TDoc list

Tdoc List

2023-03-02 11:58

Agenda	Topic	TDoc	Title	Source	Type	For	Avail	Treated	Decision	Wdrn	Replaced-by	Replaces
1	Agenda and Meeting Objectives	S3‑230600	Agenda	SA WG3 Chair	agenda		Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230601	Report for SA3#109e ad-Hoc	SA WG3 Chair	report		Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230602	Process for SA3#110	SA WG3 Chair	other		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230603	Process and agenda planning for SA3#110	SA WG3 Chair	other		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231386	Report from SA3#109	MCC	report	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
2	Meeting Reports
3	Reports and Liaisons from other Groups	S3‑230605	5G capabilities exposure for factories of the future - identified gaps	5G-ACIA	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231116	draft LS reply to TSG SA on LS S3-223147 on 5G capabilities exposure for factories of the future – identified gaps from 5G ACIA	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesThere were some questions on the provisioning described in G.1, especially from Thales. Huawei suggested not to go so much into detail and delete the paragraph on the provisioning.	revised	No	S3‑231387
		S3‑231387	LS reply to TSG SA on LS S3-223147 on 5G capabilities exposure for factories of the future – identified gaps from 5G ACIA	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231116
		S3‑230606	LS to 3GPP on PRINS middle boxes	GSMA	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑231192	LS on PRINS middle boxes	BSI (DE), Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson supported this LS.	revised	No	S3‑231388
		S3‑231388	LS on certificate and key management automation and N32 purpose	BSI (DE), Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesN32 and key management would be treated here.	approved	No		S3‑231192
		S3‑230607	LS on U2N relay direct link setup failure due to RSC mismatch or integrity failure	C1-226908	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑230816	Reply LS on U2N relay direct link setup failure due to RSC mismatch or integrity failure	Qualcomm Incorporated	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231390
		S3‑231390	Reply LS on U2N relay direct link setup failure due to RSC mismatch or integrity failure	Qualcomm Incorporated	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230816
		S3‑231069	Reply LS on U2N relay direct link setup failure due to RSC mismatch or integrity failure	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei and Philips preffered this response to Qualcomm's version. Qualcomm: integrity protection is not needed.Nokia agreed with this. Integrity protecton needed: Phillips, OPPO, Ericsson,Huawei,Interdigital. Not needed: Nokia, Qualcomm,	merged	No	S3‑231390
		S3‑230608	LS on Authentication Result Removal	C4-224418	LS in		Yes	Yes	postponed	No
		S3‑231279	Reply LS on Authentication Result Removal	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei didn’t agree with this LS. Nokia: CT4 has added information that needs to be removed due to an SA3's mistake. They are waiting for a response because they cannot implement service operations, there are no stage 2 requirements. The Chair commented that SA3 should own the problem and clean it, SA3 should not create these situations. Huawei: we cannot reopen or restudy this topic. Ericsson: CT4 not to waste time on trying to implement this, we ask them to remove it. Nokia: these are dangling APIs that have no stage 2 requirements. Huawei: they can fix it by themselves, this is a stage 3 issue. They are asking to revert a conclusion from a study. Ericsson: nothing coming from the study, this is coming from an LS from SA3 to CT4 asking them to do the wrong thing. Huawei: we had a key issue in the TR and we agreed to close the key issue by sending the LS to CT4. Suresh: this will impact implementations, we will have a show of hands to decide on this. It was proposed to have a show of hands, but Huawei didn’t agree on having a show of hands for something to be done in CT4. It’s about fixing the issue, not removing the whole feature. The Chair asked if SA3 could organize a conference call with CT4. Huawei didn’t find it worth it, there were just a couple of people involved in the discussions. Nokia insisted that this LS had been postponed for two meetings already.	noted	No
		S3‑230609	Reply LS on PLMN ID used in Roaming Scenarios	C4-224444	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑230622	Reply LS On PLMN ID used in Roaming Scenarios	S2-2207391	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑230761	Reply LS on PLMN ID used in Roaming Scenarios from CT WG4 and SA WG2	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231391
		S3‑231391	Reply LS on PLMN ID used in Roaming Scenarios from CT WG4 and SA WG2	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230761
		S3‑230610	LS on Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF	C4-225161	LS in		Yes	Yes	postponed	No
		S3‑231091	Reply LS on Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF	China Mobile	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei preferred this version as it was simpler than Nokia's proposal.	revised	No	S3‑231392
		S3‑231392	Reply LS on Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF	China Mobile	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑231091
		S3‑231140	Reply LS on Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230846	Reply LS on Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230612	LS on N32-f addressing information	C4-225571	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑231393	Reply to: LS on N32-f addressing information	Nokia	LS out	approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230616	LS reply to 3GPP C4-225571 on N32-f addressing information	GSMA	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230617	Reply LS on authenticity and replay protection of system information	R2-2208985	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231163	Reply LS on authenticity and replay protection of system information	Apple	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesThisi is a shorter option than 294.	revised	No	S3‑231396
		S3‑231396	Reply LS on authenticity and replay protection of system information	Apple	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑231163
		S3‑231294	Reply LS on authenticity and replay protection of system information	Samsung, Apple, CableLabs	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm didn’t agree with this response.It was agreed to go for a shorter response.	noted	No
		S3‑230618	LS on security for selective SCG activation	R2-2213337	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑230674	Reply LS on Security for selective SCG activation	Nokia Italy	LS out		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231397
		S3‑231397	Reply LS on Security for selective SCG activation	Nokia Italy	LS out	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230674
		S3‑230675	Discussion on (R2-2213337) LS on Security for Selective SCG Activation	Nokia Italy	discussion		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231013	Security on selection SCG activation	Huawei, HiSilicon	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231014	Reply LS on selective SCG activation	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231397
		S3‑231052	[Draft] Reply LS on security for selective SCG activation	OPPO	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231397
		S3‑231054	Discussion about LS on SCG Activation	Intel	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231056	draft_ Reply LS R2-2213337 LS on security for selective SCG activation	Intel	LS out		Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231397
		S3‑231162	Reply LS to S3-230618/R2-2213337 on security for selective SCG activation	Apple	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231397
		S3‑231303	Discussion on security for selective SCG activation	Samsung	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230619	Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting	R3-225250	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑230973	Reply LS on the User Consent for Trace Reportings	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231398
		S3‑231398	Reply LS on the User Consent for Trace Reportings	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230973
		S3‑231164	Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting (S3-230619)	Apple	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231398
		S3‑230620	LS on user consent of Non-public Network	R3-226006	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑231399	Reply to: LS on user consent of Non-public Network	Vodafone	LS out	approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230624	LS on impact of URSP rule enforcement report to 5GC	S2-2209327	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230625	LS on Time Synchronization Status notification towards UE(s)	S2-2209876	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231280	Reply LS on Time Synchronization Status notification towards UE(s)	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei preferred this option.	noted	No
		S3‑230671	Reply LS on Time Synchronization Status notification towards UE(s)	Nokia Italy	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm preferred this reply.	noted	No
		S3‑230626	LS reply on Indication of Network Assisted Positioning method	S2-2211049	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230627	LS on secured and trusted access to the serving PLMN OAM server by a MBSR	S2-2301465	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑230883	Reply LS for LS on secured and trusted access to the serving PLMN OAM server by a MBSR	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out		Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231400
		S3‑231033	Reply LS on secured and trusted access to the serving PLMN OAM server by a MBSR	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson agreed that offline methods were sufficient.	revised	No	S3‑231400
		S3‑231400	Reply LS on secured and trusted access to the serving PLMN OAM server by a MBSR	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231033
		S3‑230629	LS on UE event reporting over a user plane connection to LCS client or AF	S2-2301789	LS in		Yes	Yes	postponed	No
		S3‑231401	Reply to: LS on UE event reporting over a user plane connection to LCS client or AF	Vodafone	LS out	approval	Yes	YesHuawei didn’t want to mention OMA SUPL. Qualcomm didn’t agree so the response was postponed.	noted	No
		S3‑231034	Reply LS on user plane connection between UE and LCS client, AF or LMF	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson preferred this response.A new study mwas needed. We need TLS 1.3 and not TLS 1.2. There was a WID proposal for the meeting related to this LS.	merged	No	S3‑231401
		S3‑230881	Reply LS for LS on UE event reporting over a user plane connection to LCS client or AF	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out		Yes	YesQualcomm supported this reply.	merged	No	S3‑231401
		S3‑230630	LS on LPP message and supplementary service event report over a user plane connection between UE and LMF	S2-2301857	LS in		Yes	Yes	postponed	No
		S3‑230882	Reply LS for LS on LPP message and supplementary service event report over a user plane connection between UE and LMF	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out		Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231401
		S3‑231278	Reply LS on LPP message and supplementary service event report over a user plane connection between UE and LMF	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231401
		S3‑230631	LS on the use of a non-network defined identifier for UE identification	S2-2302163	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230639	LS on the use of a non-network defined identifier for UE identification	S6-223558	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑231160	Reply LS to S3-230639/S6-223558 on the use of a non-network defined identifier for UE identification	Apple	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231402
		S3‑231402	Reply LS to S3-230639/S6-223558 on the use of a non-network defined identifier for UE identification	Apple	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231160
		S3‑230640	CAPIF extensibility	S6-230294	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230641	LS on user consent for UE location sharing	S6-230351	LS in		Yes	Yes	postponed	No
		S3‑231161	Reply LS on user consent for UE location sharing (S3-230641/S6-230351)	Apple	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231403
		S3‑230974	Reply LS on user consent for UE location sharing	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231403
		S3‑231403	Reply LS on user consent for UE location sharing	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑230974
		S3‑230642	Specification of the 256-bit air interface algorithms	ETSI SAGE	LS in		Yes	Yes	postponed	No
		S3‑231081	Discussion about Reply LS on Specification of the 256-bit air algorithms	THALES, Idemia	discussion	Discussion	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231115	Draft Reply LS on Specification of the 256-bit air algorithms	THALES, Idemia	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231174	Information on ZUC-256	CATT	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231189	LS on Latest Information about ZUC-256	CATT	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230643	LS on initiation of new work item Y.CCO-req: ""Requirements of orchestration supporting confidential computing for network slices in IMT-2020 networks and beyond""	ITU-T SG13	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230611	Reply LS on Response LS on Identifier availability for Lawful Interception during Inter-PLMN handover	C4-225542	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230613	LS on clarification of coding of hexadecimal digits in SUCI NAI	C6-220715	LS in		Yes	Yes	postponed	No
		S3‑230621	Reply LS on Time Synchronization Status notification towards UE(s)	R3-226774	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230637	Reply LS on user’s consent for EDGEAPP	S6-223339	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230638	Reply LS on Network federation interface for Telco edge consideration for a consolidated reply	S6-223553	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230636	Reply LS to S5-226028 on Network federation interface for Telco edge consideration and proposals to answer GSMA LSs 5-226016 and S5-226017 from SA	S5-227039	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230628	Reply LS on SL positioning groupcast and broadcast	S2-2301786	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230632	Reply LS on FS_eEDGEAPP Solution for Support of NAT deployed within the edge data network	S2-2302164	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230633	LS on Identifier availability for Lawful Interception during Inter-PLMN handover	S2-2302165	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230634	LS on NSWO feature	S2-2302168	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230635	LS on NAI format for 5G NSWO	S2-2302171	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230644	Reply LS on Network federation interface for Telco edge consideration	SP-221321	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230649	lawful interception for EPS Fallback for 5G inbound roamers	GSMA	LS in		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231526
		S3‑231526	lawful interception for EPS Fallback for 5G inbound roamers	GSMA	LS in	-	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑230649
		S3‑230650	LS to SA3-LI on Volte roaming lawful interception - limitation to provide caller identify if caller activates OIR	GSMA	LS in		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231524
		S3‑231524	LS to SA3-LI on Volte roaming lawful interception - limitation to provide caller identify if caller activates OIR	GSMA	LS in	-	Yes	Yes	postponed	No		S3‑230650
		S3‑230729	TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	other	Information	Yes	Yes1. TCG – Highlights Publication of new or revised deliverables (incremental changes from the status reported at SA3#109) • TCG Measurement and Attestation RootS (MARS) Library – published January 2023 • TCG Storage Opal Family Feature Set: C_PIN Enhancements – public review January 2023 • TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification (SIIS) – public review December 2022 • TCG DICE Endorsement Architecture for Devices – published November 2022 • TCG Component Class Registry – public review October 2022 • TCG Storage Component Class Registry – public review October 2022 2. Meetings • TCG Members Meeting Hybrid F2F (Vancouver, BC) 21-23 February 2023 • TCG Members Meeting Hybrid F2F (Munich, DE) June 2023 (TBD) • MP WG meets every Monday at 10-11 ET • TMS WG meets every Monday and Friday at 12-13 ET • CyRes WG meets every Wednesday at 11-12:30 ET	noted	No
4	Work areas (Rel-18)
4.1	New WID on Security Assurance Specification for Management Function (MnF)	S3‑230866	Mnf-specific Over-Privileged Data Process threat addressing	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231457
		S3‑231457	Mnf-specific Over-Privileged Data Process threat addressing	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230866
		S3‑230867	Mnf-specific Unprotected Management data during transmission threat addressing	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231458
		S3‑231458	Mnf-specific Unprotected Management data during transmission threat addressing	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230867
		S3‑231006	Updates to MnF SCAS clause 4.3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231007	Editorial updates to MnF SCAS	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231459
		S3‑231459	Editorial updates to MnF SCAS	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231007
		S3‑231005	Living document for MnF SCAS	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231460	Draft TS 33.526	Huawei	draft TS	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231461	Cover sheet TS 33.526 information	Huawei	TS or TR cover	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
4.2	New WID on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products	S3‑231097	Presentation of TR33.927 to TSG for information and approval	China Mobile	TS or TR cover	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231098	Adding description about dispute resolution to clause and 6.5 in TR33.936	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231099	Presentation of TR33.936 to TSG for information and approval	China Mobile	TS or TR cover	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231100	Proposal to add 4.1 in TS33.527	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231101	Adding description about introduction for security functional requirements and related test cases into clause 4.2	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231102	adding description about security functional requirements deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test cases into clause 4.2	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231103	adding description about technical baseline into clause 4.2	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231462
		S3‑231462	adding description about technical baseline into clause 4.2	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231103
		S3‑231104	adding description about security requirements of operating systems, web servers and network devices to clause 4.2	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231105	adding description about security functional requirements on GVNP lifecycle management and related test cases to clause 4.2	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231463
		S3‑231463	adding description about security functional requirements on GVNP lifecycle management and related test cases to clause 4.2	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231105
		S3‑231106	adding description about security functional requirements on executive environment provision and related test cases to clause 4.2	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231464
		S3‑231464	adding description about security functional requirements on executive environment provision and related test cases to clause 4.2	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231106
		S3‑231107	adding description about instantiating VNF from trusted VNF image and related test cases to clause 4.2	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231465
