS to GSMA on defintion of network product class Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240839  
    S3‑240839 Reply LS to GSMA on defintion of network product class Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240513
    S3‑240230 LS reply on LS on MSISDN exposure to trusted AF GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240235 LS on MSISDN exposure to trusted AF S2-2311893 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240245 LS on limited MSISDN exposure S2-2401649 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240568 Reply LS to SA2 on MSISDN exposure Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240834  
    S3‑240631 Reply LS on MSISDN exposure Ericsson, Verizon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240834  
    S3‑240834 Reply LS on MSISDN exposure Ericsson, Verizon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240631
    S3‑240231 Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting R3-237964 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240242 Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting S2-2401578 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240290 Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting S5-241084 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240232 Support for MCE ID R3-238003 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240233 Reply LS on Clarification on Removal of the Indicator of UUAA result from AMF S2-2309697 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240717 Reply LS for SA2-2309697 on Removal of the uavAuthenticated IE from Create SM Context Request China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240258 LS on Removal of the uavAuthenticated IE from Create SM Context Request C4-230790 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240430 reply to CT4 on removal of uavAuthenticated IE Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240835  
    S3‑240770 Response LS to C4-230790 Lenovo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240835  
    S3‑240835 Response LS to C4-230790 Lenovo LS out Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240770
    S3‑240237 Reply LS on QMC support in RRC_IDLE and RRC_INACTIVE S2-2313777 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240239 Reply LS on L2ID and User Info for L2 based U2U S2-2313796 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240240 Reply LS on Trigger for secure user plane establishment via user plane S2-2313809 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240241 LS to RAN2/CT WGs on RAN&CT alignment issues S2-2313889 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240244 Reply LS on uniqueness of ProSe U2N RSC S2-2401587 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240247 Reply LS on MDT for NPN S5-238101 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240248 Reply LS on user consent for SON/MDT for NB-IoT UEs S5-238102 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240250 LS on clarifications regarding RNAA S6-233770 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240252 SAGE-23-02 Resynchronisation protection f5** for MILENAGE-128 and Tuak. ETSI SAGE LS in   Yes
YesEricsson had a WID for the new specification fir the current meeting.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240257 LS on AKMA service restrictions in Rel-17 C3-232563 LS in   Yes
YesNokia: clarify to operators if roaming for AKMA is supported in Rel-17. Ericsson: LI implications for this solution (blocking roaming services for Rel-17)? It was clarified that this approach was supported by SA3-LI. China Mobile: fix it in Rel-18, not Rel-17.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240706 Reply LS on AKMA service restrictions China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240837  
    S3‑240837 Reply LS on AKMA service restrictions China Mobile LS out Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240706
    S3‑240707 Reply LS on LI for AKMA in roaming China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240261 Non-Support of Ciphering Algorithm GEA2 GCF LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240254 LS on Prohibition of GEA1 & GEA2 Support in all releases SP-231782 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240262 LIAISON STATEMENT ON AEAD mode of ZUC-256 Algorithm CCSA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240484 LS on AEAD mode of ZUC-256 algorithm Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT, China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240838  
    S3‑240838 LS on AEAD mode of ZUC-256 algorithm Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT, China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240484
    S3‑240485 Disucssion paper on AEAD mode of ZUC-256 algorithm Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT, China Mobile discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240263 LS reply to GSMA NG/UPG on Lawful Interception of IMS Data Channel s3i240070 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240264 LS on AKMA service restrictions in roaming s3i240084 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240366 LS on AKMA service restrictions in roaming NDRE LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240996  
    S3‑240996 LS on AKMA service restrictions in roaming NDRE LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240366
    S3‑240453 Draft - Reply LS on AKMA service restrictions ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240837  
    S3‑240266 Reply to LS on potential collaboration between 3GPP SA5 and ETSI SAI TC S5-241079 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240267 Reply to LS on 3GPP work on energy efficiency S4-240517 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240289 Reply LS on Support for MCE ID S5-240021 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240295 TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur InterDigital, Inc. report Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240377 Reply LS - Update on SA3 initial review of AKA security concerns presented in the proposal for a new work item: Guidelines for increasing security of the AKA protocols in IMT-2020 and beyond U.S. National Security Agency LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240378 Reply LS Regarding AKA Protocols U.S. National Security Agency discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240760 Reply LS on the proposal for a new work item: Guidelines for increasing security of the AKA protocols in IMT-2020 and beyond Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240840  
    S3‑240840 Reply LS on the proposal for a new work item: Guidelines for increasing security of the AKA protocols in IMT-2020 and beyond Ericsson LS out Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240760
    S3‑240393 Draft Reply LS on Ranging service exposure security and privacy check OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240564 Draft reply LS on security aspects for Ranging/Sidelink Positioning OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240999 LS on AAD modes NTT-Docomo LS out Approval No
Yes
 		noted No    
4 Work areas                      
4.1 Maintenance (Rel-15/16/17/18)                      
4.1.1 Security Assurance S3‑240287 Presentation of Specification to TSG: TS 33.528, Version 1.0.0 BSI (DE) TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240302 GSMA review - Test Case on No Default Content Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, BSI CR Approval Yes
YesMITRE had issues with the "only explicitly needed"in the expected results, but Nokia commented that this was wording used in GSMA. It was agreed to treat 302 -307 in a call with GSMA to clarify that their iinput was correctly inserted.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240303 GSMA review - Test Case on No Directory Listings Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, BSI CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240304 GSM review - Test Case on No Web Server Header Info Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, BSI CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240305 GSMA review - Test Case on No Web Server Error Pages Info Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, BSI CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑240306 GSMA review - Test Case on No Web Server File Type Mappings Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑240307 Correcting range of values for IEs Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240331 Annex regarding assets and threats specific to the PCF network product class BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240649  
    S3‑240350 GSMA - Remove ambiguity from TC 4.4.2 Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240869  
    S3‑240869 GSMA - Remove ambiguity from TC 4.4.2 Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240350
    S3‑240374 Add UDM SCAS test case for checking the authentication verification of a synchronization failure message BSI (DE) CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240870 Add UDM SCAS test case for checking the authentication verification of a synchronization failure message BSI (DE) draftCR Agreement No
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240375 Forcing the UDR-UDM interface to exclusively use 3GPP-defined security protocols in the non co-located deployment case BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240647  
    S3‑240376 Removal of note in GVNP lifecyle management BSI (DE) CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240381 Clarifications to Robustness and Fuzz test cases MITRE Corporation CR Approval Yes
YesKeysight: we are not solving any problem here. In the end it was agreed.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240479 LS on Scope of the UDR API BSI (DE) LS out Action Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240537 Removal of N3IWF annex Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesIt was commented the rel-17 draft for N3IWF was never sent to SA by mistake (the cover page had been submitted as type pCR). MCC commented that the cover page could be resubmitted and the draft would be sent to SA and approved in Rel-18. In order to do this China Unicom had to be contacted offline. The cover page was finally created so it could be sent for approval. Huawei asked that the structure of the annex was wrong and needed to be fixed.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240538 Removal of incomplete N3IWF annex (mirror) Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240539 Reformulation of verbatim copied requirements Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240540 Resolution of the editor's notes in the SBA tests Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240541 Resolution of the editor's notes in the SBA tests Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240542 Reformulation of verbatim copied requirements Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240562 Added parameters to NRF discovery authorization BSI (DE) CR Agreement Yes
YesMCC commented that a Rel-19 WID was needed to introduce test cases in Rel-19. Huawei commented that they had a WID proposal.
 		revised No S3‑241001  
    S3‑241001 Added parameters to NRF discovery authorization BSI (DE) CR Agreement No
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑240562
    S3‑240563 Added parameters to NRF discovery authorization threat reference BSI (DE) CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240728 Correct clause references to TS 33.511 Qualcomm Incorporated CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240729 Adding the missing Xn-U interface Qualcomm Incorporated CR   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes   S3‑233855
    S3‑240775 Add VM traffic isolation security threat to TR 33.927 3GPp virtualized network product classes China Mobile Com. Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑241032  
    S3‑241032 Add VM traffic isolation security threat to TR 33.927 3GPp virtualized network product classes China Mobile Com. Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240775
    S3‑240825 Adding the missing Xn-U interface Qualcomm Incorporated CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.1.2 Service Based Architecture S3‑240648 Clarifications on NRF and NFp checks Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240867  
    S3‑240661 Consistency Between NF Profile and Certificate Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, China Telecom, KDDI CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240867  
    S3‑240867 Consistency Between NF Profile and Certificate Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, China Telecom, KDDI CR Agreement No
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑240661
    S3‑240662 Clarification of input parameter verification for token-based authorization Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, KDDI CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240867  
    S3‑240660 Terminology correction Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240644 Clarifying N32f and N32c correlation need Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.1.3 Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe S3‑240505 Discussion about UE-to-Network relay discovery security material identification Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240506 Update to the identification of U2NW discovery security materials Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240862  
    S3‑240862 Update to the identification of U2NW discovery security materials Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240506
    S3‑240511 Update to the identification of U2NW discovery security materials Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240863  
    S3‑240863 Update to the identification of U2NW discovery security materials Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240511
    S3‑240610 Update discovery key response of U2N discovery security procdure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240862  
    S3‑240611 Update discovery key response of U2N discovery security procdure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240863  
    S3‑240388 Remove circular reference in U2U Relay discovery Model A Interdigital CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240864  
    S3‑240864 Remove circular reference in U2U Relay discovery Model A Interdigital CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240388
    S3‑240779 Clarification on the collection of direct discovery set in the 5G ProSe UE-to-UE Relay Discovery with Model A Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240864  
    S3‑240341 Clause 6.6.3.2 – Security procedures without network assitance check Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm, Ericsson didn’t agree with this. Philips commented that they would take it to CT1.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240733 Rel18 ProSe – Update on security of PC5 communication for U2U Relay without network assistance Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240607 CR to TS33.503 Update U2U Relay Discovery procedure with Model A CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240609 CR to TS33.503 Update U2U Relay Discovery procedure with Model B CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240732 Rel18 ProSe – Clarification on direct discovery set protection in U2U relay discovery with model A Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
YesPhilips supported this, but Interdigital didn’t.
 		revised No S3‑240994  
    S3‑240994 Rel18 ProSe – Clarification on direct discovery set protection in U2U relay discovery with model A Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240732
    S3‑240340 Clause 6.1.3.2.3 - Clarification related to the direct discovery set Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: UE to UE relay discovery clause should have this content.
