Tdoc List

2023-09-01 14:29

Agenda Topic TDoc Title Source Type For Avail Treated Decision Wdrn Replaced-by Replaces
1 Agenda and Meeting Objectives S3‑233500 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑234138 Detail agenda planning for SA3#112 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234140 S3‑233503
    S3‑234140 Detail agenda planning for SA3#112 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234175 S3‑234138
    S3‑234175 Detail agenda planning for SA3#112 SA WG3 Chair other - Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑234140
    S3‑233502 Process for SA3#112 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233503 Detail agenda planning for SA3#112 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234138  
2 Meeting Reports S3‑233501 Report from SA3#111 MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233505 Report to SA3 from SA SA WG3 Chair report   Yes
YesThe Chair clarified that SA3 was able to ask for clarification to GSMA but no work could be started before SA1's task was concluded. Vodafone pointed out that there were a large number of inputs to this meeting. Maybe SA3 could still submot them to SA and they could decide. Suresh replied that the guidance was clear for not starting any work. SA1 would start with use cases and requirements. Vodafone commented that the operators would not follow 3GPP's guidance and work on their own. Nokia commented that this guidance could apply to new use cases and not existent ones. SA3 could work on the latter. NTT-Docomo said that some offline discussions were needed to know how to handle this. Qualcomm: exception sheets not approved? The Chair commented that for Prose secondayr authentication stage 2 the window was closed. This meant that SA3 could no longer work on this topic, so the present meeting would be the last meeting where to treat this. Qualcomm: it is up to SA2 to reopen this topic.
 		noted No    
3 Reports and Liaisons from other Groups S3‑233506 LS on Handling of SOR counter and the UE parameter update counter if stored in NVM C1-232696 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑233891 Handling of SoR/UPU Counter if stored in NVM Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233642 LS reply on AKMA service restrictions in Rel-17 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: not aligned with this response, I prefer CMCC and Huawei's response. Remove the roaming restriction and use Huawei's proposal as a baseline. Ericsson: why change Rel-17 if we didn’t change anything in Rel-18?
 		merged No S3‑234280  
    S3‑234063 Handling on SoR counter and the UE paramter update counter if stored in NVM THALES discussion Discussion Yes
YesNokia: let's see the options and create a CR from there. Huawei: this will fix it for new Ues, but this is not likely. We prefer Thales' option. Qualcomm: we agree that there is an issue. Thales' option doesn’t work for the existing SIMs.Our solution is backwards compatible and no network impact. Apple: this doesn’t happen frequently and it happens after Rel-16. Leave it to the UE. Ericsson: Thales for Rel-15 and ahead. Qualcomm's proposal for the rest. IDEMIA: Only The USIMs from Rel-15 are the issue because the storage of SoR in USIM is not present. The USIMs Rel-16 and beyond are OK NTT-Docomo: we have really old UICCs in the field..OTA will not solve the problem for these UICCss.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233824 Reply LS on Handling of SOR counter and the UE parameter update counter if stored in NVM Apple LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234066 Reply LS on Handling of SoR counter and the UE parameter update counter in NVM THALES LS out Approval Yes
YesHuawei: we should agree on network impact to avoid discussing this again. The Chair recommended to have offline discussions in order to progress in the next meeting.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234305 Reply LS on Handling of SoR counter and the UE parameter update counter in NVM THALES LS out Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233511 LS on Authentication Result Removal C4-224418 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑233645 Discussion paper on authentication result removal Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
YesEricsson: this will cause more problems. Qualcomm: note this, not endorsed. We don't want changes in the ME, if there is a problem this can be solved in the network implementation.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233646 LS reply on Authentication Result Removal Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234025 Reply LS on Authentication Result Removal Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234306 Reply LS on Authentication Result Removal Ericsson LS out Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233507 LS on Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs for U2N relay C1-234362 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑234096 Reply LS on Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs for U2N relay Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233879 Draft Reply LS on Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs for U2N relay Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234307 Reply LS on Retrieving keys for decryption of protected Ies for U2N relay Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233903 Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs for U2N relay Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233904 LS reply on LS on Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs for U2N relay Ericsson LS out Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233514 LS on Reporting of Relay UE C-RNTI and NCGI R2-2306693 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑234095 Reply LS on Reporting of Relay UE C-RNTI and NCGI Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233616 LS reply on Reporting of Relay UE C-RNTI and NCGI Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233508 Handling of access tokens provided by ECS to the EEC for accessing EES(s) C1-234363 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑233851 Reply LS on Handling of access tokens provided by ECS to the EEC for accessing EES(s) Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234153  
    S3‑234153 Reply LS on Handling of access tokens provided by ECS to the EEC for accessing EES(s) Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233851
    S3‑233520 Reply LS on enforcement of AF specific identifier S2-2307787 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233525 LS on user consent for UE location sharing S6-230351 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑233823 Reply LS on user consent for UE location sharing (S6-230351) Apple LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234308  
    S3‑234308 Reply LS on user consent for UE location sharing (S6-230351) Apple LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233823
    S3‑233526 Reply LS on FS_eEDGEAPP Solution for Support of NAT deployed within the edge data network S6-231061 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑233630 LS reply to LS C1-234363 on EES access authorization token issued by ECS InterDigital Belgium. LLC LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234153  
    S3‑233822 Reply LS on FS_eEDGEAPP Solution for Support of NAT deployed within the edge data network (S6-231061) Apple LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234309  
    S3‑234309 Reply LS on FS_eEDGEAPP Solution for Support of NAT deployed within the edge data network (S6-231061) Apple LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233822
    S3‑233529 LS on REl-18 work on architecture for enabling Edge Applications S6-232197 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233509 LS on AKMA service restrictions in Rel-17 C3-232563 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑233762 Draft Reply LS on AKMA service restrications Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234280  
    S3‑233953 Rely LS on AKMA service restrictions in Rel-17 China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No ‑  
    S3‑234280 Rely LS on AKMA service restrictions in Rel-17 China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes   ‑
    S3‑233763 Removal of the roaming restriction for Rel-17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234329 Removal of the roaming restriction for Rel-17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233764 Disscussion on removing roaming restriction for AKMA R-17 Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233536 LS on LI for AKMA in roaming s3i230421 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑233592 Response LS on LI for AKMA in roaming NDRE LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233593 Discussion on Response LS to SA3LI regarding AKMA Roaming NDRE discussion Endorsement Yes
YesQualcomm: we should go for CMCC's response as we studied and concluded already on this.This is also application dependent and out of scope of our work.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233952 Reply LS on LI for AKMA in roaming China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234310 Reply LS on LI for AKMA in roaming China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233510 Reply LS on CAPIF extensibility C3-232686 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑233787 LS.reply on CAPIF extensibility Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234154  
    S3‑234154 LS.reply on CAPIF extensibility Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233787
    S3‑234061 LS on CAPIF specification conflict Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out   Yes
YesQualcomm didn’t agree with this LS. It was agreed to try to solve this in CT3.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233512 LS on Removal of the uavAuthenticated IE from Create SM Context Request C4-230790 LS in Information Yes
YesPostponed until SA3 gets a response from SA2.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑233513 LS on Security Context Transfer between MBSF and MBSTF C4-232462 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑233721 Reply LS on Security Context Transfer between MBSF and MBSTF Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234054 Reply LS on Security Context Transfer between MBSF and MBSTF Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234155  
    S3‑234155 Reply LS on Security Context Transfer between MBSF and MBSTF Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234054
    S3‑233518 DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) S2-2306210 LS in Action Yes
YesQualcomm: we prefer Huawei's option. Nokia: Ok with Huawei, but we are not addressing the problem. Not optimistic that we can solve it during this meeting. The reality is that implementation os solving this, but the question is whether we need to do more. Qualcomm preferred to leave it to the implementation.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑233781 Reply LS on DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234156 Reply LS on DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233975 [Draft] Reply LS on DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234156  
    S3‑233524 Security for AI ML management capabilities S5-234776 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑233782 Discussion on Trustworthiness of AI/ML Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CMCC discussion Endorsement Yes
YesInterdigital supported this. Huawei didn’t agree with endorsing this. Qualcomm didn’t agree with endorsing this either.Existent security mechanisms can be used. Lenovo supported endorsing this.They suggested to send the LS reply to the ETSI group on AI.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233713 LS reply for Security for AI ML management capabilities Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233527 LS on resolving the target KMS URI for a migrated MC service user S6-231552 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑233601 Reply LS on resolving the target KMS URI for a migrated MC service user Airbus LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234157  
    S3‑234157 Reply LS on resolving the target KMS URI for a migrated MC service user Airbus LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233601
    S3‑233528 Reply LS on Alignment of SA3 security aspects for Personal IoT Networks S6-232076 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234158 Reply to LS on Alignment of SA3 security aspects for Personal IoT Networks Huawei LS out approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233533 LSout_to_3GPP_SA3_regarding_TS33_117_SCAS_Vulnerability ETSI ISG NFV LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234056 Reply LS on Authenticated Vulnerability Testing Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234159  
    S3‑234159 Reply LS on Authenticated Vulnerability Testing Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234056
    S3‑233534 Non-Support of Ciphering Algorithm GEA2 GCF LS in   Yes
YesVodafone: there are handsets in the market that would be impacted. We already talked about this, we put a strong warning in the specs stating that it should not be used. Huawei: we need a meeting cycle to discuss the CRs. Qualcomm supported this. GSMA wanted to minute an official statement of the group given that some issues may arise publicly like it happened with the recent TETRA algorithms news. Vodafone: Meeting 103 introduced changes from Rel-11 to Rel-16. Nokia commented that these still allowed the use of GEA2. Huawei: this was solved already and we decided to start it in Rel-11. NTT-Docomo: align with RAN5, so let's go back to Rel-8. Qualcomm: RAN5 took care of it, at SA3 level it's enough what we have. The Chair proposed that there would be a meeting minute text and the reply LS and actions would be discussed in the next meeting. The following minutes were agreed to be added to the report: SA3 previously added text to 43.020 at SA3#103 to strongly discourage the use of GEA1 & GEA2 from release 11 with full removal from release 16. SA3 was therefore unable to conclude on whether additional text is required or other action should be taken on support for GEA 1 and GEA2 in heavily frozen releases. SA3 members requested to study the matter between now and SA#113 in November and identify if any further action is required
 		postponed No    
    S3‑233516 LS response on Non-Support of Ciphering Algorithm GEA2 R5-233361 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233535 Non-Support of Ciphering Algorithm GEA2 mandated in Certification GCF LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233544 Reply LS on object acquisition S4aI230134 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234132 DTLS for SCTP next steps and request for input IETF Transport Area Working Group LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234134 SAGE-23-01 Specification of Milenage-256 finalized ETSI SAGE LS in   Yes
YesVodafone: different enough so we can treat them like Tuak and MILENAGE? Patrick (SAGE Chair): the two algorithm already supports the 256 bit keys. They have the same structure as the old MILENAGE. Vodafone: it seems that we need to choose between the two. Does this mean that we need a long analysis? Patrick: some considerations performance wise but security wise they are very similar. Thales: we already have Tuak, we only need one more. We prefer the AES based one. Qualcomm wanted to study the algorithms and come back next meeting with a decision on which one to pick up. IDEMIA asked if there was agreement on using only one algorithm. It was asked to be minuted that only one of the algorithms would be specified in 3GPP.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233940 Reply LS to Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting S3-223162 Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
YesVodafone: The average user is not able to understand what they are consenting to. We don’t agree with having a technical solution that allows the users to modify their contract. Huawei: there is no new solution here.
