Tdoc List

2023-05-30 12:47

Agenda Topic TDoc Title Source Type For Avail Treated Decision Wdrn Replaced-by Replaces
1 Agenda and Meeting Objectives S3‑232300 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑232796  
    S3‑232303 Process for SA3#111 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232304 Detail agenda planning for SA3#111 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233214  
    S3‑233214 Detail agenda planning for SA3#111 SA WG3 Chair other - Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232304
    S3‑232796 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232300
2 Meeting Reports S3‑232301 Report from SA3#110adHoc-e MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232302 Report from SA3#110 MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232356 Report to SA3 from SA#99 SA WG3 Chair report   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
3 Reports and Liaisons from other Groups S3‑232308 Reply LS on UE event reporting over a user plane connection to LCS client or AF C1-231128 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232309 LS on LPP message and supplementary service event report over a user plane connection between UE and LMF C1-231129 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232310 Reply LS on clarification of coding of hexadecimal digits in SUCI NAI C1-231170 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232311 Reply LS on 3GPP work on Energy Efficiency C1-232650 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232312 LS on Handling of SOR counter and the UE parameter update counter if stored in NVM C1-232696 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑232314 Reply LS on 3GPP work on Energy Efficiency C3-231470 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232315 Reply LS on UE event reporting over a user plane connection to LCS client or AF C3-231717 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232316 LS on Authentication Result Removal C4-224418 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑232317 LS on Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF C4-225161 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑232318 Reply-LS on Research highlighting potential negated OAuth policy C4-230487 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232319 LS Reply on PRINS middle boxes C4-230547 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232320 Reply LS on Identifier availability for Lawful Interception during Inter-PLMN handover C4-230628 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232321 Reply-LS on Research highlighting potential need for granular level checks using "Additional scope" under the OAuth2.0 Token Access C4-230692 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232322 LS on Removal of the uavAuthenticated IE from Create SM Context Request C4-230790 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑232323 LS on clarification of coding of hexadecimal digits in SUCI NAI C4-231395 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232324 LS on clarification of coding of hexadecimal digits in SUCI NAI C6-220715 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232325 LS to SA3 on security for L2 UE-to-UE relay R2-2304559 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑232326 Reply LS on 5G capabilities exposure for factories of the future – identified gaps (5G-ACIA-LS-2022-005 / S2-2302175) S2-2303304 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232327 Reply LS on Security architecture for 5G multicast/broadcast services S2-2303310 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑233139 Reply to: Reply LS on Security architecture for 5G multicast/broadcast services Huawei LS out approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232328 Reply LS to Reply LS to LS on SL positioning groupcast and broadcast S2-2305726 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232329 LS on security aspects for Ranging/Sidelink Positioning S2-2305727 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑232330 Reply LS to LS to SA2 on Sidelink positioning procedure S2-2305735 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232331 Reply to LS on AFId parameter value in EES invocation of Nnef_UEId_Get service S2-2305883 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232332 DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) S2-2306210 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑232333 Reply LS on security architecture for 5G multicast–broadcast services S4-230346 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑232334 LS on 3GPP work on Energy Efficiency S5-232903 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232335 Reply LS on secured and trusted access to the serving PLMN OAM server by a MBSR S5-233546 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232336 LS on user consent for UE location sharing S6-230351 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑232337 LS on AFId parameter value in EES invocation of Nnef_UEId_Get service S6-230945 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑232338 Reply LS on FS_eEDGEAPP Solution for Support of NAT deployed within the edge data network S6-231061 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑232339 LS reply to TSG SA on LS 5G-ACIA-LS-2022-005 on 5G capabilities exposure for factories of the future – identified gaps from 5G ACIA S6-231068 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232340 LS on Clarification on KMS provisioning S6-231423 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑233410 Reply to: LS on Clarification on KMS provisioning Samsung LS out approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232341 LS on resolving the target KMS URI for a migrated MC service user S6-231552 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑232342 LS reply on the use of a non-network defined identifier for UE identification S6-231604 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232343 Reply LS on 5G capabilities exposure for factories of the future – identified gaps SP-230384 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232344 LS to 3GPP on GSMA requirements for intermediaries in the roaming ecosystem GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑232346 LS to 3GPP regarding SCTP-AUTH and DTLS IETF Transport Area Working Group LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑232347 LS to SA3-LI on Volte roaming lawful interception - limitation to provide caller identify if caller activates OIR GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232348 LS to inform about the Post Quantum Telco Network Impact Assessment Whitepaper Publication GSMA LS in   Yes
YesApple: good proposal for being part of our Rel-19 study on quantum.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232349 Reply LS on Mapping of F1-C IP addresses in the IAB inter-CU topology adaptation and backhaul RLF recovery procedures R3-232166 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232350 Reply LS on lawful interception EPS fallback for 5G inbound roamer S3i230149 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232351 LS on addition of filler IEI for User-Data Header s3i230317 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232352 An Invitation to the SA4 Gender Diversity Committee Meetings S4-230431 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232353 Specification of the 256-bit air interface algorithms ETSI SAGE LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑232354 Reply LS to 3GPP SA2 on analytics exchange between different 5G PLMNs GSMA LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232355 Reply LS to 3GPP SA2 on UE specific data and analytics exchange between HPLMN and VPLMN GSMA LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232420 Discussion on Selective SCG Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232421 Introduction of Selective SCG Security Mechanisms and Procedures Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232422 LS on Security Solution for Selective SCG Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233200  
    S3‑233200 LS on Security Solution for Selective SCG Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232422
    S3‑232428 TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur InterDigital Communications other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232430 LS to 3GPP SA3 on ETSI MEC discussion on possible new requirements for AKMA framework ETSI MEC LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑232446 Discussion on security for selective SCG activation vivo discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232537 LS on Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
YesEricsson: we will align our spec to theirs and tthey will alos have to work on something new.
 		revised No S3‑233143  
    S3‑233143 LS on Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232537
    S3‑232563 Proposed method for deriving the keys for selective SCG activation Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232609 Further input on LS bundle S3-232344 (was S3-231717) from GSMA on roaming requirements Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
YesAlex (GSMA): on 2017 vs 2023 they refer to expected 5G requirements and the actual 5G deployment. For 6G we should be clear on the difference between commercial requirements and deployment requirements we can actually use. They also commented that there was some urgency for SA3 to reply on this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232610 Further analysis on LS S3-231721 from GSMA related to L-PRINS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232676 Reply LS on resolving the target KMS URI for a migrated MC service user Airbus LS out Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232689 Reply LS on security architecture for 5G multicast–broadcast services Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233439  
    S3‑233439 Reply LS on security architecture for 5G multicast–broadcast services Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232689
    S3‑232696 Reply LS on security aspects for Ranging/Sidelink Positioning Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233438  
    S3‑233438 Reply LS on security aspects for Ranging/Sidelink Positioning Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232696
    S3‑232730 Reply LS to RAN2 on security for L2 UE-to-UE relay Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233323  
    S3‑232791 Relay LS on DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232792 security of selective SCG activation Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232795 Discussion paper to review L-PRINS with risk benefit trade-off Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
YesEricsson: we support hop by hop with TLS, not PRINS. Cable Labs: we support hop by hop, evolve PRINS since we don’t agree with its current functionality.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232803 Reply LS on Research highlighting potential 5G and 4G Bidding Down Attacks Ericsson LS out   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑232805 Reply LS to Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting S3-223162 Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: don’t mandate user consent processes to the operator, this is out of scope of 3GPP. We don’t agree with the last sentence.
 		revised No S3‑233144  
    S3‑233144 Reply LS to Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting S3-223162 Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232805
    S3‑232813 SERP-LS on security protection on RRCResumeRequest message Apple LS out Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: we shouldn’t send an LS every time we agree on a CR. They can check it in Plenary. Apple: this is so RAN groups don’t get confused.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232819 Reply LS on FS_eEDGEAPP Solution for Support of NAT deployed within the edge data network (S6-231061) Apple LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232820 Reply LS on user consent for UE location sharing (S6-230351) Apple LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232837 Reply LS on AFId parameter value in EES invocation of Nnef_UEId_Get service Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: trust relationship is not quite right. Ericsson: agreed with Qualcomm on trusting the EAS.
 		revised No S3‑233140  
    S3‑233140 Reply LS on AFId parameter value in EES invocation of Nnef_UEId_Get service Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232837
    S3‑232861 [Draft] Reply LS on Secure DNS Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
YesNokia: we need more time for this as there are many details to consider. Qualcomm: don’t mess up with the DNS in 3GPP, it’s not in our scope.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232867 Reply LS on security for L2 UE-to-UE relay Lenovo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233323  
    S3‑233323 Reply LS on security for L2 UE-to-UE relay Lenovo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232867
    S3‑232879 Comparison of proposals for SCG Addition Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232916 Reply LS on security for L2 UE-to-UE relay OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233323  
    S3‑232923 [draft] Reply LS for C4-230790 on Removal of the uavAuthenticated IE from Create SM Context Request_LS China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
YesLenovo had an alternative response in tdoc 121. Qualcomm:align with SA2. Ericsson: we agree with China Mobile. Interdigital: align with SA2. Huawei: not clear whethe the feature is present or not in both China Mobile and Lenovo's proposals.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232928 [draft] reply LS on ETSI MEC discussion on possible new requirements for AKMA framework China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: they have a misunderstanding of AKMA. Anand sugested to add that we cannot use AAnF as an anchor. Ericsson: postpone the LS reply, we need more time. China Mobile: it’s important to clairfy their misunderstanding.
 		revised No S3‑233142  
    S3‑233142 Reply LS on ETSI MEC discussion on possible new requirements for AKMA framework China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232928
    S3‑232942 Discussion on Selective SCG activation OPPO discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232945 Reply-LS on security for L2 UE-to-UE relay CATT LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233323  
    S3‑232950 [Draft] Reply LS on security aspects for Ranging/Sidelink Positioning Xiaomi Technology LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233015 Reply LS on Authentication Result Removal Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233039 Discussion on security for selective SCG activation Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233054 Reply LS on SCTP-AUTH and DTLS Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
YesCableLabs: too much information in here. Huawei: IETF didn’t ask for a detailed reply like this, there was no action in SA3. Better comment in IETF direclty. No standardization action here. Qualcomm agreed with Huawei. They are not asking for an analysis. Ericsson: We can say: "we understand the problem, work on a solution and tell us". Ericsson: we need some attention from IETF.
 		revised No S3‑233355  
    S3‑233355 Reply LS on SCTP-AUTH and DTLS Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233054
    S3‑233087 Draft Reply LS on specification of the 256-bit air algorithms THALES, Idemia LS out Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with this LS. Nokia either. Qualcomm: why is ETSI SAGE not following our request? We support sending this LS.SAGE should tell us if there are any security issues by LS and not work on something different. IDEMIA: we just want to reiterate what our preference is.