 		revised No S3‑241033  
    S3‑241033 Clause 6.1.3.2.3 - Clarification related to the direct discovery set Philips International B.V. CR Approval No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240340
    S3‑240509 Clarification on multiple relay discovery security materials Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240862  
    S3‑240510 Clarification on multiple relay discovery security materials Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240863  
    S3‑240339 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay communication security Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm didn’t agree with this.
 		not pursued No    
4.1.4 Mission Critical S3‑240301 [33.180] MC gateway authentication and authorization Motorola Solutions Germany CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240861  
    S3‑240861 [33.180] MC gateway authentication and authorization Motorola Solutions Germany CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240301
4.1.5 Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G S3‑240356 AKMA service mid session disabling in roaming Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, NDRE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240915  
    S3‑240365 AKMA service restriction in roaming NDRE, Ministθre Economie et Finances, National Technical Assistance, Nokia, OTD_US, Security Service CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240915  
    S3‑240454 CR on AKMA service restrictions ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240455 Discussion on AKMA service restrictions ZTE Corporation discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240708 AKMA roaming policy control in AAnF China Mobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240915  
    S3‑240915 AKMA roaming policy control in AAnF China Mobile CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240708
    S3‑240757 Proposal for a way forward on AKMA restrictions Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240448 KAF re-keying after expiration triggered by AF ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240449 KAF re-keying after expiration triggered by AAnF ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240995  
    S3‑240995 KAF re-keying after expiration triggered by AAnF ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240449
    S3‑240450 Discussion on KAF re-keying after expiration ZTE Corporation discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240451 Adding UDM additional function to TS 33.535 in R18 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240452 Adding UDM additional function to TS 33.535 in R17 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
YesNo mirror because the content is merged in tdoc 451.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240789 Routing indicator update issue in the A-KID construction procedure Release 17 Xiaomi Communications CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240790 Routing indicator update issue in the A-KID construction procedure Release 18 (mirror) Xiaomi CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.1.6 Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS                      
4.1.7 Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services                      
4.1.8 Security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT                      
4.1.9 Security Aspects of eNPN S3‑240291 Resolution of EN concerning the content of AN-parameters. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon, ZTE CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240899  
    S3‑240899 Resolution of EN concerning the content of AN-parameters. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon, ZTE CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240291
    S3‑240627 Corrections to NSWO with CH AAA Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240916  
    S3‑240916 Corrections to NSWO with CH AAA Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑240627
    S3‑240653 Resolution of EN concerning indication from UDM to AUSF to select authentication with external credential holder Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240900  
    S3‑240900 Resolution of EN concerning indication from UDM to AUSF to select authentication with external credential holder Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240653
    S3‑240654 Resolution of EN concerning indication from UDM to AUSF to select authentication with external credential holder Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240901  
    S3‑240901 Resolution of EN concerning indication from UDM to AUSF to select authentication with external credential holder Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240654
    S3‑240655 Replacing SUPI with SUCI in I.10.2.2 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240917  
    S3‑240917 Replacing SUPI with SUCI in I.10.2.2 Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑240655
    S3‑240656 Replacing SUPI with SUCI in I.10.3.2 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240918  
    S3‑240918 Replacing SUPI with SUCI in I.10.3.2 Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑240656
4.1.10 Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC S3‑240584 Discussion paper on DNS security Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240632 DNS security aspects Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240238 Reply LS on DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) S2-2313793 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240547 Reply LS on DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240906  
    S3‑240587 LS reply on DNS over TLS (DoT) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240906  
    S3‑240906 LS reply on DNS over TLS (DoT) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240587
    S3‑240585 Revert the Annex P of TS 33.501 to Informative Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240907  
    S3‑240586 Revert Annex P of 33.501 to Informative Rel18 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240908  
    S3‑240588 Details of the DNS security mechanism in EDGE computing (non-roaming) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240907  
    S3‑240907 Details of the DNS security mechanism in EDGE computing (non-roaming) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240588
    S3‑240589 Details of the DNS security mechanism in EDGE computing (non-roaming) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240908  
    S3‑240908 Details of the DNS security mechanism in EDGE computing (non-roaming) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240589
    S3‑240590 Details of the DNS security mechanism in EDGE computing (roaming) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240909  
    S3‑240909 Details of the DNS security mechanism in EDGE computing (roaming) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240590
4.1.11 Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems S3‑240234 Clarification related to reliable location S2-2309698 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑240638 Reply LS on Clarification related to reliable location Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑241000  
    S3‑241000 Reply LS on Clarification related to reliable location Ericsson LS out Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑240638
    S3‑240351 Reply LS on Clarification related to reliable location Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240481 Reply LS on Clarification related to reliable location Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑241000  
    S3‑240482 Clarification related to reliable location Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240483 Clarification related to reliable location Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240429 Clarification to direct C2 security for unicast Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm: how to obtain the keys should be left to the UAS community. I don’t agree with the note. Interdigital: fine with the note, keep the last sentence.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240431 Align UUAA with TS23.256 due to removal of uavAuthenticated IE Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑241002  
    S3‑240432 Align UUAA with TS23.256 due to removal of uavAuthenticated IE Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑241003  
    S3‑240637 Rel18-Clarification on reliable location information Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240767 Cleans up AMF and SMF relation for UUAA Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑241002  
    S3‑241002 Cleans up AMF and SMF relation for UUAA Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240767
    S3‑240768 Cleans up AMF and SMF relation for UUAA Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑241003  
    S3‑241003 Cleans up AMF and SMF relation for UUAA Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240768
4.1.12 Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning S3‑240796 Discussion on UE privacy check for Ranging/SL Positioning service exposure Xiaomi Technology discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240342 Update of local privacy check in clause 6.3.7 for Network-assisted procedure Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
YesXiaomi didn’t agree with the change. Ericsson wasn’t convinced either.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240345 Update of local privacy check in clause 6.3.7 for server UE request Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240797 Assumption on the privacy of Located UE Xiaomi Technology CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240487 Clarification on the procedure for authorization of AF/5GC NF/LCS Client Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240948  
    S3‑240752 Clarification on the procedure of UE privacy check Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240948  
    S3‑240948 Clarification on the procedure of UE privacy check Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240752
    S3‑240778 Clarification on the authorization for UEs belonging to different PLMNs Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: GMLC and AMF interface is not defined in SA2.
 		merged No S3‑240948  
    S3‑240488 Location_PrivacyCheck service from GMLC Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240948  
    S3‑240751 Clarification on the UE Ranging/SL Positioning privacy profile Ericsson, Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
YesIt was needed to clarify how far SA2 has progressed on the subject and whether SA3 could define this.
 		revised No S3‑240949  
    S3‑240949 Clarification on the UE Ranging/SL Positioning privacy profile Ericsson, Xiaomi CR Agreement No
YesSony objected to this CR: We would make the feature totally inefficient and unsecure for most Ues. The Chair asked for a show of hands: Companies supportign the contribution: Xiaomi, Huawei, China Telecom,Ericsson,ZTE,CATT,China Unicom, OPPO, Qualcomm, Vivo. Companies not supporting: Sony, Phillips, BSI, BT,OTE. Sony: if this is not approved, we would use an over the top solution instead. The Chair advised to take this CR to the Plenary as company contribution if companies preferred it.
 		not pursued No   S3‑240751
    S3‑240346 Update of privacy check for exposure of location of Located UE by LMF Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t support this contribution.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240344 Clarification of local privacy check in clause 6.3.7 Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm didn’t support this.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240486 Reply LS on Ranging/SL Positioning service exposure security and privacy check Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240836  
    S3‑240836 Reply LS on Ranging/SL Positioning service exposure security and privacy check Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240486
    S3‑240735 Draft Reply LS on Ranging service exposure security and privacy check OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240836  
    S3‑240800 [Draft] Reply LS on Ranging/SL Positioning service exposure security and privacy check Xiaomi Technology LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240836  
    S3‑240328 Alignment of service exposure via user plane authorization. Sony, Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240726 Add authorization procedure for Ranging/SL positioning service exposure through 5GC user plane OPPO CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240801 Authorization for service exposure to Client UE via 5GC UP Xiaomi Technology CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240496 Reply LS on security aspects for Ranging/Sidelink Positioning Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240739 Reply LS on security aspects for Ranging or Sidelink Positioning OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240738 Discussion on privacy verification for ranging or SL positioning service exposure through PC5 OPPO discussion Discussion Yes
YesXiaomi, Ericsson,Sony didn’t support proposal 3. Philips supported all proposals.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240741 Add procedure of UE privacy verification for Network based operation of service exposure through PC5 link OPPO CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240929  
    S3‑240799 UE privacy check for exposure to Client UE via PC5 Xiaomi Technology CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240929  
    S3‑240343 Update of local privacy check in clause 6.3.7 for client UE exposure Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240929  
    S3‑240497 Update to the authorization procedure for Ranging/SL positioning Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240929  
    S3‑240753 UE Privacy handling for service exposure through PC5 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240929  
    S3‑240929 UE Privacy handling for service exposure through PC5 Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240753
    S3‑240742 Update procedure of UE privacy verification for UE-only operation of service exposure through PC5 link OPPO CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240929  
    S3‑240798 Privacy Check of n UEs for UE-only Operation Xiaomi Technology CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240929  
    S3‑240734 Update on UE role authorization during discovery Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑241034  
    S3‑241034 Update on UE role authorization during discovery Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240734
    S3‑240750 Correction on authorization for Ranging and Sidelink Positioning Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑240821 SL Positioning UE Privacy and Authorization InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. CR Agreement Yes
YesXiaomi: this is introducing new requirements, too late at this stage. The Chair asked if there was a new solution covering this. Interdigital: already done in the spec even without the requirement. Huawei didn’t agree with this.
 		not pursued No   S3‑240384
    S3‑240802 PC5 security policy for Ranging/SL positioning service Xiaomi Technology CR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: root keys out of scope of 3GPP. Qualcomm didn’t agree with second and third change.
 		revised No S3‑240865  
    S3‑240865 PC5 security policy for Ranging/SL positioning service Xiaomi Technology CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240802
    S3‑240803 Adding notes for Ranging/SL positioning broadcast/groupcast communication Xiaomi Technology CR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: broadcast and groupcast communication is not supported in RAN2.