		S3‑231465	adding description about instantiating VNF from trusted VNF image and related test cases to clause 4.2	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231107
		S3‑231108	adding description about introduction to clause 4.3	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231109	adding description about technical baseline into clause 4.3	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231110	adding description about security requirements of operating systems and web servers to clause 4.3	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231111	adding description about security requirements of operating systems and web servers to clause 4.3	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231112	adding description about security requirements of separation of inter-VNF and intra-VNF traffic to clause 4.3	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231113	adding description about basic vulnerability testing requirements for GVNP to clause 4.4	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231599
		S3‑231599	adding description about basic vulnerability testing requirements for GVNP to clause 4.4	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231113
		S3‑231466	Draft TR 33.936	China Mobile	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231467	Draft TS 33.527	China Mobile	draft TS	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
4.3	New WID on Mission critical security enhancements phase 3
4.4	New WID on Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for 5G Rel-17 Features	S3‑230645	Discussion on addition of applicability notes in pre-requisites for SCAS	Keysight Technologies UK Ltd	discussion	Discussion	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230646	Discussion on specification of robustness and fuzz testing for SCAS	Keysight Technologies UK Ltd	discussion	Discussion	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230647	Living document for SCAS UPF TS 33.513	Keysight Technologies UK Ltd	draftCR		Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230648	Update gNB test cases for Release 17 requirements	Keysight Technologies UK Ltd	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230864	add test case to include SNPN snenario in PLMNID verification	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231609
		S3‑231609	add test case to include SNPN snenario in PLMNID verification	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑230864
		S3‑230865	add test case to include SNPN snenario in token verification	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231610
		S3‑231610	add test case to include SNPN snenario in token verification	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230865
		S3‑230972	Clarification on SCAS	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231469
		S3‑231469	Clarification on SCAS	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230972
		S3‑230975	Update requirement and add new test case to clause 4.2.3.4.3.1	Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom,CAICT, China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, Keysight Technologies UK	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230976	Update requirement and add new test case to clause 4.2.3.4.3.2	Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom,CAICT, China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, Keysight Technologies UK	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231010	living doc to TR33.926	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231011	living doc to TR33.216	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231012	living doc to TS33.117	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
4.5	New WID on Security Assurance Specification for the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) Anchor Function Function (AAnF)	S3‑230889	Adding AKMA subscription and AKMA context asynchronization threats to TR 33.926	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230890	Security Assurance Requirement and Test for AKMA subscription data and AKMA context synchronization	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231086	Addtion to 4.2.3	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231088	Presentation of TS33.537 to TSG for approval	China Mobile	TS or TR cover	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231468	Draft TS 33.537	China Mobile	draft TS	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
4.6	New WID on SCAS for split-gNB product classes	S3‑230786	Draft TS 33.523 v0.4.0	Qualcomm Incorporated	draft TS	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230787	Draft CR: Introducing split gNBs into TR 33.926	Qualcomm Incorporated	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231473	S3‑224169
		S3‑231473	Draft CR: Introducing split gNBs into TR 33.926	Qualcomm Incorporated	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No		S3‑230787
		S3‑231615	Introducing split gNBs into TR 33.926	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Approval	Yes	YesIt will be dealt with later. Technically endorsed.	endorsed	No
		S3‑230788	Editorial corrections to draft CR to TR 33.926	Qualcomm Incoporated	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230789	Adding user plane test cases for the gNB-CU	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223347
		S3‑230790	Adding test cases for the gNB-CU-UP	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223351
		S3‑230791	Adding non-501 test cases for the gNB-CU-CP	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231470
		S3‑231470	Adding non-501 test cases for the gNB-CU-CP	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230791
		S3‑230792	Adding non-501 test cases for the gNB-CU-UP	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231471
		S3‑231471	Adding non-501 test cases for the gNB-CU-UP	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230792
		S3‑230793	Adding non-501 test cases for the gNB-DU	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231472
		S3‑231472	Adding non-501 test cases for the gNB-DU	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230793
		S3‑230794	Editorial changes to draft TS 33.253	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230795	Discussion on way forward with SCAS for split gNB work	Qualcomm Incorporated	discussion	Discussion	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230796	Coversheet for TS 33.523	Qualcomm Incorporated	TS or TR cover	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231498	Draft TS 33.523	Qualcomm	draft TS	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
4.7	Service Based Architecture (Rel-15/16/17)	S3‑230672	Referencing GSMA for interdomain N32 certificates	BSI (DE), Deutsche Telekom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei needed more details, as just adding the reference wasn’t very clear. They needed more details from GSMA. Nokia: we talked with GSMA about this already. MCC commented that the mirror for Rel-17 was missing. Huawei: move this change to a more appropriate clause.	revised	No	S3‑231436
		S3‑231436	Referencing GSMA for interdomain N32 certificates	BSI (DE), Deutsche Telekom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230672
		S3‑230704	Discussion on authorization issue in inter NF mobility	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Information	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230705	Clarification on authorization for inter NF mobility	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231320
		S3‑230706	Clarification on authorization for inter NF mobility	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230771	PRINS protocol to provide IPX the tool to fulfil its role	Mavenir	CR	Approval	Yes	YesNokia: GSMA will vote on this issue so it would be good to send them this as a draft CR to show them our position. LS in 389 would be sent to GSMA with the draft CR attached. NTT-Docomo: we will see later for which release they prefer to have this fixed. BSI agreed that this would help to be treated in GSMA. Ericsson: point out that this is not agreed in SA3, this will be just a draft.	not pursued	No
		S3‑231419	PRINS protocol to provide IPX the tool to fulfil its role	Mavenir	draftCR	Approval	Yes	YesThere was no conclusion on this document.	noted	No
		S3‑230772	PRINS protocol to provide IPX the tool to fulfil its role	Mavenir	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230782	CR on IPX originated messages in PRINS	NTT DOCOMO INC., Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231200
		S3‑231200	CR on IPX originated messages in PRINS	NTT DOCOMO INC., Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑230782
		S3‑230783	CR on IPX originated messages in PRINS - R17	NTT DOCOMO INC., Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230784	CR on IPX originated messages in PRINS - R18	NTT DOCOMO INC., Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230785	draft Reply LS on PRINS middle boxes	NTT DOCOMO INC.	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231389
		S3‑231389	Reply LS on PRINS middle boxes	NTT DOCOMO INC.	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230785
		S3‑230847	LS on PRINS currently does not fully support the IPX use case	Mavenir	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231389
		S3‑231141	Remove keyEncipherment KeyUsage from SBA certificates	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑231142	Remove keyEncipherment KeyUsage from SBA certificates	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑231143	X.509 Certificate Extension for 5G Network Function Types	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesNokia commented that the IETF RFC 9310 didn’t seem to be finished. This had to be checked.	agreed	No
		S3‑231144	X.509 Certificate Extension for 5G Network Function Types	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑231195	CR on IPX originated messages in PRINS	NTT DOCOMO INC., Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑231200	CR on IPX originated messages in PRINS	NTT DOCOMO INC., Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑230782
		S3‑231320	Clarification on authorization for inter NF mobility	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesEricsson: fine but it can be much shorter, not a whole new clause.	revised	No	S3‑231420	S3‑230705
		S3‑231420	Clarification on authorization for inter NF mobility	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231320
		S3‑231377	LS to GSMA for PRINS profiling	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231532
		S3‑231532	LS to GSMA for PRINS profiling	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231377
4.8	Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe (Rel-17)	S3‑231197	CR to TR33.503 Editorial changes	CATT	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑230927	Correction in 5.2.4.2	ChinaTelecom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑230929	Correction in 6.1.3.2.2.2	ChinaTelecom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑230931	Correction in 6.2.1 and 6.2.2	ChinaTelecom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑230932	Correction in 6.3.3.3.2	ChinaTelecom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑231018	Correction to ProSe Authentication Vector obtaining process	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	YesNokia didn’t agree on the change in step 6, as Nokia had a competing CR with a simiar change in 1066.It was solved to merge all CRs.	revised	No	S3‑231424
		S3‑231424	Correction to ProSe Authentication Vector obtaining process	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231018
		S3‑231019	Correction on SUPI in Nudm_UEAuthentication_GetProseAv service	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑231068	Clarify Kausf_p generation	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231425
		S3‑231425	Clarify Kausf_p generation	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231068
		S3‑231066	Nudm service operation correction	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231424
		S3‑231130	Clarify RID for PAnF discover	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231424
		S3‑231131	LS to CT4 to update RID usage in PAnF	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: this is not needed.Ericsson agreed.	noted	No
		S3‑231067	KDF input parameter for generating AV of ProSe authentication	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesHuawei and Nokia didn’t agree with this CR.	merged	No	S3‑231559
		S3‑231024	Discussion paper about theserving network check during EAP-AKA'	Huawei, HiSilicon	discussion	Discussion	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231023	Clarify about the ProSe authentication	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231559
		S3‑231323	Discussion on Serving Network Name used in ProSe	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231128	Use relay UE SNN to generate AV for ProSe authentication	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231559
		S3‑231559	Use relay UE SNN to generate AV for ProSe authentication	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231128
		S3‑231129	Use remote UE SNN to generate AV for ProSe authentication	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231324	Discussion on U2N discovery security procedure	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231133	Locate target DDNMF in U2N discovery security procdure	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231134	Update discovery key response of U2N discovery security procdure	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231206	DDNFM Selection during U2N Relay Discovery Security Procedure	Xiaomi Technology	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230928	Correction in 6.1.1	ChinaTelecom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑231000	Clarification of PAnF action when CP-PRUK is stale	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231070	U2N relay direct link setup failure due to RSC mismatch or integrity failure	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesInterdigital supported this principle. Huawei also agreed, provided that there was some rewording. Xiaomi didn’t agree.In their view there was a problem in the remote UE, not the relay. Interdigital reminded that CT1 was waiting for SA3 to solve this issue.	not pursued	No
		S3‑231071	Remote UE Report in UP based solution for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesInterdigital had a similar proposal in tdoc 751 for Rel-18.	revised	No	S3‑231430
		S3‑231430	Remote UE Report in UP based solution for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231071
		S3‑231072	Remote UE Report in CP based solution for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesSimilar proposal in tdoc 752 by Interdigital.	revised	No	S3‑231431
		S3‑231431	Remote UE Report in CP based solution for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231072
		S3‑231135	Discussion on separation of U2N discovery security procedure	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231136	clarify protocol layer for discovery message protection	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑231207	A Note for Protection of DCR in U2N Communication	Xiaomi Technology	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231247	Correction to privacy protection of UP-PRUKID/CP-PRUKID and RSC in DCR	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231127	Discussion on Serving Network Name used in ProSe	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑231132	Discussion on U2N discovery security procedure	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
4.9	All topics (Rel-15/16/17/18 )	S3‑230623	Reply LS on the impact of MSK update on MBS multicast session update procedure	S2-2209287	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑231352	Reply LS on the impact of MSK update on MBS multicast session update procedure	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231410
		S3‑230651	Support for multiple lists of root CA certificates	BSI (DE), Deutsche Telekom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: Do we need to standardise this? Mavenir supported this CR.DT as well.	revised	No	S3‑231423
		S3‑231423	Support for multiple lists of root CA certificates	BSI (DE), Deutsche Telekom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230651
		S3‑230652	Support for multiple lists of root CA certificates	BSI (DE), Deutsche Telekom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231448
		S3‑231448	Support for multiple lists of root CA certificates	BSI (DE), Deutsche Telekom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230652
		S3‑230653	Support for multiple lists of root CA certificates	BSI (DE), Deutsche Telekom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231449
		S3‑231449	Support for multiple lists of root CA certificates	BSI (DE), Deutsche Telekom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230653
		S3‑230656	Clarification of hashing	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑230682
		S3‑230657	Clarification of authorization verification	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑230683
		S3‑230658	Clarification of brute force mitigation mechanism verification	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑230684
		S3‑230659	Clarification of privilege escalation methods to check for	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑230685
		S3‑230660	Clarification of service reachability restriction verification	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑230686
		S3‑230661	Clarification of auto-launch verification	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑230687
		S3‑230662	Clarification of SYN Flood attack prevention test	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑230688
		S3‑230663	Clarification of privilege verification	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑230689
		S3‑230664	Clarification of CGI/Scripting component directory check	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑230690
		S3‑230665	Clarification of SSI System Command Excecution test	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑230691
		S3‑230673	Referencing GSMA for interdomain N32 certificates	BSI (DE), Deutsche Telekom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231435
		S3‑231435	Referencing GSMA for interdomain N32 certificates	BSI (DE), Deutsche Telekom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230673
		S3‑230676	Discussion on AMF SCAS test for incorrectly encoded security capabilities	BSI (DE)	discussion	Agreement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230677	Threat reference for incorrectly encoded UE security capabilities on the NG interface	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑230715
		S3‑230678	New SCAS test on valid UE security capability encoding while AS security establishment	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑230716
		S3‑230679	New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Policy Control Function (PCF)	BSI (DE)	WID new	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231187
		S3‑230680	New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR)	BSI (DE)	WID new	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231190
		S3‑230681	Need for SCAS Improvements	Deutsche Telekom AG	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	YesThe Chair commented that maybe a separate conference call could rubber stamp this kind of CRs. A joint meeting is needed in order to agree on the documents. Sven (DT) commented that which Release would be impacted was still an open question. For example, adding new test cases in Rel-19 when they were needed for those using earlier Releases. Ericsson commented that a process was needed in the cases when problems with test were found by the labs.Sven replied that such process existed already in GSMA. Ericsson added that SA3 also needed feedback in this situation as well. Alex (GSMA): important to figure out the test and release and build from there.	noted	No
		S3‑230682	Clarification of hashing	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231193	S3‑230656
		S3‑230683	Clarification of authorization verification	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei queried about the release impacted. Alex (GSMA): EU would prefer Rel-16, they could accept Rel-17. Huawei: in reality they could just pick up the latest Release, so it doesn’t matter so much.	agreed	No		S3‑230657
		S3‑230684	Clarification of brute force mitigation mechanism verification	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230658
		S3‑230685	Clarification of privilege escalation methods to check for	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231194	S3‑230659