 		revised No S3‑233212  
    S3‑233212 Draft Reply LS on specification of the 256-bit air algorithms THALES, Idemia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233087
    S3‑233120 Discussion on UUAA determination Lenovo discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233121 LS on UUAA Status Information availability for SMF_Response to C4-230790 Lenovo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233308 Ls on further input to address GSMA LS on requirements for intermediaries in the roaming ecosystem (S323244) Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233322 LS to SA2 on clarification on removal of the indicator of UUAA result from AMF China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233349 Discussion on roaming requirements collection Nokia discussion discussion Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No    
4 Work areas (Rel-18)                      
4.1 New WID on Security Assurance Specification for Management Function (MnF) S3‑232402 Remove EN on RBAC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232403 HTTP methods for Webservers Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232404 no directory listings Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232405 traffic separation Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232406 Exceptions for Client Authentication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233201  
    S3‑232436 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for MnF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232757 Annex for MnF product class Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232758 Cleanups for MnF SCAS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232759 Clause 4.3 updates for MnF SCAS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233153  
    S3‑233153 Clause 4.3 updates for MnF SCAS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232759
    S3‑232779 Clause 4.2.2 updates for MnF SCAS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233201  
    S3‑233201 Clause 4.2.2 updates for MnF SCAS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232779
    S3‑233199 Draft TS 33.526 Huawei draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑233234 Cover sheet TS 33.526 Huawei TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.2 New WID on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products S3‑232424 Proposed new Test Cases on SCAS for VNP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232917 adding description about security requirements of Traffic separation to clause 4.3 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233336  
    S3‑233336 adding description about security requirements of Traffic separation to clause 4.3 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232917
    S3‑232918 adding description about security requirements of separation of inter-VNF and intra-VNF traffic to clause 4.3 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232919 Editorial fix about section number China Mobile, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232920 Presentation of TS33.527 to TSG for information and approval China Mobile TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233202 draft TS 33.527 China Mobile draft TS discussion No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.3 New WID on Mission critical security enhancements phase 3                      
4.4 New WID on Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for 5G Rel-17 Features S3‑232431 Living doc to SCAS UPF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233391  
    S3‑233391 Living doc to SCAS UPF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑232431
    S3‑233392 Changes for SCAS UPF for Rel18 Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑232432 Living doc for SCAS gNB Keysight Technologies UK Ltd draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233339  
    S3‑233339 Living doc for SCAS gNB Keysight Technologies UK Ltd draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑232432
    S3‑233447 Changes for SCAS gNB for Rel18 Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑232433 Summary table for changes in robustness testing Keysight Technologies UK Ltd discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232434 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for gNodeB Keysight Technologies UK Ltd other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233340  
    S3‑233340 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for gNodeB Keysight Technologies UK Ltd other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232434
    S3‑232435 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for UPF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233411  
    S3‑233411 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for UPF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232435
    S3‑232440 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for AAnF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233412  
    S3‑233412 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for AAnF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232440
    S3‑232441 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for AMF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233413  
    S3‑233413 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for AMF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232441
    S3‑232442 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for AUSF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233414  
    S3‑233414 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for AUSF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232442
    S3‑232443 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for N3IWF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233415  
    S3‑233415 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for N3IWF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232443
    S3‑232444 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for NEF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233416  
    S3‑233416 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for NEF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232444
    S3‑232445 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for NRF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233417  
    S3‑233417 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for NRF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232445
    S3‑232447 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for NWDAF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233418  
    S3‑233418 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for NWDAF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232447
    S3‑232448 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for SCP Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233419  
    S3‑233419 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for SCP Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232448
    S3‑232449 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for SEPP Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233420  
    S3‑233420 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for SEPP Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232449
    S3‑232450 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for SMF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233421  
    S3‑233421 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for SMF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232450
    S3‑232451 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for UDM Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233422  
    S3‑233422 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for UDM Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232451
    S3‑232747 Living document for TR33.926 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233211 SCAS updates to threats and assets for Release 17 features Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232748 Living doc of TS 33.216 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233238 Living doc of TS 33.216 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232749 Living doc of TS 33.117 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233239 Living doc of TS 33.117 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232760 SCAS reference correction work summary Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232761 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233252  
    S3‑233252 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232761
    S3‑232762 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233253  
    S3‑233253 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232762
    S3‑232763 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232764 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233254  
    S3‑233254 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232764
    S3‑232765 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232766 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233255  
    S3‑233255 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232766
    S3‑232767 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232768 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233256  
    S3‑233256 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232768
    S3‑232769 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233257  
    S3‑233257 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232769
    S3‑232770 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233258  
    S3‑233258 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232770
    S3‑232771 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233259  
    S3‑233259 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232771
    S3‑232772 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233260  
    S3‑233260 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232772
    S3‑232773 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232774 SCAS release reference corrections Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232780 SCAS release reference corrections to living doc to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233261  
    S3‑233261 SCAS release reference corrections to living doc to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232780
    S3‑232781 SCAS release reference corrections to living doc to TS 33.513 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232782 living doc for 33.916 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233241 living doc for 33.916 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.5 New WID on Security Assurance Specification for the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) Anchor Function Function (AAnF) S3‑232439 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for AAnF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑232929 Converting the living document of AAnF SCAS to CR China Mobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233203  
    S3‑233203 Adding critical assest and threats of AAnF China Mobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232929
4.6 New WID on SCAS for split-gNB product classes S3‑232438 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for gNB-CU-CP Keysight Technologies UK Ltd other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233330  
    S3‑233330 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for split-gNB Keysight Technologies UK Ltd other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232438
    S3‑232538 Introducing split gNBs into TR 33.926 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑231615
    S3‑232539 Overview of some split gNB SCAS papers Qualcomm Incoporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232540 EditHelp changes for TS 33.523 Qualcomm Incorporated other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232541 Removal of release specific aspects from TS 33.523 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233331  
    S3‑233331 Removal of release specific aspects from TS 33.523 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232541
    S3‑232542 Corrections to TS 33.523 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232543 Coversheet for TS 33.523 Qualcomm Incorporated TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233332 Draft TS 33.523 Qualcomm draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.7 Service Based Architecture (Rel-15/16/17)                      
4.8 Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe (Rel-17)                      
4.9 All topics (Rel-15/16/17/18 )                      
4.9.1 Security Assurance S3‑232409 New SCAS test on trust anchoring BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑232419  
    S3‑232410 Interface Robustness Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233193  
    S3‑233193 Interface Robustness Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232410
    S3‑232411 Security Event Logging Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233194  
    S3‑233194 Security Event Logging Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232411
    S3‑232412 Privileged Users Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233195  
    S3‑233195 Privileged Users Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232412
    S3‑232419 New SCAS test on trust anchoring Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233244 S3‑232409
    S3‑233244 New SCAS test on trust anchoring Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232419
    S3‑232452 Clarification of synchronization failure handling BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑232476  
    S3‑232454 Clarification of RES* verification failure handling Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233130  
    S3‑232456 Clarification of Replay Protection of NAS signalling messages Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233134  
    S3‑232458 Clarification of NAS integrity algorithm selection and use BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑232504  
    S3‑232459 Clarification of invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities handling BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑232477  
    S3‑232461 Clarification of NSSAA revocation Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233204  
    S3‑233204 Clarification of NSSAA revocation Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232461
    S3‑232463 Clarification of test applicability BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑232505  
    S3‑232464 Correction of Tester Instructions in Expected Results BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑232507  
    S3‑232465 Correction of format of evidence BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑232506  
    S3‑232466 Clarification of whether tester triggers an event or NF behaviour is observed in an Execution Step BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233345  
    S3‑233345 Clarification of whether tester triggers an event or NF behaviour is observed in an Execution Step BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232466
    S3‑232467 New SCAS test on valid UE security capability encoding while AS security establishment Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233205  
    S3‑233205 New SCAS test on valid UE security capability encoding while AS security establishment Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232467
    S3‑232468 Threat reference for incorrectly encoded UE 5G security capabilities on the AMF NG interface BSI (DE) CR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑232469 Threat reference for incorrectly encoded UE 5G security capabilities on the AMF NG interface Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233206  
    S3‑233206 Threat reference for incorrectly encoded UE 5G security capabilities on the AMF NG interface Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232469
    S3‑232470 Discussion on specification AMF SCAS test for incorrectly encoding security capabilities BSI (DE) discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232471 Clarification of hashing Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233346  
    S3‑233346 Clarification of hashing Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232471
    S3‑232472 Clarification of privilege escalation methods to check for BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑232474  
    S3‑232473 Clarification of privilege verification BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑232475  
    S3‑232474 Clarification of privilege escalation methods to check for Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233207 S3‑232472
    S3‑233207 Clarification of privilege escalation methods to check for Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232474
    S3‑232475 Clarification of privilege verification Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233347 S3‑232473
    S3‑233347 Clarification of privilege verification Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232475
    S3‑232476 Clarification of synchronization failure handling BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233208 S3‑232452
    S3‑233208 Clarification of synchronization failure handling BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232476
    S3‑232477 Clarification of invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities handling BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑232509 S3‑232459
    S3‑232504 Clarification of NAS integrity algorithm selection and use Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233135 S3‑232458
    S3‑232505 Clarification of test applicability Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233348 S3‑232463
    S3‑233348 Clarification of test applicability Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232505
    S3‑232506 Correction of format of evidence Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233333 S3‑232465
    S3‑233333 Correction of format of evidence Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232506
    S3‑232507 Correction of Tester Instructions in Expected Results BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑232508 S3‑232464
    S3‑232508 Correction of Tester Instructions in Expected Results Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233334 S3‑232507
    S3‑233334 Correction of Tester Instructions in Expected Results Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232508
    S3‑232509 Clarification of invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities handling Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233133 S3‑232477
    S3‑232530 ME Change issue correction Solution 2 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑232544 Correcting some references in TS 33.511 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232545 Correcting some references in TS 33.511 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233117  
    S3‑232546 Correcting some references in TS 33.926 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233129  
    S3‑232547 Correcting some references in TS 33.926 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233118  
    S3‑232775 Correction of annex for NSSAAF product class Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesThe file was corrupted so it was to be brought again next meeting.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232806 Security event logging of username Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232809 Security event logging of username Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232821 Password expiry Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232822 Introduction of user data protection over N3 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232823 Password expiry Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232843 Correction of SBA test for UPF Huawei, Hisilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233335  
    S3‑233335 Correction of SBA test for UPF Huawei, Hisilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232843
    S3‑232844 correction of SBA test for UPF-r17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233337  
    S3‑233337 correction of SBA test for UPF-r17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232844
    S3‑233117 Correcting some references in TS 33.511 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232545
    S3‑233118 Correcting some references in TS 33.926 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232547
    S3‑233129 Correcting some references in TS 33.926 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232546
    S3‑233130 Clarification of RES* verification failure handling Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233338 S3‑232454
    S3‑233338 Clarification of RES* verification failure handling Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233130
    S3‑233133 Clarification of invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities handling Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No   S3‑232509
    S3‑233134 Clarification of Replay Protection of NAS signalling messages Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No   S3‑232456
    S3‑233135 Clarification of NAS integrity algorithm selection and use Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No   S3‑232504
4.9.2 Service Based Architecture S3‑232306 Modernization of the Integrity & Encryption Algorithms between UE and P-CSFC Telekom Deutschland GmbH CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑232606 Draft LS on NFc registration using OAM Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out   Yes
YesHuaweii: we don’t need SA5 to define anythiing.
 		revised No S3‑233351  
    S3‑233351 LS on NFc registration using OAM Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232606
    S3‑232607 Access token request handling by NRF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233220  
    S3‑233220 Access token request handling by NRF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232607
    S3‑233352 Access token request handling by NRF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232608 SBA01 Delegated access token validation Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232615 PLMN ID in certificate Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233110  
    S3‑232616 Rel-18 exception sheet for FS_eSBA_SEC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WI exception request   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232671 Correcting the UUID example in SBA certificates Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232672 Correcting the UUID example in SBA certificates Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232673 Correcting the UUID example in SBA certificates Ericsson CR   Yes
YesNokia needed more time to study this.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232675 Non-critical X.509 subjectAltName and unique DN following RFC 5280 Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232677 Non-critical X.509 subjectAltName and unique DN following RFC 5280 Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232678 Non-critical X.509 subjectAltName and unique DN following RFC 5280 Ericsson CR   Yes
YesNokia: we need one more meeting cycle to study this.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232838 Clarification on data-type encryption policy Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233343  
    S3‑233343 Clarification on data-type encryption policy Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232838
    S3‑232840 Correction of authorization between SEPP and network functions Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
YesIt was commented that this was a CR implementation mistake and by the process it should be automatically agreed. However this error was coming from a CR from SA3#91, which was quite a long time ago and it had to be checked whether it made sense to include it now. MCC note: the original misimplemented CR was probably directed to the Rel-16 or earlier version of the specification, so that's the Release where the correction should start.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232878 Clarification of SEPP inter-domain certificate profiles Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232881 Clarification of SEPP inter-domain certificate profiles Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232883 Clarification of SEPP inter-domain certificate profiles Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: I need more time to check this, it may be needed to be treated in GSMA DES.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233110 PLMN ID in certificate Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑232615
4.9.3 Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe S3‑232417 U2N relay direct link setup failure due to RSC mismatch or integrity failure Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm: no need to integrity protect the Direct Communication Reject messages. We don’t see the benefit. Philips: we agree on this direction, we are not fully sure that the current text is enough to protect agains these attacks. Interdigital: if we don’t do anything we will provide no solution to CT1. Xiaomi: CT1 is discussing our LS during this LS. I propose to postpone any action until we know what they came up with.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232617 Correction in 5G ProSe Direct Discovery China Telecommunications CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑232620 Correction in 5G ProSe Direct Discovery China Telecom CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232728 DDNMF selection in UE-to-Network Relay discovery procedure Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233377  
    S3‑232729 Discussion about DDNMF selection in UE-to-Network Relay discovery procedure Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232731 Clarification on discovery of PKMF of Relay UE by the SMF Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232793 Fix the restricted discovery procedures in 5G ProSe Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm: PDUID is used in SA2 but not in SA3. Just refer to SA2's specification.
 		revised No S3‑233185  
    S3‑233185 Fix the restricted discovery procedures in 5G ProSe Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232793
    S3‑233074 CR to TR33.503 Editorial changes CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233075 CR to TR33.503 Define missing reference points CATT CR Approval Yes
YesIntedigital: somebody will have to bring a contribution to SA2 to align.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233076 4.9.3 - Correction in clause 5.3.3.1.2.3 of TS 33.536 Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233101 Discussion on U2N discovery security procedure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233102 Locate target DDNMF in U2N discovery security procdure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Telecom, Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233377  
    S3‑233377 Locate target DDNMF in U2N discovery security procdure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Telecom, Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233102
    S3‑233103 Update discovery key response of U2N discovery security procdure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233104 Discussion on separation of U2N discovery security procedure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Telecom, Xiaomi discussion Endorsement Yes
YesQualcomm didn’t agree with these updates. CATT proposed to postpone this discussion for next meeting. Philips commented that they also needed to review the text more closely.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233105 Direct discovery security procdure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Telecom, Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233106 UE to Network Relay discovery security procdure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Telecom, Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233128 4.9.3 - Correction in clause 5.3.3.1.2.3 of TS 33.536 Philips International B.V. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
4.9.4 Mission Critical                      
4.9.5 Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G S3‑232531 AKMA Service disable or withdrawn Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑232870 Clarification on the description about AAnF China Telecommunications CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with the CR.