 		revised No S3‑241035  
    S3‑241035 Adding notes for Ranging/SL positioning broadcast/groupcast communication Xiaomi Technology CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240803
    S3‑240456 Editorial correction to the clause 6.3.5 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240866  
    S3‑240457 Add the NL6 interface to the clause 5.3 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240494 Removing the edito’s note to clause 4.2.2 in TS 33.533 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240755 Editorial correction in clause 6.3.5 of TS 33.533 OPPO CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240866  
    S3‑240804 Clean up of TS 33.533 Xiaomi Technology CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240866  
    S3‑240866 Clean up of TS 33.533 Xiaomi Technology CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240804
    S3‑240236 LS on Ranging/SL Positioning service exposure security and privacy check S2-2313776 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240246 Reply LS on security aspects for Ranging/Sidelink Positioning S2-2401651 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240634 Reply LS on Ranging/SL Positioning service exposure security and privacy check Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240836  
    S3‑240384 SL Positioning UE Privacy and Authorization InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240821  
    S3‑240394 Add authorization procedure for Ranging service exposure through 5GC user plane OPPO CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240561 Discussion on privacy verification for Ranging/SL positioning service exposure through PC5 OPPO discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240566 Add procedure of UE privacy verification for Network based operation of service exposure through PC5 link OPPO CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240593 Update procedure of UE privacy verification for UE-only operation of service exposure through PC5 link OPPO CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240599 Editorial correction in clause 6.3.5 of TS 33.533 OPPO CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4.1.13 Security Aspects of eNA S3‑240579 Update of figure in clause X.10 of TS 33.501 (eNA) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240604 Update flow of Nnwdaf_MLModelProvision Intel Technology Poland SP Zoo CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240910  
    S3‑240910 Update flow of Nnwdaf_MLModelProvision Intel Technology Poland SP Zoo CR - No
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑240604
    S3‑240477 MTLF Authorization of AIML model storage and sharing vivo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240498 Update procedure for secured and authorized AIML model sharing Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240911  
    S3‑240911 Update procedure for secured and authorized AIML model sharing Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson provided a revision that was not agreed. They objected to this solution. It was commented that if there was no solution the note in 689 had to be agreed for Rel-18. Huawei asked to minute: The use case in SA2 will not be addressed by SA3 in Rel-18. Ericsson asked to minute: we objected due to the security problems in the solution. We cannot agree with this. Ericsson commented that no consensus was reached. Intel: only one company is objecting, this can be a working agreement. NTT-Docomo: let's add the leftovers in the study in 969 and let the discussions on the SA2 use case for Plenary. Ericsson added: Several companies cannot agree on a simple solution that solves the security issue, but instead try to add additional procedures that have not been studied.
 		not pursued No   S3‑240498
    S3‑240578 Authorization of Model Sharing with MTLF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240911  
    S3‑240689 Clarification for Model Sharing with MTLF Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei objected to the added note.The LS sent to SA2 promised to provide a solution in Rel-18 to address their concern.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240502 Security of Analytics transfer between NWDAFs Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240500 Remove the EN in the X.9 Authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240602 Updates to Federated Learning Intel CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240501 Correct procedure for authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240913  
    S3‑240913 Correct procedure for authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑240501
    S3‑240577 Authorization of NWDAF MTLF to request FL process on behalf of AnLF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240499 Editorial change on procedure for protection of analytics exchange in roaming case Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240914  
    S3‑240914 Editorial change on procedure for protection of analytics exchange in roaming case Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240499
    S3‑240912 LS on Issues related Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) Huawei LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.1.14 Modified PRINS for roaming service providers in 5G S3‑240208 Elaborated LS reply to S3-234350 on Roaming Hub requirements as applicable to the Modified PRINS solution GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240212 LS to 3GPP on data plane control by roaming hubs GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240555 Reply LS on Roaming Hub requirements as applicable to the Modified PRINS solution Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240887  
    S3‑240887 Reply LS on Roaming Hub requirements as applicable to the Modified PRINS solution Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: this is consolidating replies to GSMA, no specific action to SA because they know what to do.
 		approved No   S3‑240555
    S3‑240209 Elaborated LS reply to S3-234350 on IPX Service Hub requirements as applicable to the Modified PRINS solution GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240556 Reply LS on IPX Service Hub requirements as applicable to the Modified PRINS solution Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240888  
    S3‑240888 Reply LS on IPX Service Hub requirements as applicable to the Modified PRINS solution Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240556
    S3‑240211 LS on nested JSON structures and reply to LS S3-235067 GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240213 LS to 3GPP on PRINS security profiles GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240737 Security profiles for PRINS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240889 S3‑234865
    S3‑240889 Security profiles for PRINS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240737
    S3‑240313 AI from SA: Mapping modified PRINS CR to previous releases SA3 Chair discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No    
    S3‑240544 Discussion on how to back track the 5G roaming related changes to earlier releases Huawei, HiSilicon, Vodafone discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No    
    S3‑240545 Living document for backtracking 5G Roaming changes - Modification of PRINS to enable Roaming Hubs Huawei, HiSilicon, Vodafone draftCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: this is a non FASMO feature and it is setting up a precedent. The Chair commented that this decision was not coming from SA3 and SA would decided how far back this would go. NTT-Docomo commented that SA3 would not take a stand on the CRs. Huawei proposed to endorse the CRs, as it wasn't SA3's decision to go forward but SA's. The decision on whether the CRs would be needed for Rel-16 and Rel-17 should be taken at SA level, not SA3.
 		revised No S3‑240882  
    S3‑240882 Living document for backtracking 5G Roaming changes - Modification of PRINS to enable Roaming Hubs Huawei, HiSilicon, Vodafone draftCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei clarified that this draftCR showed the changes that would go to earlier releases.
 		approved No   S3‑240545
    S3‑240546 Placeholder for collecting new changes related to the 5G roaming WID Huawei, HiSilicon, Vodafone other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240883  
    S3‑240883 Placeholder for collecting new changes related to the 5G roaming WID Huawei, HiSilicon, Vodafone other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240546
    S3‑240815 Alignments on terminology for roaming intermediaries Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240890  
    S3‑240890 Alignments on terminology for roaming intermediaries Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240815
    S3‑240551 Modification on the definition of Roaming Hub Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240891  
    S3‑240891 Modification on the definition of Roaming Hub Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240551
    S3‑240256 LS reply to S3-233786 and S3-234296 on the introduction of the domain ""ipxnetwork.org"" and clarifications of the Outsourced SEPP and Hosted SEPP deployment scenarios GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240288 LS reply to S3-240256 on the introduction of the domain ""ipxnetwork.org"" BSI (DE) LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240886  
    S3‑240886 LS reply to S3-240256 on the introduction of the domain ""ipxnetwork.org"" BSI (DE) LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240288
    S3‑240210 LS to 3GPP CT4 on in-path and in-query parameters GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240221 Reply LS on N32 Race conditions and recovery C4-235586 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240550 Clarification on the usage of N32-f context ID and N32-f message ID Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: do we need this if the same content is already in CT4 specs? Huawei: This needs to be justified here and then ask CT4 to specify it. This was taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑241036  
    S3‑241036 Clarification on the usage of N32-f context ID and N32-f message ID Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240550
    S3‑240884 Backtracking 5G roaming changes Huawei CR discussion Yes
YesIt was decided to send the CRs attached to an LS to SA. The CRs would be endorsed and the decision whether to backtrack them in Rel-16 and Rel-17 would be taken at SA level. Nokia would submit the CRs as company contributions to SA.
 		endorsed No    
    S3‑240885 Backtracking 5G roaming changes Huawei CR discussion Yes
YesSame comment as tdoc 884.
 		endorsed No    
    S3‑241037 LS on backtracking 5G roaming changes Huawei LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.1.15 All other maintenance topics (not listed above) S3‑240427 Clarification to flow selection for RNAA Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesXiaomi: just say that we reuse the existing procedures.
 		revised No S3‑240849  
    S3‑240849 Clarification to flow selection for RNAA Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240427
    S3‑240635 Security Negotiation for RNAA Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240849  
    S3‑240423 Revocation procedure invoked by resource owner client Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240850  
    S3‑240424 Revocation procedures invoked by API invoker Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240850  
    S3‑240695 Revocation procedure for RNAA Samsung CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240850  
    S3‑240792 Add revocation procedure for RNAA-related tokens Xiaomi CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240850  
    S3‑240850 Add revocation procedure for RNAA-related tokens Xiaomi CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240792
    S3‑240791 Update for CAPIF 8 Xiaomi CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240851  
    S3‑240851 Update for CAPIF 8 Xiaomi CR Approval Yes
YesReworded to "present document" instead of 3GPP.
 		agreed No   S3‑240791
    S3‑240795 Resolve ENs related to API invoker ID mapping Xiaomi CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: this is stage 3 related, not in scope of SA3.We agree with removing the editor's note. NTT-Docomo agreed with deleting the text but the new text could be made a note. They didn’t agree that this was a stage 3 problem.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240426 Access token profile for Annex C Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: this is not aligned with what’s defined in stage 3.