		S3‑230686	Clarification of service reachability restriction verification	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230660
		S3‑230687	Clarification of auto-launch verification	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230661
		S3‑230688	Clarification of SYN Flood attack prevention test	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230662
		S3‑230689	Clarification of privilege verification	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑230663
		S3‑230690	Clarification of CGI/Scripting component directory check	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230664
		S3‑230691	Clarification of SSI System Command Execution test	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231196	S3‑230665
		S3‑230707	Discussion paper of UPU implementation gaps	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Information	Yes	YesLenovo: we prefer option 1. Qualcomm: we agree on the problem statement. Solution one requires more changes than necessary, but we agree on this as a baseline. They didn’t agree with solution 2. Huawei: the change is too big. We want to avoid impact on previous releases.No preference on the solutions, but they objected to make changes before rel-18. Ericsson needed to have more time to study this because the issue was complex. Nokia commented that solving this in Rel-18 would be OK. Qualcomm agreed on the impact caused by solution 1. No need for protection with the current header information.	noted	No
		S3‑230708	Enhancement in UPU procedure to protect UPU header-sol1	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230709	Enhancement in UPU procedure to protect UPU header-sol1	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230710	Enhancement in UPU procedure to protect UPU header-Sol2	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230711	Enhancement in UPU procedure to protect UPU header-Sol2	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230712	Correction in N5CW device authentication	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesCablelabs: we agree on the problem but fix it in the Annex, not here. Qualcomm: we don’t see the problem. Huawei: there is no issue here.	not pursued	No
		S3‑230713	Correction in N5CW device authentication	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230714	Correction in N5CW device authentication	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230715	Threat reference for incorrectly encoded UE 5G security capabilities on the AMF NG interface	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: this looks more like a comformance test rather than an assurance test; it's a bit outside the SCAS domain.	not pursued	No		S3‑230677
		S3‑230716	New SCAS test on valid UE security capability encoding while AS security establishment	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑230678
		S3‑230745	[33.180] R16 Clarify protected KmsResponse payloads	Motorola Solutions, Inc	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231415
		S3‑231415	[33.180] R16 Clarify protected KmsResponse payloads	Motorola Solutions, Inc	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230745
		S3‑230746	[33.180] R16 Clarify protected KmsResponse payloads (mirror)	Motorola Solutions, Inc	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231416
		S3‑231416	[33.180] R16 Clarify protected KmsResponse payloads (mirror)	Motorola Solutions, Inc	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230746
		S3‑230747	[33.180] R16 Fix XML schema	Motorola Solutions, Inc	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑230748	[33.180] R17 Fix XML schema (mirror)	Motorola Solutions, Inc	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑230768	Including SNPN ID in SBA and N32 related descriptions	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231604
		S3‑231604	Including SNPN ID in SBA and N32 related descriptions	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	-	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230768
		S3‑230769	Including SNPN ID in SBA and N32 related descriptions	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231605
		S3‑231605	Including SNPN ID in SBA and N32 related descriptions	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	-	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230769
		S3‑230804	Clarification to the UPU procedures	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑223331
		S3‑230805	Discussion on issue with UPU MAC calculation	Qualcomm Incorporated	discussion	Discussion	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230806	Resolving the EN on CAA level ID during UUAA procedures	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑223332
		S3‑230807	Removing the ENs on passing the CAA-level ID to UE during revocation	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230844	Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230845	Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230853	Clarification on SoR AF	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231186
		S3‑230854	Address EN on S-NSSAI mapping	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230855	Address EN on AF Authorization	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesEricsson: this is introducing an authorization feature that hasn’t been defined. We don’t agree with having this procedure in step 3.	revised	No	S3‑231406
		S3‑231406	Address EN on AF Authorization	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑230855
		S3‑230856	Address issue in NSSAA procedures for multiple registration	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231188
		S3‑230857	draft LS on issues in NSSAA procedures for multiple registration	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230858	Address ENs in revocation procedures	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230875	Clarification on unused HTTP methods - Rel16	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑230876	Clarification on unused HTTP methods - Rel17	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑230891	Add Context_Remove into table 7.1.1-1	ZTE Corporation	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230892	Change NF to AAnF Service Consumer in 6.6 and 6.7	ZTE Corporation	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230970	Contribution	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑231031	CR on control-plane procedure in MBS	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	YesOverlapping with 318.	revised	No	S3‑231408
		S3‑231408	CR on control-plane procedure in MBS	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231031
		S3‑231032	Reply LS on the impact of MSK update on MBS multicast session update procedure	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231410
		S3‑231410	Reply LS on the impact of MSK update on MBS multicast session update procedure	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231032
		S3‑231048	Clarification on NEF’s authorization to AF	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑231050	SCAS release dependency proposal	Huawei, HiSilicon	discussion	Discussion	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231055	Protection of RRC Resume Request message	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231058	Clarification on user consent in EC	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231064	CR to TS 33.501 - Addition of Operator Roaming Hub definition in R17	VODAFONE Group Plc	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231317
		S3‑231078	Clarification on user consent Rel-17	Ericsson	CR		Yes	YesHuawei: change in 12.x should go to the Annex V. Vodafone objected to this CR.This is not considering the regulators' input.	not pursued	No
		S3‑231080	Clarification on user consent Rel-18	Ericsson	CR		Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231085	Security aspects of MSGin5G Service in rel-18	China Mobile	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231547
		S3‑231547	Security aspects of MSGin5G Service in rel-18	China Mobile	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231085
		S3‑231087	AAnF sending GPSI to internal AKMA AF	China Mobile	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231422
		S3‑231422	AAnF sending GPSI to internal AKMA AF	China Mobile	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231087
		S3‑231095	Update to security aspects of eNA in 33.501 for Rel-17	China Mobile	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231096	Update to security aspects of eNA in 33.501 for Rel-18	China Mobile	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231118	Modified f5* function for Milenage - Rel-17	THALES, Idemia	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesVodafone: how do you manage different versions? IDEMIA: CT6 covers this part. Ericsson: there is a problem if this is done outside the SIM. Qualcomm: MILENAGE and Tuak specs need to be modified. Ericsson agreed. Huawei: several options for f5* modification. Why this one? Thales replied that this was the simplest one. Thales asked if it was up to SAGE to make these changes for MILENAGE and Tuak. Patrik (SAGE chair, Ericsson) couldn’t reply when theses changes could be delivered by SAGE. Thales proposed to send an LS to SAGE.	not pursued	No
		S3‑231119	Add restriction for multi registrations in two PLMNs	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesQualcomm didn’t agree with the CR. Huawei: conflicting changes? We don’t see the problem to be corrected.	not pursued	No
		S3‑231120	Discussin paper on control on NSSAA procedures for multi registrations in two PLMNs	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑231121	control on NSSAA procedures for multi registrations in two PLMNs	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesEricsson: step 1 is clear enough, no need to specify. We only agree on the last change.Qualcomm commented that the concept of mapped S-NSSAIs was not explained anywhere else in SA3 specifications. The first change was unnecessary. Interdigital agreed that the first change was not needed. MCC warned that TS 33.501 had a Rel-18 version and that this needed a mirror in case it was agreed.	revised	No	S3‑231407
		S3‑231407	control on NSSAA procedures for multi registrations in two PLMNs	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑231121
		S3‑231137	Modified f5* function for Milenage - Rel-18	THALES, Idemia	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231138	Modified f5* function for Tuak - Rel-17	THALES, Idemia	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231139	Modified f5* function for Tuak - Rel-18	THALES, Idemia	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231145	Aligning DNS and ICMP security for non-3GPP access with 3GPP access	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesHuawei: if this was an issue in CT1, why didn’t they send us an LS? The Chair replied that this is was caused by existing text in TS 33.401. Revised to change the justification of the cover page.	revised	No	S3‑231412
		S3‑231412	Aligning DNS and ICMP security for non-3GPP access with 3GPP access	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231145
		S3‑231146	Adding recommendation to use one-to-one relation between SNPN and CH AAA	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231147	Adding recommendation to use one-to-one relation between SNPN and CH AAA	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231148	SEPP to include and verify the source PLMN-ID	Ericsson [was: Ericsson, Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon]	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231606
		S3‑231606	SEPP to include and verify the source PLMN-ID	Ericsson, Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231148
		S3‑231149	SEPP to include and verify the source PLMN-ID	Ericsson [was: Ericsson, Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon]	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231607
		S3‑231607	SEPP to include and verify the source PLMN-ID	Ericsson, Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231149
		S3‑231165	SERP-Draft LS on SERP.docx	Apple	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231166	CR to TS 33.501 on the Protection of the RRC Resume Request message	Apple	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231171	CR on 33203-AES-GCM/GMAC in IMS SIP security	Apple	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑231175	SCP requirements update related to source PLMN-ID	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR		Yes	YesNTT-Docomo: should or shall? Nokia: a should.	revised	No	S3‑231417
		S3‑231417	SCP requirements update related to source PLMN-ID	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	-	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231175
		S3‑231176	SCP requirements update related to source PLMN-ID	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231418
		S3‑231418	SCP requirements update related to source PLMN-ID	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	-	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231176
		S3‑231186	Clarification on SoR-AF	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesEricsson doubted whether this text was needed.It was obvious for them. Nokia didn’t find it necessary either. Vodafone: not operator domain but security domain.	revised	No	S3‑231426	S3‑230853
		S3‑231426	Clarification on SoR-AF	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231186
		S3‑231188	Address issues in NSSAA procedures for multiple registration	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑230856
		S3‑231191	pCR to Living CR S3-231148_SEPP to include and verify the source PLMN-ID	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	other		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231394
		S3‑231394	pCR to Living CR S3-231148_SEPP to include and verify the source PLMN-ID	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	other	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231191
		S3‑231193	Clarification of hashing	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	YesVodafone: it looks like we are creating requirements from the back doorand creating solutions for them. Do we have these requirements in another specifications (e.g. TS 33.501)? We could produce CRs for TS 33.501. We are testing things that are not present in our documents. Nokia: this is not in scope of TS 33.501. This is product security, part of implementation. Vodafone: the requirements should be present in another document. Huawei: we want to see the requirements firstly in their proper place. Alex (GSMA): this is good security hardening of products, that we should be doing anyway. We shouldn’t have a strong resistance as this is not unreasonable. We shouldn’t delay as ENISA needs the input by Summer. The Chair commented that the requirements should not go to TS 33.501. Vodafone: We should back fill these things in the virtualization work as well. We shouldn’t be adding test cases with requirements attached. Vodafone asked to have this minuted.These requirements are not in the current 3GPP specs and they should be looked at in the virtualization work because there is an operational aspect. Maybe we could send these requirements to the virtualization work. Nokia: don’t put these aspects in 3GPP. Every company may have their own security policy, how to handle passwords? This is company specific. Vodafone: I need to see at least a minimum level of hardening, I'm worried to see this only in a test specification. The Chair commented that there was nothing new here, but it didn’t exist in the 3GPP domain. Vodafone: what is considered good hardening in 5G should be captured somewhere. Ericsson: add the requirements in TS 33.117. We already have password requirements in there, just add more. Alex (GSMA): which specification for design and which for testing should be clear. Better not to mix them, create a new specification. Ericsson: Put the requirements in TR 33.926. Alex (GSMA) replied that this was a TR. Ericsson: strange to introduce the test and then the requirement, do it the other way round. Marcus (OPPO): TR 33.926 is the wrong place, no requirements there. Huawei: we need to see the requirements before agreeing on this document. The Chair asked if it was Huawei's concern that this was a Rel-17 CR affecting current implementations.Huawei replied that this was not the case, they didn’t agree with the CR. Alex (GSMA): a block rejection of all the changes even if some of them are simple would not give a good impression of 3GPP's role with this subject. Huawei: we don’t object to all CRs, we have issues with this particular one.	not pursued	No		S3‑230682
		S3‑231194	Clarification of privilege escalation methods to check for	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑230685
		S3‑231196	Clarification of SSI System Command Execution test	Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Deutsche Telekom	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230691
		S3‑231241	R18 Update I.2.2.2.1 for limitations of AAA server (mirror)	Xiaomi communications	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231242	R17 Update I.2.2.2.1 for limitations of AAA server	Xiaomi communications	CR	Approval	Yes	YesNokia: this is out of scope.	not pursued	No
		S3‑231243	R17 Update Subscription and unsubscription procedure of NSACF notification service	Xiaomi communications	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231406
		S3‑231244	R18 Update Subscription and unsubscription procedure of NSACF notification service (mirror)	Xiaomi communications	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231284	KAF lifetime and Ua* protocol recommendations	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesNokia commented that this was based on resuts from a study. Qualcomm: approve this in Rel-18. MCC commented that if this was a clarification the cover page should be modified to prove that this was a needed correction and not coming from a study. Nokia didn’t agree with the first change.	revised	No	S3‑231421
		S3‑231421	KAF lifetime and Ua* protocol recommendations	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231284
		S3‑231285	Rel17 Clarification on AF authorization for the NSACF notification procedure	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231406
		S3‑231286	Rel17 Alignment of NSACF notification procedure with existing procedures	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231287	Rel18 Clarification on AF authorization for the NSACF notification procedure	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231288	Rel18 Alignment of NSACF notification procedure with existing procedures	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231289	Living document for SERP: draftCR to TS 33.501 on the Protection of the RRC Resume Request message	Ericsson	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231295	Discussion on Resumecause protection	Samsung	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	YesEricsson: reopen a Study, add a new solution in FSB? Qualcomm: this is not improving security, it is introducing complexity. Huawei: this is not maintenance, it should have been placed in another agenda item. This is for Rel-18.	noted	No
		S3‑231297	Living document for SERP: draftCR to TS 33.501 on the Protection of the RRC Resume Request message	Samsung	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231305	[IAB][Rel-17] IAB inter-CU topology adaptation procedure	Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	YesMCC commented that this was a new feature for Rel-17, this was frozen. Samsung commented that that CT4 had the feature but it lacked the security for it.	not pursued	No
		S3‑231306	[IAB][Rel-18] IAB inter-CU topology adaptation procedure	Samsung, Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231317	Addition of Operator Roaming Hub definition in R17	Vodafone	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231413	S3‑231064
		S3‑231413	Addition of Operator Roaming Hub definition in R17	Vodafone	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231317
		S3‑231318	CR on control-plane procedure in MBS	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231408
		S3‑231319	Authentication of AUN3 devices behind RG	CableLabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Rogers Communications, Thales, Charter Communications	CR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: this is very vague. Note it for this meeting.	not pursued	No
		S3‑231321	Authentication for UE behind 5G-RG and FN-RG using NSWO	CableLabs, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesQualcomm: this is a new feature, we cannot add it now. It should be Rel-18, not completed in Rel-17.	not pursued	No