 		revised No S3‑234267  
    S3‑234267 LS on the user consent for trace reporting S3-223162 Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
YesIt was clarified that the RAN3 LS referred here had already been replied the previous year. MCC suggested to have this as a new LS and refer to the old RAN3 LS in the text.
 		approved No   S3‑233940
    S3‑233521 LS on GSMA requirements regarding intermediaries in the roaming ecosystem and related LSs S2-2307983 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233531 LS to 3GPP on GSMA requirements for intermediaries in the roaming ecosystem GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233532 LS to 3GPP on the introduction of the domain “ipxnetwork.org” in addition to “3gppnetwork.org” GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑233553 Discussion document on the implementation of Roaming Hubs for 5G SA roaming Vodafone España SA discussion Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233554 Modification of PRINS to enable Roaming Hubs Vodafone, TIM, DoCoMo CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234319  
    S3‑234319 Modification of PRINS to enable Roaming Hubs Vodafone, TIM, DoCoMo draftCR Agreement Yes
YesIt was clarified that the intention was to submit this as Rel-16 but final decision could be made in Plenary. MCC explained that the endorsement didn’t bind SA3 to the contents, as there were several issues to be defined. AT&T had concerns on the Release were this was directed to. For example, creating a snow ball effect impacting SA2. The Chair commented that SA2 had closed Rel-18 and there was no chance that they would have to reopen it. These changes didn’t have impact on other groups. GSMA commented that they wanted to see this in Rel-15 (maybe too far), and reminded that it was an operational deployment limitation. The critical point is that the operators can deploy using the 3GPP specs, and additionally this is not an architectural problem. Charter: how do present the CR to SA? Vodafone: presented as part of an LS sent to SA1 and Plenary. Also presented separately by the supporting companies. Verizon: we support this CR, but we should agree on the Release here as well, not in Plenary. Orange and TIM preferred to get feddback from GSMA before endorsing the content. Verizon, KPN, KDDI agreed on the CR. It was agreed to attach this CR on the LS to GSMA in 4350.
 		approved No   S3‑233554
    S3‑233555 Modification of PRINS to enable Roaming Hubs Vodafone, TIM, DoCoMo CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233556 Modification of PRINS to enable Roaming Hubs Vodafone, TIM, DoCoMo CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233557 CR to 33.501 R16 to implement error message reporting Vodafone España SA CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234319  
    S3‑233558 CR to 33.501 R17 to implement error message reporting (mirror) Vodafone España SA CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233559 Enable Roaming Hub Error message origination Vodafone, TIM, DoCoMo CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233560 Correction of and addition of missing roaming definitions Vodafone, TIM, DoCoMo CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234319  
    S3‑233561 Correction of and addition of missing roaming definitions Vodafone, TIM, DoCoMo CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233562 Correction of and addition of missing roaming definitions Vodafone, TIM, DoCoMo CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233563 LS out on the implementation of roaming hubs Vodafone España SA LS out Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233596 Aggrigation of PLMN_IDs for Roaming Hubs Vodafone CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234319  
    S3‑233597 Aggrigation of PLMN_IDs for Roaming Hubs Vodafone, TIM, DoCoMo CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233598 Aggrigation of PLMN_IDs for Roaming Hubs Vodafone, TIM, DoCoMo CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233784 LS on 5G roaming Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
YesVodafone: quite strongly worded, it needs to be turned down. AT&T: make GSMA aware that we want to be involved.
 		revised No S3‑234296  
    S3‑234296 LS on 5G roaming Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233784
    S3‑233785 DP for LS on roaming Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233786 LS on ipx domain Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233517 Reply LS on 3GPP work on Energy Efficiency S1-231805 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233522 LS on 3GPP work on Energy Efficiency S4-231111 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233523 LS on LS Reply on O-RAN – Transport Network Slicing Enhancement IM/DM TS28.541 S5-234824 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233515 LS to SA2 on sidelink positioning agreements R2-2306842 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233530 Reply LS on GSMA requirements regarding intermediaries in the roaming ecosystem and related LSs SP-230763 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233583 TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234136 Draft reply LS to DTLS for SCTP next steps and request for input Oy LM Ericsson AB LS out   Yes
YesCable Labs: agreed with this proposal. Nokia: we need more discussion. I have problems to map the answers to the questions. Huawei: we have a preference for solution 2 but we need to discuss it more. Cisco commented that IETF expected a response before their September meeting.
 		revised No S3‑234160  
    S3‑234160 Reply LS to DTLS for SCTP next steps and request for input Oy LM Ericsson AB LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234136
    S3‑234141 Rel- 8 CR Not anymore supported GPRS encryption algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234142 Rel- 9 CR Not anymore supported GPRS encryption algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234143 Rel- 10 CR Not anymore supported GPRS encryption algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234144 Rel- 11 CR Not anymore supported GPRS encryption algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234145 Rel- 12 CR Not anymore supported GPRS encryption algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234146 Rel- 13 CR Not anymore supported GPRS encryption algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234147 Rel- 14 CR Not anymore supported GPRS encryption algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234148 Rel- 15 CR Not anymore supported GPRS encryption algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234149 Rel- 16 CR Not anymore supported GPRS encryption algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234150 Rel- 17 CR Not anymore supported GPRS encryption algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233640 Handling of SOR counter and the UE parameter update counter if stored in NVM Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234174 Endorsement on MILENAGE algorithm IDEMIA discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234350 LS on 5GSA roaming hub based roaming Vodafone LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4 Work areas (Rel-18)                      
4.1 New WID on Security Assurance Specification for Management Function (MnF)                      
4.2 New WID on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products                      
4.3 Mission critical security                      
4.4 New WID on Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for 5G Rel-17 Features                      
4.5 New WID on Security Assurance Specification for the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) Anchor Function Function (AAnF) S3‑233676 Clean up for AAnF SCAS ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234225  
    S3‑233955 Editorial corrections to TS33537 China Mobile CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234225  
    S3‑234225 Editorial corrections to TS33537 China Mobile CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233955
4.6 New WID on SCAS for split-gNB product classes S3‑233854 Adding the clause references to TS 33.523 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233855 Adding the missing Xn-U interface Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233856 Linking the gNB and split gNB specifications Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234131  
    S3‑233857 Removing redundant text from clause 5.2.2.1.4 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234131 Linking the gNB and split gNB specifications Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234325 S3‑233856
    S3‑234325 Linking the gNB and split gNB specifications Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234131
4.7 Service Based Architecture (Rel-15/16/17)                      
4.8 Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe (Rel-17)                      
4.9 All Maintenance topics (Rel-15/16/17/18 )                      
4.9.1 Security Assurance S3‑233538 Interface Robustness Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234220 Rel-18 Interface Robustness Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233539 Security Event Logging Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233540 Privileged Users Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234221 rel-18 Privileged Users Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233541 AMF redirection to EPS remove CIoT precondition Keysight Technologies CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234326  
    S3‑234326 AMF redirection to EPS remove CIoT precondition Keysight Technologies CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233541
    S3‑233542 NAS based redirection from 5GS to EPS Keysight Technologies CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233543 AMF Test - NAS Integrity failure Keysight Technologies CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233546 Packet Filtering support Testing Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes861
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233603 Added UDM threat reference for use of an invalid and uncompressed point in ECIES protection scheme for SUCI decryption BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233622  
    S3‑233604 Added UDM SCAS test cases for checking an invalid and uncompressed point in ECIES protection scheme for SUCI decryption BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233623  
    S3‑233605 Clarification of Replay Protection of NAS signalling messages BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234165  
    S3‑234165 Clarification of Replay Protection of NAS signalling messages BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233605
    S3‑233606 Clarification of NAS integrity algorithm selection and use BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234166  
    S3‑234166 Clarification of NAS integrity algorithm selection and use BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233606
    S3‑233607 Clarification of invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities handling BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234167  
    S3‑234167 Clarification of invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities handling BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233607
    S3‑233609 Correction of UDM service naming BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233610 Correction of UDM service naming BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233611 Correction of UDM service naming BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234191  
    S3‑233622 Added UDM threat reference for use of an invalid and uncompressed point in ECIES protection scheme for SUCI decryption BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233624 S3‑233603
    S3‑233623 Added UDM SCAS test cases for checking an invalid and uncompressed point in ECIES protection scheme for SUCI decryption BSI (DE), Deutsche Telekom AG CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑233604
    S3‑233624 Added UDM threat reference for use of an invalid and uncompressed point in ECIES protection scheme for SUCI decryption BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233625 S3‑233622
    S3‑233625 Added UDM threat reference for use of an invalid and uncompressed point in ECIES protection scheme for SUCI decryption BSI (DE), Deutsche Telekom AG CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑233624
    S3‑233773 Addition of critical assets and threats specific to NSSAAF network product class Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233774 Addition of critical assets and threats specific to NSSAAF network product class Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233775 Reference correction for MnF SCAS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233858 Adding the missing Xn-U interface Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234327  
    S3‑234327 Adding the missing Xn-U interface Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233858
    S3‑233859 Correction of cross-refence in clause 4.2.3.4.1 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233860 Correction of cross-refence in clause 4.2.3.4.1 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233861 Correction of cross-refence in clause 4.2.3.4.1 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234226  
    S3‑234226 Correction of cross-refence in clause 4.2.3.4.1 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233861
    S3‑233862 Adding a missing requirement name Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.9.2 Service Based Architecture S3‑233545 Update on the token verification Deutsche Telekom AG CR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with the first bullet. They had an overlapping contribution in 3942. Nokia: No binding between the authentication and authorization here.
 		merged No S3‑234206  
    S3‑233636 Discussion paper on NF authorization at NEF for AF data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233637 LS on NF Authorization at NEF for AF data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233638 NF authorization at NEF for AF data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233639 NF authorization at NEF for AF data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233780 Clarification on access token request for accessing services Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234207  
    S3‑234207 Clarification on access token request for accessing services Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233780
    S3‑233792 Delegated access token validation Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson and Huawei had issues with the CR. Cable Labs agreed with the principle but wanted a simpler CR.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233793 Clarification on subscribe-notify Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234351  
    S3‑234351 Clarification on subscribe-notify Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233793
    S3‑233794 SCP to include 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id header Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: this text is already present in the SCP clause.