 		revised No S3‑240852  
    S3‑240852 Access token profile for Annex C Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240426
    S3‑240636 Details for RNAA token Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240852  
    S3‑240625 SNAAPPY - Update to RNAA functional security model description Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240425 Correction on authentication and authorization for RNAA Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240475 Alignment of 33.122 for RNAA NTT DOCOMO CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑241039  
    S3‑241039 Alignment of 33.122 for RNAA NTT DOCOMO CR Approval No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240475
    S3‑240793 Resolve ENs related to token claims Xiaomi CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240852  
    S3‑240794 Resolve EN related to authorization request or token request Xiaomi CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240312 Security Enhancement on selective SCG Activation Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240311 Updates to Security for Selective SCG Activation Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑235100
    S3‑240744 SCPAC: FC values Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240512 Update the Security for Subsequent CPAC Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240841  
    S3‑240694 Updates to Security for Selective SCG Activation Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240841  
    S3‑240743 SCPAC: Updates to Security for Selective SCG Activation Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240841  
    S3‑240608 Comments on SCG Activation papers Intel Technology Poland SP Zoo discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240619 Updates to Security for Selective SCG Activation Intel Technology Poland SP Zoo draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240841  
    S3‑240746 SCPAC: Updates to Security for Selective SCG Activation Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240841  
    S3‑240841 SCPAC: Updates to Security for Selective SCG Activation Ericsson other Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240746
    S3‑240990 SCPAC: Updates to Security for Selective SCG Activation Samsung, Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon, Apple, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel CR Approval No
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240745 SCPAC: Releasing prepared SCPAC configurations at handover Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240841  
    S3‑240747 SCPAC: Algorithm negotiation Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240841  
    S3‑240748 SCPAC: Secondary Node key update for SCPAC Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240841  
    S3‑240749 SCPAC: Protection of traffic between UE and SN for SCPAC Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240841  
    S3‑240329 Correction of UDM service naming BSI (DE) CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240857  
    S3‑240842 Correction of UDM service naming BSI (DE) CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240857 Correction of UDM service naming BSI (DE) CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240329
    S3‑240843 Correction of UDM service naming BSI (DE) CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240844 Correction of UDM service naming BSI (DE) CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240352 Discussion paper of UPU implementation gaps Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240353 Enhancement in UPU procedure to protect UPU header Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240991  
    S3‑240355 Editorial Correction Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240853  
    S3‑240370 Discussion on UDM authentication verification of synchronization failure message BSI (DE) discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240371 Add the case of a failed AUTS verification in the UDM/ARPF to the synchronization failure recovery of the Home Network BSI (DE) CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240372 Add the case of a failed AUTS verification in the HE/AuC to the re-synchronisation procedure BSI (DE) CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240373 Add UDM threat reference for missing verification of synchronization failure messages. BSI (DE) CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240395 Add missing RFC4122 in References section Ericsson CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240845  
    S3‑240845 Add missing RFC4122 in References section Ericsson CR Approval No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240395
    S3‑240396 Add missing RFC4122 in References section Ericsson CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240846  
    S3‑240846 Add missing RFC4122 in References section Ericsson CR Approval No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240396
    S3‑240397 Add missing RFC4122 in References section Ericsson CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240847  
    S3‑240847 Add missing RFC4122 in References section Ericsson CR Approval No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240397
    S3‑240399 Clarify pre-registration in CA/RA for NF instance ID verification Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240848  
    S3‑240848 Clarify pre-registration in CA/RA for NF instance ID verification Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240399
    S3‑240428 Issue in NSSAA procedures for multiple registration Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Endorsement Yes
YesEricsson: we have been discussing this since Rel-16. Not everyone is seeing this as an issue. Huawei asked the group to make a decision on whether there was an issue. Only Ericsson had expressed their opinion.
 		revised No S3‑240868  
    S3‑240868 Issue in NSSAA procedures for multiple registration Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Endorsement Yes
YesHuawei commented that this was a serious issue that may require a technical voting. The Chair commented that Huawei could raise this in SA plenary, but Huawei replied that SA would not have the expertise to address this, The Chair proposed to have a show of hands in order to see everybody's opinion on the question in this document. Show of hands: Do you agree the issues identified are valid for current NSSAA is not working with mulitple PLMN registrations? (Yes or No) Q1: For YES Huawei Q2: for NO Ericsson, AT&T, Cisco Huawei asked to minute given these results: "mulitple registration feature can be supported in the NSSAA procedure since Rel-16. The issue identified in S3-240428 is determined by SA3 not valid, with the following voting outcome" (TBC by Huawei).
 		noted No   S3‑240428
    S3‑240433 Editorial changes to TS33.310 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240458 Discussion on the failure cases in home network triggered re-authentication ZTE Corporation discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240461 Clear up for HONTRA procedure ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240853  
    S3‑240853 Clear up for HONTRA procedure ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
YesMCC: Note A is correct, but NOTE B should be Note 2.
 		agreed No   S3‑240461
    S3‑240462 Add service operations to TS 33.501 based on HONTRA ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240471 Add some context to 5GMSG on AKMA Ua star protocol ZTE FRANCE SASU CR   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240472 TS 33.501 Rel17 CR on correcting NSWO static network name CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240473 TS 33.501 Rel18 CR on correcting NSWO static network name CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240530 Clarification on the function of UE ID trusted non-3GPP access Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: no need for this.
 		revised No S3‑240992  
    S3‑240992 Clarification on the function of UE ID trusted non-3GPP access Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240530
    S3‑240532 CR on key misalignment Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: we don’t see the issue here. The Chair commented that this could be a corner issue, maybe not necessary to add a new clause in this case. Samsung: this could have an impact on the UE.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240534 Updates to the certificate lifecycle management Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with this level of granularity.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240535 Clarifications to the CMP message protection Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240575 CR on Security vulnerability fix for use of AES-GCM and AES-GMAC in 33.203 Apple CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240855  
    S3‑240855 CR on Security vulnerability fix for use of AES-GCM and AES-GMAC in 33.203 Apple CR - Yes
YesAfter this CR was agreed, Nokia objected to this CR and proposed to postpone the issue for the next meeting. They noted that core network should have been checked on the cover page and it could affect current implementations. Huawei commented that this could be corrected by MCC in Plenary and was not reason to not pursue the CR. It was clarified that Nokia also objected to the first change in the body of the CR, not only the cover page. Apple complained that decisions should not be reverted like this. Huawei suggested that Nokia could come to Plenary with a revised CR, but the Chair added that Plenary would not have the expertise to agree on a revision. Thales,China Mobile: if we allow reverting decisions, this could be applied to any document of the meeting. The Chair commented that if there was impact on the current implementations SA3 should be able to correct before it is too late. Puneet (SA Chair) commented that documents could still be challenged during the meeting week given that SA could not handle these kind of technical issues.Working agreement could also be an option if there was an objection from a single company.
 		not pursued No   S3‑240575
    S3‑240580 Updates to the SBA certificate profile Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240583 Correction to validation of usage of X.509 certificate procedure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with the rationale. They didn’t agree with the change.
 		revised No S3‑240993  
    S3‑240993 Correction to validation of usage of X.509 certificate procedure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑240583
    S3‑240622 Add some context to 5GMSG on AKMA Ua star protocol ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240856  
    S3‑240856 Add some context to 5GMSG on AKMA Ua star protocol ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240622
    S3‑240647 Forcing the UDR-UDM interface to exclusively use 3GPP-defined security protocols in the non co-located deployment case BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240723 S3‑240375
    S3‑240649 Annex regarding assets and threats specific to the PCF network product class BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240725 S3‑240331
    S3‑240663 Discussion on the 3GPP specific JWT claims registration in IANA Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
YesHuawei: stage 3 should make the decision for the registration, it is not SA3's business to do this. Ericsson: we just inform the CT Chair.He has seen this discussion paper.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240664 Updating Internet Drafts to Final RFCs (Rel-17) Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240858  
    S3‑240858 Updating Internet Drafts to Final RFCs (Rel-17) Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240664
    S3‑240665 Updating Internet Drafts to Final RFCs (Rel-18) Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240859  
    S3‑240859 Updating Internet Drafts to Final RFCs (Rel-18) Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240665
    S3‑240666 Voiding Reference to TLS 1.1 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240667 Voiding Reference to TLS 1.1 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240668 Voiding Reference to TLS 1.1 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240669 Serving Network Name check at AUSF for the case that the 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id header is not included Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240670 Serving Network Name check at AUSF for the case that the 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id header is not included Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia and NTT-Docomo didn’t agree with the "AUSF behaviour is up to implementation" as it brought many problems to the operators.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240671 Serving Network Name check at AUSF for the case that the 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id header is not included Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240723 Forcing the UDR-UDM interface to exclusively use 3GPP-defined security protocols in the non co-located deployment case BSI (DE) CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑240647
    S3‑240725 Annex regarding assets and threats specific to the PCF network product class BSI (DE) CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240860 S3‑240649
    S3‑240860 Annex regarding assets and threats specific to the PCF network product class BSI (DE) CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: this depends on the related draft being approved in SA plenary.