		S3‑231322	Discussin paper on control on NSSAA procedures for multi registrations in two PLMNs	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231325	Authentication for UE behind 5G-RG and FN-RG using NSWO	CableLabs, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231405
		S3‑231405	Authentication for UE behind 5G-RG and FN-RG using NSWO	CableLabs, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesIt was agreed to submit it as TE18 given that it was a small change. Revised to introduce some changes on the cover page.	agreed	No		S3‑231325
		S3‑231326	CR on control-plane procedure in MBS	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231409
		S3‑231353	Correction to Clause 7A.2.1	Lenovo	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑231376	Security vulnerability fix for use of AES-GCM and AES-GMAC in 33.203	Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd	CR	Approval	No	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231378
		S3‑231378	Security vulnerability fix for use of AES-GCM and AES-GMAC in 33.203	Apple	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑231376
		S3‑231379	User consent check by DCCF	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231383
		S3‑231380	User consent check by DCCF	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231382
		S3‑231382	User consent check information by DCCF	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR		Yes	YesEricsson: not needed. Vodafone: step 4 needs rewording. It was asked if there was any support for this but there wasn't any.	not pursued	No		S3‑231380
		S3‑231383	User consent check information by DCCF	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR		Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑231379
		S3‑231404	EU 5G Scheme phase 2	ENISA	other	Presentation	Yes	YesVodafone asked if this impacted SCAS specs only. ENISA confirmed this. ENISA insisted on that there was no need to reivent the wheel. Requirements were not clear yet, they just wanted to keep the channel open. It was asked if maintenance was being considered for the documents that were referenced (since the 3GPP specs would change their version over time). ENISA replied that normally a pointer to the latest version could be sufficient in some cases. If this latest was not valid, a version would be specified. A permanent conatct with SA3 would be neeeded during the maintenance.	noted	No
		S3‑231409	CR on control-plane procedure in MBS	Huawei	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑231411	LS on modified f5* algorithms	Thales	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231414	Addition of Operator Roaming Hub definition in R18	Vodafone	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑231603	LS on Mapping of F1-C IP addresses in the IAB inter-CU topology adaptation and backhaul RLF recovery procedures	Qualcomm	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
4.10	ProSe Secondary Authentication	S3‑230750	Discussion on 5G ProSe Relay and support for Regulatory services	InterDigital Finland Oy	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230751	Resolution of Remote UE identity Remote UE Report procedure (UP)	InterDigital Finland Oy	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231430
		S3‑230752	Resolution of Remote UE identity in Remote UE Report procedure (CP)	InterDigital Finland Oy	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231431
		S3‑231074	[Draft] LS on ProSe Secondary Authentication	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230749	Living document to TS 33.503 for Prose Secondary Authentication	InterDigital Finland Oy, ChinaTelecom	draftCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson commented that they preferred a pCR removing the editor's note instead of making the change directly in the living document.	merged	No	S3‑231432
		S3‑230980	Secondary Authentication Procedure without N3IWF	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: we can’t see the changes on the baseline here.	revised	No	S3‑231432
		S3‑231432	Secondary Authentication Procedure without N3IWF	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑230980
		S3‑230981	Secondary Authentication Procedure with N3IWF	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231433
		S3‑231433	Secondary Authentication Procedure with N3IWF	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230981
		S3‑230982	General clause for Secondary Authentication Procedure	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231434
		S3‑231434	General clause for Secondary Authentication Procedure	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑230982
		S3‑231620	Living document to TS 33.503 for Prose Secondary Authentication	Interidigital	draftCR	Approval	No	Yes	approved	No
4.11	New WID on DTLS protocol profile for AKMA and GBA	S3‑230894	General part for GBA DTLS to TS 33.222	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230898	Shared key-based mutual authentication between UE and NAF to TS 33.222	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231475
		S3‑231475	Shared key-based mutual authentication between UE and NAF to TS 33.222	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑230898
		S3‑231371	Enable IETF DTLS in Ua protocol	Xiaomi communications	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231475
		S3‑230899	Shared key-based UE authentication with certificate-based NAF authentication to TS 33.222	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230900	Living document for GBA DTLS to TS 33.222	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231476
		S3‑231476	Living document for GBA DTLS to TS 33.222	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230900
		S3‑230893	General part for AKMA DTLS to TS 33.535	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230896	Shared key-based mutual authentication between UE and AF to TS 33.535	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231372	Enable IETF DTLS in Ua star protocol	Xiaomi communications	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230897	Shared key-based UE authentication with certificate-based NAF authentication to TS 33.535	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230895	Living document for AKMA DTLS to TS 33.535	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231236	Enable IETF DTLS in Ua protocol	Xiaomi communications	CR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑231237	Enable IETF DTLS in Ua star protocol	Xiaomi communications	CR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
4.12	New WID on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture Phase 2	S3‑230725	OAuth for subscribe notify	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Mavenir	CR		Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230726	OAuth for subscribe notify	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Mavenir	CR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231395
		S3‑231395	OAuth for subscribe notify	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Mavenir	CR	-	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230726
		S3‑230727	NF service consumer registration by OAM	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Mavenir	CR		Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230728	NF service consumer registration by OAM	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Mavenir	CR		Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑230764	SCP trust assumptions	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR		Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑230766	SBA TLS certificate update	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR		Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑230767	SBA TLS certificate update	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR		Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑231551	SBA TLS certificate update	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	-	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑230874	Clarification on subsribe-notification	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231395
		S3‑231150	Clarification on access token requests for NF Producers of a specific NF type and token-based authorization for indirect communication with delegated discovery	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesNokia asked for more time. Mavenir agreed, there were errors in the CR.	not pursued	No
4.13	New WID on IETF OSCORE protocol profiles for GBA and AKMA	S3‑231199	draft CR: OSCORE as GBA Ua	THALES	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231474
		S3‑231238	Enable OSCORE in Ua protocol	Xiaomi communications	CR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑231239	Enable OSCORE in Ua star protocol	Xiaomi communications	CR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑231281	Living document for AKMA_GBA_OSCORE: draftCR to TS 33.535, IETF OSCORE as AKMA Ua* protocol	Ericsson	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231282	Living document for AKMA_GBA_OSCORE: draftCR to TS 33.220, IETF OSCORE as GBA Ua protocol	Ericsson	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231474
		S3‑231474	Living document for AKMA_GBA_OSCORE: draftCR to TS 33.220, IETF OSCORE as GBA Ua protocol	Ericsson	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231282
		S3‑231373	Enable OSCORE in Ua protocol	Xiaomi communications	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231474
		S3‑231374	Enable OSCORE in Ua star protocol	Xiaomi communications	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
4.14	New WID on Security aspect of home network triggered primary authentication	S3‑230977	Skeleton and new SBI of the HONTRA for normative work	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231477
		S3‑231477	Skeleton and new SBI of the HONTRA for normative work	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230977
		S3‑230978	Basic HONTRA procedure	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231478
		S3‑231478	Basic HONTRA procedure	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230978
		S3‑231264	Add HONTRA procedure in the TS 33.501	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	CR	Approval	Yes	YesMerged into S3-231478	not pursued	No
		S3‑231283	Draft CR for the Home Network Triggered Primary Authentication	Ericsson	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231478
		S3‑231355	HONTRA Updates	Lenovo	CR	Approval	Yes	YesMerged into S3-231478	not pursued	No
		S3‑230702	HNTRA procedure for SoR case	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesMerged into S3-231478	not pursued	No
		S3‑230901	Draft CR to TS 33.501-Comply with error code during interworking	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231299	Network Initiated Primary Authentication	Samsung	CR	Approval	Yes	YesMerged into S3-231478	not pursued	No
		S3‑230902	Draft CR to TS 33.501-Network initiated Primary Authentication	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231478
		S3‑230703	HNTRA procedure for UPU wrap around case	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesMerged into S3-231478	not pursued	No
		S3‑230903	Draft CR to TS 33.535-Kakma refresh	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
5	Rel-18 Studies
5.1	Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations	S3‑231182	FBS - Way forward for KI#2	Philips International B.V., Apple, Deutsche Telekom	pCR	Endorsement	Yes	YesQualcomm: close the study. ORANGE: close the study. The Chair commented that this SID was taking too much time from SA3's work.	noted	No
		S3‑231336	Addressing the editor’s note in 6.27.2.1.1 of Sol#27	CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223883
		S3‑231339	Addressing EN on NR Repeater in 6.27.2.2.4 of Sol#27	CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223885
		S3‑231342	Addressing the editor’s note in 6.27.2.2.1of Sol#27	CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223886
		S3‑231167	5GFBS-UE behaviors on signature verification	Apple	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231298	Resolving EN of solution#7 (TR 33.809)	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230822	Conclusion for KI #3	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesVodafone: never publish it or conclude that there is no normative coming out of this. Apple: 900 series TR? ORANGE: no. It was discussed whether the study could be stopped and leave the TR as a draft. MCC replied that this was possible, just inform SA plenary about it. Vodafone asked if the draft could be referenced, MCC replied that it wasn't possible even if the TR was published since 800 series TRs can only be referenced by other 800 series TRs. CableLabs: just conclude that there is no agreement and no normative work for every key issue. ORANGE: there are key issues that are not agreed, so this is not possible. The Chair asked Apple to bring a clean way to close the study for the next meeting. It would be a contribution concluding the TR and mentioning that no normative work would follow. Apple: no further normative work? Orange: disagree, let's see next meeting. All contributions for the current meeting were noted.	noted	No		S3‑223373
		S3‑231183	FBS - Additions in solution #25	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231296	Solution for Resumecause protection	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
5.2	Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation	S3‑230758	Evaluation of Solution 5	Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231437	Evaluation of Solution 5	Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency	pCR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑230863	New solution on boot time attestation at 3GPP function level	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson didn’t see this solution working. NIST also found some issues with the text. This was	noted	No
		S3‑230971	Evaluation on Solution 5	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
5.3	Study on Security Aspects of Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 2	S3‑230812	LS on UE-to-UE relay discovery direct discovery	Qualcomm Incorporated	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230760	Update to Conclusion to KI #1	InterDigital Finland Oy	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231271	pCR to TR33.740 Conclusion of key issue #1	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230809	Conclusion of KI#1	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230942	Conclusion for KI #1 in TR 33.740	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231257	Conclusion on Key Issue #1 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230949	Update to the conclusion of KI#2 in TR 33.740	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230757	Update to TR 33.740 Conclusion for KI#2	InterDigital Finland Oy	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQuakcomm didn’t agree because this was proposing a new security procedure. Existing security procedures can be used here.	revised	No	S3‑231568
		S3‑231568	Update to TR 33.740 Conclusion for KI#2	InterDigital Finland Oy	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑230757
		S3‑231025	Add conclusion to KI#2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital: dependency on RAN here, this is layer 2. Implications on the security establishment. Qualcomm supported this but they required some changes.	revised	No	S3‑231438
		S3‑231438	Add conclusion to KI#2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231025
		S3‑231076	Conclusion for KI#2	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231177	ProSe - Conclusion on KI#2	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital: authentication method at application layer is outside scope of 3GPP. Qualcomm didn’t agree with the second paragraph.	revised	No	S3‑231579
		S3‑231579	ProSe - Conclusion on KI#2	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231177
		S3‑231258	Conclusion on Key Issue #2 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesDisagreement with the last bullet from Ericsson, Qualcomm and Philips. First bullet was agreed.	revised	No	S3‑231440
		S3‑231440	Conclusion on Key Issue #2 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑231258
		S3‑231272	pCR to TR33.740 Conclusion of key issue #2	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231438
		S3‑231026	Add conclusion to KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231580
		S3‑231442	Add conclusion to KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑231077	Conclusion for KI#3	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm had issues with the changes in blue. Philips was fine with the first paragraph, had some comments on the second part. This had to be taken offline.	revised	No	S3‑231580
		S3‑231580	Conclusion for KI#3	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231077
		S3‑231178	ProSe - Conclusion on KI#3	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital had issues with the first and third paragraphs. Qualcomm as well. The second point was left open for discussion.	noted	No
		S3‑231274	pCR to TR33.740 Conclusion of key issue #3	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesSecond paragraph was not agreed, the last sentence was removed as well, from Qualcomm's comments.	revised	No	S3‑231443
		S3‑231443	pCR to TR33.740 Conclusion of key issue #3	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231274
		S3‑230759	Update to TR 33.740 Conclusion for KI#4	InterDigital Finland Oy	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm didn’t agree with the first change. The second change needed clarification on what the privacy issue was.	revised	No	S3‑231569
		S3‑231569	Update to TR 33.740 Conclusion for KI#4	InterDigital Finland Oy	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑230759
		S3‑231027	Add conclusion to KI#5	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesSamsung didnt agree with the proposal. OPPO: this is not related to key issue 5. Xiaomi: this should be for Key issue 2.	noted	No
		S3‑231316	Conclusion on KI #5	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesOPPO: conflict with 369. We would discuss on whether the security is hop by hop or end to end, the security policy aspect. Qualcomm: I don’t see why the negotiation is there. Xiaomi was fine with the contribution but some rewording was needed. OPPO: there is no negotiation here.	revised	No	S3‑231567
		S3‑231567	Conclusion on KI #5	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑231316
		S3‑231369	Conclusion for KI#5	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231075	Conclusion for KI#6	Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: add layer 2. A note was also added.	revised	No	S3‑231444
		S3‑231444	Conclusion for KI#6	Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231075
		S3‑230904	Conclusion for the KI#6	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231444
		S3‑230755	Evaluation TR 33.740 Sol #12	InterDigital Finland Oy	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: agree on the text, but keep the editor's note.	revised	No	S3‑231445
		S3‑231445	Evaluation TR 33.740 Sol #12	InterDigital Finland Oy	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230755
		S3‑230811	Updates on the solution #24	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231616
		S3‑231616	Updates on the solution #24	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230811
		S3‑230933	Evaluation of TR33.740 Solution 11	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesOverlapping with 815 by Qualcomm.	noted	No
		S3‑231028	Address EN and add evaluation for Sol #26	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: we cannot agree with the first paragraph in step 3 and the first paragraph in the evaluation. Xiaomi didn’t agree with the contribution.	revised	No	S3‑231582
		S3‑231582	Address EN and add evaluation for Sol #26	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231028
		S3‑231179	ProSe - Evaluation Solution #10	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei was not fine with the reference to TS 33.536.	revised	No	S3‑231611
		S3‑231611	ProSe - Evaluation Solution #10	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231179
		S3‑231253	Update the evaluation of solution #30 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231269	pCR to TR33.740 New Solution for discovery integrated into unicast establishment procedure	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital: we need to check alignment with SA2 (integrity discovery). They also had some doubts on the discovery message. Xiaomi: add an editor's note.	revised	No	S3‑231446