 		revised No S3‑234352  
    S3‑234352 SCP to include 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id header Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233794
    S3‑233795 Including SNPN ID in SBA and N32 related descriptions Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: It is missing because it doesn’t apply.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233796 Including SNPN ID in SBA and N32 related descriptions Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233958 CR_Removing N32 precontext ID in 33.501 in R16 China Mobile CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233959 CR_Removing N32 precontext ID in 33.501 in R17 China Mobile CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233960 CR_Removing N32 precontext ID in 33.501 in R18 China Mobile CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233989 Clarification of SEPP inter-domain certificate profiles Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234212  
    S3‑234212 Clarification of SEPP inter-domain certificate profiles Ericsson CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233989
    S3‑233995 Clarification of SEPP inter-domain certificate profiles Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234213  
    S3‑234213 Clarification of SEPP inter-domain certificate profiles Ericsson CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233995
    S3‑233998 Clarification of SEPP inter-domain certificate profiles Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234214  
    S3‑234214 Clarification of SEPP inter-domain certificate profiles Ericsson CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233998
4.9.3 Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe S3‑233677 Correction on derivation of CP-PRUK ID star ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234215  
    S3‑234215 Correction on derivation of CP-PRUK ID star ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233677
    S3‑233678 Correction on derivation of CP-PRUK ID star ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233746 Clarification about Annex A.3 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234215  
    S3‑234023 CR to TR33.503 Correct definition of reference point Npc14 CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233613 Discussion on U2N discovery security procedure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233614 Update discovery key response of U2N discovery security procdure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233615 Locate target PKMF in UP based security procedure of U2N relay communication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234218  
    S3‑234218 Locate target PKMF in UP based security procedure of U2N relay communication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233615
    S3‑233743 Identify discovery security materials in UE-to-Network Relay discovery Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233759 Clarification on discovery of PKMF of Relay UE by the SMF in remote UE report procedure Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234277  
    S3‑234277 Clarification on discovery of PKMF of Relay UE by the SMF in remote UE report procedure Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233759
    S3‑233934 Correction in clause 6.3.3.2.2 and 6.3.3.3.2 of TS 33.503 OPPO,Xidian CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234219  
    S3‑234219 Correction in clause 6.3.3.2.2 and 6.3.3.3.2 of TS 33.503 OPPO,Xidian CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233934
    S3‑234097 Correction to privacy protection of UP-PRUKID/CP-PRUKID and RSC in DCR Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234098 Add the 5G PKMF service operation Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234338  
    S3‑234338 Add the 5G PKMF service operation Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234098
    S3‑233908 LS on U2N relay direct link setup failure due to RSC mismatch or integrity failure Ericsson LS out Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233909 U2N relay direct link setup failure due to RSC mismatch or integrity failure Ericsson, Philips International B.V CR Agreement Yes
YesXiaomi didn’t support the CR. Qualcomm supported it.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233826 Correction in clause 6.3.3.2.2 and 6.3.3.3.2 of TS 33.503 OPPO CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4.9.4 Mission Critical S3‑233591 [33.180] Clarification on SIP core access authentication HOME OFFICE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.9.5 Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G S3‑233634 AKMA Service disable or withdrawn Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233635 AKMA Service disable or withdrawn Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233643 AKMA service restriction in VPLMN Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233644 AKMA service restriction in VPLMN Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233679 Correction of step numbers in clause 6.2 of TS 33.535 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233680 Correction of step numbers in clause 6.2 of TS 33.535 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233681 Update the definition of AKMA context in TS 33.535 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233682 Update the definition of AKMA context in TS 33.535 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233833 Clarification on the description about AAnF China Telecom CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234222  
    S3‑234222 Clarification on the description about AAnF China Telecom CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233833
    S3‑233836 Clarification on the description about AAnF China Telecom CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234223  
    S3‑234223 Clarification on the description about AAnF China Telecom CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233836
    S3‑234109 Routing indicator update issue in the A-KID construction procedure Release 16 Xiaomi Communications CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234108 Routing indicator update issue in the A-KID construction procedure Release 17 (mirror) Xiaomi Communications CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234107 Routing indicator update issue in the A-KID construction procedure Release 18 (mirror) Xiaomi Communications CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.9.6 Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS                      
4.9.7 Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services S3‑233683 Clarification for MBSSF in MBS ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233684 Clarification for MBSSF in MBS ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233902 5MBS Annex W NOTE Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234229  
    S3‑234229 5MBS Annex W NOTE Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233902
    S3‑233916 5MBS Annex W NOTE Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234230  
    S3‑234230 5MBS Annex W NOTE Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233916
4.9.8 Security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT                      
4.9.9 Security Aspects of eNPN                      
4.9.10 Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC                      
4.9.11 Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems S3‑233863 Correcting some references in TS 33.256 Qualcomm Incorporated, China Mobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.9.12 All other maintenance topics (not listed above) S3‑233594 [33.434] Key Provisioning procedure Motorola Solutions, Samsung CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson wasn’t sure that the key management procedure was under scope of SA3, but of SA6. Motorola commented that it was in scope and that we should communicate this to SA6. This was taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑234161  
    S3‑234161 [33.434] Key Provisioning procedure Motorola Solutions, Samsung CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233594
    S3‑233647 Authentication result removal Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: what we are doing here is not aligned with CT4. We can ask them to remove their content so we can work appropriately this meeting.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233648 Authentication result removal Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233847 Authentication result removal Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233686 Correction on the Kamf derivation parameter ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233687 Correction on the Kamf derivation parameter ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233688 Correction on KAMF derivation function in 33.501 R18-mirror ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233720 Security handling in mobility from 5GS to EPS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesApple: we have evaluated this and we cannot agree on this one. We tried to solve this in the last meeting but it wasn't accepted. Qualcomm: what happens if we introduce 256-bit algoithms? Not convinced that this would work on UE implementations. The Chair asked if this was a field problem. Ericsson wasn’t convinced either and wanted more offline discussions.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233728 Update Area of interest in OAuth2.0 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: not ok with this principle. Nokia: this CR is relevant and could be useful. This was left open.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233788 CR to 33.122 CAPIF Vendor specific security methods Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung, AT&T CR Agreement Yes
YesAlternative in tdoc 4070. Ericsson didn’t agree with either option.Signalling is related to stage 3. Apple preferred tdoc 788 option. Huawei was fine with either option.
 		revised No S3‑234312  
    S3‑234312 CR to 33.122 CAPIF Vendor specific security methods Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung, AT&T CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233788
    S3‑234070 Alternative Cr 33.122 CAPIF Vendor specific security methods Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung, MITRE draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234311  
    S3‑234311 Alternative Cr 33.122 CAPIF Vendor specific security methods Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung, MITRE draftCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234070
    S3‑233808 NSSAA procedure update for multiple registration Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson, Nokia: proposed to note, no agreement. Ericsson: maybe discuss it in Rel-19.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233809 Clarification on AF authorization in clause 12.4 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesXiaomi didn’t agree with this CR. We don’t need this level of detail. Ericsson: we are fine but without so many details because this content is already somewhere else. Nokia: detailed information shouldn't go in the overall description, move it to another clause.
 		revised No S3‑234216  
    S3‑234216 Clarification on AF authorization in clause 12.4 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233809
    S3‑233810 Clarification of AF authorization in clause 12.4 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234217  
    S3‑234217 Clarification of AF authorization in clause 12.4 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233810
    S3‑233818 SERP-LS on security protection on RRCResumeRequest message Apple LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233819 SERP-Discussion paper on SERP feature summary Apple discussion Information Yes
YesQualcomm didn’t accept this. They asked if there was any exception sheet for this work. Ericsson: we agreed that we would choose option 1 and prepare a CR. Qualcomm: there was no agreement on the options. Huawei: we don’t agree with going towards to technical votes or working agreements on this topic. Nokia: our understanding is that there was an agreement on option 1. The Chair commented that this was a very long discussion about this. No consensus could be reached here and voting would resolve nothing.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234032 SERP CR to TS 33.501 on the Protection of the RRC Resume Request message Ericsson, Apple, Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesObjected by Qualcomm. It was noted that there were 11 supporters. The Chair stated that consensus needed to be reached and this may have to be discussed at SA Plenary. Huawei's preference was to try to reach consensus, although they supported the CR. They warned that if the plan was to get to a working agreement, they would withdraw their support. The Chair replied that since there were implications on other working groups he was reluctant to get to a working agreement. He asked the supporters to contribute directly to SA plenary with a discussion paper.Apple believed that the decision would be taken back to SA3.
 		revised No S3‑234314  
    S3‑234314 SERP CR to TS 33.501 on the Protection of the RRC Resume Request message Ericsson, Apple, Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesRevised to add more supporting companies.
 		not pursued No   S3‑234032
    S3‑233820 CR on Security vulnerability fix for use of AES-GCM and AES-GMAC in 33.203 Apple CR Approval Yes
YesPreferred by Huawei.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233937 Adding secure ESP algorithms Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia liked this proposal. Huawei didn’t agree with this. They commented that it wasn’t backwars compatible.Qualcomm agreed with Huawei.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233821 CR on 33501_s1n1_idlemode_mapped_ctxt Apple CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234162  
    S3‑234162 CR on 33501_s1n1_idlemode_mapped_ctxt Apple CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233821
    S3‑233830 CR on Security for selective SCG activation OPPO CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233871 Discussion on selective SCG procedures Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233872 Adding the selective SCG functionality Qualcomm Incorporated draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234008 CR on selective SCG activation Samsung CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233839 Correction of authorization between SEPP and network functions Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
YesNokia: the reference to the SA meeting is not correct. They added: don’t mandate these kind of changes in the SEPP. They didn’t agree with it. Ericsson clarified that it was merged and not agreed in SA-91-Bis, The reason for change is not correct. Vodafone: Authorization not part of the mutual authentication? This sentence is not in the appropriate place.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234274 Correction of authorization between SEPP and network functions Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233869 Discussion on protecting header information in UPU Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233870 Protection of UPU header Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: this is the last meeting in Rel-18, so if we don’t agree on this we will miss the window. Nokia: this is maintenance. The Chair commented that if the impact was minimal on CT groups, it could be done next meeting. Apple didn’t agree with this CR. Huawei commented that there was impact on the UE side, in stage 3. Nokia also wanted to treat this in the current meeting. The Chair commented that no backwards compatibility would be addressed in an agreed solution.
 		not pursued No   S3‑232551
    S3‑233873 IAB inter-CU topology adaptation and backhaul RLF recovery procedures Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
YesSamsung had an alternative proposal in 4014. Ericsson supported Qualcomm's CR. Nokia didn’t support this CR.
 		not pursued No   S3‑232564
    S3‑234014 [IAB][Rel-17] IAB inter-CU topology adaptation procedure Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234353  
    S3‑234353 [IAB][Rel-17] IAB inter-CU topology adaptation procedure Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234014
    S3‑234018 [IAB][Rel-18] IAB inter-CU topology adaptation procedure Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesIt introduces some changes w.r.t release 17.
 		revised No S3‑234354  
    S3‑234354 [IAB][Rel-18] IAB inter-CU topology adaptation procedure Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234018
    S3‑233887 Mobility procedure for Trusted Non-3GPP access Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233892 Handling of SoR/UPU Counter stored in NVM Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233893 Updating the FC values Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233894 Guidance on mitigating privacy risk of variable length NAI based SUPIs Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234315 Guidance on mitigating privacy risk of variable length NAI based SUPIs Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233918 Discussion of the Verification of the serving network name by the AUSF Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233919 Verification of the serving network name by the AUSF Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233920 Verification of the serving network name by the AUSF Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233921 Correction of NAI format for 5G NSWO Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234168  
    S3‑234168 Correction of NAI format for 5G NSWO Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233921
    S3‑233922 Correction of NAI format for 5G NSWO Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234169  
    S3‑234169 Correction of NAI format for 5G NSWO Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233922
    S3‑234116 Update NSWO procedure for NAI format Release 17 Xiaomi Communications CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234168  
    S3‑234117 NSWO procedure for NAI format Release 18 (mirror) Xiaomi Communications CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234169  
    S3‑233735 SN authentication for R17 NSWO Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234168  
    S3‑233956 Revised SID on enhancement of AKMA China Mobile SID revised Approval Yes
YesIt was clarified that the scope of the TR and the SID should be aligned.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233967 Security in 5G system location services to support user plane positioning Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: too late to do this in Rel-18 without SA1 and SA2 intervention. Huawei supported this, but suggested to use AKMA for the protection. Qualcomm: TLS mechanism to be used is out of scope. It was commented that a TEI18 code could be used since it was a small enhancement.