 		agreed No   S3‑240725
    S3‑240730 Discussion on protecting header information in UPU Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑234701
    S3‑240731 Protection of UPU header Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240991 S3‑234702
    S3‑240754 UPU Header Security Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240991  
    S3‑240991 UPU Header Security Lenovo CR Approval No
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑240754
    S3‑240776 Clarification to non-SBA interfaces Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   Yes
YesHuawei: there isn't an issue here. If there is an issue we should go back to rel-15 to align all releases. Ericsson: not needed. China Mobile: N32 is not a service based interface. NTT-Docomo: it is a service based interface, but not registered in the NRF.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240940 LS on Registering JWT Claims at IANA Ericsson LS out discussion Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.2 New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR). S3‑240318 Discussion of the protection mechanism of the permanent key leaving the UDR environment. BSI (DE) discussion Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑240025
4.3 New WID on SCAS for Rel-18 features on existing functions. S3‑240514 update UP policy testing to align with split gNB SCAS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240521 Add certificate enrolment to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson asked to postpone this for the next meeting.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240522 Local certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240523 Peer certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240524 expired certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei commented that this was submitted as a CR in Chicago and Ericsson had concerns about that, hence the draft CR here. It was not clear what their concerns were since this whole package would be resubmitted to the next meeting.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240525 Add threat to certificate enrolment to TR 33.926 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240526 Add threat to local certificate checking at gNB Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240527 Add threat to peer certificate checking at gNB Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240528 Add threat to expired certificate checking at gNB Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240531 Clarification on execute steps 3 about operating system to adapt to more scenario Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240871  
    S3‑240871 Clarification on execute steps 3 about operating system to adapt to more scenario Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240531
4.4 New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF). S3‑240727 SMSF Specific Security requirement and test case for draft TS 33.529 IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240872  
    S3‑240872 SMSF Specific Security requirement and test case for draft TS 33.529 IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240727
    S3‑240736 Add a new clause in annexure to Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes specific to SMSF IIT Bombay CR Approval Yes
YesContinuing content from agreed CR S3-240121
 		revised No S3‑240873  
    S3‑240873 Add a new clause in annexure to Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes specific to SMSF IIT Bombay CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240736
    S3‑240756 Diameter Session security requirements on SGd interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF requirements IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240774 Add a clause in annexure to Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes specific to SMSF IIT Bombay CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240816 Minor additions/modifications for draft TS 33.529 IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240874 Draft TS 33.529 IIT Bombay draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.5 New WID on Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms. S3‑240286 Updates on WID on Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID revised Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240875  
    S3‑240875 Updates on WID on Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID revised Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240286
    S3‑240309 Introduction of the Snow 5G 256-bits algorithm specification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234424
    S3‑240269 Introduction of the Snow 5G 256-bits implementers’ test data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS   Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234425
    S3‑240270 Introduction of the Snow 5G 256-bits design conformance test data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234426
    S3‑240271 Introduction of the AES 256-bits algorithm specification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234427
    S3‑240272 Introduction of the AES 256-bits implementers’ test data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234428
    S3‑240273 Introduction of the AES 256-bits design conformance test data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234429
    S3‑240274 Introduction of the ZUC based 256-bits algorithm specification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234430
    S3‑240275 Introduction of the ZUC 256-bits implementers’ test data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234431
    S3‑240276 Introduction of the ZUC 256-bits design conformance test data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234432
    S3‑240278 Technical provision to Snow 5G based 256-bit Algorithm Implementation Test Data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240279 Technical provision to Snow 5G based 256-bit Algorithm Conformance Test Data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240280 Technical provision to AES based 256-bit Algorithm Specification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240281 Technical provision to AES based 256-bit Algorithm Implementation Test Data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240282 Technical provision to AES based 256-bit Algorithm Conformance Test Data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240310 Technical provision to Snow 5G based 256-bit Algorithm Specification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240594 Technical Provision to ZUC based 256-bit algorithm specification Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT, CMCC, CUCC, CTCC pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240292
    S3‑240595 Technical Provision to ZUC based 256-bit Algorithm Implementation Test Data Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT, CMCC, CUCC, CTCC pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240293
    S3‑240597 Technical Provision to ZUC based 256-bit algorithm conformance test data Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT, CMCC, CUCC, CTCC pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240294
    S3‑240268 Coverpage for TS 35.240 Skeleton for the Snow 5G based 256-bit Algorithm Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240277 Technical provision to Snow 5G based 256-bit Algorithm Specification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240283 Technical provision to ZUC based 256-bit Algorithm Specification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240284 Technical provision to ZUC based 256-bit Algorithm Implementation Test Data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240285 Technical provision to ZUC based 256-bit Algorithm Conformance Test Data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240292 Technical Provision to ZUC based 256-bit algorithm specification Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240594  
    S3‑240293 Technical Provision to ZUC based 256-bit Algorithm Implementation Test Data Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240595  
    S3‑240294 Technical Provision to ZUC based 256-bit algorithm conformance test data Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240596, S3‑240597  
    S3‑240495 Updates on WID on Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms Huawei, HiSilicon WID revised Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240875  
    S3‑240596 Technical Provision to ZUC based 256-bit algorithm conformance test data Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT, CMCC, CUCC, CTCC pCR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes   S3‑240294
    S3‑241011 Draft TS 35.240 Nokia draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241012 Draft TS 35.241 Nokia draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241013 Draft TS 35.242 Nokia draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241014 Draft TS 35.243 Nokia draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241015 Draft TS 35.244 Nokia draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241016 Draft TS 35.245 Nokia draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241017 Draft TS 35.246 Nokia draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241018 Draft TS 35.247 Nokia draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241019 Draft TS 35.248 Nokia draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241023 Cover sheet TS 32.240 Nokia TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241024 Cover sheet TS 32.241 Nokia TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241025 Cover sheet TS 32.242 Nokia TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241026 Cover sheet TS 32.243 Nokia TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241027 Cover sheet TS 32.244 Nokia TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241028 Cover sheet TS 32.245 Nokia TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241029 Cover sheet TS 32.246 Nokia TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241030 Cover sheet TS 32.247 Nokia TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241031 Cover sheet TS 32.248 Nokia TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.6 New WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 19                      
4.7 New WID on Addition of Milenage-256 algorithm S3‑240404 TS 35.235 Skeleton THALES draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240405 TS 35.236 Skeleton THALES draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240406 TS 35.237 Skeleton THALES draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240817 TS 35.234 skeleton THALES draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240818 TS 35.235 skeleton THALES draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240819 TS 35.236 skeleton THALES draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240820 TS 35.237 Skeleton THALES draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240407 pCR: TS 35.234 introduction THALES pCR Approval Yes
YesRemove "prepared by SAGE"
 		approved No    
    S3‑240408 pCR: TS 35.235 introduction THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240409 pCR: TS 35.236 introduction THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240410 pCR: TS 35.237 introduction THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240403 TS 35.234 skeleton THALES draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240936 Draft TS 35.237 Thales draft TS discussion No
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240937 Draft TS 35.234 Thales draft TS discussion No
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240938 Draft TS 35.235 Thales draft TS discussion No
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240939 Draft TS 35.236 Thales draft TS discussion No
Yes
 		approved No    
4.8 New WID on 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols S3‑240675 Updates to the IKEv2 profile Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240877  
    S3‑240877 Updates to the IKEv2 profile Ericsson CR Agreement No
YesContent is agreed and it will go into draft CR S3-240876.
 		not pursued No   S3‑240675
    S3‑240676 Updates to the 3GPP TLS profile Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: changes based on draft RFCs are not appropriate.
 		revised No S3‑240878  
    S3‑240878 Updates to the 3GPP TLS profile Ericsson CR Agreement No
YesContent will go into the draft CR in tdoc 876.
 		not pursued No   S3‑240676
    S3‑240639 Updates to TLS protocol profiles Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240878  
    S3‑240650 Updates to Profiling of IPsec Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: why mentioning IKEv1, which is deprecated, if we use IKEv2?
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240677 Change of requirements for DTLS over SCTP (DTLS/SCTP) Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: not in scope of the work item. It’s softening a requirement. Cisco: IETF is trying to find a workaround to fix this. When we have the improvement we can make the changes. Leave it as it is until then.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240463 Remove the reference to TLS 1.1 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240620 Update the reference to DTLS 1.3 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: don’t restrict this to Rel-19 if it’s a wrong reference. It was checked how far back the error happened and stop in Rel-18 in order not to create a Rel-19 version of the spec.
 		revised No S3‑240879  
    S3‑240879 Update the reference to DTLS 1.3 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240620
    S3‑240621 Update the reference to DTLS 1.3 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240880  
    S3‑240880 Update the reference to DTLS 1.3 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240621
    S3‑240672 Update of an Obsoleted RFC Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: backwards comppatible? It was kept open to be checked. Content will go into the draft CR in 881.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240673 Updating Obsolete RFC 2818 by RFC 9110 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNTT_Docomo needed time to check the RFC for backwards compatiblity issues.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240674 Replacing MD5 with SHA-256 in Example Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesIt was commented that this would create a Rel-18 version and a Rel-19 version of the specification.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240678 Clarifications for EAP-TLS 1.3 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesContent will go into the draft CR for TS 33.510.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240679 Clarifications of privacy options for EAP-TLS Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240464 Update the reference to DTLS 1.3 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240465 Update the reference to DTLS 1.3 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240876 Draft CR on CryptoSP TS 33.210 Ericsson draftCR discussion No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑240881 Draft CR CryptoSP for TS 33.501 Ericsson draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5 Rel-19 Studies                      
5.1 New Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security S3‑240314 Draft TR33.794 Skeleton Lenovo draft TR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: data to be exposed as clause title? We are not taking a stand yet. Ericsson had also doubts on the
 		revised No S3‑240896  
    S3‑240896 Draft TR33.794 Skeleton Lenovo draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240314
    S3‑240332 Scope to TR 33.794 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, AT&T, Charter Communications, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240897  
    S3‑240897 Scope to TR 33.794 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, AT&T, Charter Communications, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240332
    S3‑240333 Introduction to TR 33.794 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, AT&T, Charter Communications, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240334 Security Assumptions for TR 33.794 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, AT&T, Charter Communications, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240898  
    S3‑240898 Security Assumptions for TR 33.794 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, AT&T, Charter Communications, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240334
    S3‑240688 Security Assumptions for Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, AT&T, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: we are not taking the stand of exposing the security logs.
 		revised No S3‑240902  
    S3‑240902 Security Assumptions for Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, AT&T, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240688
    S3‑240335 Data related to Malformed Message Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, AT&T, Charter Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240903  
    S3‑240903 Data related to Malformed Message Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, AT&T, Charter Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240335
    S3‑240336 Data related to Massive number of Service Messages Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, AT&T, Charter Communications, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240904  
    S3‑240904 Data related to Massive number of Service Messages Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, AT&T, Charter Communications, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240336
    S3‑240383 ZTS New Data exposure use case: Unauthorized/unauthenticated NF service access request MITRE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240905  
    S3‑240905 ZTS New Data exposure use case: Unauthorized/unauthenticated NF service access request MITRE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240383
    S3‑240385 ZTS New data exposure use case: Topology discovery MITRE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei needed some clarifications
 		revised No S3‑241020  
    S3‑241020 ZTS New data exposure use case: Topology discovery MITRE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240385
    S3‑240814 Use case : security data exposure for API security risks on 5G SBA layer Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, AT&T, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: too much detail. Huawei didn’t agree with this.
 		revised No S3‑241004  
    S3‑241004 Use case : security data exposure for API security risks on 5G SBA layer Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, AT&T, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240814
    S3‑240337 KI related to WT1 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, AT&T pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: same key issue from previous TR, we would be repeating the same discussions. Lenovo: this key issue was agreed.
 		revised No S3‑241005  
    S3‑241005 KI related to WT1 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, AT&T pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240337
    S3‑240338 Usecase for security policy enforcement Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, AT&T pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑241021  
    S3‑241021 Usecase for security policy enforcement Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, AT&T pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240338
    S3‑240382 FS_eZTS Timeline MITRE Corporation discussion Endorsement Yes
YesThe Chair commented that solutions should be submitted before November. Solutions should not come in the last meeting.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240740 FS_eZTS offline Call Minutes Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241038 Draft TR 33.794 Lenovo draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2 New Study on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services phase 2 S3‑240761 TR 33.790 skeleton Ericsson, China Mobile draft TR Approval Yes
YesNokia: we don’t normally talk about earlier releases studies (on the background clause). Replace background with assumptions.
 		approved No    
    S3‑240715 Scope for NG RTC SEC Ph2 SID China Mobile, Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240942  
    S3‑240942 Scope for NG RTC SEC Ph2 SID China Mobile, Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240715
    S3‑240762 TR 33.790 Background clause proposal Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: it reads like evaluation of solutions. MCC: reword as it also reads like objectives of the study (e.g. "needs to be aligned..", instead of "aligns with.."). Huawei: we always align with SA2, we don’t need this assumption.