		S3‑231446	pCR to TR33.740 New Solution for discovery integrated into unicast establishment procedure	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231269
		S3‑231315	New Solution with evaluation for KI #5	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: this only applies to layer 3, not layer 2.	revised	No	S3‑231566
		S3‑231566	New Solution with evaluation for KI #5	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231315
		S3‑231368	Resolving EN for Solution 22	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231553
		S3‑231553	Resolving EN for Solution 22	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231368
		S3‑231266	pCR to TR33.740 Update Solution28	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230813	Update the evaluation of solution #8	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230934	Update to the evaluation of TR33.740 Solution 8	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230939	Update to the evaluation of TR33.740 Solution 24	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230814	Update the evaluation of solution #9	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230936	Update to the evaluation of TR33.740 Solution 9	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei supported this contribution.	noted	No
		S3‑230815	Add an evaluation of solution #11	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230938	Update to the evaluation of TR33.740 Solution 23	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231205	pCR to TR33.740 Update Solution16 and its evaluation	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231552
		S3‑231552	pCR to TR33.740 Update Solution16 and its evaluation	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231205
		S3‑230979	Add Layer-2 description to sol#27	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231180	ProSe - Solution #27 update	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesMCC commented that normative language should be avoided in the description of solutions. It was commented that as long as the top clause read "potential solutions" this could be accepted.	approved	No
		S3‑231252	Evaluation of solution #21 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231254	Update the evaluation of solution #23 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesMCC: refer to SA2 document instead of saying "aligned with SA2 conclusion".	noted	No
		S3‑231255	Update the evaluation of solution #24 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231256	Update the evaluation of solution #31 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231554
		S3‑231554	Update the evaluation of solution #31 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231256
		S3‑231265	pCR to TR33.740 Update Solution17's evaluation	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231251	Remove the Editor's Note and evaluate the solution #7 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230753	Evaluation TR 33.740 Sol #1	InterDigital Finland Oy	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230754	Evaluation TR 33.740 Sol #13	InterDigital Finland Oy	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230810	Updates on the solution #23	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230940	Add evaluation in Sol #6	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230950	pCR to update TR33.740 Solution 11	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231073	Resolve EN in solution #4	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231248	Update to solution #7 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231249	Update to solution #8 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231630
		S3‑231630	Update to solution #8 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231249
		S3‑231250	Update to solution #9 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231631
		S3‑231631	Update to solution #9 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231250
		S3‑231313	EN Resolution of Sol #19	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231314	EN Resolution of Sol #29	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231439	Draft TR 33.740	CATT	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.4	Study on privacy of identifiers over radio access	S3‑230733	PCR to 33.870 - Solution #10 Evaluation	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesLenovo: capture the backward the compatibility, UE impact. Huawei: we disagree with the view on backward compatibility. Qualcomm:this solution is not back ward compatible. Moving to a different terminal will not protect the SUPI. Interdigital: clause 5.1.3 key issue,states that the solution needs to be evaluated w.r.t backwards compatiblity. Qualcomm: I don’t think that this is backward compatible in some scenarios. It was agreed to add an editor's note on the backwards compatibility, and a new sentence on the protocolos like TLS.	noted	No
		S3‑231172	Updating Solution #9: Concealing length of SUPIs in SUCIs by padding the SUPIs	Oy LM Ericsson AB	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesThales: I don’t agree with "if the UE doesn’t have an USIM then the parameters are stored in the ME". Qualcomm: evaluation should go away.	revised	No	S3‑231441
		S3‑231441	Updating Solution #9: Concealing length of SUPIs in SUCIs by padding the SUPIs	Oy LM Ericsson AB	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231172
		S3‑230736	PCR to 33.870 - Solution #9 Evaluation	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231202	Resolution of EN in solution #8	THALES, Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230737	PCR to 33.870 - Solution #8 Evaluation	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm didn’t agree with the first paragraph on the backward compatibility. Interdigital: we agreed on this definition before. It doesn’t require any changes of the UE and network implementation. We are not compatibles with the SUPIs that are allocated already. Huawei: this is not a real evaluation, reformulate it or remove it.	noted	No
		S3‑230738	PCR to 33.870 - Solution #7 Evaluation	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: avoid the statement on backwards compatibility. Interdigital: if SUPI is replaced in the UE we call it not compatible with the SUPI that was already provisioned. Nokia: reword the backward compatiblity term.	noted	No
		S3‑230905	Add evaluation to solution 6	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Agreement	Yes	YesEricsson: where is the padding done? ZTE: preconfigured in USIM and UDM. Overlapping with tdoc 739. Qualcomm: add an editor's note to say that further evaluation is needed.	revised	No	S3‑231428
		S3‑231428	Add evaluation to solution 6	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230905
		S3‑230739	PCR to 33.870 - Solution #6 Evaluation	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesLenovo: there is an error in the contribution, not the right evaluation.	noted	No
		S3‑230921	EN removal for solution #5	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230887	Evaluation for Solution#5	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	YesHuawei: not clear where the padding is done. Ericsson: what if there is no USIM in the device? Thales: there is no reason to preclude the fact that there is a USIM.	revised	No	S3‑231429
		S3‑231429	Evaluation for Solution#5	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230887
		S3‑230740	PCR to 33.870 - Solution #5 Evaluation	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231429
		S3‑231089	Remove EN and Provide Evaluation for Solution #4	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230741	PCR to 33.870 - Solution #4 Evaluation	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230742	PCR to 33.870 - Solution #3 Evaluation	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230735	PCR to 33.870 Changes to Solution #2	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230743	PCR to 33.870 - Solution #2 Evaluation	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231364	Update to Solution #1 in ID Privacy	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230744	PCR to 33.870 - Solution #1 Evaluation	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231173	KI #1 Conclusion	Oy LM Ericsson AB	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230694	New Informative Annex for TR 33.870	NCSC	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230731	PCR to 33.870 New clause for comparative evaluation of KI#1 solutions	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230734	PCR to 33.870 - New clause for mapping solutions and KIs	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230732	PCR to 33.870 - Aggregate changes	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230730	Privacy Study - Notes from the offline call on 2023-02-08	InterDigital France R&D, SAS	other	Information	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230756	Remove EN to Key Issue #2	Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, InterDigital, Apple, CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231583
		S3‑231583	Remove EN to Key Issue #2	Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, InterDigital, Apple, CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230756
		S3‑230821	Solution Proposed for KI#2, protecting users with high priority	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231584
		S3‑231584	Solution Proposed for KI#2, protecting users with high priority	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230821
		S3‑230880	New solution for prevention of detection of priority access	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Johns Hopkins University APL	pCR		Yes	YesThales, Intel: we object to this solution.	noted	No
		S3‑230885	Policy-based C-RNTI and TMSI refresh	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: it is not clear how to mitigate the leakage of information when sending the parameter,information elements, in the clear. Ericsson:, John Hopkins: no protection of the information in the clear. Qualcomm: remove the evaluation.	revised	No	S3‑231585
		S3‑231585	Policy-based C-RNTI and TMSI refresh	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230885
		S3‑230955	A mitigation solution for key issue #2 based on selective usage of priority-access	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231584
		S3‑231273	New Solution to KI #2	Ericsson-LG Co., LTD	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: remove the evaluation. The solution is incomplete. Lot of details are missing, it's premature. Intel: we object because this is incomplete. Thales: note this contribution.	noted	No
		S3‑230721	New KI: Protection of Home Network Identifiers	MITRE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: We said in the begining of 5G that some of these identifiers didn’t need to be protected. Qualcomm: what has changed since we decided not to protect them? Interdigital: laws of privacy has changed. Governments have tightened their privacy requirements. Vodafone: some way the identifer will show information of the customer. I can't see a realistic way of solving it, though. NTT-Docomo: we will spend too long time on this, I don't see how this can be deployed. MITRE: solution is hard, but this is an issue. Philips: if there is an issue we should study it, even if we don’t see a solution now. Qualcomm: already studied in phase 1 of 5G. At least we need an analysis from technical point of view. I don’t know about any law for routing information being protected.	noted	No
		S3‑230877	New Key Issue for protecting 3GPP radio identifiers and privacy sensitive information during remote troubleshooting	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Vodafone, Verizon	pCR		Yes	YesHuawei: out of scope of the study. NCSC: availability against privacy issue here. China Mobile: not comfortable with this.	noted	No
		S3‑231427	Draft TR 33.870	Interdigital	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.5	Study on Standardising Automated Certificate Management in SBA	S3‑230859	Adding evaluation to solution#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231479
		S3‑231479	Adding evaluation to solution#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230859
		S3‑230918	Updating evaluation of solution#8 in TR33.876	China Telecommunications	pCR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231480
		S3‑231480	Updating evaluation of solution#8 in TR33.876	China Telecommunications	pCR	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230918
		S3‑231268	KI#2 Sol#13 EN resolution and evaluation	Ericsson-LG Co., LTD	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231481
		S3‑231481	KI#2 Sol#13 EN resolution and evaluation	Ericsson-LG Co., LTD	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231268
		S3‑230833	Conclusion of KI#2	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231482
		S3‑231482	Conclusion of KI#2	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230833
		S3‑230998	Conclusion proposal for KI # 2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231482
		S3‑230879	Evaluation for Solution#14	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231483
		S3‑231483	Evaluation for Solution#14	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230879
		S3‑230953	Evaluation for solution #15 on certificate update and renewal	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231484
		S3‑231484	Evaluation for solution #15 on certificate update and renewal	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230953
		S3‑230878	Conclusion of KI#3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231485
		S3‑230954	Conclusion for key issue #3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231485
		S3‑231485	Conclusion for key issue #3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230954
		S3‑231004	Evaluation of solution 6	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231486
		S3‑231486	Evaluation of solution 6	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231004
		S3‑230832	Conclusion of KI#5	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231487
		S3‑231487	Conclusion of KI#5	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230832
		S3‑231270	KI#6 Sol#7 EN resolution and evaluation	Ericsson-LG Co., LTD	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230996	Address the EN of Sol #9	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230831	Conclusion of KI#6	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230999	Add the conclusion for key issue #6	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230828	Discussion paper on new draft rfc on X.509 certificate EKU for JOSE	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230827	Enhancement of solution #10	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230830	Conclusion of KI#7	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231488
		S3‑231488	Conclusion of KI#7	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei asked to minute: this revision doesn’t address our concerns.	approved	No		S3‑230830
		S3‑230826	Resolution of EN in solution #12 of FS_ACM_SBA	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230829	Conclusion of KI#9	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231586
		S3‑231586	Conclusion of KI#9	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230829
		S3‑230997	Address ENs of Sol #1 and add the evaluation	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231267	KI#1 Sol#2 EN resolution and evaluation	Ericsson-LG Co., LTD	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231588
		S3‑231588	KI#1 Sol#2 EN resolution and evaluation	Ericsson-LG Co., LTD	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231267
		S3‑231262	Update to solution #4 in TR 33.876	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231589
		S3‑231589	Update to solution #4 in TR 33.876	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231262
		S3‑231263	Update to solution #5 in TR 33.876	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231590
		S3‑231590	Update to solution #5 in TR 33.876	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231263
		S3‑231358	Proposal Solution #XX ACME use in 3GPP	Google Inc., CableLabs, Charter Communications, Telefonica, Deutsche Telekom	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231489
		S3‑231489	Proposal Solution #XX ACME use in 3GPP	Google Inc., CableLabs, Charter Communications, Telefonica, Deutsche Telekom	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231358
		S3‑230825	Solution of assurance of unique NF identifiers in certificates	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231591
		S3‑231591	Solution of assurance of unique NF identifiers in certificates	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230825
		S3‑230952	Slice specific initial enrolment procedure	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231592
		S3‑231592	Slice specific initial enrolment procedure	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230952
		S3‑231065	pCR to 33876 - Addition of solution for private cert keys in transit and at rest	VODAFONE Group Plc	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesNokia: scope issues with this contribution. Vodafone: adding a clause on best practices? Informative annex? Huawei: we need to discuss this further with Vodafone. We don’t have a common understanding of this.	noted	No
		S3‑230917	Clarify the use of cross-certificates	China Telecommunications	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: GSMA ruled out cross certification in roaming cases. Why are we including it here?	noted	No
		S3‑231499	Draft TR 33.876	Nokia	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.6	New SID on AKMA phase 2	S3‑230701	KI1 conclusion for case 1 and case3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Xiaomi, Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230908	Conclusion for KI#1	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231008	Cocnlusion for key issue 1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231203	Conclusion for Key Issue #1	THALES	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm, Ericsson: UE impact that wasn't pointed out in the SID. Qualcomm preferred the Huawei approach.	noted	No
		S3‑230906	Add EN to the solution 1 and 6 and 14	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230907	Add EN to the solution 5	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230910	updates to the solution 3 and 9	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230911	updates to the solution 15	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231035	Evaluation for Solution #5	LG Electronics	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231036	Evaluation for Solution #12	LG Electronics	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230909	Discussion on multi-registration in AKMA roaming	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Discussion	Yes	YesEricsson: Part of solution 16 can go to normative. Nokia agreed.	noted	No
		S3‑231505	Draft TR 33.737	China Mobile	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.7	Study of Security aspect of home network triggered primary authentication	S3‑230803	Proposed addition to the conclusions	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑230291
		S3‑230930	Solution #10 evalution	BUPT, China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: not sure if his evaluation is appropriate.Just write "this solution is not evaluated".	merged	No	S3‑231548
		S3‑231009	Clean up of the TR	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231548
		S3‑231548	Clean up of the TR	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231009
		S3‑231549	TR 33.741 cover sheet	Huawei	TS or TR cover	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231550	Draft TR 33.741	Huawei	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.8	Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation for 5G – phase 3	S3‑231090	Presentation of TR33.738 to TSG for information	China Mobile	TS or TR cover	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231490
		S3‑231490	Presentation of TR33.738 to TSG for information	China Mobile	TS or TR cover	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231090
		S3‑230969	New solution for authorization on roaming	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231491
		S3‑231491	New solution for authorization on roaming	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230969
		S3‑231094	Update to solution #8	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231492
		S3‑231492	Update to solution #8	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231094