 		revised No S3‑234170  
    S3‑234170 Security in 5G system location services to support user plane positioning Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233967
    S3‑233974 Transport security for DNS Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: we agree that the annex is informative. Qualcomm: we don’t agree with the changes in annex P. MCC commented that using " recommended" was the same as saying "should" and that was normative language. If informative language was needed it was better to use the term "can". MCC clarified that the annex was changed to normative given that the content had normative language. So either this language was changed to make it informative or the annex should be made normative. Some companies wanted to make annex P normative when using EDGE. Huawei: EDGE can refer to P.2.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234171 Transport security for DNS Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233987 33.501 Rel-17 Correction: Reverting Annex P back to informative Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234172 33.501 Rel-17 Correction: Reverting Annex P back to informative Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233988 33.501 Rel-18 Correction: Reverting Annex P back to informative Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234021 Data collection and exposure to enable security monitoring Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Center for Internet Security, Cablelabs, Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, Charter Communications, Telefonica, Rakuten Mobile Inc CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: there was no conclusion in the study, so we cannot go forward with this. Related to 4017.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234042 Identification of Applications with URSP rules Lenovo, AT&T, Broadcom, CableLabs, CATT, Charter, China Mobile, China Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Intel, LG Electronics, Motorola Solutions MSI, NEC, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung, Verizon CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei,Google, Apple,Qualcomm objected to this CR. The Chair suggested to esacalate the discussion to Plenary.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233750 Security for Selective SCG Activation Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234191 Correction of UDM service naming BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233611
    S3‑234164 Security for Selective SCG Activation Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233641 ME Change issue correction Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234152 CR for TR33809 clean up Apple CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234163 S3‑233825
    S3‑234163 CR for TR33809 clean up Apple CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234152
    S3‑234330 LS to SA6 on SEAL key management provisioning procedure Motorola LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.10 ProSe Secondary Authentication S3‑233519 Reply LS on ProSe Secondary Authentication S2-2307743 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑233576 ProSe Secondary Authentication triggered by SMF during Relay PDU Session establishment InterDigital, Europe, Ltd., LG Electronics, China Telecom other Approval Yes
YesQualcomm, Ericsson: Rel-18 is done, we don’t have time for this if there is impact on SA2 procedures. PDU session establsihment is an SA2 procedure, we cannot decide anything here.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233577 ProSe Secondary Authentication for CP and UP InterDigital, Europe, Ltd., LG Electronics, China Telecom other Approval Yes
YesEricsson: the update of the WID was rejected in SA plenary, so why are we seeing this change here? Interdigital: technically there is no change in the procedure, it's just a clarification.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233578 Support for Prose Secondary Authentication InterDigital, LG Electronics, Samsung, ChinaTelecom, Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233579 [Draft] Reply LS on ProSe Secondary Authentication InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233760 Addressing Editor's Note on remote multiple Remote User ID Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233761 pCR on addressing the issue of refaining from sending data by the remote UE Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233768 pCR on addressing the issue of refaining from sending data by the remote UE Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
4.11 New WID on DTLS protocol profile for AKMA and GBA S3‑233689 Add AKMA Ua* protocol based on DTLS to TS 33.535 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.12 New WID on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture Phase 2 S3‑233599 Validation of the parameters sent by OAuth 2.0 client (NF Service Consumer) in the access token request. Oy LM Ericsson AB CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233941 Validation of the parameters sent by OAuth 2.0 client (NF Service Consumer) in the access token request. Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233942 Use of NF Instance ID in the mutual authentication between the NF Consumer and NRF Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234206  
    S3‑234206 Use of NF Instance ID in the mutual authentication between the NF Consumer and NRF Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233942
4.13 New WID on IETF OSCORE protocol profiles for GBA and AKMA S3‑234026 Living document for AKMA_GBA_OSCORE: draftCR to TS 33.220, IETF OSCORE as GBA Ua protocol Ericsson, THALES, Xiaomi draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234231  
    S3‑234231 Living document for AKMA_GBA_OSCORE: draftCR to TS 33.220, IETF OSCORE as GBA Ua protocol Ericsson, THALES, Xiaomi draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234026
    S3‑234328 IETF OSCORE as GBA Ua protocol Ericsson, THALES, Xiaomi CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234027 pCR to GBA OSCORE living doc: Clarifications Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234232  
    S3‑234232 pCR to GBA OSCORE living doc: Clarifications Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234027
    S3‑234028 IETF OSCORE as AKMA Ua* protocol Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234029 AKMA OSCORE Ua* protocol identifier Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.14 New WID on Security aspect of home network triggered primary authentication S3‑234030 Home Network triggered Primary authentication clarifications Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234227  
    S3‑234227 Home Network triggered Primary authentication clarifications Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234030
    S3‑233652 Resolving EN related to notification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑233675 Home network initiated authentication NEC CR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑233692 Address the EN for name of notification message between AMF and UDM ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑234031 LS on Nudm_UECM service operation updates Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233653 Resolving EN in HONTRA procedures Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑233699 Address the EN for handing 2 AMFs problem ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑234100 Discussion on the pending flag in the HONTRA procedure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234101 Remove the pending flag in the HONTRA procedure Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑234102 Update to the HONTRA procedure to remove the EN related to the pending flag Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑233693 Alligment stage 3 for SoR and UPU counter wrap ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233754 Update the potential trigger on SoRUPU case Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233868 Resolving AKMA EN in HONTRA procedures Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑234024 Resolving ENs in HONTRA Procedure Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑233691 Address the EN for AAnF factor ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑233930 EN resolving on signalling overload LG Electronics CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑233752 Link KAF refresh to KAKMA refresh Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234281  
    S3‑234281 Link KAF refresh to KAKMA refresh Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233752
    S3‑233690 Add GPSI to UDM service ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233910 A possible condition for deriving AKMA key via HONTRA ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233911 Addition of AAnF functionality ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234228  
    S3‑234228 Addition of AAnF functionality ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233911
    S3‑233912 Addition of UDM functionality ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233913 Update AKMA key lifetimes ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233914 Update AKMA related UDM services ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233694 Mobility for EPS to 5GC ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233695 Update the figure of HNA ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑233832 Resolving the AAnF EN for the HONTRA feature BUPT other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑233753 Delete EN on two AMF pending flags Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑233755 Update the Figure and description to align with the latest conclusion. Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑234099 Correction ot the HONTRA procedure triggered by the AAnF Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑233929 Correction of wrong reference clause number LG Electronics CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234227  
    S3‑233696 A possible condition for deriving AKMA key via HONTRA ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233697 Addition of AAnF functionality ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233698 Addition of UDM functionality ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233700 Update AKMA key lifetimes ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233701 Update AKMA related UDM services ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4.15 New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Policy Control Function (PCF)                      
4.16 New WID on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2 S3‑233649 AUN3 device supporting 5G key hierarchy procedure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234233  
    S3‑234233 AUN3 device supporting 5G key hierarchy procedure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233649
    S3‑233650 Correction in AUN3 device procedure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234234  
    S3‑233651 Correction in AUN3 device procedure for SMC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234234  
    S3‑234234 Correction in AUN3 device procedure for SMC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233651
    S3‑233671 AUSF sends back MSK to W-AGF after successful EAP authentication CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233757 Delete EN in caluse 7B.7 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234234  
    S3‑233758 CR on registration procedure of AUN3 device supporting 5G key hirerachy Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234233  
4.17 Proposed WID for UAS Phase 2 security S3‑233864 Living document for UAS draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234346 S3‑233425
    S3‑234346 Living document for UAS draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233864
    S3‑234347 Adding the security aspects of Rel-18 UAS features Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233582 Security and privacy for Direct C2 communications InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234208  
    S3‑234208 Security and privacy for Direct C2 communications InterDigital, Europe, Ltd., Huawei, Lenovo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233582
    S3‑233816 Direct C2 security for unicast Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234208  
    S3‑233866 Resolving the identity privacy EN Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233867 Resolving the UUAA EN Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
YesObjection from Lenovo.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234035 Updates to A2X Direct C2 Communication Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234210 Updates to A2X Direct C2 Communication Lenovo draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑234038 Updates to Direct Detect and Avoid Lenovo CR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: SA2 is responsible to define the IDs ,not SA3.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234209 Updates to Direct Detect and Avoid Lenovo draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233865 Some proposed changes to the Rel-18 draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234211  
    S3‑234211 Some proposed changes to the Rel-18 draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233865
4.18 New WID on Automated certicate management in SBA S3‑233654 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_General Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234235  
    S3‑234235 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_General Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233654
    S3‑233658 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Set up of initial trust Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon, Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234236  
    S3‑234236 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Set up of initial trust Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon, Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233658
    S3‑233664 Discussion paper on automated additions of root CAs certificates using CMP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233655 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_CMP profile_cleaning ENs Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234237  
    S3‑234237 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_CMP profile_cleaning ENs Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233655
    S3‑233730 Update to CMPv2 Profiling Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234237  
    S3‑233657 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Trusted NF Instance Id Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234238  
    S3‑234238 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Trusted NF Instance Id Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233657
    S3‑233656 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Validation of usage of X.509 certificate Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234239  
    S3‑234239 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Validation of usage of X.509 certificate Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233656
    S3‑233659 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Certificate revocation procedures Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233660 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Certificate Updates Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234240  
    S3‑234240 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Certificate Updates Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233660
    S3‑233766 certificate update of the NF Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234240  
    S3‑233661 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Lifecycle management Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234241  
    S3‑233767 NRF optimization for certificate lifecycle management Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234241  
    S3‑234241 NRF optimization for certificate lifecycle management Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233767
    S3‑233662 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_slicing Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234242  
    S3‑234242 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_slicing Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233662
    S3‑234006 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc: Best practice security for key management Ericsson other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234243  
    S3‑234243 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc: Best practice security for key management Ericsson other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234006
    S3‑233663 draftCR_living_doc_ACM_SBA Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234244  
    S3‑234244 draftCR_living_doc_ACM_SBA Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233663
    S3‑234313 Certificate Management for 5GC NFs Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.19 New WID on security enhancements for NGRTC S3‑233852 Living CR for RTC Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234247  
    S3‑234247 Living CR for RTC Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233852
    S3‑234033 Annex N additions for IMS data channels. Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234245 Annex N additions for IMS data channels. Ericsson other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑234034 IMS Data channel security updates Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234246  
    S3‑234246 IMS Data channel security updates Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234034
    S3‑234337 CR on security aspects of NG RTC Huawei CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.20 New WID on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC — phase 2 S3‑233985 Correction on GPSI verification Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234260 Correction on GPSI verification Ericsson other Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233986 More clarification on authentication of EEC by EES Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234001 [draftCR] Informative annex for details of authentication method Samsung draftCR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm: many mistakes (key names wrong) and I cannot see how this can be added. Samsung: these details are needed. Nokia: an informative annex is useful for the reader.We support this. Apple: this is not needed. Qualcomm: we agreed not to standardize any method, so we shouldn’t add any info on things we didn’t standardize.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233831 Add authentication method negotiation between EEC and ECS or EES OPPO other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234195  
    S3‑233984 EEC authentication and authentication method negotiation Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234256  
    S3‑234256 EEC authentication and authentication method negotiation Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233984
    S3‑234003 draftCR on ECS and EES authentication method indication Samsung, Lenovo, InterDigital, Intel, Thales, Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234195  
    S3‑234195 draftCR on ECS and EES authentication method indication Samsung, Lenovo, InterDigital, Intel, Thales, Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234003
    S3‑234112 Security method negotiation mechanism for EEC and ECSEES Xiaomi Communications draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234195  
    S3‑233840 Clarification on EES authorization Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233980 Token-based EES authorization Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233983 EEC provided IP address verification Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234004 draftCR for IP address verification on EES API exposure Samsung draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233977 Adressing security of Edge Node Sharing Ericsson other Approval Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with the contribution.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233841 Living CR of EDGE_Ph2 on TS 33.558 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234196  