 		not pursued No    
4.9.6 Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS S3‑232704 Correction on UP IP for EN-DC (R17) Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232705 Correction on UP IP for EN-DC (R18) Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesNot needed as there is no version of TS 33.401.
 		not pursued No    
4.9.7 Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services S3‑232690 CR on control-plane procedure in MBS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson referred to previous talks in conference calls and they preferred another more detailed option that had baeen discussed before. Qualcomm: there is no consensus on whether we really need to male changes in our specification. Huawei: add some text that user plane and control plane have different procedures to address Ericsson's concerns. Samsung was fine with the note. The Chair commented that instead of expandind unnecessarily the note it was better to add a new sub-clause.
 		revised No S3‑233165  
    S3‑233165 CR on control-plane procedure in MBS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232690
    S3‑232691 CR on control-plane procedure in MBS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233166  
    S3‑233166 CR on control-plane procedure in MBS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232691
4.9.8 Security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT                      
4.9.9 Security Aspects of eNPN                      
4.9.10 Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC S3‑232789 Security for EAS discovery in non-roaming case Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233341  
    S3‑233341 Security for EAS discovery in non-roaming case Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232789
    S3‑232790 Security for EAS discovery in non-roaming case Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233342  
    S3‑233342 Security for EAS discovery in non-roaming case Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232790
4.9.11 Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems S3‑232661 Address ENs in revocation procedures Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233406  
    S3‑233119 TS 33.256 EN Cleanup Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233406  
    S3‑233406 TS 33.256 EN Cleanup Lenovo,Huawei CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233119
4.9.12 Others S3‑232307 Modernization of the Integrity & Encryption Algorithms between UE and P-CSFC Telekom Deutschland GmbH CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑232808  
    S3‑232520 Discussion paper of UPU implementation gaps Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232521 Enhancement in UPU procedure to protect UPU header-All 3 solutions Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm: we can focus on current implementations until Rel-17 and then enhance in Rel-18.
 		merged No S3‑233329  
    S3‑232522 Enhancement in UPU procedure to protect UPU header-All 3 solutions Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233388  
    S3‑232523 Correction in N5CW device authentication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233146  
    S3‑233146 Correction in N5CW device authentication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232523
    S3‑232524 Correction in N5CW device authentication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233147  
    S3‑233147 Correction in N5CW device authentication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232524
    S3‑232525 Correction in N5CW device authentication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233148  
    S3‑233148 Correction in N5CW device authentication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232525
    S3‑232526 TNGF address handling correction Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: this clashes with SA2's agreements. Qualcomm: backwards compatibility issues here. Nokia replied that this could be added in Rel-18 as an enhancements.
 		merged No S3‑233150  
    S3‑232527 TNGF address handling correction Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233151  
    S3‑232528 Handling of SOR counter and the UE parameter update counter if stored in NVM Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233152  
    S3‑233152 Handling of SOR counter and the UE parameter update counter if stored in NVM Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232528
    S3‑232529 ME Change issue correction Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm disagreed with the CR, backwards compatibility among other issues.They didn’t agree with the LS. Huawei agreed with Qualcomm. Ericsson: in CT1 Apple submitted a CR that wasn't agreed but it could be handled there with a few changes that we could tell them. Thales didn’t agree with this CR, especially with the ACK generation. IDEMIA: When USIM is removed the ME has some mandatory taks to perform. The Chair suggested to send an LS back to CT1 referring to what happens when USIM is removed. Qualcomm: we don’t specify what the ME does when the USIM is removed. IDEMIA: no required changes in SA3 specifications.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232548 Discussion on issue with UPU MAC calculation Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232549 Clarification to the UPU procedures Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233329 S3‑230804
    S3‑233329 Clarification to the UPU procedures Qualcomm Incorporated,Nokia CR Agreement Yes
YesAgreed to start from Rel-15 and merge Nokia CRs here (e.g. 521).
 		agreed No   S3‑232549
    S3‑232550 Clarification to the UPU procedures Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233388  
    S3‑233388 Clarification to the UPU procedures Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232550
    S3‑233389 Clarification to the UPU procedures Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑233390 Clarification to the UPU procedures Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232551 Protection of UPU header Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232562 Thoughts on changing the salt in AES-GCM and AES-GMAC in IMS Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Endorsement Yes
YesApple couldn’t agree on this.They suggested to continue discussing. Tdoc 3059 from Ericsson is related to this topic.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232564 IAB inter-CU topology adaptation and backhaul RLF recovery procedures Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232604 CAPF 33.122 Vendor specific Security Methods Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel, Samsung CR   Yes
YesEricsson: we don’t agree with this CR. MCC commented that mandating security methods outside 3GPP's scope was not appropriate. Ericsson had a similar concern. This was taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑233350  
    S3‑233350 CAPF 33.122 Vendor specific Security Methods Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel, Samsung CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232604
    S3‑232662 Address EN on S-NSSAI mapping Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233376  
    S3‑232663 Address EN on AF Authorization Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesDiscussed together with 3019 from Huawei and 979 from Xiaomi.
 		merged No S3‑233376  
    S3‑232664 NSSAA procedures for multiple registration Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesDiscussed with 3098 from Nokia. Ericsson: we have seen this issue brought here several times before and we still don’t agree on it. Huawei: Nokia is addressing the same issue in tdoc 3098, so we don’t understand why Ericsson can live that contribution and not this one.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232797 Protection of RRC Resume Request message Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232798 SN authentication for R17 NSWO Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: we don’t agree with the solution part. Qualcomm: not sure that this is needed.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232799 CR on N5CW registration key generation Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233149  
    S3‑232800 Security of CPAC Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233353  
    S3‑233353 Security of CPAC Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232800
    S3‑232801 Security of CPAC Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233354  
    S3‑233354 Security of CPAC Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232801
    S3‑232802 Fix the restricted discovery procedures in LTE ProSe R17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233232  
    S3‑233232 Fix the restricted discovery procedures in LTE ProSe R17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232802
    S3‑232804 Add service area in TS33.501 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: this is not FASMO.We don’t agree with the change. Nokia supported the CR.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232808 Modernization of the Integrity & Encryption Algorithms between UE and P-CSFC Telekom Deutschland GmbH CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: we can agree with including in a new WID on crypto maintenance. Ericsson had some issues but wanted to have some offline work. Qualcomm: increase of complexity in here.
 		not pursued No   S3‑232307
    S3‑232812 SERP-CR on security protection on RRCResumeRequest message Apple CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232814 CR on TS 33.501 on IRAT security Apple CR Approval Yes
YesThe SA3 Chair asked why only Rel-18 was being changed if this was a problem in 5G earlier implementations. Apple was open to inlude more releases. Ericsson: we need more time to study it. Qualcomm: this is not really an issue and we don’t agree with the solution. Qualcomm commented that they hadn't seen this issue internally. Huawei: we need more time to study the scenario.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232815 CR on 33501_s1n1_idlemode_mapped_ctxt Apple CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232851 Authentication result removal Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
YesKPN: more details are needed here, but it’s a start. Ericsson agreed with KPN. Nokia: we didn’t have a solution for the key issue in the TR in Rel-16. Huawei: this is a problem happening in CT4 in the field. We actually sent them an LS about this.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232852 Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233154  
    S3‑233154 Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232852
    S3‑232862 Transport security for DNS Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: we need more time to review this.The DNS topic should be treated in the EDGE clause as well. Qualcomm: I don’t agree with this CR. This annex was not meant for EDGE, it was meant for LTE and it must remain informative. The EDGE case is to be treated separately. Samsung supported the CR. GSMA: this is more than cat-F, it should be cat-B or C. MCC had the same comment, Huawei: we prefer to have these changes separately, don’t touch the annex. We need more time for this.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232871 Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF Nokia Poland CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233155  
    S3‑233155 Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF Nokia Poland CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232871
    S3‑232885 Verification of the serving network name by the AUSF Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia didn’t agree with this CR.Huawei didn’t agree either,
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232886 Verification of the serving network name by the AUSF Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232887 Correction of the authorization of NF Service Consumers for data access via DCCF Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233154  
    S3‑232888 Correction of the authorization of NF Service Consumers for data access via DCCF Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233155  
    S3‑232889 Correction of procedures for N3GPP trusted access Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233149  
    S3‑233149 Correction of procedures for N3GPP trusted access Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232889
    S3‑232890 Correction of procedures for N3GPP trusted access Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233150  
    S3‑233150 Correction of procedures for N3GPP trusted access Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232890
    S3‑232891 Correction of procedures for N3GPP trusted access Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233151  
    S3‑233151 Correction of procedures for N3GPP trusted access Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232891
    S3‑232892 Correction of procedures for N5CW Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233146  
    S3‑232893 Correction of procedures for N5CW Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233147  
    S3‑232894 Correction of procedures for N5CW Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233148  
    S3‑232979 R17 Update Subscription and unsubscription procedure of NSACF notification service Xiaomi CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233376  
    S3‑232980 R18 Update Subscription and unsubscription procedure of NSACF notification service (mirror) Xiaomi CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233380  
    S3‑233019 Rel17 Clarification on AF authorization for the NSACF notification procedure Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233376  
    S3‑233376 Rel17 Clarification on AF authorization for the NSACF notification procedure Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233019
    S3‑233020 Rel17 Alignment of NSACF notification procedure with existing procedures Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei found that there was a misalignment between SA2 and SA3 so they couldn’t agree on this CR. This was taken offline.
 		merged No S3‑233376  
    S3‑233021 Rel18 Clarification on AF authorization for the NSACF notification procedure Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233380  
    S3‑233380 Rel18 Clarification on AF authorization for the NSACF notification procedure Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233021
    S3‑233022 Rel18 Alignment of NSACF notification procedure with existing procedures Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233380  
    S3‑233023 Proposal for a living document for SERP: draftCR to TS 33.501 on the Protection of the RRC Resume Request message Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233035 Discussion on Resumecause protection Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233132  
    S3‑233036 [draftCR] Protection of the RRC Resume Request message Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233037 Living document for SERP: draftCR to TS 33.501 on the Protection of the RRC Resume Request message Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233044 [IAB][Rel-17] IAB inter-CU topology adaptation procedure Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233131  
    S3‑233045 [IAB][Rel-18] IAB inter-CU topology adaptation procedure Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm considered that this wasn’t needed. Samsung:
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233059 Adding secure ESP algorithms Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233060 Removing text and note forbidding ESP dummy packets Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm: not comfortable removing this. The gain is less than the risk of removing this for current implementations.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233061 Updates of obsoleted RFCs Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233062 Updates to the IKEv2 profile Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: IDi and IDR used for authentication would be wrong anyway. We need to review this more closely. Huawei: proposals are good but we need more time to check. Qualcomm: consider the WID for Rel-19, it's a bit late for Rel-18 and I don’t understand the Idi and Idr statement. Ericsson: this is stage 3, we have time. Qualcomm: no, it has stage 2 impact. The Chair clarified that even if this was stage 3 CT groups would complain because they wouldn’t have the time to get additional work.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233063 Remove keyEncipherment and KeyAgreement from TLS certificate profile Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233064 Remove keyEncipherment and KeyAgreement from TLS certificate profile Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: we need time to analyse this.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233065 Remove keyEncipherment and KeyAgreement from TLS certificate profile Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233078 Discussion paper on the purpose and requirements of Annex V TS 33.501 Nanjing Ericsson Panda Com Ltd discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233080 Clarification of the intended usage and requirements for user consent framework Rel-17 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei, Nokia didn’t agree with this CR.Existent procedures are good enough. GSMA: it needs rewording (user consent intended for internal use within the operators domain?). Qualcomm: subscriber's base consent? What is this?