		S3‑231092	Conclusion for key issue #1	China Mobile	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230835	Resolution of ENs of KI#1 conclusion in eNA_SEC_Ph3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230956	New solution on authorization for AI/ML model sharing	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230957	New solution on authorization for AI/ML model sharing	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231053	Add ADRF storage details	Intel	pCR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231493
		S3‑231493	Add ADRF storage details	Intel	pCR	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231053
		S3‑230836	NFc registration in KI#3 conclusion in eNA_SEC_Ph3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231496
		S3‑230837	Authorization granularity in KI#3 conclusion in eNA_SEC_Ph3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231494
		S3‑231494	Authorization granularity in KI#3 conclusion in eNA_SEC_Ph3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230837
		S3‑230838	AI_ML model encryption in KI#3 conclusion in eNA_SEC_Ph3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231495
		S3‑231495	AI_ML model encryption in KI#3 conclusion in eNA_SEC_Ph3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑230838
		S3‑230924	Conclusion for KI#3: Removal of EN related to Authorization	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231494
		S3‑231051	Conclusion for KI#3: Removal of EN related to Registration	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231496
		S3‑231496	Conclusion for KI#3: Removal of EN related to Registration	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231051
		S3‑230958	Update conclusion to KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231152	Updates to conclusions to KI#3 "Security for AI/ML model storage and sharing"	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231494
		S3‑230840	Evaluation of solution #18 in eNA_SEC_Ph3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231593
		S3‑231593	Evaluation of solution #18 in eNA_SEC_Ph3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230840
		S3‑230919	Evaluation for solution#15 in TR33.738	China Telecommunications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230842	Conclusion of eNA_SEC_Ph3 KI#2	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231497
		S3‑230922	Conclusion for KI#2 in TR33.738	China Telecommunications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231497
		S3‑230925	Conclusion for KI#2	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231497
		S3‑231151	Conclusions to KI#2 "Authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group"	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231497
		S3‑231497	Conclusions to KI#2 "Authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group"	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231151
		S3‑230839	Evaluation of solution #6 in eNA_SEC_Ph3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: concerned about additional security related data.	revised	No	S3‑231594
		S3‑231594	Evaluation of solution #6 in eNA_SEC_Ph3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230839
		S3‑231356	Update to Solution #9 in eNA	Lenovo	pCR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231595
		S3‑231595	Update to Solution #9 in eNA	Lenovo	pCR	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231356
		S3‑230841	Conclusion of eNA_SEC_Ph3 KI#4	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230920	Evaluation for solution#19 in TR33.738	China Telecommunications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230923	Conclusion for KI#5 in TR33.738	China Telecommunications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231597
		S3‑231597	Conclusion for KI#5 in TR33.738	China Telecommunications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230923
		S3‑231337	New solution addressing KI#6	Lenovo, Nokia	pCR		Yes	YesQualcomm objected to this, not in scope. Huawei also objected.	noted	No
		S3‑231357	Update to Solution #20 in eNA	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: wait a meeting cycle for this solution.	noted	No
		S3‑231500	Draft TR 33.738	China Mobile	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.9	Study on Security Enhancement of support for Edge Computing — phase 2	S3‑230843	Update in solution #23 (EAS discovery procedure protection)	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesVodafone: we don’t provision the UE as described here. I will not object because this is not a solution.	revised	No	S3‑231447
		S3‑231447	Update in solution #23 (EAS discovery procedure protection)	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230843
		S3‑231016	Addressing the EN in solution#23	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231447
		S3‑231017	Conclusion for Key issue#1.2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesVodafone objected to this contribution, it had to be taken offline. Ericsson: editor's note, this is not complete.	revised	No	S3‑231587
		S3‑231587	Conclusion for Key issue#1.2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231017
		S3‑230870	Resolving EN of conclusion of KI#2.1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231059	Further conclusion for KI# 2.1	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesVodafone: you need to map the statement on the token based solution to an existing solution. Apple had also issues with the token based solution statement.	revised	No	S3‑231529
		S3‑231529	Further conclusion for KI# 2.1	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231059
		S3‑231060	Conclusion update for KI#2.1 to address the GPSI spoofing attack	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: this is not needed. Thales didn’t agree with the conclusion either. Ericsson: we can address the threat in the normative phase without writing it here? Huawei agreed to write something to avoid confusion for implementers.	revised	No	S3‑231450
		S3‑231450	Conclusion update for KI#2.1 to address the GPSI spoofing attack	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231060
		S3‑231240	Update Conclusion for KI 2.1	Xiaomi communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: we don’t agrree with this.	revised	No	S3‑231598
		S3‑231598	Update Conclusion for KI 2.1	Xiaomi communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑231240
		S3‑231300	Update to conclusion#2.1	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson had issues with the contribution. Qualcomm: why do we need another way of provising the root certificates in the UE? Vodafone supported this. Apple: wording not clear. Thales: no requirement for privacy, change the wording.	revised	No	S3‑231451
		S3‑231451	Update to conclusion#2.1	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231300
		S3‑230871	Resolving EN of conclusion of KI#2.2	Huawei, HiSilicon, Thales	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesApple: first change not needed, any authentication methods can be used. We don’t agree with the second change either. Samsung: clarification on the second change. Huawei: second change refers to an existing solution in the TR.	merged	No	S3‑231452
		S3‑231062	Further conclusion for KI#2.2	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231451
		S3‑231301	Update to conclusion#2.2	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231452
		S3‑231452	Update to conclusion#2.2	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesSamsung: there is a big support for this contribution. They asked for a working agreement. Apple objected because they thought that the issue was left for implementation. Samsung: there is no need for standardization. NTT_Docomo: I have reservations and I would like to see in the WID how this works for an operator-network side. For the sake of progress we can include this in the study. OPPO: not a conclusion language, make it a note. Apple agreed, China Telecom as well.	noted	No		S3‑231301
		S3‑230802	Resolving the EN in solution #22	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231168	MEC-Addressing the EN#1 in solution#7	Apple	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231169	MEC-Addressing the EN#2 in solution#7	Apple	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231454
		S3‑231454	MEC-Addressing the EN#2 in solution#7	Apple	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231169
		S3‑231302	Evaluation for solution#22	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230872	Resolving EN of conclusion of KI#2.3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230873	Resolving EN of conclusion of KI#2.4	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesVodafone: why remove it if the TR is not finished? Huawei: editorial issue, it should be located in the whole clause 7 and not here. Vodafone: ok, there are other cases where we are removing editor's notes without reason.	approved	No
		S3‑230723	Conclusion for solution #26.	InterDigital Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesConflict with tdoc 869.	noted	No
		S3‑230722	Address ENs	InterDigital Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: these details are not very clear. Huawei: how to verify the tokens is not clear here. Keep the editor's note in the evaluation.	revised	No	S3‑231455
		S3‑231455	Address ENs	InterDigital Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230722
		S3‑230869	Resolving EN of conclusion of KI#2.6	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231063	A new solution for KI#2.6	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesVodafone: author providing his own evaluation for his solution.We normally put an editor's note in these cases for further evaluation.	revised	No	S3‑231456
		S3‑231456	A new solution for KI#2.6	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231063
		S3‑231061	A new key issue on user consent for data sharing via North-Bound APIs	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: this should go to SNAAPPY study.Qualcomm didn’t understand the relation with SNAPPY.	noted	No
		S3‑230724	Editorial change	InterDigital Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231453	Draft TR 33.739	Huawei	draft TR	Approval	No	Yes	approved	No
5.10	Study on Personal IoT Networks Security Aspects	S3‑230666	conclusion on KI#1	vivo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230780	KI#1 Conclusions	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230912	Add conclusion for KI#1	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230989	Add conclusion to KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231201	Conclusion for Key Issue #1	THALES	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231354	Add conclusion to KI#1 of TR 33.882	Xiaomi Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230667	conclusion on KI#2	vivo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230781	KI#2 Conclusions	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230886	Conclusion for KI#2: Authorization of PIN capabilities	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230913	Add conclusion for KI#2	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231235	Add conclusion to KI#2 of TR 33.882	Xiaomi communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230778	Sol#1 Updating Evaluation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230779	Sol#3 Removal of EN	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231596
		S3‑231596	Sol#3 Removal of EN	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230779
		S3‑231181	PIN - Evaluation Solution #4	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231539
		S3‑231539	PIN - Evaluation Solution #4	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231181
		S3‑230819	Resolution of EN#1 in Solution#7 for KI#1	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231540
		S3‑231540	Resolution of EN#1 in Solution#7 for KI#1	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230819
		S3‑230820	Resolution of EN#2 in Solution#7 for KI#1	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230777	KI#1 New Sol for local PINE authentication	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231541
		S3‑231541	KI#1 New Sol for local PINE authentication	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230777
		S3‑231170	PINE authentication	Apple	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: it goes against SA2's conclusions. It has impact on primary authentication and the local interface (WLAN, Bluetooth,..). Interdigital: accept the solution add all these to the evaluation. Qualcomm: only evaluate solutions that are in line with the other WGs.	noted	No
		S3‑231345	Solution for KI#2	Lenovo	pCR		Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231557	Draft TR 33.882	Vivo	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.11	Study on SNAAPP security	S3‑230775	Sol#1 Adding Evaluation to Sol#1	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230774	Sol#3 Updating Evaluation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231359	Update to Solution #4 in Snaappy	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231230	Add evaluation to Sol #9 of TR 33.884	Xiaomi communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231231	Add evaluation to Sol #10 of TR 33.884	Xiaomi communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231310	Update on Sol#11	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231311	Update on Sol#12	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230776	KI#1 Conclusions	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231545
		S3‑230966	Conclusion for key issue #2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231545
		S3‑231312	Conclusion on KI#2	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231545
		S3‑230963	Update on solutiion #1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230967	Address EN on solutiion #1: username mapping	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230968	Address EN on solutiion #1: message of scope	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230773	Sol#3 Resolving ENs on scopes and claims	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231360	Update to Solution #5 in Snaappy	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231057	Resolving ENs in solution #6	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231234	Resolve EN for Sol #9 of TR 33.884	Xiaomi communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231309	Resolving EN on Sol#11	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230965	New Solution on OAuth2.0 Token Revocation	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231232	KI#1 and KI#2, New Sol on resource owner policies based authorization mechanism	Xiaomi communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231233	KI#2, New Sol on User authorization revocation for API invocation procedure	Xiaomi communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231375	new solution: authorization revocation for persistent changes	NTT DOCOMO INC.	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230964	Role mapping from TR 23.700-95	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231381	Editorials for 33.884	NTT DOCOMO INC.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231384	pCR to 33.884 on architectural assumptions	NTT DOCOMO INC.	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231545	SNAAPPY conclusions	NTT-Docomo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231608	Draft TR 33.884	NTT-Docomo	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231617	TR 33.884 cover sheet	NTT-Docomo	TS or TR cover	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.12	Study on enhanced security for network slicing Phase 3	S3‑230848	Wayforward discussion for KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	discussion	Information	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230849	KI#1 update	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231506
		S3‑231506	KI#1 update	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑230849
		S3‑230915	Update to KI#1 providing VPLMN slice information to roaming UE	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Agreement	Yes	YesThales, Qualcomm didn’t agree with this contribution. There is no threat, it’s integrity protected.	merged	No	S3‑231506
		S3‑230914	New solution to KI#1 protecting SoR container from UDM to UE	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Agreement	Yes	YesThales: note this solution, there is nothing to do.	noted	No
		S3‑230850	Conclusion for KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231507
		S3‑231507	Conclusion for KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230850
		S3‑230851	Update to KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: this is more in the SA2's domain. They have a key issue 6 about this.The security issue is still unclear. No need to have more additions in the existing text.	noted	No
		S3‑230852	New solution to KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231508
		S3‑231508	New solution to KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: key issue 3 was agreed last meeting. We noted all solutions. Ericsson had agreed to wait for the WID completion in SA2, their objection is not following this now. Nokia: Ericsson also objected stating that we had to follow for SA2 WID and now they object to our solutions as well. Ericsson: this key issue was handled in a emeeting. We need to see the outcome of SA2 and see the security implications of their decisions, this needs time. Ericsson objected to 508 and 509. Huawei: I appeal to Ericsson to allow any solution to go into the TR and not to block the work here. Nokia added that no technical justifications were given to their objections. Noamen (Huawei): just add a note on the alignment with SA2 to address Ericsson's concerns. It was agreed to remove the evaluation and add an editor's note for the SA2 alignment.	approved	No		S3‑230852
		S3‑231037	New solution to KI#3	LG Electronics	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231508
		S3‑231125	solution for KI#3 network slice admission control	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231509
		S3‑231509	solution for KI#3 network slice admission control	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231125
		S3‑231126	conclusion for KI#3 network slice admission control	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231560
		S3‑231560	conclusion for KI#3 network slice admission control	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑231126
		S3‑231122	update to KI#2 temporary network slice	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231123	solution for KI#2 temporary network slice for NSSAA	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: this is an SA2 topic.	noted	No
		S3‑231124	conclusion for KI#2 temporary network slice for NSSAA	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231619	Draft TR 33.886	Huawei	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.13	Study on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2	S3‑230986	conclusion for KI#4	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesLenovo: solution 7 has some limitations, and it is not the only option. Ericsson: we should agree on one solution, not several. The key issue is late, we need another meeting cycle to check solution 7.	revised	No	S3‑231510
		S3‑231510	conclusion for KI#4	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑230986
		S3‑231361	Conclusion to KI#4	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231366	Conclusions for KI#4 in 5WWC	CableLabs	pCR		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231328	Conclusions for KI#5 in 5WWC	CableLabs, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230699	updating conclusion for KI1	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230988	update conclusion for KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231153	TNAP mobility using modified ERP	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesNokia wanted to add some editors' notes. Huawei needed some clarifications as well. Lenovo: this is not needed. Changing EAP is not fine for us. Ericsson: just add an editor's note. If we block solutions it will be harder to get to conclusions in the next meeting.	revised	No	S3‑231512
		S3‑231512	TNAP mobility using modified ERP	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231153
		S3‑230800	Adding FT details to solution #7	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231513
		S3‑231513	Adding FT details to solution #7	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230800