    S3‑234196 Living CR of EDGE_Ph2 on TS 33.558 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233841
    S3‑233842 Living CR of EDGE_Ph2 on TS_33.501 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234197  
    S3‑234197 Living CR of EDGE_Ph2 on TS_33.501 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233842
    S3‑233845 CR of EDGE_Ph2 on TS 33.558 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234198  
    S3‑234198 Correction of NAI format for 5G NSWO Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233845
    S3‑233846 CR of EDGE_Ph2 on TS 33.501 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234199  
    S3‑234199 Security of EAS discovery procedure via V-EASDF in roaming Scenario Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233846
4.21 New WID on AKMA phase 2 S3‑234016 Clarification on Kaf refresh in AKMA OPPO CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234044 Clarification on Kaf refresh in AKMA OPPO CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234248  
    S3‑234248 Clarification on Kaf refresh in AKMA OPPO CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234044
4.22 New WID on security aspects of MSGin5G Ph2 S3‑233702 Add some context to 5GMSG on AKMA Ua star protocol ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.23 New WID on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation for 5G - phase 3 S3‑233950 living CR for eNA China Mobile draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234282  
    S3‑234282 living CR for eNA China Mobile draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233950
    S3‑234355 living CR for eNA China Mobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233853 Editorials changes of X.8 and X.9 China moble other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233946 Procedure for protection of analytics exchange in roaming case China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234283  
    S3‑234283 Procedure for protection of analytics exchange in roaming case China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233946
    S3‑233947 Updates on clause 13 for eNA analytics roaming China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234284  
    S3‑234284 Updates on clause 13 for eNA analytics roaming China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233947
    S3‑233945 Procedure for protection of data exchange in roaming case China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234285 Procedure for protection of data exchange in roaming case China Mobile other Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233948 Updates on clause 13 for eNA data roaming China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234284  
    S3‑233667 pCR on Living draft CR WID eNA_Ph3_FL_Authorization - diagram Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234286  
    S3‑234286 pCR on Living draft CR WID eNA_Ph3_FL_Authorization - diagram Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233667
    S3‑233666 pCR on Living draft CR WID eNA_Ph3_FL_Authorization Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234287  
    S3‑234287 pCR on Living draft CR WID eNA_Ph3_FL_Authorization Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233666
    S3‑233724 Update Service Area in FL Authorization Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234287  
    S3‑233925 Resolving Editor's Note on Authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234287  
    S3‑233896 Update to living CR for eNA-X.9 China Telecommunications draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233732 Clarification on authorization for FL and model sharing Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233665 pCR on Living draft CR WID eNA_Ph3_Key distribution EN Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233924 Resolving Editor's Note on key distribution Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233932 Key Distribution for Secure Model Sharing Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233923 Resolving Editor's Note on Interoperability indicator of model storage consumer Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233931 Authorization Mechanism for NWDAF and NF Service Consumer using Vendor ID Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233926 Authorization of Model Sharing with MTLF Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233727 Clarify the Allowed NF list and resolve EN in Model authorizaion procedure Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234288  
    S3‑234288 Clarify the Allowed NF list and resolve EN in Model authorizaion procedure Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233727
    S3‑233951 Security for AIML model storage and sharing China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234289  
    S3‑234289 Security for AIML model storage and sharing China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233951
    S3‑233725 Discussion paper on protection of DataSetTag Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233726 Procedure for secured and authorized AI/ML model data sharing Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
4.24 New WID on Security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2 S3‑233733 Security for NSWO support in SNPN Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234275  
    S3‑233734 Discussion for security issue for NSWO Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
YesEricsson didn’t support this. Cable Labs supported this contribution. Nokia: we need more time to figure out if there is a problem.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233927 NSWO support in SNPN without CH and with CH using AUSF/UDM Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234275  
    S3‑234275 NSWO support in SNPN without CH and with CH using AUSF/UDM Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233927
    S3‑234113 Discussion on decorated NAI issue for NSWO in SNPN scenarios Xiaomi Communications discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234114 Update living doc for NAI format of NSWO in SNPN scenarios Xiaomi Communications other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234275  
    S3‑233669 NSWO support in SNPN using CH with AAA server CableLabs, Charter Communications CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234290  
    S3‑234290 NSWO support in SNPN using CH with AAA server CableLabs, Charter Communications CR Agreement Yes
YesIt was agreed to attach this CR to the LS in 4291 and bring it back next meeting.
 		not pursued No   S3‑233669
    S3‑233670 LS on NSWO support in SNPN using CH AAA server CableLabs LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234291  
    S3‑234291 LS on NSWO support in SNPN using CH AAA server CableLabs LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233670
    S3‑233756 Security for access to SNPN services via Trusted non-3GPP access Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234292  
    S3‑233969 Resolution of editor notes related to the temporary identifier used during trusted non-3GPP access. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234292  
    S3‑234292 Resolution of editor notes related to the temporary identifier used during trusted non-3GPP access. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233969
    S3‑233928 Authentication method selection and clause structure for non-3GPP access support in SNPN Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234293  
    S3‑233970 Resolution of editor notes related to selection of authentication method. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234293  
    S3‑234293 Resolution of editor notes related to selection of authentication method. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233970
    S3‑234115 Resolve ENs related to authentication method selection in SNPN scenarios Xiaomi Communications CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234293  
    S3‑233685 Correction on Support for N5CW devices in SNPN with CH ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.25 New WID on Security Aspects of Proximity-based Services in 5GS Phase 2 S3‑234055 Living document for 5G_ProSe_Ph2 CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234251  
    S3‑234251 Living document for 5G_ProSe_Ph2 CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234055
    S3‑234331 Living document for 5G_ProSe_Ph2 CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233704 Update clause 6.6.4 ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234252  
    S3‑234252 Update clause 6.6.4 ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233704
    S3‑233748 Correction about the clause of L2 UE-to-UE relay Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234252  
    S3‑233905 Cleanup ENs of emergency support in the 5G_ProSe_Ph2 living doc Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233580 Identity privacy for L3 U2U Relay InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234335  
    S3‑234335 Identity privacy for L3 U2U Relay InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233580
    S3‑233586 4.25 - Update to 5G ProSe UE-to-UE Discovery Model A - small correction Philips International B.V. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234253  
    S3‑234253 4.25 - Update to 5G ProSe UE-to-UE Discovery Model A - small correction Philips International B.V. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233586
    S3‑233587 4.25 - Update to 5G ProSe UE-to-UE Discovery Model B - small correction Philips International B.V. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234254  
    S3‑234254 4.25 - Update to 5G ProSe UE-to-UE Discovery Model B - small correction Philips International B.V. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233587
    S3‑234105 Update to the UE-to-UE Relay Discvoery with Model A procedure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234255  
    S3‑234255 Update to the UE-to-UE Relay Discvoery with Model A procedure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234105
    S3‑233585 4.25 - Update to 5G ProSe UE-to-UE Discovery Model A - VT Philips International B.V. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234339  
    S3‑234059 Update security procedure of U2U relay discovery Model A CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234339  
    S3‑233875 Updating security procedure for U2U relay discovery with model A in ProSe draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
YesCATT didn’t find this acceptable. Interdigital didn’t agree with the proposals in 585, 059 and 875.
 		revised No S3‑234339  
    S3‑234339 Updating security procedure for U2U relay discovery with model A in ProSe draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233875
    S3‑233876 Updating security procedure for U2U relay discovery with model B in ProSe draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
YesXiaomi proposed to add some more text in step 0.
 		revised No S3‑234340  
    S3‑234340 Updating security procedure for U2U relay discovery with model B in ProSe draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233876
    S3‑233880 Update general clause of U2U Relay discovery security in ProSe draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑234036 Update to the security procedure for U2U Relay Discovery with Model A in ProSe living doc Samsung other Approval Yes
YesQualxomm and CATT didn’t agree with this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234064 Detailed protection information of U2U relay discovery CATT draftCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: we need some clarifications from CT1 group, but we are fine with the changes. Interdigital: this is redundant. The protection mechanism is already specified. CATT agreed to keep only the first change.
 		revised No S3‑234257  
    S3‑234257 Detailed protection information of U2U relay discovery CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234064
    S3‑233906 Resolve ENs of security with network assistance in the 5G_ProSe_Ph2 living doc Ericsson, China Telecom other Approval Yes
YesNot agreeable by Interdigital.
 		revised No S3‑234341  
    S3‑234341 Resolve ENs of security with network assistance in the 5G_ProSe_Ph2 living doc Ericsson, China Telecom other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233906
    S3‑234103 Update to the security procedure for UE-to-UE Relay communication with network assistance Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software other Approval Yes
YesInterdigital disagreed with the contribution.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234104 Update to the security procedure for UE-to-UE Relay communication without network assistance Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software other Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: not fine with the second bullet.
 		revised No S3‑234258  
    S3‑234258 Update to the security procedure for UE-to-UE Relay communication without network assistance Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234104
    S3‑233584 4.25 - 5G ProSe UE-to-UE Selection of security mechanism Philips International B.V. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233674 Selection methods between mechanisms with or without network assistance China Telecom Corporation Ltd.,Huawei, HiSilicon, Interdigital, Philips, Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234259  
    S3‑234259 Selection methods between mechanisms with or without network assistance China Telecom Corporation Ltd.,Huawei, HiSilicon, Interdigital, Philips, Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233674
    S3‑233703 Update clause 6.6.3.3 to 5G_ProSe_Ph2 living doc ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233877 Updating selection mechanisms in ProSe draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234259  
    S3‑234058 Selection between establishing PC5 security with or without network assistance CATT draftCR Approval Yes
YesCATT presented this as opposed to the contribution in 584. They argued that this had better chance to be implemented in the field, to be near the application layer,rather than the current work in 584. The Chair advised CATT to work together with the rest of the companies in contribution 584.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233581 Identity privacy for L2 U2U Relay InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234336  
    S3‑234336 Identity privacy for L2 U2U Relay InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233581
    S3‑233881 Adding a description for privacy of identities during layer-2 U2U relay reselection Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233588 4.25 - Integrated discovery Philips International B.V. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233744 Security of UE-to-UE Relay with integrated discovery Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233747 Security mechanism selection in integrated discovery of UE-to-UE Relay Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233878 Adding integrated discovery security Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233907 Security of 5G ProSe PC5 Communication with integrated discovery for 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-UE Relay with network assistance Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234057 Security for integrated U2U relay discovery CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234106 Security for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE Relay communication with integrated Discovery Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software other Approval Yes
YesXiaomi: No protection for discovery in V2X. Either we have protection or not. Huawei: fine with no protection. CATT: we defined security for discovery in our solution but people didn’t want to go this way. There were seven proposals in total, but whether to go for V2X or network-assisted needed to be agreed.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234019 Security Policy Handling in U2U Relay OPPO, Xidian other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234062 Hop-by-hop security policy CATT draftCR Approval Yes
YesOPPO: not implied anywhere that hop by hop security is mandatory. Qualcomm: hop by hop is already specified. They didn’t agree with this proposal. The Chair commented that although no mentioned the link was protected. OPPO: but this protection is not mandatory.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233749 Clarification about selection of security mechanisms in path switching for U2N relay Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234276  
    S3‑234276 Clarification about selection of security mechanisms in path switching for U2N relay Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233749
    S3‑234039 Update to clause 4.2 in ProSe living doc Samsung other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑234043 Update to clause 7 in ProSe living doc Samsung other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234261  
    S3‑234261 Update to clause 7 in ProSe living doc Samsung other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234043
    S3‑234127 Update to clause 5.2.5.2 in ProSe living doc Samsung other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234041
    S3‑233848 Clarification on the authorization of UE Relay Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesQualcomm didn’t agree with this. It was never discussed during the study and this is the last meeting for Prose. No time to consider this. CATT agreed with Qualcomm. Philips supported this as well. Huawei: not a big issue that can be solved now.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233849 Clarification about selection of U2N relay Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233850 Clarification about Layer-2 link modification Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234041 Update to clause 5.2.5.2 in ProSe living doc Samsung other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234127  
4.26 New WID on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning S3‑233705 pCR to 33.533 Update clause 3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234262  
    S3‑234073 33.533: Terms and Abbreviations Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234262  
    S3‑234262 33.533: Terms and Abbreviations Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234073
    S3‑233706 pCR to 33.533 Update clause 4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234264  
    S3‑234074 33.533: Functional Entity of SLPKMF Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234264  
    S3‑234264 33.533: Functional Entity of SLPKMF Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234074
    S3‑234075 33.533: Update of Reference Points Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234342  
    S3‑234342 33.533: Update of Reference Points Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234075
    S3‑234076 33.533: Common Security Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234343  
    S3‑234343 33.533: Common Security Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234076
    S3‑233883 Adding discovery security procedures for V2X capable UEs Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234265  
    S3‑234265 Adding discovery security procedures for V2X capable UEs Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233883
    S3‑233884 Updates on discovery procedures Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233915 Add Discovery Security Procedure for V2X Capable UEs Guangdong OPPO Mobile Telecom. other Agreement Yes
YesIt was queried whether the editor's note could be kept, MCC replied that a new WID would be needed to address it since the current WID had to be finished It was agreed to state that DCR was left unprotected. It wasn’t possible to do it as maintenance.