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233081 Clarification of the intended usage and requirements for user consent framework Rel-18 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233094 Discussion on multiple registration in parallel Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
YesEricsson preferred solution in 095. Qualcomm didn’t support this solution.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233095 Add restriction on UE for multi registrations in two PLMNs Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233096 Add restriction on 5GC for multi registrations in two PLMNs Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233097 Discussin paper on control on NSSAA procedures for multi registrations in two PLMNs Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233098 control on NSSAA procedures for multi registrations in two PLMNs Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson only agreed with the third change. Qualcomm didn’t agree with the first change.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233099 LS to CT4 to clarify NSSAA procedure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233113 AF accessing 5GC assistance information in AI/ML OPPO CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm: not convinced that we need this CR. OPPO commented that the conclusions of the TR needed to be captured somehow. MCC commented that it was dangerous to bring CRs based on conclusions in TRs. The current cover page didn’t read like a correction was made. It seemed more like a cat-B CR where a new procedure was being described. Even if it is brought as an informative annex it could be considered as cat-B, so a better wording was needed in the cover page for the justifcation and consequences if not approved. Qualcomm: we don’t have a conclusion for user consent yet. We don’t agree with this CR, it should be in the TR and not in the TS. Apple: TRs cannot be referred to, that's why we want to include it in the TS. Ericsson: not happy with ZZ.3. Without this clause there isn't real content so the annex would not be needed. OPPO: SA2 would be puzzled if we don’t conclude on this. It was commented that SA2 didn’t need to refer to the TR. AT&T: interested parties can check the TR, this is for information.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233131 [IAB][Rel-17] IAB inter-CU topology adaptation procedure Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑233044
    S3‑233132 Discussion on Resumecause protection Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑233035
    S3‑233141 SERP status summary Apple discussion discussion Yes
YesQualcomm: consider the option of not doing anything. No security benefit for all this complexity. We will object to any CR for any of these options. Ericsson: OK with option 1. Samsung: OK with option 2. Nokia: option 2. DT: option 1. Huawei was OK with both options. Google: option 2. Intel: option 2. Qualcomm: if option 1 protects against the downgrade we could discuss it. The Chair commented that option 2 was a superset of option so this needed to be taken into account. Show of hands: Option 1: Ericsson, Verizon, China Telecom,Huawei,Vivo, Apple, OPPO, Xiaomi,DT,Nokia, Cable Labs, Google, Interdigital. Option 2: Intel, Samsung, Huawei. Option 1 was the preferred option, but the Chair commented that it should be a single implementable CR and not three different solutions as it we had now.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233145 LS on clarifitcation to the UPU header handling Qualcomm LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.10 ProSe Secondary Authentication S3‑232488 Living document to TS 33.503 for Prose Secondary Authentication InterDigital, Inc. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233198  
    S3‑233198 Living document to TS 33.503 for Prose Secondary Authentication InterDigital, Inc. draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑232488
    S3‑232490 Naming alignment for 5GPRUK and deleting redundant EN InterDigital, Inc. other Approval Yes
YesEricsson wanted to keep the editor's note and wait for the reply form SA2. Interdigital: we didn’t ask SA2 anything about revokation, what are we waiting for? It was agreed to keep the editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑233184  
    S3‑233184 Naming alignment for 5GPRUK and deleting redundant EN InterDigital, Inc. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232490
    S3‑232732 Addressing Editor's Note on remote multiple Remote User ID Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesEricsson: we asked SA2, let’s wait for the reply. Interdigital: it still is a draft CR, let’s go ahead and adjust later.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232733 pCR on addressing the issue of refaining from sending data by the remote UE Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: we are fine in general with this contribution. Ericsson had some issues with this and it was kept open.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232734 pCR on Addressing Editor's Note on remote UE's subscription update notification Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232754 Discussion paper on refraining from sending data at remote UE Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232755 pCR on refraining issue Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233442 Exception sheet Prosesa Interdiigtal WI exception request Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.11 New WID on DTLS protocol profile for AKMA and GBA S3‑232624 Living document for GBA DTLS to TS 33.220 ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233270  
    S3‑233270 Living document for GBA DTLS to TS 33.220 ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232624
    S3‑233307 Living document for GBA DTLS to TS 33.220 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233379  
    S3‑233379 Living document for GBA DTLS to TS 33.220 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233307
    S3‑232625 Living document for AKMA DTLS to TS 33.535 ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233271  
    S3‑233271 Living document for AKMA DTLS to TS 33.535 ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232625
    S3‑232996 Enable DTLS in Ua star protocol Xiaomi communications other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233271  
4.12 New WID on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture Phase 2 S3‑232895 Clarification on access token requests for NF Producers of a specific NF type and token-based authorization for indirect communication with delegated discovery Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑233215 Clarification on access token requests for NF Producers of a specific NF type and token-based authorization for indirect communication with delegated discovery Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑232947 Validation of the parameters sent by OAuth 2.0 client (NF Service Consumer) in the access token request. Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.13 New WID on IETF OSCORE protocol profiles for GBA and AKMA S3‑233001 Resolve EN for choosing GBA_U GBA_ME Xiaomi communications other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233375  
    S3‑233012 Living document for AKMA_GBA_OSCORE: draftCR to TS 33.220, IETF OSCORE as GBA Ua protocol Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233423  
    S3‑233423 Living document for AKMA_GBA_OSCORE: draftCR to TS 33.220, IETF OSCORE as GBA Ua protocol Ericsson draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑233012
    S3‑233013 pCR to GBA OSCORE living doc: Clarifications Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233375  
    S3‑233375 pCR to GBA OSCORE living doc: Clarifications Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233013
    S3‑233014 Proposal for a living document for AKMA_GBA_OSCORE: draftCR to TS 33.535, IETF OSCORE as AKMA Ua* protocol Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233432 Exception sheet AKMA_GBA_OSCORE Ericsson WI exception request Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.14 New WID on Security aspect of home network triggered primary authentication S3‑232491 HNTRA procedure for SoR case Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233224  
    S3‑232492 HNTRA procedure for UPU case Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233224  
    S3‑232493 HNTRA procedure alignment Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233287  
    S3‑233287 HNTRA procedure alignment Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232493
    S3‑232559 Updating the SoR/UPU counter text in HONTRA draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233224  
    S3‑233224 Updating the SoR/UPU counter text in HONTRA draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232559
    S3‑232560 Resolving the AKMA EN in the HONTRA draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233219  
    S3‑233219 Resolving the AKMA EN in the HONTRA draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232560
    S3‑232626 Delete the SOR and UPU counter wrap around ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232627 Draft CR to TS 33.535-AAnF function ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232628 Draft CR to TS 33.535-AF function ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232629 Draft CR to TS 33.535-Kaf rekeying ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232630 Draft CR to TS 33.535-Kakma rekeying ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233221  
    S3‑232631 Draft CR to TS 33.535-UDM function ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232632 EN removal for optional supporting of HONTRA in 5GC ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233216  
    S3‑233216 EN removal for optional supporting of HONTRA in 5GC ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232632
    S3‑232633 EN removal for new UDM service ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233219  
    S3‑232634 EN removal for pending authentication ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232635 EN removal for selection of AMF ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233217  
    S3‑232636 EN removal for sending authentication requests to 2 AMFs ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232637 EN removal for the response message parameters and the semantics of the different cases ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232638 update the figure of HNA ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232743 New service for UDM Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232744 Living document for HONTRA CR to TS33.535 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233221  
    S3‑233221 Living document for HONTRA CR to TS33.535 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232744
    S3‑233441 Living document for HONTRA CR to TS33.535 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑232745 updating SoR/UPU clauses Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232746 Living document of HONTRA to TS 33.501 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233222  
    S3‑233222 Living document of HONTRA to TS 33.501 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232746
    S3‑233440 Living document of HONTRA to TS 33.501 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑232751 updating interworking usecase Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233223  
    S3‑233223 updating interworking usecase Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232751
    S3‑232752 cleanup HONTRA Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233217  
    S3‑232753 deleting EN for AKMA Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232811 EN removal for optional support of HONTRA LG Electronics other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233216  
    S3‑232974 Remove the EN related to the selection of AMF Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233217  
    S3‑232975 New UDM service operation Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233218  
    S3‑233016 HONTRA clarifications Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233217  
    S3‑233217 HONTRA clarifications Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233016
    S3‑233033 [draftCR] Adding a new security sevice operation provided by the UDM Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233218  
    S3‑233218 [draftCR] Adding a new security sevice operation provided by the UDM Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233033
    S3‑233034 [draft CR] Resolving EN on multiple AMF issue in HNTRA Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233217  
    S3‑233125 HONTRA Clarifications Lenovo draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233221  
4.15 New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Policy Control Function (PCF) S3‑232414 Scope definition for draft TS 33.528 BSI (DE) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232415 Introduction for draft TS 33.528 chapter 4 BSI (DE) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232416 PCF-specific security requirements and related test cases for draft TS 33.528 BSI (DE) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233170  
    S3‑233170 PCF-specific security requirements and related test cases for draft TS 33.528 BSI (DE) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232416
    S3‑232437 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for PCF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233424  
    S3‑233424 Robustness interfaces and protocols defined for PCF Keysight Technologies UK Ltd other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232437
    S3‑233209 Draft TS 33.528 BSI draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.16 New WID on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2 S3‑232499 TNGF and N3IWF redirection information KI3 solution Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233272  
    S3‑232603 CR to TS 33.501, 5WWC, Authentication of AUN3 devices behind RG CableLabs, Charter Communications, Rogers Communications CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233290  
    S3‑233290 CR to TS 33.501, 5WWC, Authentication of AUN3 devices behind RG CableLabs, Charter Communications, Rogers Communications CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232603
    S3‑232739 CR on N3IWF and TNGF relocation Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233272  
    S3‑233272 CR on N3IWF and TNGF relocation Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232739
    S3‑232740 CR on AUN3 device registration Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.17 Proposed WID for UAS Phase 2 security S3‑232552 Living document for UAS draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233425  
    S3‑233425 Living document for UAS draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑232552
    S3‑232553 Proposed text for A2X security parts of UAS living document Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233282  
    S3‑233282 Proposed text for A2X security parts of UAS living document Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232553
    S3‑232554 Proposed text for the Broadcast Remote ID part of UAS living document Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233285  
    S3‑232555 Proposed text for the Direct Detect and Avoid part of UAS living document Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233286  
    S3‑233286 Proposed text for the Direct Detect and Avoid part of UAS living document Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232555
    S3‑232556 Proposed text for the Direct C2 Communication part of UAS living document Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233289  
    S3‑233289 Proposed text for the Direct C2 Communication part of UAS living document Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232556
    S3‑232590 Security for Direct C2 InterDigital, Inc. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233289  
    S3‑232591 Privacy for Direct C2 InterDigital, Inc. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233286  
    S3‑232660 Direct C2 security for unicast Huawei, HiSilicon other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233289  
    S3‑232717 Security and privacy for DAA unicast security Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233286  
    S3‑232718 Security and privacy for DAA traffic broadcast communication Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233286  
    S3‑232719 Security and privacy for Remote ID Broadcast communication Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233285  
    S3‑233285 Security and privacy for Remote ID Broadcast communication Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232719
    S3‑232924 Removal of AMF UUAA result indication_LS China Mobile other Approval Yes
YesLenovo: postpone. Ericsson suported the contribution. No need to add existent text from the SA2 specifications.There is a need to make the correction in Rel-17. Huawei: we don’t agree with this CR.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232925 Enhance the overview with R18 contents-4 China Mobile other Approval Yes
YesMCC commented that this looked like an additional scope clause and not an overview. It was commented that the intention was to give a more detailed scope.
 		approved No    
    S3‑232926 Add the background on A2X Direct Communication-5.x.1 China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233284  
    S3‑233284 Add the background on A2X Direct Communication-5.x.1 China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232926
    S3‑232927 Add the background on A2X Direct C2 Communication-5.y.1 China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233289  
    S3‑233114 Updates to A2X Direct Communication Security for DAA Service Lenovo draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233286  
    S3‑233116 Updates to A2X Direct C2 Communication Security Lenovo draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233289  
    S3‑233445 Exception sheet UAS_Ph2 Qualcomm WI exception request Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.18 New WID on Automated certicate management in SBA S3‑232423 Living document for ACM_SBA (Automated Certificate Management in SBA) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233269  
    S3‑233269 Living document for ACM_SBA (Automated Certificate Management in SBA) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR - No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑232423
    S3‑232516 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Validation of usage of X.509 certificate Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233192  
    S3‑233192 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Validation of usage of X.509 certificate Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232516
    S3‑232517 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Set up of initial trust Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233191  
    S3‑233191 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Set up of initial trust Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232517
    S3‑232518 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Certificate enrolment and renewal for 5GC NFs Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
YesHuawei pointed out that clause x.2.2 was identical to existing content, it could be considered redundant. Ericsson: add a paragraph about CMPv3. It was commented that input on CMPv3 would be added once IETF was done with it. MCC: note 1a contains normative statements, notes can only be informative.