 		revised No S3‑240943  
    S3‑240943 TR 33.790 Background clause proposal Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240762
    S3‑240553 A new KI on third party specific user identities Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240944  
    S3‑240716 Key issue of third party specific user identities China Mobile, Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240944  
    S3‑240944 Key issue of third party specific user identities China Mobile, Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240716
    S3‑240782 Key issue for third party specific user identities Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240944  
    S3‑240347 New KI - Authorization in IMS Avatar communication Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240945  
    S3‑240554 a new KI on the security of Avartar Communication Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240945  
    S3‑240763 New Key issue on the security of IMS Avatar Communication using Data Channel Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240945  
    S3‑240945 New Key issue on the security of IMS Avatar Communication using Data Channel Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240763
    S3‑240560 Discussion on the security of Avatar Communication Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240615 new key issue on IMS DC capability exposure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
YesMCC: aliign requirements language in all contributions(shall be able to support, shall provide capability to support,..instead of shall support).
 		revised No S3‑240946  
    S3‑240946 new key issue on IMS DC capability exposure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑240615
    S3‑240616 new key issue on authenticity of DC application Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with the key issue, out of scope of the study. CableLabs thought it was in scope.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240559 A new solution on third-party specific user identities Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia didn’t agree with this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240941 Draft TR 33.790 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.3 New Study on security for PLMN hosting a NPN S3‑240411 skeleton of TR 33.757 China Telecomunication Corp, ZTE draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240412 Scope of TR 33.757 China Telecomunication Corp, ZTE, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240976  
    S3‑240976 Scope of TR 33.757 China Telecomunication Corp, ZTE, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240412
    S3‑240387 Scope for TR 33.757 Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240976  
    S3‑240413 Overview of TR 33.757 China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240978  
    S3‑240978 Overview of TR 33.757 China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240413
    S3‑240386 Overview for TR 33.757 Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240978  
    S3‑240468 Add terms to TR 33.757 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesUse of the term "premises" was deemed inadequate by some companies.
 		revised No S3‑241006  
    S3‑241006 Add terms to TR 33.757 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240468
    S3‑240414 Security assumptions of TR 33.757 China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240979  
    S3‑240979 Security assumptions of TR 33.757 China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240414
    S3‑240415 New KI on dedicated UPF interacting with PLMN through N4 interface China Telecom, ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240980  
    S3‑240718 new KI - security of signalling message in N4 interface China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
YesIt was pointed out that SA3-LI would need to look at this.
 		revised No S3‑240980  
    S3‑240980 new KI - security of signalling message in N4 interface China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240718
    S3‑240721 new KI - Security of topology hiding in N4 interface China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240980  
    S3‑240416 New KI on dedicated NFs interacting with PLMN through SBA interface China Telecom, ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240981  
    S3‑240981 New KI on dedicated NFs interacting with PLMN through SBA interface China Telecom, ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240416
    S3‑240696 Key Issue on NF Authorization in PLMN hosting NPN Scenario Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240981  
    S3‑240719 new KI - security of signalling message in SBI interface China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240981  
    S3‑240722 new KI - Security of topology hiding in SBA interface China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240981  
    S3‑240788 New KI on authorization of NFs deployed in the customer premises Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240981  
    S3‑240474 Key issue on SUPI privacy issue in PLMN hosting NPN Scenario IIT Delhi, IIT Bhilai, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑241007  
    S3‑241007 Key issue on SUPI privacy issue in PLMN hosting NPN Scenario IIT Delhi, IIT Bhilai, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240474
    S3‑240720 new KI - security of subscription data sharing China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: we need more time to understand the threat before agreeing on this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240469 New KI on UE authentication ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240697 Key Issue on DNS Security in PLMN hosting NPN Scenario Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: benefit for the attacker here?
 		merged No S3‑240981  
    S3‑240389 New key issue on topology hiding for TR 33.757 Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240978  
    S3‑240390 New key issue on malformed message for TR 33.757 Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240978  
    S3‑240446 Key issue on SUPI privacy issue in PLMN hosting NPN Scenario IIT Delhi, IIT Bhilai pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240977 Draft TR 33.757 China Telecom draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.4 New Study of ACME for Automated Certificate Management in SBA S3‑240207 Proposed skeleton for TR 33.776 Study of Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) Cisco Systems draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240316 Introduction for TR 33.776 Google Inc. pCR   Yes
YesHuawei: some content here is subjective. Nokia provided other changes as well.
 		revised No S3‑240983  
    S3‑240983 Introduction for TR 33.776 Google Inc. pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240316
    S3‑240317 Scope for TR 33.776 Google Inc. pCR   Yes
YesHuawei, Nokia: last objective doesn’t appear in the approved study.
 		revised No S3‑240987  
    S3‑240987 Scope for TR 33.776 Google Inc. pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240317
    S3‑240823 New key issue on Trust Anchors Google Inc., John Hopkins University APL, Cisco pCR   Yes
YesHuawei: key issue written in a solution form. It should refer to existing solutions.
 		revised No S3‑240998  
    S3‑240998 New key issue on Trust Anchors Google Inc., John Hopkins University APL, Cisco pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240823
    S3‑240822 New key issue on Secure Transport of Messages Google Inc. pCR   Yes
YesNokia: not sure what this means, chicken-egg problem. NCSC: this doesn’t feel like a key issue. Huawei: what's the key issue for?
 		revised No S3‑240997  
    S3‑240997 New key issue on Secure Transport of Messages Google Inc. pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240822
    S3‑240824 New key issue on ACME Challenge Validation Google Inc. pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia agreed with the key issue. It shouldn’t refer to the SHAKEN. Huawei:better to merge with similar key issues.
 		revised No S3‑240984  
    S3‑240984 New key issue on ACME Challenge Validation Google Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240824
    S3‑240367 New key issue on Certificate Enrolment Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: remove security threats and requirements.
 		revised No S3‑240985  
    S3‑240985 New key issue on Certificate Enrolment Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240367
    S3‑240504 New KI on limitations of ACME protocol Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240984  
    S3‑240369 New key issue on certificate renewal Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
YesNCSC: threats and requirements are not applicable. They should be removed.
 		revised No S3‑240986  
    S3‑240986 New key issue on certificate renewal Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240369
    S3‑240368 New key issue on certificate revocation Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: we are not defining a new framework.Refer to existing mechanisms. NCSC didn’t agree with this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240379 New key issue for automated certificate management protocol selection Cisco Systems pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240380 New key issue on client identity validation Telus, CIsco Systems pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240984  
    S3‑240392 Proposed skeleton for TR 33.776 Study of Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) Cisco Systems draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240982 Draft TR 33.776 Cisco draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.5 New Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256-bits S3‑240330 Draft Skeleton for TR 33.700-41 KDDI Corporation draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240319 Introduction for TR 33.700-41 KDDI Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240320 Scope definition for TR 33.700-41 KDDI Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: keep the removed paragraph. MCC: this reads like the objectives of the study, not like the scope of the document. It needs some rewording.
 		revised No S3‑241008  
    S3‑241008 Scope definition for TR 33.700-41 KDDI Corporation pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240320
    S3‑240321 Assumptions for TR 33.700-41 KDDI Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑241009  
    S3‑240543 Assumption proposal for the 256-bit algorithm introduction study Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑241009  
    S3‑241009 Assumption proposal for the 256-bit algorithm introduction study Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240543
    S3‑240628 Discussion about 256-bit security Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240629 Adding Security Assumpations to TR 33.700-41 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑241009  
    S3‑240322 New Key Issue on insufficient long-term key length for 256-bit security KDDI Corporation, THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑241022  
    S3‑240698 Key Issue on insufficient entropy due to permanent secret key length (K) Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑241022  
    S3‑241022 Key Issue on insufficient entropy due to permanent secret key length (K) Samsung pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑240698
    S3‑240785 New KI on 256-bit security algorithm negotiation Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑241022  
    S3‑240300 Key issue on Dynamic change of AKA parameters in Authentication procedures Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑240769 New KI on Key Derivation OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240989  
    S3‑240784 New KI on 256-bit CK IK in AKA procedure Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑240323 New Key Issue on different cryptographic key lengths in dual connectivity KDDI Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesOPPO: no new threats in the key issues, we are introducing a new algoirthm not fixing something that is broken. Ericsson didn’t agree with the key issue, they didn’t see the security threat either. CableLabs found it useful the keep the scenario for backward compatibility reasons, even without threats and potential requirements. Qualcomm didn’t agree with just collecting scenarios without having anything to do.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240325 New Key Issue on different cryptographic key lengths across AMF change and AMF reallocation KDDI Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm and Ericsson didn’t agree with the key issue.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240326 New Key Issue on different cryptographic key lengths across handovers KDDI Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240327 New Key Issue on different cryptographic key lengths on AS and NAS layer KDDI Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia didn’t agree with this.Huawei and Ericsson didn’t like the key issue either.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240573 New KI for CAT_256 on Flexibility to adjust the preference on security algorithms Apple pCR   Yes
YesSame concerns as 327.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240298 Key issue on 256-bit algorithm adaptation in NAS procedures Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240989  
    S3‑240299 Key issue on 256-bit algorithm adaptation in AS procedures Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240492 Key issues on Introduction of 256-bit algorithms in 5G system Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240989  
    S3‑240989 Key issues on Introduction of 256-bit algorithms in 5G system Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑240492
    S3‑240324 New Key Issue on bid-down attacks during negotiation of cryptographic algorithms and key lengths KDDI Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia didn’t agree with the wording. Ericsson: not in the scope of this study. Qualcomm: nothing to do with 256-btis, it’s about bidding down.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240571 New KI for CAT_256 on correctly indication Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240989  
    S3‑240470 New Key Issue on different length of cryptographic key in EPS and 5GS interworking ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑240493 Solution on transitions to 256 bit algorithms Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑240572 New solution for CAT_256 on correctly indication Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑240574 New solution for CAT_256 on Flexibility to adjust the preference on security algorithms Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑241010 Draft TR 33.700-41 KDDI draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.6 New Study on mitigations against bidding down attacks S3‑240548 Skeleton for TR 33.701 - Study on mitigations against bidding down attacks Huawei Technologies Sweden AB draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240536 Draft TR 33.701 scope Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240569 key issue on decommissioning 2G/3G Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240919  
    S3‑240642 New KI - for mitigations against Bidding Down Attacks Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240919  
    S3‑240699 Key issue on 2G or 3G bidding down attack Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240919  
    S3‑240919 Key issue on 2G or 3G bidding down attack Samsung pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240699
    S3‑240786 New KI on Mitigating attack of 2G3G false base station in decommissioning scenarios Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240919  
    S3‑240515 New KI on bidding down attack in case of decommissioning of 3G and 2G networks Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240919  
    S3‑240570 solution on decommissioning 2G/3G Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240928 Draft TR 33.701 Huawei draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.7 New Study on Security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 2 S3‑240626 Draft skeleton of TR 33.700-29 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240640 Scope of TR 33.700-29 CATT, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240931  
    S3‑240931 Scope of TR 33.700-29 CATT, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240640
    S3‑240398 Comments to Scope of TR 33.700-29 InterDigital, Inc. other Approval Yes
YesHuawei: leave the editor's note. There may be no work for us. MCC: it needs rewording since the way is written still reads like an editor's note.Just remove "has to be studied" and "wil require coordination with SA3-LI".