 		merged No S3‑234265  
    S3‑234077 33.533: Protection of Integrated Discovery for V2X UE Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233719 Authorization for UE role in ranging Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234266  
    S3‑234078 33.533: Procedure of UE Role Authorization Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson, Qualcomm: remove the V2X part.
 		revised No S3‑234266  
    S3‑234266 33.533: Procedure of UE Role Authorization Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234356 S3‑234078
    S3‑234356 33.533: Procedure of UE Role Authorization Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234266
    S3‑233722 Removal of the editor’s note on MT-LR procedure Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234344  
    S3‑234344 Removal of the editor’s note on MT-LR procedure Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233722
    S3‑233723 Authorization of AF or 5GC NF for UEs belonging to several PLMNs Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234268  
    S3‑234092 33.533: update to the procedure for authorization of AF/5GCNF for Ranging/SL Positioning service exposure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234268 33.533: update to the procedure for authorization of AF/5GCNF for Ranging/SL Positioning service exposure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234093 33.533: remove the EN related to the privacy profile Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
YesEricssonL these changes should be handled in SA2. Philips had a similar thought. Xiaomi: SA2 didn’t define a privacy profile, so we have to define it. Philips agreed that it needed to be added. The Chair proposed to agree in SA3 and send an LS to SA2.
 		revised No S3‑234269  
    S3‑234269 33.533: remove the EN related to the privacy profile Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234093
    S3‑233718 Authorization for the SL Positioning Client UE Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234345  
    S3‑234345 Authorization for the SL Positioning Client UE Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233718
    S3‑233943 4.26 - Authorization of UEs for Ranging-SL Positioning service exposure Philips International B.V. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234345  
    S3‑234081 33.533: Client UE Authorization for Service Exposure via PC5 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234345  
    S3‑234082 33.533: Client UE Authorization for Service Exposure via 5GC User Plane Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: we plan to propose to remove the whole user plane solution in the next SA2 meeting.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234083 33.533: Client UE Authorization for Service Exposure via 5GC Control Plane Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234345  
    S3‑233589 4.26 - Privacy protection of sharing location of Located UE with Target UE Philips International B.V. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234271  
    S3‑234084 33.533: Procedure of Privacy Verification for UE-only Operation Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234271  
    S3‑234271 33.533: Procedure of Privacy Verification for UE-only Operation Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234084
    S3‑234085 33.533: Security Procedure for Unicast Communication without Long-term Credential Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234272  
    S3‑234272 33.533: Security Procedure for Unicast Communication without Long-term Credential Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234085
    S3‑233707 pCR to 33.533 Update clause 6.4.4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234273  
    S3‑234079 33.533: Security for Communication between the UE and LMF Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234273  
    S3‑234273 33.533: Security for Communication between the UE and LMF Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234079
    S3‑234080 33.533: Requriement for UE Authorization during Communication Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234357  
    S3‑234357 33.533: Requriement for UE Authorization during Communication Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234080
    S3‑233590 4.26 - Secure broadcast/groupcast of ranging information Philips International B.V. other Approval Yes
YesProcedures merged into 4279.
 		merged No S3‑234278  
    S3‑233834 Secuity requirement for groupcast and broadcat communication OPPO other Agreement Yes
YesProcedures into 4279.
 		revised No S3‑234278  
    S3‑234278 Secuity requirement for groupcast and broadcat communication OPPO other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233834
    S3‑234086 33.533: Security Requriements and Key Hierarchy for SLPP Signalling Broadcast and Groupcast Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
YesOnly requirement part is merged.
 		merged No S3‑234278  
    S3‑233835 Add security procedures for groupcast communication OPPO other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234279  
    S3‑233882 Adding one-to-many communication security in SL positioning draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
YesRequirement part will go to 4278.
 		revised No S3‑234279  
    S3‑234279 Adding one-to-many communication security in SL positioning draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233882
    S3‑234065 PCR to TS33.533-Security for broadcast and groupcast communication CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesProcedures into 4279.
 		merged No S3‑234278  
    S3‑234087 33.533: Security Procedure for SLPP Signalling Groupcast involving the Network Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234279  
    S3‑234088 33.533: Security Procedure for SLPP Signalling Groupcast without involving the Network Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234279  
    S3‑234094 33.533: Security related services Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234358  
    S3‑234358 33.533: Security related services Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234094
    S3‑233897 Add Discovery Security Procedure for V2X Capable UEs Guangdong OPPO Mobile Telecom. pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234263 Draft TS 33.533 Xiaomi draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑234270 LS on privacy profile Xiaomi LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑234359 Cover sheet TS 33.533 Xiaomi TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.27 New WID on enhanced security aspects of SEAL for vertical                      
4.28 New WID on application enablement aspects for subscriber-aware northbound API access S3‑234129 pCR to draft CR on SNAAPPY - editorials NTT DOCOMO INC. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234297  
    S3‑234297 pCR to draft CR on SNAAPPY - editorials NTT DOCOMO INC. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234129
    S3‑234046 pCR to living document of RNAA: updates to clause 5 Samsung other Agreement Yes
YesClause 5.1 is merged into S3-234297.
 		merged No S3‑234298  
    S3‑233790 pCR to DraftCR SNAAPPY Functional security models for CAPIF supporting RNAA Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233972 pCR to DraftCR SNAAPPY: Definition of device Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233736 API invoker obtaining authorization from resource owner Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234298  
    S3‑233791 pCR to DraftCR SNAAPPY API invoker is part of UE Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234298  
    S3‑233976 pCR to SNAAPPY CR baseline living document Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234298  
    S3‑234049 Authentication and authorization using OAuth including redirection Samsung other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234298  
    S3‑234121 Authorization code grant with PKCE for the RNAA scenarios Xiaomi Communications other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234298  
    S3‑234123 Client credentials grant type for the RNAA scenarios Xiaomi Communications other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234298  
    S3‑234125 Authorization code flow for the RNAA scenarios Xiaomi Communications other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234298  
    S3‑234130 pCR to draft CR on SNAAPPY - adding oauth flows NTT DOCOMO INC. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234298  
    S3‑234298 pCR to draft CR on SNAAPPY - adding oauth flows NTT DOCOMO INC. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234130
    S3‑234120 Update the general procedure to address the redundant authorization issue Xiaomi Communications other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234298  
    S3‑234126 Update to Clause 6.5 for clarification on claims Lenovo draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234298  
    S3‑234051 Add a new annex on token for RNAA Samsung other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234298  
    S3‑234118 Update token and token request for the RNAA scenarios Xiaomi Communications other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234298  
    S3‑234122 API invoker onboarding mechainsm for RNAA scenarios Xiaomi Communications other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234124 Update onboarding and authorization mechanism selection procedure to support RNAA scenarios Xiaomi Communications other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234298  
    S3‑233737 Revocation procedures invoked by API invoker Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233789 pCR to DraftCR SNAAPPY Security requirements on CAPIF-8 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: we don’t agree, there are reference points that are outside oiur scope.
 		revised No S3‑234299  
    S3‑234299 pCR to DraftCR SNAAPPY Security requirements on CAPIF-8 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233789
    S3‑233738 Revocation procedure invoked by resource owner client Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234053 pCR to living document RNAA: revocation Samsung other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234119 API invoker authorization revocation for RNAA scenarios Xiaomi Communications other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234128 baseline SNAAPPY draft CR to 33.122 NTT DOCOMO INC. draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234300  
    S3‑234300 baseline SNAAPPY draft CR to 33.122 NTT DOCOMO INC. draftCR - Yes
Yes
 		revised No   S3‑234128
    S3‑234360 CR on security for resource owner aware northbound access to APIs NTT DOCOMO INC. CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.29 New WID for Security aspects on User Consent for 3GPP services Phase 2 S3‑233731 User consent parameters extension based on user cosent for roaming requirements Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234294 User consent parameters extension based on user cosent for roaming requirements Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4.30 New WID on security enhancements for MBS Phase 2 S3‑233717 Security protection for resource sharing across broadcast MBS Sessions during network sharing Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234295  
    S3‑233874 Security handling in network sharing scenario Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234295  
    S3‑234295 Security handling in network sharing scenario Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233874
    S3‑234010 Security protection for resource sharing across broadcast MBS Sessions during network sharing Samsung CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234295  
4.31 New WID for security of SEAL Data Delivery enabler                      
5 Rel-18 Studies                      
5.1 Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations                      
5.2 Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation S3‑233564 pCR to TR33.848 - Editorial corrections Vodafone GmbH pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232872
    S3‑233565 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #1 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234177 S3‑232875
    S3‑234177 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #1 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233565
    S3‑233566 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #2 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234178 S3‑232876
    S3‑234178 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #2 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233566
    S3‑233567 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #3 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234179 S3‑232877
    S3‑234179 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #3 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233567
    S3‑233568 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #4 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234180 S3‑232880
    S3‑234180 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #4 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233568
    S3‑233569 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #5 Vodafone GmbH pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234249 S3‑232882
    S3‑234249 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #5 Vodafone GmbH pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233569
    S3‑233570 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #6 Vodafone GmbH pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232884
    S3‑233571 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #7 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232912
    S3‑233572 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #8 Vodafone GmbH pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234183 S3‑232913
    S3‑234183 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #8 Vodafone GmbH pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233572
    S3‑233573 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of Conclusions and Recommendations Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234184 S3‑232915
    S3‑234184 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of Conclusions and Recommendations Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233573
    S3‑233574 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of Appendix - Potential contents page for an Attestation TR Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232944
    S3‑233575 Cover Sheet for TR 33.848 - For Information and Approval Vodafone España SA TS or TR cover Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233617 Addition of evaluation for Solution #4 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234180  
    S3‑233618 Addition of evaluation for Solution #6 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234181  
    S3‑234181 Addition of evaluation for Solution #6 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233618
    S3‑233619 Conclusion for KI#6 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233620 Conclusion for KI#9 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234184  
    S3‑233621 Conclusion for KI#13 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233739 Recommendations for SIV Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesMCC recommended to reword the second paragraph to state what was missing technically and what needed to be done in the future from the technical point of view.