 		revised No S3‑233190  
    S3‑233190 pCR to ACM_SBA living doc_Certificate enrolment and renewal for 5GC NFs Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232518
    S3‑232825 Discussion paper on CMPv3 and lightweight profile Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233082 Update to living document - Initial Trust Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233191  
    S3‑233233 Exception sheet for ACM_SBA Nokia WI exception request Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.19 New WID on security enhancements for NGRTC S3‑232847 living CR for RTC Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233298  
    S3‑233298 living CR for RTC Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232847
    S3‑232848 Security aspects of SBA in IMS media control interface Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233299  
    S3‑233299 Security aspects of SBA in IMS media control interface Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232848
    S3‑232849 Security aspects ofDC usage in IMS Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233017 Annex N additions for IMS data channels Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233018 IMS Data channel security updates Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233435 exception sheet NG_RTC_SEC Huawei WI exception request Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.20 New WID on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC — phase 2 S3‑232785 Authentication and Authorization between AC and EEC Huawei, HiSilicon other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232786 Authentication and Authorization between V-ECS and H-ECS Huawei, HiSilicon other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233171  
    S3‑233171 Authentication and Authorization between V-ECS and H-ECS Huawei, HiSilicon other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232786
    S3‑232787 Security for EAS discovery procedure via V-EASDF Huawei, HiSilicon other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233172  
    S3‑233172 Security for EAS discovery procedure via V-EASDF Huawei, HiSilicon other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232787
    S3‑232788 Transport security for the EDGE10 interface Huawei, HiSilicon other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232836 Clarification on GPSI verification Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233174  
    S3‑233174 Clarification on GPSI verification Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesThe contents of 860 were merged into this document,
 		approved No   S3‑232836
    S3‑232839 Clarification on Server side certificate-based TLS authentication Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesNokia: certificate-based TLS shall be supported and then the details are out of scope? Apple: we didn’t agree on these authentication methods, it could be left for implementation. Samsung: we have a proposal to add an informative annex about this in tdoc 3053.
 		approved No    
    S3‑232841 Living CR of EDGE_Ph2 on TS 33.558 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233371  
    S3‑233371 Living CR of EDGE_Ph2 on TS 33.558 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑232841
    S3‑232842 Living CR of EDGE_Ph2 on TS_33.501 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233372  
    S3‑233372 Living CR of EDGE_Ph2 on TS_33.501 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑232842
    S3‑232853 Addressing security of Edge Node Sharing Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232856 Token-based EES authorization Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232859 EEC authentication and authentication method negotiation Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233173  
    S3‑233173 EEC authentication and authentication method negotiation Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑232859
    S3‑232860 GPSI verification Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑232997 Update for authentication and authorization between V-ECS and H-ECS Xiaomi communications other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233171  
    S3‑233048 [draft CR] ECS/EES side certificate-based authentication Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233168  
    S3‑233168 [draft CR] ECS/EES side certificate-based authentication Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233048
    S3‑233053 [draftCR] Informative annex for details of authentication method Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
YesApple disagreed with the contribution as it had been agreed to leave this out of scope. Qualcomm: this info is already avalabile in other specs.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233434 Exception sheet EDGE_Ph2 Huawei WI exception request Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.21 New WID on AKMA phase 2 S3‑232639 Add AKMA roaming requirements and network model ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233278  
    S3‑232640 Add content for Use of AP ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233281  
    S3‑232741 Update architecture to support roaming Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233278  
    S3‑233278 AKMA roaming requirements Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232741
    S3‑232742 Adding Roaming requirement Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233278  
    S3‑232932 AKMA roaming requirements China Mobile draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233278  
    S3‑232933 AKMA AP China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233281  
    S3‑233281 AKMA AP China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232933
    S3‑232934 Living document for AKMA ph2 WID China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233383  
    S3‑233383 Living document for AKMA ph2 WID China Mobile other Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑232934
    S3‑233405 AKMA ph2 security enhancement China Mobile CR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑232995 Update for authentication proxy in AKMA scenarios Xiaomi communications other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233281  
4.22 New WID on security aspects of MSGin5G Ph2                      
4.23 New WID on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation for 5G - phase 3 S3‑232511 Authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group China Telecommunications draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233267  
    S3‑232535 pCR on Living draft CR WID eNA_Ph3_AIML model sharing Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233268  
    S3‑232536 pCR on Living draft CR WID eNA_Ph3_FL_Authorization Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
YesEricsson: refer to TS 23.888 instead of quoting.
 		revised No S3‑233267  
    S3‑233267 pCR on Living draft CR WID eNA_Ph3_FL_Authorization Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232536
    S3‑232670 Authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group. Intel Belgium SA/NV draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233267  
    S3‑232698 Authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233267  
    S3‑232708 Authorization for analytics exchange in roaming case Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232709 Authorization for data exchange in roaming case Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232896 Authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233267  
    S3‑232897 Security for AI/ML model storage and sharing Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233268  
    S3‑233268 Security for AI/ML model storage and sharing Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232897
    S3‑232939 living CR for eNA China Mobile draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233266  
    S3‑233266 living CR for eNA China Mobile draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑232939
    S3‑232940 General description of protection of data and analytics exchange in roaming case China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233386  
    S3‑233386 General description of protection of data and analytics exchange in roaming case China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232940
    S3‑232941 protection of analytics exchange in roaming case China Mobile other Approval Yes
YesEricsson: this is copying existing text in SA2 specs. They didn’t see the value of this contribution and 708.
 		revised No S3‑233387  
    S3‑233387 protection of analytics exchange in roaming case China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232941
    S3‑233429 Exception sheet eNA_Ph3_SEC China Mobile WI exception request Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.24 New WID on Security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2 S3‑232418 Living document for eNPN_Ph2 (Security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2) Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233248  
    S3‑233248 Living document for eNPN_Ph2 (Security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2) Ericsson draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑232418
    S3‑233444 Living document for eNPN_Ph2 (Security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2) Ericsson CR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑232587 pCR: NSWO support in SNPN using CH with AAA server Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233243  
    S3‑233243 pCR: NSWO support in SNPN using CH with AAA server Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232587
    S3‑232621 Using credential holder for primary authentication in Untrusted N3GPP access CableLabs other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233240  
    S3‑232622 Using credential holder for primary authentication in Trusted N3GPP access CableLabs other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233242  
    S3‑232623 N5CW devices using credential holder for primary authentication CableLabs other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233246  
    S3‑232830 Informative description of authentication for localised services Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233247  
    S3‑233247 Informative description of authentication for localised services Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232830
    S3‑232898 Update to living document - Untrusted non-3GPP access Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233240  
    S3‑233240 Update to living document - Untrusted non-3GPP access Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232898
    S3‑232899 Update to living document - (Option 1) Trusted non-3GPP access Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232900 Update to living document - (Option 2) Trusted non-3GPP access Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233242  
    S3‑233242 Update to living document - (Option 2) Trusted non-3GPP access Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232900
    S3‑232901 Update to living document - Access to SNPN services for N5CW devices Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233246  
    S3‑233246 Update to living document - Access to SNPN services for N5CW devices Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232901
    S3‑232902 Update to living document - NSWO access to SNPN Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233245  
    S3‑233245 Update to living document - NSWO access to SNPN Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232902
    S3‑232903 Update to living document - Security aspects of access to localized services Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233247  
    S3‑232998 Add the security mechanism for N5CW devices in SNPN scenarios Xiaomi communications other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233246  
    S3‑232999 Add the security mechanism for trusted non-3GPP access in SNPN scenarios Xiaomi communications other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233242  
    S3‑233000 Add the security mechanism for untrusted non-3GPP access in SNPN scenarios Xiaomi communications other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233240  
    S3‑233443 Exception sheet eNPN_Ph2 Ericsson WI exception request Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.25 New WID on Security Aspects of Proximity-based Services in 5GS Phase 2 S3‑232569 Adding security procedure for U2U relay discovery with model A in ProSe draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
YesCATT: objecton to note 2.
 		revised No S3‑233177  
    S3‑233177 Adding security procedure for U2U relay discovery with model A in ProSe draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232569
    S3‑232570 Adding security procedure for U2U relay discovery with model B in ProSe draft CR Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
YesDiscussed together with 3066.
 		merged No S3‑233178  
    S3‑232592 Selection between security mechanisms with or without network assistance InterDigital, Inc. draftCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson objected to the Reject message. They also found standalone discovery a very confusing term.
 		merged No S3‑233182  
    S3‑232605 Selection methods between security mechanisms with or without network assistance China Telecommunications draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233182  
    S3‑233182 Selection methods between security mechanisms with or without network assistance China Telecommunications draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232605
    S3‑232611 Add General in U2U Relay communication China Telecommunications draftCR Approval Yes
YesDiscussed with 976.
 		merged No S3‑233180  
    S3‑232612 Add Subclause in U2N Relay emergency China Telecommunications draftCR Approval Yes
YesDiscussed with 642 and 682.
 		merged No S3‑233179  
    S3‑232614 Add General in U2U Relay Discovery China Telecommunications draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233176  
    S3‑232641 Add some terms to 5G_ProSe_Ph2 living doc ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232642 Update clause 6.3.6 to 5G_ProSe_Ph2 living doc ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233179  
    S3‑232643 Update clause 6.6.3 to 5G_ProSe_Ph2 living doc ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
YesDiscussed with 681.
 		merged No S3‑233373  
    S3‑232644 Update clause 6.6.4 to 5G_ProSe_Ph2 living doc ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233183  
    S3‑232645 Update scope to 5G_ProSe_Ph2 living doc ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233175  
    S3‑233175 Update scope to 5G_ProSe_Ph2 living doc ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232645
    S3‑232681 Security for U2U relay in 3GPP coverage Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233373  
    S3‑232682 Emergency service via Layer 2 and Layer 3 UE-to-network relay Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233179  
    S3‑233179 Emergency service via Layer 2 and Layer 3 UE-to-network relay Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232682
    S3‑232721 Security for UE-to-UE Relay discovery procedures Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233176  
    S3‑232722 Security procedures for Layer-3 UE-to-UE Relay with network assistance Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesEricsson: this solution doesn’t work. Xiaomi agreed with Ericsson. Interdigital supported this contribution as opposed to Ericsson's proposal in 681.
 		revised No S3‑233373  
    S3‑233373 Security procedures for Layer-3 UE-to-UE Relay with network assistance Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232722
    S3‑232723 Security procedures for Layer-3 UE-to-UE Relay without network assistance Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: object to second sentence.
 		revised No S3‑233181  
    S3‑233181 Security procedures for Layer-3 UE-to-UE Relay without network assistance Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232723
    S3‑232724 Security procedures for 5G ProSe Layer-2 UE-to-UE Relay Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233183  
    S3‑233183 Security procedures for 5G ProSe Layer-2 UE-to-UE Relay Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232724
    S3‑232725 Selection of UE-to-UE Relay security procedures Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233182  
    S3‑232976 Security requirement for UE-to-UE Relay communication Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233180  
    S3‑233180 Security requirement for UE-to-UE Relay communication Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232976
    S3‑232977 Security of 5G Prose PC5 Communication for 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-UE Relay without network assistance in TS 33.503 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233181  
    S3‑232978 Security for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE Relay communication with integrated discovery Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software other Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: this is not concluded in the study yet, we don’t agree with this one now. Huawei: let's discuss it first in the study.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233025 Living document for 5G_ProSe_Ph2 CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233374  
    S3‑233374 Living document for 5G_ProSe_Ph2 CATT draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑233025
    S3‑233030 PCR to the living document for 5G_ProSe_Ph2-Model A discovery CATT draftCR Approval Yes
YesDiscussed with 569. Interidigital preferred Qualcomm's contribution.
 		merged No S3‑233177  
    S3‑233066 PCR to the living document for 5G_ProSe_Ph2-Model B discovery CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233178  
    S3‑233178 PCR to the living document for 5G_ProSe_Ph2-Model B discovery CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233066
    S3‑233072 4.25 - Update to 5G UE-to-UE Relay Discovery (Clause 6.1.3.3.1) Philips International B.V. draftCR Approval Yes
YesOPPO: second paragraph is not acceptable.
 		revised No S3‑233176  
    S3‑233176 4.25 - Update to 5G UE-to-UE Relay Discovery (Clause 6.1.3.3.1) Philips International B.V. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233072
    S3‑233073 4.25 - Update to selection of security mechanism (Clause 6.6.3.3) Philips International B.V. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233182  
    S3‑233430 Exception sheet 5G_ProSe_Ph2 CATT WI exception request Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.26 New WID on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning S3‑232646 Update clause 4 to TS 33.533 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233310  
    S3‑232694 Authorization for application server and 5GC NF in Ranging/SL Positioning service exposure, Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233312  
    S3‑233312 Authorization for application server and 5GC NF in Ranging/SL Positioning service exposure, Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232694
    S3‑232695 Authorization for UE in Ranging/SL Positioning service exposure, Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesXiaomi didn’t agree with this contribution.
 		revised No S3‑233398  
    S3‑233398 Authorization for UE in Ranging/SL Positioning service exposure, Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232695
    S3‑232715 Security for the ranging discovery Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233312  
    S3‑232716 Ranging unicast security procedures Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233315  
    S3‑232962 33.533: Update to the Scope Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233309  
    S3‑233309 33.533: Update to the Scope Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
YesAdding groupcast.