		S3‑230801	Adding evaluation to solution #7	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesLenovo needed some clarifications.	revised	No	S3‑231514
		S3‑231514	Adding evaluation to solution #7	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230801
		S3‑230985	Update solution#10	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230987	Update to sol#11	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231001	update solution #5	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231002	update solution #6	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231003	update solution #8	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231351	Clarifications to Solution #8 5WWC	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231329	Key issue on indirect authentication of AUN3 devices behind	CableLabs, Rogers Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231330	Solution for indirect authentication of AUN3 devices behind RG	CableLabs, Rogers Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231334	Conclusions for KI#Y in 5WWC	CableLabs, Rogers Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230700	updating the existing solution mapping	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231511	Draft TR 33.887	Nokia	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.14	Study on the security aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) for the NG-RAN	S3‑231290	KI2 conclusion	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231350	New Key Issue for robustness of RAN AI/ML framework against resource exhaustion attacks	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	noted	No
5.15	Study on security support for Next Generation Real Time Communication services	S3‑230860	Adding conclusion on KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231291	Conclusion for key issue #1	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230861	Adding conclusion on KI#2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231536
		S3‑231292	Conclusion for key issue #2	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231536
		S3‑231536	Conclusion for key issue #2	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231292
		S3‑231293	Update Solution#1	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231558	Draft TR 33.890	Huawei	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.16	Study on security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2	S3‑230946	Resolution of EN – conclusion to KI#1 – Trusted access	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230984	Update 7.1.2 and 7.1.3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231155	Discussion for removal of Editor's note in conclusion for trusted N3GPP	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231156	Updated conclusion for KI#1 regarding trusted access	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230947	Resolution of EN – conclusion to KI#1 - NSWO	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: remove the third bullet, it is not new.	merged	No	S3‑231501
		S3‑231157	Updated conclusions for KI#1 regarding NSWO	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: solution 15 should also be made normative, not informative.	revised	No	S3‑231501
		S3‑231501	Updated conclusions for KI#1 regarding NSWO	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231157
		S3‑230916	conclusion for KI2	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Agreement	Yes	YesDiscussed together with 1158. Qualcomm preferred Ericsson's contribution, more simple. Nobody seemed to support having al these steps in the conclusion.	noted	No
		S3‑231158	Updated conclusion of KI#2 Authentication for UE access to hosting network	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesLenovo preferred to keep the second editor's note.	revised	No	S3‑231502
		S3‑231502	Updated conclusion of KI#2 Authentication for UE access to hosting network	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231158
		S3‑230945	Resolution of EN – conclusion to KI#1 – Untrusted access	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: why impact 5G procedures with non standardised EAP methods?	noted	No
		S3‑230948	Resolution of EN – conclusion to KI#1 – N5GC device access	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: don’t remove the editor's note until this is solved in the normative work.	noted	No
		S3‑230992	Update evaluation to solution#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231533
		S3‑231533	Update evaluation to solution#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230992
		S3‑230993	Add further impacts and evaluations to sol#5	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231534
		S3‑231534	Add further impacts and evaluations to sol#5	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230993
		S3‑230994	Address Editor’s Note to sol#6	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231535
		S3‑231535	Address Editor’s Note to sol#6	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230994
		S3‑230983	New solution on IDi of trusted non-3GPP access	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231504
		S3‑231504	New solution on IDi of trusted non-3GPP access	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230983
		S3‑230995	Delete Editor’s Note in sol#8	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231154	Updates to Solution #14	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm wanted to keep the editor's notes open for one more meeting cycle for a proper analisys. Ericsson: this is in line with SA2.	noted	No
		S3‑231363	Update to Solution #16 NPN	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson, Nokia and Qualcomm found issues with this digital identifier in the contribution. A justification was needed,	noted	No
		S3‑230990	clarification the scope of sol#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesXiaomi didn’t agree with the contribution. Huawei: this part is not addressed in the solution.	noted	No
		S3‑230991	Delete Edirot’s Note of sol#7	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231503	Draft TR 33.858	Ericsson	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231621	Cover sheet TR 33.858	Ericsson	TS or TR cover	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.17	Study on Security of Phase 2 for UAS, UAV and UAM	S3‑230797	Draft TR 33.891 v0.5.1	Qualcomm Incorporated	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230441
		S3‑231348	Update to Solution #2 UAS	Lenovo	pCR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231537
		S3‑231537	Update to Solution #2 UAS	Lenovo	pCR	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231348
		S3‑230798	Coversheet for TR 33.891	Qualcomm Incorporated	TS or TR cover	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231538
		S3‑231538	Coversheet for TR 33.891	Qualcomm Incorporated	TS or TR cover	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230798
		S3‑231618	Draft TR 33.891	Qualcomm	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.18	Study to enable URSP rules to securely identify Applications	S3‑231335	Conclusion for KI#1	Lenovo	pCR		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231015	updates to evaluation of solution2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231542
		S3‑231542	updates to evaluation of solution2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231015
		S3‑231333	Evaluation Update of Solution #2	Lenovo	pCR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231543
		S3‑231543	Evaluation Update of Solution #2	Lenovo	pCR	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231333
		S3‑230943	Resolution to editor’s note in solution 1 concerning threat mitigation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231544
		S3‑231544	Resolution to editor’s note in solution 1 concerning threat mitigation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230943
		S3‑230944	Resolution to editor’s note in solution 1 concerning the provisioning of security material	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231556	Draft TR 33.892	Lenovo	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231622	Cover sheet TR 33.892	Motorola Mobility	TS or TR cover	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.19	Study on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning	S3‑231213	33.893: Resolve the Editor’s Notes in Solution #7	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231515
		S3‑231515	33.893: Resolve the Editor’s Notes in Solution #7	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231213
		S3‑231029	New solution for protecting direct communnication	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231516
		S3‑231516	New solution for protecting direct communnication	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231029
		S3‑231220	33.893: New Solution on Direct Communication Security for Ranging-based Services	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231517
		S3‑231517	33.893: New Solution on Direct Communication Security for Ranging-based Services	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231220
		S3‑231030	Conclude to KI#4 about Ranging unicast direct communicaiton	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesXiaomi: this is not agreable.	noted	No
		S3‑231224	33.893: Conclusion on Key Issue #4	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricssonL we don’t want any conclusions yet.	noted	No
		S3‑231261	Update and evaluate to solution #9 in TR 33.893	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: not sure that this solution fulfils the key issue.	revised	No	S3‑231623
		S3‑231623	Update and evaluate to solution #9 in TR 33.893	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231632	S3‑231261
		S3‑231632	Update and evaluate to solution #9 in TR 33.893	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231623
		S3‑231021	Network assisted SL positioning discovery	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: not clear if this is security related, more in SA2's scope.	noted	No
		S3‑231022	Network assisted SL positioning security material provisioning	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei required some clarifications on whether it is in the coverage area or outside.	noted	No
		S3‑231219	33.893: New Solution on Discovery Security for Ranging/SL Positioning Service	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm, Philips: last point on ciphering algorithm discovery message confidentiality is not true.	revised	No	S3‑231624
		S3‑231624	33.893: New Solution on Discovery Security for Ranging/SL Positioning Service	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231219
		S3‑231223	33.893: Conclusion on Key Issue #3	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm, Ericsson: we cannot accept solution 9.	revised	No	S3‑231518
		S3‑231518	33.893: Conclusion on Key Issue #3	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231223
		S3‑231208	33.893: Update to the Key Issue #2	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcom and Huawei didn’t like any of the changes. Huawei: copying all the SA2 text is not a good way of doing this.	revised	No	S3‑231625
		S3‑231625	33.893: Update to the Key Issue #2	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231208
		S3‑231211	33.893: Update to the Evaluation of Solution #2	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231259	Update to evaluation of solution #3 in TR 33.893	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231212	33.893: Resolve the Editor’s Notes in Solution #4	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231520
		S3‑231520	33.893: Resolve the Editor’s Notes in Solution #4	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231212
		S3‑231217	33.893: New Solution on Role Verification during Discovery based on Discovery Keys	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm and Philips didn’t agree with this.	noted	No
		S3‑231260	Update to solution #5 in TR 33.893	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231020	Resolving editor notes in Solution #10	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: just delete the second editor's note. Philips didn’t understand the phrase on the token being revoked due to the lifetime being expired. This was taken offline.	revised	No	S3‑231521
		S3‑231521	Resolving editor notes in Solution #10	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231020
		S3‑231216	33.893: New Solution on Token Provision for UE Role Authorization	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231215	33.893: Add Evaluation to Solution #11	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231218	33.893: New Solution on Client UE Authorization for Service Exposure through the Network	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231047	conclusion on key issue 2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesAdding an editor's note to add coordination with SA2 as proposed by Ericsson. Xiaomi didn’t agree with the second bullet: this is not authorization.On the first bullet we don’t have requirements related to UE privacy profile handling.	revised	No	S3‑231626
		S3‑231626	conclusion on key issue 2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231047
		S3‑231222	33.893: Conclusion on Key Issue #2	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: solution 2 is not aligned with sA2's normative work. Remove solution 3 in the second bullet.	noted	No
		S3‑230817	Updates to the Key Issue #5	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231522
		S3‑231522	Updates to the Key Issue #5	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230817
		S3‑230941	Update KI #5	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesOPPO: Broadcast and groupcast shuld have requirements? Xiaomi: different use cases, different solutions. Apple: they are different as well. For Qualcomm they should be together.No difference. CATT: in RAN2 they don’t mind about this difference. Separate is OK. The Chair suggested adding requirements for both, and in the future more different requirements could be alaways brought.	merged	No	S3‑231522
		S3‑231275	pCR to TR33.893 Update Key issue#5	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231522
		S3‑231209	33.893: Potential Requirements for KI #5	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑231522
		S3‑230818	A new solution for group communication security for Ranging/SL Positioning services	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231600
		S3‑231600	A new solution for group communication security for Ranging/SL Positioning services	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230818
		S3‑231276	pCR to TR33.893 New solution for protecting groupcast and broadcast data in coverage	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231601
		S3‑231601	pCR to TR33.893 New solution for protecting groupcast and broadcast data in coverage	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑231276
		S3‑231277	pCR to TR33.893 New solution for protecting groupcast and broadcast data out of coverage	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231602
		S3‑231602	pCR to TR33.893 New solution for protecting groupcast and broadcast data out of coverage	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑231277
		S3‑231341	Protection of broadcast communication	Lenovo	pCR		Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231045	update to solution 1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231210	33.893: Additional Evaluation for Solution #1	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231214	33.893: Resolve the Editor’s Note in Solution #8	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231185	Ranging - Update Key Issue #1- privacy risks of exposing positioning reference signals	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231184	Ranging - New solution KI#1, #2, #3	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231046	conclusion on key issue 1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231221	33.893: Conclusion on Key Issue #1	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230884	New Key issue for Monitoring and detecting attacks on ranging devices and services	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231519	Draft TR 33.893	Xiaomi Technology	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.20	Study on Security and Privacy of AI/ML-based Services and Applications in 5G	S3‑231365	Conclusion for KI#1	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: there are privacy issues here.No data should be exposed to third parties, as it is the case with the NWDAF. Nokia: the NWDAF problem is a maintenance issue, this is a study. Qualcomm agreed with Ericsson. The user consent needs more analysis and SA3 needs to wait for SA2 anyway.	revised	No	S3‑231523
		S3‑231523	Conclusion for KI#1	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesOPPO: Ericsson is trying to bring an issue that is outside of 3GPP's scope. User-subscriber authorization is not part of the KI. AT&T agreed with OPPO. This is not part of the study. Apple supported as well. Ericsson could bring a contribution dealing with this. Nokia: not an issue in this study. China Mobile: bring a new key issue about this.	approved	No		S3‑231365
		S3‑231246	New Sol on OAuth 2.0 based 5GC assistance information exposure	Xiaomi communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231245	Add evaluation to Sol #2 of TR 33.898	Xiaomi communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: UE privacy profile is related to user consent? We need to wait for the reply LS from SA2. Then we can add the evaluation.	noted	No
		S3‑230935	Add evaluation in Sol#4	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: No framework for user consent. Besides, it is not compliant with GDPR and it misses detail on the exposure to third parties. Nokia: then this is a gap in Rel-17 to be corrected with a CR. OPPO: your comment is against the existing framework and not this particular solution. You need to bring a CR. It was agreed to add an editor's note on the existing framework.	revised	No	S3‑231525
		S3‑231525	Add evaluation in Sol#4	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230935
		S3‑230937	Update Sol#5	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231627	Draft TR 33.898	OPPO	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.21	Study on applicability of the Zero Trust Security principles in mobile networks	S3‑230720	New KI: Support for Policy Decision Points and Policy Enforcement Points within 5GC SBA	MITRE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: out of scope of 3GPP. Nokia agreed with Ericsson.It's an implementation issue. Huawei: 5GC is not an enterprise, there is a lack of evaluation here.	noted	No
		S3‑231347	Update of Key Issue #1	Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Charter Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: this is not a security requirement. Firs editor's note remains.	revised	No	S3‑231527
		S3‑231527	Update of Key Issue #1	Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Charter Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231347
		S3‑231338	Solution to Key Issue-1	Lenovo, Charter Communications, US National Security Agency	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: there is a lot of things that are out of scope.	revised	No	S3‑231612
		S3‑231612	Solution to Key Issue-1	Lenovo, Charter Communications, US National Security Agency	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑231338
		S3‑231340	Solution to KI#1	Lenovo, Charter Communications, US National Security Agency	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231613
		S3‑231613	Solution to KI#1	Lenovo, Charter Communications, US National Security Agency	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑231340
		S3‑230888	Clarify authorization for non-SBA interfaces	China Telecommunications	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: this is not applicable at all. These are not even SBA interfaces, it's irrelevant.	noted	No
		S3‑231343	Update to Tenet #5	Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Charter Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230717	Alignment of 3GPP’s 5G Security to the fifth NIST Tenet of ZTA	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesNokia: we don’t agree with this document. Huawei was fine with this evaluation.	noted	No