 		merged No S3‑240931  
    S3‑240466 Add some terms and abbreviations to TR 33.700-29 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesKPN: we are not using these terms. Ericsson: we are already referring to the SA2 TR, no need to copy the terms here.
 		revised No S3‑240932  
    S3‑240932 Add some terms and abbreviations to TR 33.700-29 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240466
    S3‑240441 Architecture and security assumptions of TR 33.700-29 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240933  
    S3‑240605 Architecture and security assumptions of TR 33.700-29 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240933  
    S3‑240643 pCR to TR33.700-29 Architecture and security assumptions CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240933  
    S3‑240657 Architectural Assumptions for security aspects of satellite access phase 2 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240933  
    S3‑240780 Security assumptions of 5G satellite access phase 3 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: we cannot have assumption on the physical environment.
 		revised No S3‑240933  
    S3‑240933 Security assumptions of 5G satellite access phase 3 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240780
    S3‑240442 Key issues of TR 33.700-29 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240934  
    S3‑240467 New KI on UE authentication under Store and Forward Satellite operation mode ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240934  
    S3‑240478 New KI on Protection of Store and Forward Satellite Operation OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240934  
    S3‑240623 Security and Privacy Aspects of Store and Forward (S&F) Satellite Operation Intel Technology Poland SP Zoo pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240934  
    S3‑240646 pCR to TR33.700-29 New key issue for authentication and authorization in S&F Satellite Operation CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240934  
    S3‑240934 pCR to TR33.700-29 New key issue for authentication and authorization in S&F Satellite Operation CATT, China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE Corporation, OPPO, Intel Technology Poland SP Zoo, Samsung, Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240646
    S3‑240700 Key Issue on security mechanisms to authenticate and authorize a UE for the Store & Forward Satellite operation Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240934  
    S3‑240781 Key issue for Security for S&F satellite operation Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240934  
    S3‑240807 Key issue on primary authentication of store and forward packet issue Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240934  
    S3‑240645 pCR to TR33.700-29 New key issue for data communication security in S&F Satellite Operation CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240934  
    S3‑240808 Key issue on MT and MO store and forward packet issue Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240934  
    S3‑240701 Key issue on isolation of keys in S&F operating mode Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑240603 New KI - authentication in Store & Forward Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240934  
    S3‑240702 Key issue on protection of partial attach and registration accept message Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑240810 Key issue on security and privacy aspects of emergency reporting during S&F operations Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑240348 New KI - Security of UE-satellite-UE communication Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑240349 New KI - Authorization in UE-satellite-UE communication scenario Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: Threats not connnected with the requirement. Huawei didn’t agree with the threat and requirement. Xiaomi didn’t agree with this. Ericsson: I don’t agree with this. It is not about impersonating satellite.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240606 Potential security and lawful intercept challenges in IMS based telephony for UE-satellite-UE Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240777 New KI - UE-Satellite-UE communication Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240809 Key issue on secured information exchange at satellite level(UE-SAT-UE) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Philips International B.V., Lenovo, InterDigital Inc pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240598 New KI - security of backhaul communication over feeder link in generic regenerative mode Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesThere were queries on the need to contact SA2 before going ahead with this key issue. It was agreed to send an LS to SA2.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240600 New KI - security of communication over inter satellite link Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240806 Add Access Authentication Security Threats to TR 33.700-29 Study on Security and Privacy Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 3 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Discussion No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240930 Draft TR 33.700-29 CATT draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑240950 LS on security of IP transport over satellite transport links Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.8 New Study on Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication S3‑240315 Draft 33.702 Study on Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240358 Security assumption Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240920  
    S3‑240920 Security assumption Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240358
    S3‑240360 KI for UE connecting to the new TNAP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240921  
    S3‑240921 KI for UE connecting to the new TNAP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240360
    S3‑240516 New KI on TNGF mobility Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240923  
    S3‑240773 New key issue of UE connecting TNAP LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240921  
    S3‑240361 KI on AUN3 device connecting to the new 5G-RG Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240922  
    S3‑240922 KI on AUN3 device connecting to the new 5G-RG Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240361
    S3‑240520 New KI on AUN3 case Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240922  
    S3‑240772 New key issue of AUN3 device LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240922  
    S3‑240362 KI on N5CW device connecting to the new TWAP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240923  
    S3‑240923 KI on N5CW device connecting to the new TWAP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240362
    S3‑240771 New key issue of N5CW device LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240923  
    S3‑240363 KI on UE connecting to the new WLAN AP under the same NSWOF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240924  
    S3‑240924 KI on UE connecting to the new WLAN AP under the same NSWOF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240363
    S3‑240519 New KI on NSWO case Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240924  
    S3‑240359 Scope Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240925  
    S3‑240925 Scope Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240359
    S3‑240364 copying solutions back to this TR from previous TR Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑240517 New solution on TNGF mobility Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240926  
    S3‑240926 New solution on TNGF mobility Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240517
    S3‑240518 conclusion on TNGF mobility Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240927 Draft TR 33.702 Nokia draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
6 New Study/Work item proposals S3‑240357 New WID on AKMA service disabling Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, NDRE WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑241040  
    S3‑241040 New WID on AKMA service disabling Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, NDRE WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240357
    S3‑240417 Dummy WID for R19 Home control for NSAC procedures Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, LGE, Xiaomi, ZTE WID new Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: we didn’t see a need for the normative work during the study, so we don’t agree with this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240418 Home control for Network Slice Admission Control procedures Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, LGE, Xiaomi, ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240529 R19 SCAS WID Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo commmented that the term Phase 4 was not really correct as this was not introducing new features but used as a maintenance tool. Maybe another name could be found. MITRE: third objective is too specific. Huawei: make work as stable as possible, don’t keep bringing tests by the end of the Release.We prefer to keep SCAS work similar to stage 2 work deadlines. NTT-Docomo: exception for the WID to address NESAS and EC comments for Rel-18? Huawei: best effort basis, not all features will have test cases because this is company driven. Ericsson: come back to this WID after we are done with Rel-18?
 		revised No S3‑240951  
    S3‑240951 R19 SCAS WID Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240529
    S3‑240581 New WID_Automated additions of root CAs certificates using CMP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240953 New WID_Automated additions of root CAs certificates using CMP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID new Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑240582 Automated additions of root CAs certificates using CMP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240954  
    S3‑240954 Automated additions of root CAs certificates using CMP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240582
    S3‑240592 New WID on Certificate bound access token in SBA Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID new Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: WID is not needed. Ericsson agreed that this was not needed, the RFC may not be applicable here. CableLabs: bring a CR instead, the change is very small. Nokia: we need to receive the feedback on whether we need this security enhancement. NTT-Docomo: we need clear understanding on whether this is needed in roaming or not.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240630 New WID on specification of new f5 function Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
YesEricsson commented that this was not mandating the use of f5**, just specifying it. It is decision of the operator to implement it or not. Huawei queried why there was a TR. Ericsson commented that this was done before, the security analysis was always captured in a TR. Apple: we should evaluate the SAGE documents before specifying them. IDEMIA: support this WID, but why creating a new specification instead of reusing existent ones? Huawei: extend the other MILENAGE WID to include this. IDEMIA didn’t support this, because the other WID was MILENAGE 256 and this was 128. Apple: having a TR and a TS in this WID? MCC commented that the TR was not a study so it was OK.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240691 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Cloud Native Products (CNP) Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
YesNokia: what is cloud native? We need to define this in Rel-19 and then we can create a SCAS for it. Huawei agreed that CNP didn’t have a definition in 3GPP.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240811 New WID on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service phase 3 China Mobile WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240952 S3‑240713
    S3‑240952 New WID on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service phase 3 China Mobile WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240811
    S3‑240296 Study on Security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G OPPO, Apple, BUPT, Cable Labs, CATR, CATT, China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, HiSilicon, Huawei, Intel, Inter Digital, KPN, Lenovo, Philips International B.V., Samsung, T-Mobile USA, Verizon, Vivo, Xiaomi, Xidian University, ZTE SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240955  
    S3‑240955 Study on Security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G OPPO, Apple, BUPT, Cable Labs, CATR, CATT, China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, HiSilicon, Huawei, Intel, Inter Digital, KPN, Lenovo, Philips International B.V., Samsung, T-Mobile USA, Verizon, Vivo, Xiaomi, Xidian University, ZTE SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240296
    S3‑240297 draft skeleton for AIoT security OPPO other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240491 Discussion on Security Aspects on Ambient IoT Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240391 New SID on security aspects of Usage of User Identities InterDigital Belgium. LLC SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240957  
    S3‑240957 New SID on security aspects of Usage of User Identities InterDigital Belgium. LLC SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240391
    S3‑240421 Discussions for R19 UAS security Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240422 R19 SID on UAS security enhancement Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
YesMITRE, Nokia: objective 1 was already discussed in Chicago. Nokia didn’t see a security issue in WT2.