 		approved No   S3‑232962
    S3‑232963 33.533: Overview of security architecture Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233310  
    S3‑233310 33.533: Overview of security architecture Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232963
    S3‑232964 33.533: Security Requirements and Procedure for Discovery Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233314  
    S3‑233314 33.533: Security Requirements and Procedure for Discovery Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232964
    S3‑232965 33.533: Security Procedure for Discovery of V2X capable UEs Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233314  
    S3‑232966 33.533: Authorization Requirements for Ranging/SL Positioning Services Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with the last requirement. Qualcomm: third and fourth requirements were not discussed in the key issue.
 		revised No S3‑233313  
    S3‑233313 33.533: Authorization Requirements for Ranging/SL Positioning Services Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232966
    S3‑232967 33.533: Authorization of AF/5GC NF for Ranging/SL positioning service exposure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233314  
    S3‑232968 33.533: Procedure of UE Role Authorization by the Network Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232969 33.533: Security Requirements and Procedures for Unicast Communication Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233315  
    S3‑233315 33.533: Security Requirements and Procedures for Unicast Communication Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232969
    S3‑232970 33.533: Security Procedure for Direct Communication without Long Term Credentials Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233311 Draft TS 33.533 Xiaomi draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.27 New WID on enhanced security aspects of SEAL for vertical S3‑233038 [draftCR] Living document for SEAL security for network domain interfaces Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233327 SEAL security for network domain interfaces Samsung CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.28 New WID on application enablement aspects for subscriber-aware northbound API access S3‑232713 Authentication and authorization for RNAA Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232865 Client credential flow Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233126 pCR to SNAAPPY CR NTT DOCOMO INC. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233407  
    S3‑233407 pCR to SNAAPPY CR NTT DOCOMO INC. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233126
    S3‑233127 SNAAPPY CR baseliine NTT DOCOMO INC. draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233426  
    S3‑233426 SNAAPPY CR baseliine NTT DOCOMO INC. draftCR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑233127
    S3‑233437 Exception sheet SNAAPY NTT-Docomo WI exception request Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
5 Rel-18 Studies                      
5.1 Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations S3‑232818 5GFBS - Conclusion Apple pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233328  
    S3‑233328 5GFBS - Conclusion Apple pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232818
    S3‑233213 Cover page TR 33.809 Apple TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233446 Draft TR 33.809 Apple draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2 Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation S3‑232845 New solution on attestation at 3GPP application layer Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233305  
    S3‑233305 New solution on attestation at 3GPP application layer Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232845
    S3‑232872 pCR to TR33.848 - Editorial corrections Vodafone GmbH pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232875 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #1 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233156  
    S3‑233156 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #1 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232875
    S3‑232876 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #2 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233157  
    S3‑233157 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #2 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232876
    S3‑232877 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #3 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233158  
    S3‑233158 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #3 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232877
    S3‑232880 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #4 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233159  
    S3‑233159 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #4 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232880
    S3‑232882 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #5 Vodafone GmbH pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233160  
    S3‑233160 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #5 Vodafone GmbH pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232882
    S3‑232884 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #6 Vodafone GmbH pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233161  
    S3‑233161 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #6 Vodafone GmbH pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232884
    S3‑232912 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #7 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233162  
    S3‑233162 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #7 Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232912
    S3‑232913 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #8 Vodafone GmbH pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233163  
    S3‑233163 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of evaluation for Solution #8 Vodafone GmbH pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232913
    S3‑232914 Cover Sheet for TR 33.848 - For Information Vodafone GmbH TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233164  
    S3‑233164 Cover Sheet for TR 33.848 - For Information Vodafone GmbH TS or TR cover Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑232914
    S3‑232915 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of Conclusions and Recommendations Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233306  
    S3‑233306 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of Conclusions and Recommendations Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232915
    S3‑232944 pCR to TR33.848 - Addition of Appendix - Potential contents page for an Attestation TR Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233079 pCR to TR33.848 - Update of Annex B Vodafone GmbH pCR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑233384 Draft TR 33.848 Vosafone draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.3 Study on Security Aspects of Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 2 S3‑232571 Updates on the solution #23 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232572 Updates on the solution #24 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232573 Conclusion of KI#1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232574 Conclusion of KI#2 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232575 Conclusion of KI#5 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232593 Update to TR 33.740 Conclusion for KI#1 InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232594 Discussion on ProSe U2U Relay discovery security with Model A InterDigital, Inc. discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232595 DRAFT LS on Security for U2U Relay Discovery with Model A InterDigital, Inc. LS out Approval Yes
YesQualcomm didn’t agree with sending this LS. Key issue 1 can be agreed in SA3. Key issue 2 is not clear on the protected discovery sets.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232596 Update TR 33.740 conclusion for KI #2 InterDigital, Inc., Philips International B.V., Huawei, HiSilicon, Xiaomi pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232597 Update TR 33.740 conclusion for KI #4 InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232598 Update TR 33.740 Solution #34 InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232599 Update to TR 33.740 Solution #35 InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232600 Update to TR 33.740 Solution #36 InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232601 Update Evaluation TR 33.740 solution #12 InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232680 Update to solution #31 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232683 Update to solution #3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232684 Update to conclusion for KI#1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232685 Update to conclusion for KI#2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232720 Update to the conclusion of KI#1 in TR 33.740 to include the Discovery integrated in PC5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232972 Update to Conclusion on Key Issue #1 in TR 33.740 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232973 draft LS on UE-to-UE Relay discovery Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
YesCATT: SA3 can reuse existing solutions.We don’t need this LS.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233005 pCR to TR33.740 Update Solution #28 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233006 pCR to TR33.740 Update conclusion of key issue #1 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233007 pCR to TR33.740 Update conclusion of key issue #5 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233040 Conclusion on KI #1 Samsung, KT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233041 Conclusion on KI #5 Samsung, KT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233067 5.3 - Update to Solution 32 Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233068 5.3 - Update to Solution 37 Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233069 5.3 - Conclusion to KI 1 Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
YesTwo options were on the table according to the group of contributions:: Option 1: DCR protected with network assistant information. Option 2: DCR not protected without network assistant mechanisms. CATT proposed to support both options and make it optional which one to use.
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233115 Conclusion for KI#5 OPPO pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233408 Cover sheet TR 33.740 CATT TS or TR cover Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.4 Study on privacy of identifiers over radio access S3‑232407 Update to Solution #11 in ID Privacy Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑232426 Add Evaluation to Solution #12 in ID Privacy Johns Hopkins University APL, InterDigital pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232429 Evaluation of Solution #11 in ID Privacy Peraton Labs pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232500 PCR to 33.870 Changes to Solution #2 InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232501 PCR to 33.870 - Solution #2 Evaluation InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232510 A discussion paper on conclusions for KI #1: Privacy aspects of variable length user identifiers InterDigital Communications, CableLabs, Convida Wireless, Ericsson, Nokia, Philips, Telefonica, US National Security Agency, Verizon Wireless discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233083  
    S3‑232582 Correction to Solution 11 - Protecting the privacy of high priority users Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232583 Evaluation of Solution 11 - Protecting the privacy of high priority users Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232584 Proposed Evaluation to Solution 12 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232585 Proposed conclusion to KI#2- Protecting the privacy of high priority users Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232586 pCR: Conclusion for KI#1 Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesChina Mobile supported this contribution. Lenovo: fine with this one, but the alternative in 3057 could also be fine if the example in the second bullet was removed. Qualcomm: remove the fitst sentence.Add an editor's note on further conclusion is FFS.
 		revised No S3‑233186  
    S3‑233186 pCR: Conclusion for KI#1 Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232586
    S3‑232602 Update to Solution #11 in ID Privacy Johns Hopkins University APL, InterDigital pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232668 Solution 12: Delete Privacy EN Intel Belgium SA/NV pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232669 Solution 12: Delete Privacy EN Intel Belgium SA/NV pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232873 Supplement to Solution #7 China Telecommunications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232921 EN Removal for sol#4 33.870 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232922 Evaluation for sol#4 33.870 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232981 New sol to KI#2 of TR 33.870 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233055 Updating Solution #9: Concealing length of SUPIs in SUCIs by padding the SUPIs Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233056 Updating Evaluation of Solution #9: Concealing length of SUPIs in SUCIs by padding the SUPIs Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233057 KI #1 Conclusion Ericsson, Interdigital, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Convida Wireless, CableLabs, NCSC, Telefonica, US NSA, Philips, Verizon Wireless and John Hopkins University pCR Approval Yes
YesThales: remove USIM and/or ME. IDEMIA: subscription is in the USIM. SUPI is a part of the subscription parameters. Qualcomm: we don’t agree with the third conclusion proposal. Huawei: we don’t have a solution ready.It seems to have an UE impact, is it worth it? China Mobile: we don’t agree with the third bullet conclusion.
 		merged No S3‑233186  
    S3‑233077 New Solution to KI #2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233083 A discussion paper on conclusions for KI #1: Privacy aspects of variable length user identifiers InterDigital Communications, CableLabs, Convida Wireless, Ericsson, NCSC, Nokia, Philips, Telefonica, US National Security Agency, Verizon Wireless discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		not treated No   S3‑232510
    S3‑233122 Update to Solution #1 in ID Privacy Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233378 Draft TR 33.870 Interdigital draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.5 Study on Standardising Automated Certificate Management in SBA S3‑232408 Evaluation of Solution #16, ACME, for Automated Certificate Management in SBA Cisco Systems, Google, Telefonica, Charter Communications, AT&T, CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233187  
    S3‑233187 Evaluation of Solution #16, ACME, for Automated Certificate Management in SBA Cisco Systems, Google, Telefonica, Charter Communications, AT&T, CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232408
    S3‑232425 Address EN in Solution #16, ACME, for Automated Certificate Management in SBA Cisco Systems, CableLabs, Google pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232512 TR 33.876 cover for Information and Approval Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232513 Update of IETF reference in Solution 10 and removal of EN in KI7 conclusion Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232514 Editorials in clause 3 of TR 33.876 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232515 Conclusion of ACM_SBA KI#6 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232824 KI#6 Sol#7 EN resolution and evaluation Ericsson pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233188  
    S3‑233188 KI#6 Sol#7 EN resolution and evaluation Ericsson pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232824
    S3‑233137 Address Editor Note in Solution #16 Section 6.16.2.2.2.3 Certificate Validation Google Inc., Cablelabs, Deutsche Telekom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233189 draft TR 33.876 Nokia draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.6 New SID on AKMA phase 2 S3‑232647 Conclusion for KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233275  
    S3‑233275 Conclusion for KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232647
    S3‑232930 Clarification of the scope China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233276  
    S3‑233276 Clarification of the scope China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
YesThird bullet and note go away. MCC commented that if the key issue was not addressed it needed to be removed from the scope.In case the Study had this issue in the objectives it would need to be revised as well to reflect that fact that it wasn’t treated.
 		approved No   S3‑232930
    S3‑232931 Presentation of TR 33.737 to TSG China Mobile TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233277 Draft TR 33.737 China Mobile draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.7 Study of Security aspect of home network triggered primary authentication                      
5.8 Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation for 5G – phase 3 S3‑232502 Update to conclusion on KI#2 China Telecommunications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233250  
    S3‑233250 Update to conclusion on KI#2 China Telecommunications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232502
    S3‑232503 Update to conclusion on KI#3 China Telecommunications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233251  
    S3‑232532 Resolution of ENs of KI#2 conclusion in eNA_SEC_Ph3 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233250  
    S3‑232533 Resolution of ENs of KI#1 conclusion in eNA_SEC_Ph3 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with the authorization policies in the authorization token.
 		revised No S3‑233249  
    S3‑232534 Conclusion of eNA_SEC_Ph3 KI#4 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232666 Resolution of EN for KI#2 Intel Belgium SA/NV pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233250  
    S3‑232699 Update conclusion for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233250  
    S3‑232706 Conclusion update for AI ML model authorization Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233251  
    S3‑232707 Conclusion for abnormal NF detection Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesIt was commented that the key issue 4 wasn't really agreed and that is why no consensus could be reached since Release 17.
 		revised No S3‑233262  
    S3‑233262 Conclusion for abnormal NF detection Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232707
    S3‑232904 Resolve EN to conclusion to KI#2 "Authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group" Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233250  
    S3‑232905 Resolution of EN in the conclusion for KI#3 "Security for AI/ML model storage and sharing" Ericsson, Nokia, Intel pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233251  
    S3‑233251 Resolution of EN in the conclusion for KI#3 "Security for AI/ML model storage and sharing" Ericsson, Nokia, Intel pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232905
    S3‑232935 Conclusion for key issue #4 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232936 Conclusion for key issue #6 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233265  
    S3‑233265 Conclusion for key issue #6 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232936
    S3‑232937 Update conclusion for key issue #1 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233249  
    S3‑233249 Resolution of ENs of KI#1 conclusion in eNA_SEC_Ph3 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232533
    S3‑232938 Presentation of TR33.738 to TSG for approval China Mobile TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233436  
    S3‑233436 Presentation of TR33.738 to TSG for approval China Mobile TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232938
    S3‑233123 Update to Solution #9 in eNA Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: change editor's notes to NOTES.