		S3‑231344	Update to Tenet #6	Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Charter Communications	pCR		Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230718	Alignment of 3GPP’s 5G Security to the sixth NIST Tenet of ZTA	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231346	Cleanup of Tenet #7	Lenovo, US National Security Agency	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231528	Draft TR 33.894	Motorola Mobility	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.22	Study of Security aspects on User Consent for 3GPP Services Phase 2	S3‑230960	Conclusion for key issue #2 User Consent for NTN	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesApple: just say "no normative is required".	revised	No	S3‑231530
		S3‑231530	Conclusion for key issue #2 User Consent for NTN	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230960
		S3‑230961	Conclusion for key issue #3 Unified Framework	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231349	Solution to Key Issue #2 UCS NTN	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230765	Solution update - user consent authorization function	Nokia UK	pCR		Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑230926	New key issue on enhancement of user consent for using logged MDT for NG-RAN AI/ML	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	YesNokia: this is coming from an LS from RAN. Qualcomm: there is no LS related to MDT user collection data from a RAN group.	noted	No
		S3‑230959	Clean up for TR 33.896	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231531	Draft TR 33.896	Huawei	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.23	Study on security enhancements for 5G multicast-broadcast services Phase 2	S3‑230808	A new solution for mitigating privacy attacks exploiting group paging with TMGI	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231041	A new solution to address the privacy issue with TMGI	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231042	conclusion on key issue 2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231044	conclusion on key issue 1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231307	[MBS] Conclusion for Key Issue#1	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231308	[MBS] Resolving ENs in solution#1	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑231327	[MBS] Evaluation for solution#3	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231043	Addressing the editor's note in solution 3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230951	Updates to Solution#2	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231049	LS on Proposal for common TMGI, MSK and MTK identifiers for MOCN	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231555	Draft TR 33.883	Huawei	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.24	Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture	S3‑230654	TR skeleton FS_N32SEPP_SEC - Study on security for N32 and SEPP hosting scenarios	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	other		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230668	pCR to TR FS_N32SEPP_SEC - Shifting KIs and solutions to new TR	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230669	Removal of KIs and solutions from TR 33.875 due to shift to new study FS_N32SEPP	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	YesHuawei: strange that we are voiding everything. MCC commented that it was better to have TRs and studies with a clear scope that is not overlapping. The SIDs should be revised as well so as not to clash in content. Nokia commented that they had prepared a skeleton for rel-19, and the Chair commented that no work in release 19 would not be started until later. Release 18 items had priority. Huawei preferred not to move anything until the new Rel-19 study was agreed. So the best way for them would be to keep the content and delete later with a CR. NTT-Docomo: close this study in Rel-18, and start a new study in Release 19( with a more reduced scope), using the same TR number or a different one. CableLabs: just delete the content as proposed and minute that the content will be moved to Release 19 whenever we start the work in there. This was taken offline.	noted	No
		S3‑230670	Presentation of Report TR 33.875 v1.7.0	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	TS or TR cover		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231628
		S3‑231628	Presentation of Report TR 33.875 v1.7.0	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	TS or TR cover	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230670
		S3‑230762	KI11 Solution 21 EN resolution	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230763	KI11 Solution 22 EN resolution	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230770	pCR to TR FS_N32SEPP_SEC KI10 solution to enable intermediaries to initiate signalling messages	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, NTT Docomo	other		Yes	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑230823	updating solution 26 in TR33.875	Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231082	KI11 analysis and conclusions	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231546
		S3‑231546	KI11 analysis and conclusions	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑231082
		S3‑231114	pCR to FS_N32SEPP_SEC - Mapping table	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	other	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231117	New Solution to KI #11 Problem 2	Oy LM Ericsson AB	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231198	KI4 solution 23 evaluation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231629	Draft TR 33.875	Nokia	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.25	Study on Security Aspects of Satellite Access	S3‑231226	33.700-28: New Solution on AF Authorization based on OAuth Token	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: this solution should be aligned with sA2. They havent decided the details yet. Qualcomm: no need for this solution, especially the UE involvement. This is not acceptable. Nokia also had many issues with this document. Interdigital: we can mention the UE's involvement in the evaluation. Qualcomm: we don’t agree with having the UE in the key issue.	noted	No
		S3‑231227	33.700-28: New Solution on AF Authorization based on UE Policy	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: SA2 has not concluded on this yet. Xiaomi: we can add an editor's note about this. Qualcomm had the same comment here as in 226.	noted	No
		S3‑231228	33.700-28: New Solution on AF Authorization based on UE Profile	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231229	33.700-28: New Key Issue on Consistent Provision of Coverage Information to the UE and CN	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
6	New Study/Work item proposals	S3‑230655	SID on Study on security for N32 and SEPP hosted scenarios	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	SID new		Yes	YesVodafone: we want to close the current TR, and move the pending issues to a new TR. Huawei: we have a TR, we can continue working in that document. Nokia: we endorsed this in a discussion paper in November. Qualcomm: abuse of the process. We should continue the key issues in the current TR in Release 18, otherwise bring it back in Release 19. CableLabs: we agreed to do this in a separate study, but it should go to Release 19. The Chair commented that it could not be pushed to Release 19 given that this was required by GSMA. Mavenir: we endorsed this already. Huawei: we commented in the last meeting that we would not commit to new studies, we didn’t agree with having Studies in Release 19. We support studying the key issues, we only disagree with the process. Nokia: we don’t remove the issues from the current TR yet then. Qualcomm didn’t like having discussion papers for endorsement. They didn’t agree with spending time for Release 19. NTT-Docomo: we only work for requirements coming from GSMA, other things we come up with should be moved to Release 19. Nokia; let's send it for Release 19.	revised	No	S3‑231614
		S3‑231614	SID on Study on security for N32 and SEPP hosted scenarios	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	SID new	-	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑230655
		S3‑230692	Discussion paper on potential risks in deployment of 256-bit algorithms	KDDI Corporation	discussion	Discussion	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230693	Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256 bits	KDDI Corporation	SID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑230834
		S3‑230695	New Draft WID: Introduction of 256bit Algorithms	VODAFONE Group Plc	WID new	Agreement	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑230696	WID on Security aspects of home network triggered primary authentication	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	WID new	Approval	Yes	YesVodafone: justification is weak, having a TR is not enough. We haven't even sent the TR for information. This is what we should do as a principle before starting the normative work.Maybe propose normative text in an annex of the TR? NTT-Docomo: no need to update the WID. New use cases will come up and we can reuse the gneral procedure for the WID. Huawei: when SA2 finishes the work we can always bring a CR and a linked WID, business as usual. Nokia agreed that SA3 could do this when SA2's work is done.	noted	No
		S3‑230697	New WID on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs, Charter Communications, Lenovo, Apple	WID new	Agreement	Yes	YesQualcomm: add the objectives where we have agreements. If there is any change we can always bring a revised WID together with a CR, this doesn’t take any time. The Chair asked when to stop the study and start the WID. Vodafone: finish all SIDs that are followed in WIDs in the next emeeting.	revised	No	S3‑231561
		S3‑231561	New WID on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs, Charter Communications, Lenovo, Apple	WID new	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230697
		S3‑230698	Discussion paper for MPS support over WLAN and relationship with HNTRA study	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230799	Proposed WID for UAS Phase 2 security	Qualcomm Incorporated, Lenovo, Huawei, HiSilicon	WID new	Agreement	Yes	YesInterdigital: timelines are aggressive. It was decided to extend them.	revised	No	S3‑231562
		S3‑231562	Proposed WID for UAS Phase 2 security	Qualcomm Incorporated, Lenovo, Huawei, HiSilicon	WID new	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230799
		S3‑230824	New WID on Automated certicate management in SBA	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	WID new		Yes	YesRevised to introduce more key issues from the current meeting. Vodafone: why having this in Release 18? Nokia: this was needed for a long time. NTT-Docomo: release independent feature? Huawei: maybe impact on stage 3. CableLabs: renmove the NOTE.	revised	No	S3‑231563
		S3‑231563	New WID on Automated certicate management in SBA	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	WID new	-	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230824
		S3‑230834	Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256 bits	KDDI Corporation	SID new	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No		S3‑230693
		S3‑230862	New WID on security enhancements for NGRTC	Huawei, HiSilicon	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231564
		S3‑231564	New WID on security enhancements for NGRTC	Huawei, HiSilicon	WID new	Approval	Yes	YesAdding the previous study in section 2.2 as parent work item.	agreed	No		S3‑230862
		S3‑230868	New WID on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC — phase 2	Huawei, HiSilicon	WID new	Approval	Yes	YesVodafone: is the TR finished? Huawei: one key issue is open.	revised	No	S3‑231565
		S3‑231565	New WID on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC — phase 2	Huawei, HiSilicon	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑230868
		S3‑230962	New WID on UC3S_Ph2	Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, CAICT	WID new	Agreement	Yes	YesVodafone: why 5G specific user consent mechanisms? Huawei: just clarification text for TS 33.501. It was argued whether bringing this as TEIx ,but MCC didn’t like this as new requirements were going to be introduced. This couldn’t be considered as a technical enhancement if it was bringing requirements. Qualcomm: bring a CR with the WID if there is normative content, bring cat-F if it's more like a correction.	noted	No
		S3‑231038	Discussion paper on security enhancements for 5GC LoCation Services Phase 3	Huawei, HiSilicon	discussion	Information	Yes	YesQualcomm: the WID is not needed. Existing solutions support hop by hop or end to end, the operator can decide which way to go.	noted	No
		S3‑231039	New WID on security enhancements for 5GC LoCation Services Phase 3	Huawei, HiSilicon	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231040	New WID on security enhancements for MBS Phase 2	Huawei, HiSilicon	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231083	New WID on AKMA phase 2	China Mobile	WID new	Approval	Yes	YesNokia: remove the bulllet "other conclusions from TR 33.737".	revised	No	S3‑231570
		S3‑231570	New WID on AKMA phase 2	China Mobile	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231083
		S3‑231084	New WID on security aspects of MSGin5G Ph2	China Mobile	WID new	Approval	Yes	YesThe Chair pointed out that TS 33.501 was becoming too big and instead of keep adding annexes it was recommended to create new TS. Revised to move the SA6 WID to table 2.3, remove guideline text, impact on ME. It was pointed out that there was an accompanying CR with this to send them as one shot to SA.	revised	No	S3‑231571
		S3‑231571	New WID on security aspects of MSGin5G Ph2	China Mobile	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231084
		S3‑231093	New WID on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation for 5G - phase 3	China Mobile	WID new	Approval	Yes	YesVodafone: don’t copy all supporting companies from the SID, you need their agreement firstly.	revised	No	S3‑231572
		S3‑231572	New WID on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation for 5G - phase 3	China Mobile	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231093
		S3‑231159	New WID on Security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2	Ericsson	WID new	Agreement	Yes	YesVodafone: SA2 study goes to 2.3, SA3 Study goes to 2.2. Qualcomm: objetives are still open,because conclusions from the SID are pending.	revised	No	S3‑231573
		S3‑231573	New WID on Security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2	Ericsson	WID new	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231159
		S3‑231187	New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Policy Control Function (PCF)	BSI (DE)	WID new	Approval	Yes	YesNokia: the PCF is not listed as a product in TR 33.926. We need to analyze first if there are threats. Vodafone: we need this as an operator. GSMA: UDR and PCF are in ENISA's list of products with lots of personal data. PCF is optional, but if present there is a lot of user data being accessed. NTT-Docomo: UDM and UDR can be in the same WID. Ericsson: TS 33.117 is applied for both UDR and PCF.We don’t have any specific requirements in TS 33.501. We support studying what test cases could be applied here. Vodafone: study item on how to separate UDR and UDM? We have a document about this already. It's important to have SCAS for UDR. GSMA: keep UDR and UDM in two separate documents, otherwise if one fails they both fail. MCC: just use one rapporteur. They also pointed some other editorial issues on the WID template. NTT-Docomo: can we plan an emeeting for SCAS? We only need to plan it 3 or 4 weeks in advance and it won't take much time of the other SA3 meetings. Let's have a discussion to plan the emeeting.	revised	No	S3‑231574	S3‑230679
		S3‑231574	New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Policy Control Function (PCF)	BSI (DE)	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231187
		S3‑231190	New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR)	BSI (DE)	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑230680
		S3‑231204	New WID on Security Aspects of Proximity-based Services in 5GS Phase 2	CATT, China Unicom	WID new	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: Remove the last line of the objectives, this appears already in section 5. Huawei: don’t put as an objective whatever is not concluded, also don’t be so general. We can revise the WID if the TR changes its conclusions. Motorola solutions: remove the public safety services, it will be done somewhere else.	revised	No	S3‑231575
		S3‑231575	New WID on Security Aspects of Proximity-based Services in 5GS Phase 2	CATT, China Unicom	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231204
		S3‑231225	New WID on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning	Xiaomi Technology	WID new	Approval	Yes	YesVodafone: SA3 study should go for section 2.2. SA1 study should go to table in 2.3. Remove last phrase of objectives.	revised	No	S3‑231576
		S3‑231576	New WID on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning	Xiaomi Technology	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑231225
		S3‑231304	New WID on enhanced security aspects of SEAL for vertical	Samsung	WID new	Agreement	Yes	YesVodafone: swap study and WID in tables 2.2 and 2.3. MCC: change the acronym to SEAL_ph2 since this is the same as Rel-16. Apple: we never studied the possible solutions for SA6's work.It is possible that we may not agree on anything.	revised	No	S3‑231577
		S3‑231577	New WID on enhanced security aspects of SEAL for vertical	Samsung	WID new	Agreement	Yes	YesApple: do we need a TR for these key issues? Chair: if the feature is defined by somebody else we don’t need a study.	agreed	No		S3‑231304
		S3‑231331	New SID on QUIC optimization for access traffic steering, switching and splitting support in the 5G system architecture; Phase 3	Lenovo, BROADCOM CORPORATION, CableLabs, CATT, Charter Communications, Inc, CISCO, Deutsche Telekom, InterDigital, Inc., LG Electronics, Nokia, Tencent, vivo Mobile Communication Co.,, Xiaomi, ZTE Corporation, China Mobile	SID new	Approval	Yes	No	not treated	No
		S3‑231362	New WID on application enablement aspects for subscriber-aware northbound API access	NTT DOCOMO INC.	WID new	Agreement	Yes	YesNokia: sceptical about enhancements for SEAL. This was removed.	revised	No	S3‑231578
		S3‑231578	New WID on application enablement aspects for subscriber-aware northbound API access	NTT DOCOMO INC.	WID new	Agreement	Yes	YesNTT-Docomo: the WID will be updated according to the progress.	agreed	No		S3‑231362
		S3‑231367	AIML Security and Privacy WID	OPPO	WID new	Agreement	Yes	YesQualcomm: there is no conclusion that justifies a WID. Vodafone: wrong template used. MCC: title reads "study". Ericsson: there is no conclusion for new normative work. Vodafone: remove the line "other conclusions requiring..".	noted	No
		S3‑231370	New WID to enable URSP rules to securely identify Applications (USIA)	Lenovo	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
7	CVD and research	S3‑230614	Research highlighting potential negated OAuth policy	GSMA	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑230615	Research highlighting potential need for granular level checks using ""Additional scope"" under the OAuth2.0 Token Access.	GSMA	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑230719	Reply-LS on the need for granular level checks using "Additional scope" under the OAuth2.0 Token Access	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231581
		S3‑231581	Reply-LS on the need for granular level checks using "Additional scope" under the OAuth2.0 Token Access	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑230719
		S3‑231332	Discussion summary of CVD paper	SA WG3 Vice Chair	discussion	Presentation	Yes	YesThe CVD process needed to be discussed further. MCC commented that it was hard to have a process with the electronic meeting limitations, but since f2f were back it would be possible to have offline discussions on CVD in the meeting room and sharing sensitiive information. The Chair clarified that the paper was already published and the authors had expressed their intention to bring to 3GPP CVD further research. He also clarified that this presentation was submitted for information. Huawei commented that the panel would filter CVDs and bring those that required a follow up in SA3. Vodafone: it's normal for GSMA to give public statements replying to CVDs but not in 3GPP.	noted	No
8	Any Other Business	S3‑230604	SA3 meeting calendar	SA WG3 Chair	other		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑231079	SA3 guidelines for delegates	MCC	other	Information	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑231385
		S3‑231385	SA3 guidelines for delegates	MCC	other	Information	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑231079
9	Closing of the meeting