 		merged No S3‑234184  
    S3‑234185 Recommendations for SIV Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234071 Discussion on way forward for Virtualization Study Vodafone España SA discussion Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234072 pCR to TR33.848 - resolution of editors note in clause 6.2.2.4 Vodafone España SA pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234182 Draft TR 33.848 Vodafone draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.3 Study on Security Aspects of Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 2                      
5.4 Study on privacy of identifiers over radio access S3‑233939 KI #1 – Further Conclusions Ericsson, Interdigital, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Convida Wireless, Verizon Wireless, Johns Hopkins University APL, Philips, MITRE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234069 Conclusion for Key Issue #1 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233895 Deletion of EN in KI#1 Conclusion Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233938 Concealing the length of SUPIs in SUCIs by padding the SUPIs (consolidated from Sol #2, 5, and 9) Ericsson, Interdigital, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234040 Update to Solution #1 in ID Privacy Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233962 EN Removal for sol#4 33.870 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233963 Evaluation for sol#4 33.870 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233828 Supplement to Solution #7 China Telecommunications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233886 Proposed conclusion to KI#2- Protecting the privacy of high priority users Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232585
    S3‑233804 Updates to Solution 11 in ID Privacy Johns Hopkins University APL, Qualcomm Incorporated, InterDigital, Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: some feedback is needed from RAN2, we are not addressing the key issue here. Huawei: we are not causing any impact on the RAN, this is only on the UE. Ericsson: we need an LS depending on the conclusion for RAN2 and CT1.
 		revised No S3‑234186  
    S3‑234186 Updates to Solution 11 in ID Privacy Johns Hopkins University APL, Qualcomm Incorporated, InterDigital, Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233804
    S3‑233935 Evaluation of Solution #11 Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234250  
    S3‑233973 LS on evaluation of solution#11 efficacy and accuracy to protect privacy of high priority users Ericsson LS out   Yes
YesPeraton Labs: this impacts the MPS functionality.
 		revised No S3‑234187  
    S3‑234187 LS on evaluation of solution#11 efficacy and accuracy to protect privacy of high priority users Ericsson LS out - Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑233973
    S3‑233885 Evaluation of Solution 11 - Protecting the privacy of high priority users Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234250 S3‑232583
    S3‑233600 Evaluation of Solution #11 in ID Privacy Peraton Labs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234250  
    S3‑234250 Evaluation of Solution #11 in ID Privacy Peraton Labs pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes   S3‑233600
    S3‑233729 On the claims against solution#11 Huawei, HiSilicon, Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233933 Solution 12: Delete Privacy EN Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234189  
    S3‑233803 Add Evaluation to Sol 12 in ID Privacy Johns Hopkins University APL, InterDigital, Qualcomm IncorporatedAdd Evaluation to Solution #12 pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234189  
    S3‑234189 Add Evaluation to Sol 12 in ID Privacy Johns Hopkins University APL, InterDigital, Qualcomm IncorporatedAdd Evaluation to Solution #12 pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233803
    S3‑233966 New Solution to KI #2 Ericsson pCR   Yes
YesIntel,Qualcomm: remove evaluation. Qualcomm: inactive mode is an optional feature and may not be implemented.
 		revised No S3‑234188  
    S3‑234188 New Solution to KI #2 Ericsson pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233966
    S3‑234190 Draft TR 33.870 Interdigital draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.5 Study on Standardising Automated Certificate Management in SBA                      
5.6 New SID on AKMA phase 2                      
5.7 Study of Security aspect of home network triggered primary authentication                      
5.8 Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation for 5G – phase 3                      
5.9 Study on Security Enhancement of support for Edge Computing — phase 2 S3‑233772 Resolving EN of Conclusion of KI#1.2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: convert the editor's note into a note.
 		revised No S3‑234192  
    S3‑234192 Resolving EN of Conclusion of KI#1.2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233772
    S3‑233629 Adding conclusions for KI#2.6 InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233979 Update conclusion on authorization between EESes Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233626 Adding evaluation for Sol#26 InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233837 Resolving EN of Conclusion of KI#2.6 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234320  
    S3‑234320 Resolving EN of Conclusion of KI#2.6 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233837
    S3‑233838 pCR on addressing Sol#27 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233978 Resolving EN in solution #27 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234194 Resolving EN in solution #27 Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233628 Adding conclusions for KI#2.7 InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234321  
    S3‑233771 Coclusions for KI#2.7 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234321  
    S3‑234321 Coclusions for KI#2.7 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233771
    S3‑233982 Conclusion for EEC provided IP address verification Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234321  
    S3‑233999 Conclusion for key issue#2.7 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234321  
    S3‑234110 Add conclusion to KI#2.7 in TR 33.739 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234321  
    S3‑233627 Comparative evaluation of KI#2.7 solutions InterDigital Belgium. LLC discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233769 Addition of solution 30 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233770 Discussion on the solutions for KI#2.7 Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233981 Resolving ENs in solution #28 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234322  
    S3‑234322 Resolving ENs in solution #28 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233981
    S3‑233990 Updates to evaluation of solution#28 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233991 Evaluation of solution#29 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233992 Evaluation of solution#30 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233993 Evaluation of solution#31 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233996 Evaluation of solution#33 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233997 Evaluation of solution#34 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234060 Evaluation of solution#32 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑233994
    S3‑234111 Add evaluation to sol #32 in TR 33.739 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233843 TR 33.739 EN Cleanup Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234323  
    S3‑234323 TR 33.739 EN Cleanup Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233843
    S3‑233844 Cover sheet TR 33.739 Huawei, HiSilicon TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234324  
    S3‑234324 Cover sheet TR 33.739 Huawei, HiSilicon TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233844
    S3‑233994 Evaluation of solution#32 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234060  
    S3‑234193 Draft TR 33.739 Huawei draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.10 Study on Personal IoT Networks Security Aspects                      
5.11 Study on SNAAPP security                      
5.12 Study on enhanced security for network slicing Phase 3                      
5.13 Study on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2                      
5.14 Study on the security aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) for the NG-RAN                      
5.15 Study on security support for Next Generation Real Time Communication services                      
5.16 Study on security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2                      
5.17 Study on Security of Phase 2 for UAS, UAV and UAM                      
5.18 Study to enable URSP rules to securely identify Applications S3‑234037 Conclusion for KI#1 Lenovo, AT&T, Broadcom, CableLabs, CATT, Charter, China Mobile, China Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Intel, LG Electronics, Motorola Solutions MSI, NEC, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung, Verizon, Xiaomi pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234316  
    S3‑234316 Conclusion for KI#1 Lenovo, AT&T, Broadcom, CableLabs, CATT, Charter, China Mobile, China Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Intel, LG Electronics, Motorola Solutions MSI, NEC, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung, Verizon, Xiaomi pCR Approval Yes
YesApple: if there is no conclusion in the TR, why are we bringing a CR? It was clarified that the CR was independent from the TR.
 		approved No   S3‑234037
    S3‑233890 pCR: Conclusion for TR 33.892 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233815 conclusions to KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233889 pCR: Evalution of Solution #1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233814 Evaluatoin to Sol#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233813 Solution to KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234048 TR 33.892 cover Lenovo TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234361  
    S3‑234361 TR 33.892 cover Lenovo TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234048
    S3‑234317 Draft TR 33.892 Lenovo draft TR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.19 Study on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning                      
5.20 Study on Security and Privacy of AI/ML-based Services and Applications in 5G                      
5.21 Study on applicability of the Zero Trust Security principles in mobile networks S3‑234000 Data collection for Security Monitoring Lenovo, Charter Communications, US National Security Agency, Telefonica, Rakuten Mobile, Center for Internet Security, Cablelabs, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234200  
    S3‑234200 Data collection for Security Monitoring Lenovo, Charter Communications, US National Security Agency, Telefonica, Rakuten Mobile, Center for Internet Security, Cablelabs, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell is also a co-source of the contribution.
 		approved No   S3‑234000
    S3‑234002 Conclusion to KI#1 Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Telefonica, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Rakuten Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234201  
    S3‑234201 Conclusion to KI#1 Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Telefonica, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Rakuten Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234002
    S3‑233776 Addition of tenet 4 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234202  
    S3‑234202 Addition of tenet 4 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233776
    S3‑233777 Completion of tenet 6 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234203  
    S3‑234203 Completion of tenet 6 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233777
    S3‑234007 Update to Tenet #7 Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Telefonica pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234204  
    S3‑234204 Update to Tenet #7 Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Telefonica pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234007
    S3‑233778 Completion of tenet 7 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234204  
    S3‑233783 Add Tenets to Tenet Evaluation Summary Johns Hopkins University APL, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234224  
    S3‑234224 Add Tenets to Tenet Evaluation Summary Johns Hopkins University APL, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233783
    S3‑234015 Add dynamic access control to 6.X China Moble pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233673 SBA Zero Trust Access Control via NRF and SCP/NF MITRE Corporation, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234005 TR 33.894 Cleanup Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234205  
    S3‑234205 TR 33.894 Cleanup Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234005
    S3‑234009 Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG: TR 33.894 Lenovo TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234348  
    S3‑234348 Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG: TR 33.894 Lenovo TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234009
    S3‑233633 Add key issue for dynamic access control CMDI pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234318 Draft TR 33.894 Lenovo draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.22 Study of Security aspects on User Consent for 3GPP Services Phase 2                      
5.23 Study on security enhancements for 5G multicast-broadcast services Phase 2                      
5.24 Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture                      
5.25 Study on Security Aspects of Satellite Access                      
5.26 All TR Clean up, Coorections etc S3‑233825 CR for TR33809 clean up Apple CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234152  
    S3‑233917 Addressing comments from EditHelp Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233797 Editorial cleanups Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234304  
    S3‑234304 Editorial cleanups Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233797
    S3‑233798 Scope alignment with key issues addressed Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233799 Clarifications on deployment options Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233800 Key issue 11 editorial updates Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233801 Alignment of key issue 12 with GSMA input Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233802 Evaluation clarification to solution for access tokens for NFc Sets Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233805 TR33.886 clean-up Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233944 Clean up for 33.738 China Mobile CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233954 Cleanup of 33737 China Mobile CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234301  
    S3‑234301 Cleanup of 33737 China Mobile CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233954
    S3‑233968 Clean up of TR 33.738 China Mobile CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234302  
    S3‑234302 Clean up of TR 33.738 China Mobile CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233968
    S3‑234047 Clean Up for TR 33.740 CATT other Approval Yes
YesMCC: this should be a CR.
 		revised No    
    S3‑234303 Clean Up for TR 33.740 CATT CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
6 New Study/Work item proposals S3‑233537 Study of ACME for Automated Certificate Management in SBA Cisco Systems, Google, Mavenir, CableLabs, Charter Communications, AT&T, Microsoft, TELUS, DISH Network, Deutsche Telekom SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233547 Discussion on SCAS for UDR Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233548 New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR) BSI (DE) WID new Approval Yes
YesGSMA: UDR came out in ENISA's as one of the key network functons. Alex added that we should focus on covering the logical function, dangeorus to stay on the standalone verrsion only. It was pointed out that the dates were too short. MCC commented that an SA2 spec was listed as impacted specification, which is wrong.