 		revised No S3‑233263  
    S3‑233263 Update to Solution #9 in eNA Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233123
    S3‑233124 Update to Solution #20 in eNA Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233264 Draft TR 33.738 China Mobile draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.9 Study on Security Enhancement of support for Edge Computing — phase 2 S3‑232478 Adding evaluation for Sol#26 InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233283  
    S3‑233283 Adding evaluation for Sol#26 InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232478
    S3‑232479 EEC Authorization by V-ECS in VPLMN InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232480 A solution for EEC IP address verification InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233366  
    S3‑233366 A solution for EEC IP address verification InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232480
    S3‑232481 Updates for Solution #26 InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233283  
    S3‑232482 Additional Scenario for Solution #26 – Scenario 2 InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233283  
    S3‑232483 Additional Scenario for Solution #26 – Scenario 3 InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233283  
    S3‑232783 Update the Key issue on EEC provided information verification Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232784 New solution for EEC provided IP address verification Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233344  
    S3‑233344 New solution for EEC provided IP address verification Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232784
    S3‑232817 MEC - Adding conclusions on UE optimisation in KI#2.2 Apple pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232834 Resolving EN in Conclusions for Key Issue #2.6 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232835 Resolving EN of in Conclusions for Key Issue#2.1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233169  
    S3‑233169 Resolving EN of in Conclusions for Key Issue#2.1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232835
    S3‑232854 Resolving EN in solution #27 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233303  
    S3‑233303 Resolving EN in solution #27 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232854
    S3‑232855 Update conclusion on authorization between EESes Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: there are still issues in the solution that need to be addressed. This is a bit premature.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232857 Conclusion for EEC provided IP address verification Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232858 Resolving ENs in solution #28 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232982 Update KI#2.1 conclusion of TR 33.739 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
YesThales, Qualcomm disagreed as it was written here.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232983 KI#2.7, new sol on AKMAGBA based IP address verification Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233367  
    S3‑233367 KI#2.7, new sol on AKMAGBA based IP address verification Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
YesRemoving evaluation.
 		approved No   S3‑232983
    S3‑232984 KI#2.7, new sol on KDF based IP verification Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233368  
    S3‑233368 KI#2.7, new sol on KDF based IP verification Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232984
    S3‑233046 Updates to conclusion#2.1 Samsung, Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo, Apple: the content is agreed but it shouldn’t be a conclusion. Better placed in the TS in the form of a note.
 		merged No S3‑233169  
    S3‑233047 Updates to conclusion#2.2 Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon, Intel, CableLabs, China Unicom, ZTE, Thales, Lenovo, Hyundai Motor Company, InterDigital Communications, KT, Deutsche Telekom pCR Approval Yes
YesShow of hands on the optimization procedure in this document: Support: Samsung, Huawei,Interdigital, DT,Thales, ZTE. No support: Xiaomi, Apple,Ericsson, Vivo. The Chair commented that this was optional for the network and UE. Apple commented that there was no big difference between the hands raised. The Chair declared a working agreement on the content of tdoc S3-233047.
 		approved No    
    S3‑233049 Updates to evaluation of solution#28 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233050 New solution for IP address verification Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233369  
    S3‑233369 New solution for IP address verification Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233050
    S3‑233051 New solution for IP address verification using access token Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233370  
    S3‑233370 New solution for IP address verification using access token Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233051
    S3‑233052 Conclusion for key issue#2.7 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233197 Draft TR 33.739 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.10 Study on Personal IoT Networks Security Aspects S3‑232581 Conclusion for KI#1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233433  
    S3‑232648 Add conclusion for KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232667 Conclusion for KI#2: Authorization of PIN capabilities. Intel Belgium SA/NV pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232686 Conclusion for KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232750 Conclusion to KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232756 clean up KI #1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232831 Conclusions to KI#1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233433  
    S3‑233433 Conclusions to KI#1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232831
    S3‑232832 Conclusions to KI#2 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232987 Add conclusion for KI #2 of TR 33.882 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232988 Add conclusion to KI#1 of TR 33.882 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233008 Cover sheet for presentation of TR 33.882 to TSG-SA#100 vivo TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233273  
    S3‑233273 Cover sheet for presentation of TR 33.882 to TSG-SA#100 vivo TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233008
    S3‑233024 Interim conclusions on KI#1 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233026 Interim conclusions on KI#2 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233027 Mega to clean up ENs vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233409 TR cleanup Vivo pCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.11 Study on SNAAPP security S3‑232712 Address ENs for solution #1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233356  
    S3‑233356 Address ENs for solution #1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232712
    S3‑232863 Resolving EN in solution #6 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233304  
    S3‑233304 Resolving EN in solution #6 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232863
    S3‑232864 Update to conclusion Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233274  
    S3‑232990 KI#1, new sol on checking API invoker authorization Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232991 KI#2, add evaluation to sol #14 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232992 KI#2, update sol #14 for the triggering of authorization revocation Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232993 Update authorization revocation conclusion Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233274  
    S3‑232994 Update conclusion of TR 33.884 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233274  
    S3‑233028 pCR to 33.884 - conclusions NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233274  
    S3‑233274 pCR to 33.884 - conclusions NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233028
    S3‑233029 pCR to 33.884 - TR cleanup NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233427  
    S3‑233427 pCR to 33.884 - TR cleanup NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233029
    S3‑233042 Resolving EN on conclusion Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233274  
    S3‑233043 Updates to sol#6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233324  
    S3‑233324 Updates to sol#6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233043
    S3‑233382 Draft TR 33.884 NTT-Docomo draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑233428 Cover sheet TR 33.884 NTT_Docomo TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.12 Study on enhanced security for network slicing Phase 3 S3‑232650 Conclusion for KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233357  
    S3‑232653 KI#1 update Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232654 new solution to KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233361  
    S3‑233361 new solution to KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232654
    S3‑232655 conclusions to KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233357  
    S3‑233357 conclusions to KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232655
    S3‑232656 Evaluation to solution#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233359  
    S3‑233359 Evaluation to solution#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232656
    S3‑232657 conclusions to KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233358  
    S3‑233358 conclusions to KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232657
    S3‑232679 Conclusion for KI#2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233357  
    S3‑232794 Conclusion for KI#3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232810 Conclusion for KI#3 LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233358  
    S3‑232989 Add evaluation to sol #3 of TR 33.886 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233360  
    S3‑233360 Add evaluation to sol #3 of TR 33.886 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232989
    S3‑233100 conclusion for KI#3 network slice admission control Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233358  
    S3‑233385 Draft TR 33.886 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑233399 Cover sheet TR 33.886 Huawei TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.13 Study on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2 S3‑232494 KI3 conclusion update Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232495 KI4 conclusion Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232496 updating the existing solution mapping Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232497 Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG: TR 33.887, Version 0.7.0 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232498 Revised WID on Security aspect of 5WWC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID revised Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232557 Proposed conclusion for KI#4 Qualcomm Incorporated, Cablelabs, Broadcom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232737 Add conclusion to KI#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232738 Update solution#11 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233280  
    S3‑233280 Update solution#11 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232738
    S3‑232906 Resolving ENs in Solution #13 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233381  
    S3‑233381 Resolving ENs in Solution #13 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232906
    S3‑233084 TR cleanup Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233288  
    S3‑233288 TR cleanup Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑233084
    S3‑233093 Discussion on KI#4 solution analysis Lenovo discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233107 LS on Clarification of support for trusted non-3GPP technologies Lenovo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233108 Conclusion to KI#4 Lenovo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233279 Draft TR 33.887 Nokia draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.14 Study on the security aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) for the NG-RAN S3‑232453 Discussion paper on Effects of black-box data poisoning on RAN AI/ML Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232455 Key issue updates for robustness of the RAN AI/ML framework against data poisoning attacks Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232457 Solution for Key Issue #2 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232460 Updates for Key Issue #1 User Privacy of the RAN AI/ML framework Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232462 Solution for Key Issue #1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233009 AIML_NGRAN KI2 conclusion Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233010 AIML_NGRAN KI1 conclusion Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233011 AIML_NGRAN KI3 conclusion Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233363 Draft TR33.877 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑233393 Cover sheet TR 33.877 Ericsson TS or TR cover Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.15 Study on security support for Next Generation Real Time Communication services S3‑232846 Conclusion for key issue #1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233297  
    S3‑233297 Conclusion for key issue #1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232846
    S3‑232850 Cleanups for RTC Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233300  
    S3‑233300 Cleanups for RTC Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232850
    S3‑233301 Draft TR 33.890 nn draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑233302 Presentation of TR33.890 to TSG for information and approval Huawei TS or TR cover Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.16 Study on security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2 S3‑232618 Solution using credential holder AAA for NSWO via 5GC CableLabs, Charter Communications pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: not clear what motivates this. This is not in the SA2 spec on NSWO. There are non seciurity issues here that need to be solved by SA2.
 		revised No S3‑233402  
    S3‑233402 Solution using credential holder AAA for NSWO via 5GC CableLabs, Charter Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232618
    S3‑232619 Additional conclusion on using Credential Holder AAA for NSWO CableLabs, Charter Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232710 New Solution on Implicit Authentication for Serving Network for NSWO support in SNPN Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232711 Conclusion for Implicit Authentication for Serving Network related to NSWO Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232735 Delete Editor's Note to sol#18 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233403  
    S3‑233403 Delete Editor's Note to sol#18 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232735
    S3‑232736 Update conclusion 7.1.3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233235  
    S3‑232828 Resolution of EN – conclusion to KI#1 – N5GC device access Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232829 Resolution of EN – conclusion to KI#1 – Trusted access Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Intel pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233235  
    S3‑233235 Resolution of EN – conclusion to KI#1 – Trusted access Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Intel pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232829
    S3‑232907 Updated conclusion for KI#1 regarding trusted access Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233235  
    S3‑232908 Updated conclusion for KI#1 regarding N5CW access Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232909 Updated conclusion of KI#2 Authentication for UE access to hosting network Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233404  
    S3‑233404 Updated conclusion of KI#2 Authentication for UE access to hosting network Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232909
    S3‑232910 Clean up of TR 33.858 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233236  
    S3‑233236 Clean up of TR 33.858 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232910
    S3‑232911 Presentation of Report to TSG: TR 33.858, Version 2.0.0 Ericsson TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232985 Update Conclusion for Trusted N3GPP access to SNPN Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232986 update Sol#2 for tracability of UE Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233237 Draft TR 33.858 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.17 Study on Security of Phase 2 for UAS, UAV and UAM                      
5.18 Study to enable URSP rules to securely identify Applications S3‑232588 pCR: Evaluation of Solution #1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑233362 pCR: Evaluation of Solution #1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑232589 pCR: Conclusion for TR 33.892 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesApple: we support this, there is no technical feasibility.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232658 new solution to KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232659 conclusions to KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232827 Resolution of editor’s note in solution 1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233362  
    S3‑232868 Conclusion for KI#1 Lenovo, AT&T, Broadcom, CableLabs, CATT, Charter, China Mobile, China Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Intel, LG Electronics, Motorola Solutions MSI, NEC, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung, Verizon, Xiaomi pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
5.19 Study on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning S3‑232576 Update of a conclusion for KI #3 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233230  
    S3‑233230 Update of a conclusion for KI #3 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232576
    S3‑232577 Updates on the solution #15 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232578 An update of solution #12 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232579 Update on solution #9 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233228  
    S3‑233228 Update on solution #9 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232579
    S3‑232580 Conclusion of KI#5 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233231  
    S3‑232649 Add conclusion for KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233230  
    S3‑232692 Conclusion for KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233225  
    S3‑232693 update to solution#21 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232714 Update to the conclusion of KI#3 in TR 33.893 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233230  
    S3‑232807 New solution for Discovery security material and SL session root key provisioning for Ranging/SL Positioning UE discovery Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233229  
    S3‑233229 New solution for Discovery security material and SL session root key provisioning for Ranging/SL Positioning UE discovery Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232807
    S3‑232816 SL Positioning-Groupcast security Apple pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232826 Update to Solution #19 BUPT, OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232866 Removal of Editor’s Notes of solution #28 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232874 Resolve the Editor’s Notes in Solution #27 BUPT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232943 Update Sol#21 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232946 Update the Conclusion of KI#3 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233230  
    S3‑232948 Conclusion on KI#5 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233231  
    S3‑232949 pCR to TR33.893 Update Solution #22 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232951 33.893: Update Note 5 in Solution #15 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232952 33.893: Resolve the Editor’s Note in Solution #16 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233394  
    S3‑233394 33.893: Resolve the Editor’s Note in Solution #16 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232952
    S3‑232953 33.893: Resolve the Editor’s Note in Solution #17 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233395  
    S3‑233395 33.893: Resolve the Editor’s Note in Solution #17 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232953
    S3‑232954 33.893: Conclusions on Privacy during Discovery for Key Issue #1 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233226  
    S3‑233226 33.893: Conclusions on Privacy during Discovery for Key Issue #1 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232954
    S3‑232955 33.893: Conclusions on Non-Trackability for Key Issue #1 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233227  
    S3‑233227 33.893: Conclusions on Non-Trackability for Key Issue #1 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232955
    S3‑232956 33.893: Conclusions on Client UE Authorization for Key Issue #2 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233225  
    S3‑233225 33.893: Conclusions on Client UE Authorization for Key Issue #2 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232956
    S3‑232957 33.893: Further Conclusions UE Role Authorization for Key Issue #2 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233396  
    S3‑233396 33.893: Further Conclusions UE Role Authorization for Key Issue #2 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232957
    S3‑232958 33.893: Further Conclusions on Key Issue #3 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233230  
    S3‑232959 33.893: Further Conclusions on Key Issue #4 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233397  
    S3‑233397 33.893: Further Conclusions on Key Issue #4 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232959
    S3‑232960 33.893: Conclusions on Key Issue #5 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233231  
    S3‑233231 33.893: Conclusions on Key Issue #5 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑232960
    S3‑233002 pCR to TR33.893 Update Solution #23 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233003 pCR to TR33.893 Update Solution #24 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233004 pCR to TR33.893 Conclusion of KI#5 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233231  
    S3‑233070 5.19 - Update to Solution 20 Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233071 5.19 - Conclusion KI 5 Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233231  
    S3‑233210 Draft TR 33.893 Xiaomi draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑233400 Cover sheet TR 33.893 Xiaomi TS or TR cover Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.20 Study on Security and Privacy of AI/ML-based Services and Applications in 5G S3‑232484 Solution of Untrusted AF Authorization for Policy Management InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232485 Solution of Trusted AF Authorization for Policy Management InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232486 Solution Evaluation for AIML AF Authorization Policy Management InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232700 Add conclusion for key issue #1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233109 Missed changes in pCR OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233111 clean up of TR 33.898 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233112 Presentation of TR 33.898 OPPO TS or TR cover Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233365 Draft TR 33.898 Huawei draft TR discussion Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.21 Study on applicability of the Zero Trust Security principles in mobile networks S3‑232427 Add Tenets to Tenet Evaluation Summary Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑232487 Add Tenets to Tenet Evaluation Summary Johns Hopkins University APL, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232776 Evaluation for tenet 4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232777 Additions to evaluation of tenet 6 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233320  
    S3‑233320 Additions to evaluation of tenet 6 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232777
    S3‑232778 Additions to evaluation of tenet 7 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233085 Update to Tenet #7 Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Telefonica pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233086 Update to Tenet #6 Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Telefonica pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233320  
    S3‑233088 Update to Tenet #5 Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Telefonica pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233089 New clause on actual tenets information Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Telefonica pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233090 Discussion on agreed threat scenarios and the need to collect data Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Johns Hopkins University APL, Telefonica discussion Endorsement Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with a designated network function in SBA.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233091 Data collection for Security Monitoring Lenovo, Charter Communications, US National Security Agency, Telefonica, Rakuten Mobile, Center for Internet Security, Cablelabs, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson objected to this solution. There are propietary solutions already working.