 		revised No S3‑240967  
    S3‑240967 R19 SID on UAS security enhancement Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240422
    S3‑240439 New SID on Study on Security and Privacy Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity based Services in 5GS - Phase 3 China Telecomunication Corp. SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240968  
    S3‑240507 New SID on Security Aspects of System Enhancement for Proximity-based Services in 5GS - Phase 3 Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240968  
    S3‑240565 New SID on Security Aspects of Proximity based Services in 5GS Phase 3 China Unicom SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240968  
    S3‑240508 Discussion about study on Security Aspects of ProSe - Phase 3 Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240624 Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 CATT SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240968  
    S3‑240968 Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 CATT SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240624
    S3‑240476 Discussion Paper on Study on security aspects of Core Network Enhanced Support for AIML vivo, China Mobile discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240710 New SID on Study on security aspects of AIML enhancements China Mobile, vivo SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240969  
    S3‑240969 New SID on Study on security aspects of AIML enhancements China Mobile, vivo SID new Approval Yes
YesIt was commented that this depended on the CR in 911. That CR was not pursued, so WT3 would include the issue in the CR. It was suggested to remove WT3 so Plenary would decide whether to include it.
 		agreed No   S3‑240710
    S3‑240812 Comments to S3-240710 New SID on Study on security aspects of Core Network Enhanced Support for AIML InterDigital, Inc. other Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240552 New_SID_EdgeComputing Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240970  
    S3‑240970 New_SID_EdgeComputing Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240552
    S3‑240576 New SID on security aspects for Multi-Access Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE Corporation, China Telecom, OPPO, China Unicom, CATT, CableLabs, Lenovo, Charter, Intel SID new Approval Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with WT1 and asked to reword WT2.They didn’t find WT3 needed either.
 		revised No S3‑240971  
    S3‑240971 New SID on security aspects for Multi-Access Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE Corporation, China Telecom, OPPO, China Unicom, CATT, CableLabs, Lenovo, Charter, Intel SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240576
    S3‑240805 Discussion on MPQUIC security performance aspects for MASSS Lenovo discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240652 New SID on 5GS enhancements for Energy Saving Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, OPPO, Telecom Italia SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240972  
    S3‑240972 New SID on 5GS enhancements for Energy Saving Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, OPPO, Telecom Italia SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240652
    S3‑240690 New SID on Security aspects of 5G NR Femto Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Verizon, Samsung, AT&T, Charter SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240973  
    S3‑240973 New SID on Security aspects of 5G NR Femto Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Verizon, Samsung, AT&T, Charter SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240690
    S3‑240703 New SID on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, IIT Delhi, Lenovo, OPPO SID new Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: the TUs are not realistic with the amount of work needed.
 		revised No S3‑240974  
    S3‑240974 New SID on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, IIT Delhi, Lenovo, OPPO SID new Approval No
YesNTT_Docomo: this has a massive impact on identification structure and there is no obvious way forward, not clear that we will even finish this in 6G.
 		agreed No   S3‑240703
    S3‑240704 Study on security aspects of CAPIF Phase 3 Samsung SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240975  
    S3‑240975 Study on security aspects of CAPIF Phase 3 Samsung SID new Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑240704
    S3‑240601 CAPIF - DP Security concerns on onboarding information Nokia, Nokia Shanhai Bell discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240705 New SID on security aspects NR mobility enhancement Samsung SID new Approval Yes
YesApple: not needed. RAN work may have security issues before the study is done. The work can be done through LS. The Chair commented that the work needed to be captured properly.
 		revised No S3‑241041  
    S3‑241041 New SID on security aspects NR mobility enhancement Samsung SID new Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑240705
    S3‑240591 Discussion paper on EU ID security Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240709 New SID on security management service China Mobile, ZTE, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CATT, CableLabs, China Telecom SID new Approval Yes
YesNTTG_Docomo: objectives need to be rewritten. Ericsson: not clear what the outcome is. Huawei: management is not in our scope. We would need to colaborate with SA5.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240711 Discussion on security for XR China Mobile discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240712 New SID on security for XR services China Mobile SID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson: postpone until SA2 has progressed their work. NTT-Docomo: this looks like management time of LS that will come from other groups, nothing major. CableLabs supported this. The Chair commented that creating dummy TRs could cause overload and unproductive discussions, but from 3GPP tracking point of view there is a need for identification of the work and a proper procedure to follow. Past work has been done under work items that don’t allow any tracking of the work (e.g. TEIx). Non-SA3 companies cannot find out where the work is done.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240766 Discussion of Revised SID on enablers for Zero Trust Security Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240765 Revised SID on enablers for Zero Trust Security Ericsson, AT&T, Johns Hopkins University APL, MITRE, T-Mobile, US National Security Agency SID revised Agreement Yes
YesHuawei, Nokia didn’t agree with this revised SID.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240419 Discussions for R19 security enhancement of network slicing Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240420 R19 SID on security enhancement of network slicng Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom SID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson: WT3 is based on SA2 work? Huawei: there is a TEI19 WID related to WT3. The Chair commented that definitely three studies would not be able to be performed in SA3, there had to be a merge or choose just one. AT&T: let's move on to SA2 priorities.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240612 discussion on resource isolation for 5G network slice Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240613 new SID on resource isolation for 5G network slice Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: use cases are not clear. Motorola solutions: there are 3 network slicing proposals, let's merge them all.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240813 New SID: end-to-end slice data protection THALES SID new Approval Yes
YesCableLabs: we lack of specific requirements, the Nokia study would help. NTT-Docomo: clarifiy what "ends" are.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240447 New SID on the evolvement of PRINS to better support roaming intermediaries CableLabs SID new Agreement Yes
YesVerizon: nothing that needs to be studied here. Nokia: there is no evolution from PRINS to hop-by-hop TLS. What’s the risk of choosing hop-by-hop TLS instead of end to end PRINS? We would need a CR or discussion paper on this. NTT-Docomo: we miss the data plane protection, it should be added here but there is no way to do this in Rel-18. CableLabs: hop-by-hop TLS and PRINS are not mutually exclusive.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240489 Discussion on Security Enhancement for NEF Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240490 New SID on 5G Security Enhancement for NEF Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
YesA merge with 704 was discussed.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240680 Study on NRF public key retrieval by NF Service Producers Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom SID new Agreement Yes
YesNokia supported this study. The study was noted due to the lack of time budget. The work will be handled with TEI19 CRs.
 		noted No    
    S3‑240614 Revision of Rel19 NG_RTC_SEC_Ph2 SID Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID revised Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240988  
    S3‑240641 Revised SID on Study on Security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 3 CATT SID revised Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240713 New SID on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service phase 3 China Mobile SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240811  
    S3‑240764 Revised SID on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 Ericsson, China Mobile SID revised Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240988  
    S3‑240988 Revised SID on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 Ericsson, China Mobile SID revised Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240764
7 CVD and research S3‑240225 CVD-2023-0079 - Lack of GPRS IOV randomisation GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240758 Explicit requirement on initial INPUT value for the GPRS-A5 ciphering algorithm Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240956  
    S3‑240956 Explicit requirement on initial INPUT value for the GPRS-A5 ciphering algorithm Ericsson,Nokia CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240758
    S3‑240759 Reply LS on CVD-2023-0079 – Lack of GPRS IOV randomisation Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240892  
    S3‑240892 Reply LS on CVD-2023-0079 – Lack of GPRS IOV randomisation Ericsson LS out Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240759
    S3‑240259 CVD-2023-0075 - Certificate validation on IMS access interface GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑240440 Reply LS to GMSA on CVD-2023-0075 – Certificate validation on IMS access interface CableLabs LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240687 LS on GSMA CVD-2023-0075 – Certificate validation on IMS access interface Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑240894  
    S3‑240894 LS on GSMA CVD-2023-0075 – Certificate validation on IMS access interface Ericsson LS out Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑240687
    S3‑240686 Certificate validation on IMS access interface Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesQuacomm: not worth going beyond Rel-18 for this. Samsung: only Rel-18.
 		revised No S3‑240893  
    S3‑240893 Certificate validation on IMS access interface Ericsson;CableLabs CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240686
    S3‑240443 Validate FQDN of P-CSCF against the subjectAltName field in its server certificate CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240444 Validate FQDN of P-CSCF against the subjectAltName field in its server certificate CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240445 Validate FQDN of P-CSCF against the subjectAltName field in its server certificate CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240260 CVD-2023-0069 - 5G Core Network Attacks GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑240685 LS on GSMA CVD-2023-0069 - 5G Core Network Attacks Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240434 LS-reply to GSMA on CVD-2023-0069 5G Core Network Attacks Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240435 Clarification on SBI service request procedures Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240436 Clarification on SBI service request procedures Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑240895  
    S3‑240437 Clarification on SBI token Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240438 Clarification on SBI token Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240617 CVD-0069 Cross check on NF discovery request Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No   S3‑234870
    S3‑240681 Validation of the allowed slices in the access token request at NRF Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesChina Mobile only agreed with the note, not the rest of the changes.
 		revised No S3‑240895  
    S3‑240895 Validation of the allowed slices in the access token request at NRF Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑240681
    S3‑240682 Validation of the requested slices at NF service producer Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑240683 Support iat claim in the access token Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑240684 Clarification of security requirement on NF Discovery response Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑240618 CVD-0069 Condition of including allowed sNSSAIs in access token Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes   S3‑234871
    S3‑240958 Explicit requirement on initial INPUT value for the GPRS-A5 ciphering algorithm Ericsson CR discussion No
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240959 Explicit requirement on initial INPUT value for the GPRS-A5 ciphering algorithm Ericsson CR discussion No
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240960 Explicit requirement on initial INPUT value for the GPRS-A5 ciphering algorithm Ericsson CR discussion No
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240961 Explicit requirement on initial INPUT value for the GPRS-A5 ciphering algorithm Ericsson CR discussion No
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240962 Explicit requirement on initial INPUT value for the GPRS-A5 ciphering algorithm Ericsson CR discussion No
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240963 Explicit requirement on initial INPUT value for the GPRS-A5 ciphering algorithm Ericsson CR discussion No
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240964 Explicit requirement on initial INPUT value for the GPRS-A5 ciphering algorithm Ericsson CR discussion No
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240965 Explicit requirement on initial INPUT value for the GPRS-A5 ciphering algorithm Ericsson CR discussion No
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑240966 Explicit requirement on initial INPUT value for the GPRS-A5 ciphering algorithm Ericsson CR discussion No
Yes
 		agreed No    
8 Any Other Business S3‑240205 SA3 meeting calendar SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑240935 Cover sheet Draft TS 33.520 China Unicom TS or TR cover Approval No
Yes
 		approved No