 		revised No S3‑234332 S3‑232413
    S3‑234332 New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR) BSI (DE) WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233548
    S3‑233551 Discussion on Security for NTN Store and Forward Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233552 New SID on Security for NTN Store and Forward Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233595 New WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 19 Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233602 New SID on study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256 bits KDDI Corporation SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233672  
    S3‑233608 New SID on Privacy aspects of management data collection and sharing Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233612 Study on security enhancement for mobility over non-3GPP access Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs, Charter Communications, Broadcom, Lenovo, Xiaomi, ChinaMobile, Google, ZTE, Apple Keysight Technologies, LGE, Rogers Communications, Philips International B.V. SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233631 Discussion on Rel-19 WG Chair discussion Discussion Yes
YesVodafone: are we limited to the SA2 topics? The Chair commented that other groups like SA6 would dump topics on SA3 as well. These topics would be decided in Plenary in December. Vodafone: we can say that a number of slots are already taken and define how many we have left. The Chair commented that it would be needed to define how much time SA3 would dedicate to other topics and how much SA3 would need for security topics from other groups, otherwise it would get out of control like with the Prose authentication work. Huawei: hard to know how long time we dedicate to a study. We can propose a time budget and if this is reached, a re-evaluation would be needed. Ericsson: the company that provides the rapporteur needs to make sure that they are prepared for the job. Huawei: it is not expected that 3GPP will train the new rapporteur.Enforce the timelines that appear in the WID template.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233632 Discussion paper on Security and Privacy Aspects of Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI) IIT Delhi discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233668 Study on Security aspects of Dual NR Registration Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233672 New SID on study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256 bits KDDI Corporation SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑233602
    S3‑233708 Discussion on new SID on dual 3GPP access security ZTE Corporation discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233709 New SID on dual 3GPP access security ZTE Corporation SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233710 Discussion paper on application login via IMS China Telecom Corporation Ltd. discussion   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233711 New SID on application login via IMS China Telecom Corporation Ltd. SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233712 New WID on Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234334  
    S3‑234334 New WID on Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID new Agreement Yes
YesVodafone clarified that only redacted versions could be made public whereas the unredacted versions would be sent to ETSI for registration with French authorities. Ericsson: having identifiers in TS 33.501 may confuse the implementers. Huawei: say which clauses will be impacted in TS 33.501.Apple preferred not to have any impact on TS 33.501. Huawei: AID mode is not here, not addressed by SAGE. Qualcomm: that's not for now, we just want the simple specs, very clean and clear. SA3 Chair: AID mode can be part of the SID.
 		agreed No   S3‑233712
    S3‑233714 Discussion on Security Enhancement for Ambient IOT Service Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233715 New SID on Security Enhancement for Ambient IOT Service Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233716 Discussion on Security Enhancement for NEF service Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233740 Discussion on mitigations against unsecure UE selection between different generation networks Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233741 Discussion about Security study for Integrated Sensing and Communication Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233742 New Study on Security Aspects of Integrated Sensing and Communication Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233745 New WID on security aspects of Selective SCG Activation Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233751 New WID on SCAS for Rel-18 features Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Agreement Yes
YesEricsson asked if this could be part of Rel-18 since it was testing Rel-18. The Chair commented that he discussed in Plenary whether this kind of WID could continue after Rel-18 was frozen. Ericsson: do this during stage 3 timeline and we stick to the same release. The Chair commented that this would make a very strict timeline.Huawei agreed that it would put SA3 under a lot of pressure to finish before the Release is frozen. Maybe make it cover Rel-19 features that are completed early as well, so we would cover as much as possible. GSMA commented that certification would he harder. AMFs are messed about during several releases, so it would be very difficult which SCAS goes to which specification to which release. A product would be tested under the wrong SCAS. There is a need to have a conversation in plenary to have SCAS treated as test specifications. SCAS don’t have to be time bound to the release deadlines so we have time to do the work properly. The Chair agreed and encouraged to work on some input to present in Plenary.He mentioned that LI had already some similar agreement with Plenary. Huawei commented that it would be challenging to justify Rel-18 as a target release. There is a risk that deadlines are not met and it might be required that a revised WID changes the target Release. Vodafone: test specs need stable specs, it makes sense that they are one release behind. There shouldn't be a problem.
 		revised No S3‑234349  
    S3‑234349 New WID on SCAS for Rel-18 features Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233751
    S3‑233765 Discussion on a key misalignment issue Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233779 On the TU allocation for security studies Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233806 Home control for Network Slice Admission Control (NSAC) procedures Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, LGE, Xiaomi, ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233807 Dummy WID for eNS3 security Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, LGE, Xiaomi, ZTE WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233811 R19 SID discussions for security enhancement of network slicng Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233812 R19 SID on security enhancement of network slicng Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233817 Discussions for security enhancement of UAS Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233827 New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF) IIT Bombay WID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson supported this SCAS work.They asked if there were plans to have SMS specific test cases that don’t exist in TS 33.117? Nokia: they will be network function specific test cases. Ericsson was wondering if there were tests referring to new fucntionality instead of just referring to TS 33.117. Nokia commented that there would be test cases for new interfaces. Huawei wasn’t sure of what wasn't covered in TS 33.117. Qualcomm: just one Rapporteur, not two. The Chair reminded the necessity of companies providing Rapporteurs who were familiar with 3GPP drafting rules and procedures. Ericsson added that new Rapporteurs could use the help of supporting companies who knew the rules.
 		revised No S3‑234333  
    S3‑234333 New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF) IIT Bombay WID new Approval Yes
YesIt was queried whether the Rapporteur could be present to defend this WID. Nokia commented that they couldn’t get the visa this time. The Chair commented that SA plenary could decide the Rapporteur as SA2 is doing now. Orange pointed out that there were companies supporting the WID who were not present in the room and didn’t like that.Any changes made in the current meeting could not be agreed because they were not in the room. MCC and the Chair commented that there was no obligation for the companies supporting the WID to attend the meeting and agree with the changes. The Plenary would be a chance to object to the changes. The Chair suggested to take this issue to plenary (presence of supporting companies in WID) since this was no technical issue. ORANGE had a sustained objection. Nokia proposed to remove the controversial companies and add them in a revised WID during plenary. MCC reminded that WID supporting companies were expected to come contribute in the work, regardless of whether they had participated in SA3 before or not. It was agreed to remove some companiy names.
 		agreed No   S3‑233827
    S3‑233829 New SID on Security Aspects of Network Sharing Enhancements China Unicom SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233888 TNAP Mobility within a TNAN Qualcomm Incorporated WID new Agreement Yes
YesAssociated with the CR in 887. Cable Labs: better to do this in Rel-19. Nokia: this is one of multiple solutions in the TR, so it is not fair to go for this solution only with a CR. Lenovo: it can be treated in Rel-19. There was no conclusion for this key issue. Qualcomm: we don’t want to study this again in Rel-19.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233898 Study on resource isolation enforcement for application in 5G network Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, U.S. National Security Agency, NIST, CableLabs, China Telecommunications SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233899 Discussion on security for PLMN hosting a NPN China Telecommunications discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233900 discussion on resource isolation enforcement for application in 5G network Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233901 New SID on security for PLMN hosting a NPN China Telecommunications SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233936 New WID on 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols Ericsson, Interdigital, CableLabs WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233949 Discussion paper for Study on security aspects of AIMLenhancements China Mobile discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233957 Proposal about considerations to security management China Mobile discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233961 Discussion on security for XR China Mobile other Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233964 New SID on security for XR services China Mobile SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233965 WID on security enhancements for 5GC Location Services Phase 3 Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233971 New SID on 5GS enhancements for Energy Saving Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new Information Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234011 Discussion Paper on Rel.19 Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security Lenovo discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234012 Study on Security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G OPPO, Cable Labs, Apple, ZTE, Xiaomi, Verizon, Intel, T-Mobile USA, Philips International B.V., China Telecom, Lenovo SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234137  
    S3‑234013 Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, MITRE, Interdigital, Motorola Solutions, Charter Communications, Johns Hopkins University APL, Intel, US National Security Agency, Telefonica, NCSC, OTD_US, Deutsche Telekom, Keysight Technologies, Center for Internet Security, SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234176 Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, MITRE, Interdigital, Motorola Solutions, Charter Communications, Johns Hopkins University APL, Intel, US National Security Agency, Telefonica, NCSC, OTD_US, Deutsche Telekom, Keysight Technologies, Center for Internet Security, SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234017 New WID on Applicability of Zero Trust Security Principles in mobile networks Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Center for Internet Security, Cablelabs, US National Security Agency, Johns Hopkins University APL, Charter Communications, Telefonica, Rakuten Mobile Inc WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234020 Discussion on study for security aspects of 5G mobile metaverse Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234022 New SID on security aspects of 5G mobile metaverse services Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234045 New WID to enable URSP rules to securely identify Applications (USIA) Lenovo, AT&T, Broadcom, CableLabs, CATT, Charter, China Mobile, China Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Intel, LG Electronics, Motorola Solutions MSI, NEC, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung, Verizon, Xiaomi WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234050 New SID on QUIC optimization for access traffic steering, switching and splitting support in the 5G system architecture; Phase 3 Lenovo, BROADCOM CORPORATION, CableLabs, CATT, Charter Communications, Inc, China Mobile, CISCO, Deutsche Telekom, InterDigital, Inc., LG Electronics, Nokia, Tencent, vivo Mobile Communication Co.,, Xiaomi, ZTE Corporation SID new   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234052 New SID on Security Enhancements for URSP in Roaming Scenarios Lenovo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Philips SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234067 New SID on Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 CATT SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234068 New SID on Study on Security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 3 CATT SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234089 New SID on security aspects of Satellite Access Phase 3 Xiaomi Technology SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234090 New SID on security aspects of Integrated Sensing and Communication Xiaomi, OPPO, China Telecom, Apple, ZTE, Lenovo SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234091 Discussion on Security Study for ISAC Xiaomi Technology discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234137 Study on Security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G OPPO SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No   S3‑234012
    S3‑234139 Study on Security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G OPPO SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No   S3‑234137
7 CVD and research S3‑233549 Discussion Document on Mitigating downgrade attacks Vodafone España SA discussion Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: we approve solving this issue. We propise to have a SID or WID to go through this. Cable Labs: no changes in SA3? Huawei replied that this was a secuirty issue so in SA3's scope. Qualcomm: a WID would drag out the issue. Huawei: a WID is better to traceability. Otherwise, which time frame? What release? This is basically a new feature. Nokia: we support Vodafone and sending the LS. Apple supported this as well. A WID or SID would be useful. DT: send the LS since RAN2 is meeting next week. Ericson: send the LS and a study for the long term. Vodafone: operators are removing 2G and 3G. Once we don’t have these networks maybe we won't pick up all these things. Huawei: fine with sending the LS. The Chair commented that there was no room for a large study.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233550 Draft LS out to CT and RAN on Mitigating Downgrade Attacks Vodafone España SA LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234173  
    S3‑234173 LS out to CT and RAN on Mitigating Downgrade Attacks Vodafone España SA LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233550
    S3‑234133 Invalid Curve Attack on the 5G SUCI Privacy GSMA LS in   Yes
YesHuawei asked for one meeting cycle to evaluate this. Nokia: is the test device compliant with TS 33.501? Alex (GSMA): most of the companies speaking up here are represented in the GSMA CVD pannel already. Tale a cycle but SA3 should do something as a sign that we listen to the research community. BSI test cases would be discussed in the SCAS session.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑234135 CVD-2023-0069 – 5G Core Network Attacks GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
8 Any Other Business S3‑233504 SA3 meeting calendar SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
YesQualcomm: remove January meeting and let's meet in March. Orange proposed the same thing.
 		noted No    
9 Closing of the meeting