 		revised No S3‑233325  
    S3‑233325 Data collection for Security Monitoring Lenovo, Charter Communications, US National Security Agency, Telefonica, Rakuten Mobile, Center for Internet Security, Cablelabs, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑233091
    S3‑233092 Conclusion to KI#1 Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Telefonica, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: discussing conclusions at this point is too early. We object to this. Ericsson also objected.
 		revised No S3‑233326  
    S3‑233326 Conclusion to KI#1 Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Telefonica, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑233092
    S3‑233136 ZTA approach: NF to NF Communication Access Control via PDP and PEP MITRE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233448 Draft TR 33.894 Lenovo draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.22 Study of Security aspects on User Consent for 3GPP Services Phase 2 S3‑232701 Clean up for UC3S_Ph2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑233318 Draft TR 33.896 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑233319 Cover sheet TR 33.896 Huawei TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.23 Study on security enhancements for 5G multicast-broadcast services Phase 2 S3‑232565 A new solution for mitigating privacy attacks exploiting group paging with TMGI Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232566 Conclusion for Key Issue #2 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233167  
    S3‑232567 An update on the evaluations of solution #1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232568 Conclusion for Key Issue #1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesShow of hands: Q: Which option do you prefer as the conclusion of the MOCN issue? Option A: S3-232568 --> Qualcomm, Ericsson Option B: S3-232687 --> Huawei, Samsung, Nokia, Apple, OPPO,Philips,CATT Option B as way forward.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232674 Conclusion for KI#2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233167  
    S3‑233167 Conclusion for KI#2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232674
    S3‑232687 Conclusion for KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon, Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑232688 Conclusion for KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon, Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑233167  
    S3‑233031 [MBS] Updates to solution#1 Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233032 [MBS] Evaluation for solution#3 Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑233196 draft TR 33.883 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑233364 Cover sheet TR 33.883 Huawei TS or TR cover Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.24 Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture                      
5.25 Study on Security Aspects of Satellite Access S3‑232651 Add a new solution for key issue 1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesXiaomi: not aligned with SA2.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232652 Update conclusion for key issue 1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232971 33.700-28: Update to Conclusion on Key Issue #1 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233316  
    S3‑233316 33.700-28: Update to Conclusion on Key Issue #1 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232971
    S3‑233317 Draft TR 33.700-28 Xiaomi draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑233401 Cover sheet TR 33.700-28 Xiaomi TS or TR cover Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
6 New Study/Work item proposals (only Rel-18 in scope) S3‑232413 New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR) BSI (DE) WID new Approval Yes
YesNokia: UDR-UDM interface is internal and transparent to SCAS, not visible from architecture perspective. We don’t need this WID. Huawei: too much detail in the justification. It needs to be revised. Orange: even if the interface UDR-UDM is internal it doesn’t mean that we cannot test it. BSI: there are standalone implementations for UDR, we feel the need for testing it. KPN: TR 33.845 considered UDR and UDM as a separate thing. This WID is needed. Ericsson supported this WID. KPN, Orange,Philips Keysight alsu supported this WID. The Chair asked what could be done in this WID. BSI replied: transmission of keys between UDR and UDM can be tested, depending on the implementation. Orange commented that these kind of issues were part of the technical work of the WID and not of the discusssion for agreeing on the WID. NTT-Docomo: plenty of test cases in other SCAS documents that are implementation dependent.We are only testing the security. Nokia: let’s do first the anlaysis; is there anything to do here? NTT-Docomo: we can do a single shot approval, WID together with a complete TS. Huawei: this is going into Release 19 timeline, fix the dates. The Chair commented that existing UDM test cases already address part of the UDR functionality, so it was unclear whether this could be included in the UDM WID or a separate UDR WID. It was agreed that test cases would be brought on the UDR and a decision would be made after discussions.
 		noted No   S3‑230680
    S3‑232489 Revised WID: 5G ProSe Secondary Authentication InterDigital, Inc. WID revised Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: we want to wait for the response from SA2 to our LS before making this change on the WID. Huawei: no need to update, everything is supported already. Interdigital: we only want to clarify that user plane is included. Ericsson: SA2 is evaluating this procedure this week. Interdigital: in that case we will not convert the living document into a CR. No need procedure is being introduced in this update.We want to avoid objections in the future becaue the UP is not mentioned in the Study Item. KPN supported Interdigital. MCC: it is OK to align the work done with the description in the SID. The Chair clarified that no new procedure was being added here.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232519 Revised WID on Automated certificate management in SBA Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID revised   Yes
YesHuawei: concerned with key issue 9 to avoid committing to anything. We just want to reformulate.
 		revised No S3‑233291  
    S3‑233291 Revised WID on Automated certificate management in SBA Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID revised - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232519
    S3‑232558 Update of 5WWC WID Qualcomm Incorporated WID revised Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232613 SID on Study on security for N32 and SEPP hosted scenarios Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new   Yes
YesEricsson: it cannot be done in Rel-18. The Chair commented that a WID or SID iwas not practical for this issue. Orange: where is this coming from? Requirements from SA1? Nokia: some topics come from SA1 and SA2. The Chair said that objectives needed to be very clear and coordination between 3GPP groups and GSMA was needed. SA3 could take the lead and have a call with GSMA. Huawei: we endorsed something but we agree now to work on something without a proper approved study.
 		noted No    
    S3‑232665 new WID on eNS3 Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, LGE, ZTE WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑232697 New WID on security enhancements for MBS Phase 2 Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233292  
    S3‑233292 New WID on security enhancements for MBS Phase 2 Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232697
    S3‑232702 New WID for UC3S_Ph2 Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, CAICT WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑232703 User Consent for Roaming in eNA Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm: use the eNA WID for this. Huawei: this is the outcome of the study. The Chair proposed to revise the WID. Nokia: delete the second paragraph or make it a note.
 		revised No S3‑233293  
    S3‑233293 User Consent for Roaming in eNA Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232703
    S3‑232726 New WID for security of SEAL Data Delivery enabler Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile, Samsung WID new Approval Yes
YesIt was ckarified that this was a one shot WID. It would be finished with the following CR.
 		revised No S3‑233295  
    S3‑233295 New WID for security of SEAL Data Delivery enabler Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile, Samsung WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232726
    S3‑232727 Add security aspect of SEAL Data Delivery enabler Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile, Samsung CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233294  
    S3‑233294 Add security aspect of SEAL Data Delivery enabler Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile, Samsung CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑232727
    S3‑232869 New WID to enable URSP rules to securely identify Applications (USIA) Lenovo, AT&T, Broadcom, CableLabs, CATT, Charter, China Mobile, China Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Intel, LG Electronics, Motorola Solutions MSI, NEC, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung, Verizon, Xiaomi WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232961 Revised WID on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning Xiaomi Technology WID revised Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233296  
    S3‑233296 Revised WID on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning Xiaomi Technology WID revised Approval Yes
YesAdding the broadcast.
 		agreed No   S3‑232961
    S3‑233058 New WID on 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
YesDT: support. Qualcomm: too late for Rel-18, postpone this until Rel-19. We don’t agree with some issues in the objectives and justification but we can discuss it offline for the next meeting. We agree on the need for this WID. Huawei: in favor of this WID as well, but inline with Qualcomm's comments. Ericsson: can we bring this in Gotemburg? SA3 Chair: bring this as a discussion paper or slides to the Rel-19 workshop so everyone is aware. Apple supported this WID.
 		noted No    
    S3‑233431 Exception sheet for security enhancements for MBS Phase 2 Huawei WI exception request Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
7 CVD and research S3‑232313 Reply LS on Research highlighting potential 5G and 4G Bidding Down Attacks C1-232756 LS in Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑232345 LS to 3GPP Bidding-Down Attacks in 5G and 4G v5 GSMA LS in   Yes
YesEricsson: not clear in what use cases they are sending the information unprotected. Qualcomm liked CT1's response and was fine to refer to them.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑232561 Reply LS on Research highlighting potential 5G and 4G Bidding Down Attacks Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233321  
    S3‑233321 Reply LS on Research highlighting potential 5G and 4G Bidding Down Attacks Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑232561
    S3‑232833 Reply LS on Research highlighting potential 5G and 4G Bidding Down Attacks Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
8 Any Other Business S3‑232305 SA3 meeting calendar SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑233138  
    S3‑233138 SA3 meeting calendar SA WG3 Chair other - Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: move away from the dates with other groups we coordinate with.
 		noted No   S3‑232305
    S3‑232357 SA3 Rel-19 Planning SA WG3 CHair discussion   Yes
YesThe Chair clarified that the workshop expects company inputs rather than SA3's. No work items will be approved in the workshop, the format is slides. The Chair presented the organization based on time management scheme, as proposed by SA plenary. He commented that this kind of management was very cumbersome. On the other hand, drafting sessions could be used instead. NTT-Docomo asked to have drafting sessions on Thursday mornings, and have a separate track for SCAS topics. Huawei: overdo SCAS? Not so critical. Studies are becoming overwhelming, though. The Chair commented that studies for Rel-18 should be closed whatever their status. Nokia supported having the parallel stream for SCAS. Qualcomm: e-meeting for SCAS and rubber stamping in SA3 like we do with SA3-LI. Three parallel tracks create logistical and resource issues. Ericsson: create 15 alocations and associate a WID for each? Monday evenings for maintenance sessions. Is there a limited number of WIDs we can agree on? Interdigital: limit the number of contributions. Three maintenance sessions + three drafting sessions --: The Chair will present this in next SA.
 		noted No    
9 Closing of the meeting