TDoc list

Tdoc List

2022-11-23 15:41

Agenda	Topic	TDoc	Title	Source	Type	For	Avail	Treated	Decision	Wdrn	Replaced-by	Replaces
1	Agenda and Meeting Objectives	S3‑223140	Agenda	SA WG3 Chair	agenda		Yes	YesThe WG Chair welcomed the attendees and thanked for their attendance after three years of remote meetings. A video from the Toulouse mayor of Toulouse was shown. Mireille (Thales) gave the welcome speech on behalf of 3GPP.	approved	No
		S3‑223143	Process for SA3#109	SA WG3 Chair	other		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223145	Process and agenda planning for SA3#109	SA WG3 Chair	other		Yes	Yes	noted	No
2	Meeting Reports	S3‑223141	Report from SA3#108e	MCC	report		Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223142	Report for SA3#108e ad-Hoc	SA WG3 Chair	other		Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223144	Report from last SA	SA WG3 Chair	report		Yes	YesChristine asked about stage 2 freeze dates and SA3 dependency on SA2. Suresh clarified that this dependency is well understood in SA2.	noted	No
3	Reports and Liaisons from other Groups	S3‑223148	LS on clarification for UE_NOT_FOUND cause code for UP in CT1	C1-226279	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑223317	LS Reply on UE_NOT_FOUND cause code	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesHelena (Ericsson): this LS is for Rel-18 and they have frozen the specifications in Rel-17. It was decided to discuss this in the related CRs.	revised	No	S3‑223903
		S3‑223903	LS Reply on UE_NOT_FOUND cause code	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No		S3‑223317
		S3‑223149	LS on user’s consent for EDGEAPP	C3-223780	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑223181	Reply LS on user’s consent for EDGEAPP	S6-222555	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223620	Reply LS on user’s consent for EDGEAPP (S3-223149)	Apple	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223904
		S3‑223649	[DRAFT] Reply LS on user’s consent for EDGEAPP	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223904
		S3‑223482	Reply LS on User Consent for EDGEAPP	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesVodafone: user consent better left for regulators.	revised	No	S3‑223904
		S3‑223904	Reply LS on User Consent for EDGEAPP	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223482
		S3‑223162	Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting	R3-225250	LS in		Yes	YesEricsson didn’t agree with Apple's and Huawei's proposal.	postponed	No
		S3‑223229	Reply LS to Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223905
		S3‑223905	Reply LS to Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	-	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223229
		S3‑223621	Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting (S3-223162)	Apple	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223905
		S3‑223492	Reply LS on the User Consent for Trace Reportings	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223905
		S3‑223163	LS on user consent of Non-public Network	R3-226006	LS in		Yes	YesQualcomm: user content not important if the user is not human. Ericsson: better handle it next meeting. There is no reply submitted to this meeting. The Chair commented that better not to postpone.	postponed	No
		S3‑223906	Reply to: LS on user consent of Non-public Network	Qualcomm	LS out	approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223178	LS on User consent for Application Detection	S2-2209973	LS in		Yes	YesEricsson: user consent not applicable here. Huawei: check SA2's info. If the SUPI is connected the user consent is needed. Interdigital agreed that user consent was needed. Vodafone: we would end up pressing content for everything and I'm not sure we need to standardise this as it is done in the handset anyway.	replied to	No
		S3‑223454	Reply LS on User consent for Application Detection	OPPO	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223907
		S3‑223686	Reply LS on User consent for Application Detection	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm supported Ericsson's proposal.	revised	No	S3‑223907
		S3‑223907	Reply LS on User consent for Application Detection	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223686
		S3‑223179	Reply LS on User Consent Updating	S5-225321	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223151	LS on Authentication Result Removal	C4-224418	LS in		Yes	YesNokia preferred Ericsson's view. Huawei commented that SA3 could align with CT4. Ericsson: SA3 didn’t see a need some years ago. Remove it from stage 3 to avoid CT's work and then SA3 checking it out. BT: this is a security function without a stage 2 requirement. IT should be removed.	postponed	No
		S3‑223609	Reply LS on autentication result removal	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223908
		S3‑223833	Reply LS on Authentication Result Removal	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223908
		S3‑223908	Reply LS on Authentication Result Removal	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223833
		S3‑223152	Reply LS on PLMN ID used in Roaming Scenarios	C4-224444	LS in		Yes	Yes	postponed	No
		S3‑223165	Reply LS On PLMN ID used in Roaming Scenarios	S2-2207391	LS in		Yes	Yes	postponed	No
		S3‑223204	Reply LS on PLMN ID used in Roaming Scenarios	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223909	Reply LS on PLMN ID used in Roaming Scenarios	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	-	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223153	Reply LS on handling of the modification policy in the IPX and receiving SEPP	C4-224467	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223157	LS to 3GPP - Hosted SEPP	GSMA	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑223386	LS to GSMA DESS on SEPP certificates	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223910
		S3‑223910	LS to GSMA DESS on SEPP certificates	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223386
		S3‑223676	Discussion paper on SEPP inter-domain certificate on N32 interface	Ericsson	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223154	LS on Indication of Network Assisted Positioning method	C4-224626	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223155	Reply LS on Facilitating roaming adoption across 3GPP NPN deployments	C6-220475	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223183	Reply LS on Facilitating roaming adoption across 3GPP NPN deployments	SP-220985	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223185	Facilitating roaming adoption across 3GPP NPN deployment	WBA	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223156	Completion of SGP.22 v3.0	GSMA	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223159	Re-use of CAPIF by ETSI MEC	ETSI ISG MEC	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223195	Reply LS on Re-use of CAPIF by ETSI MEC	S6-223027	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223160	Reply LS on null security algorithm	R2-2208832	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223161	Reply LS on authenticity and replay protection of system information	R2-2208985	LS in		Yes	Yes	postponed	No
		S3‑223166	LS on protection of the URSP rules from HPLMN	S2-2207501	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑223472	Reply LS about Protection of URSP rules from HPLMN	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223911
		S3‑223801	Reply to LS on protection of the URSP rules from HPLMN	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out		Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223911
		S3‑223740	Discussion on protection of the URSP rules from HPLMN	Samsung	discussion	Discussion	Yes	YesSamsung: no possibility of changing the access technology type would be the attack scenario here. Qualcomm: Observation 1 not correct. VPLMN can change the traffic routing. Vodafone: I don’t agree with observation 1. Cable Labs: we support Qualcomm's proposal. BT: The threat exists but there are easier ways for the VPLMN to override this. If we don’t trust the VPLMN to do this what do we trust it for? I don’t see the value of this one. VPLMN can be trusted for URSP rules: Docomo, Cable Labs, Huawei, Qualcomm,Thales, Deutsche Telekom, BT, Vodafone,China Mobile, Charter communications. VPLMN cannot be trusted, URSP rules need to be protected: Samsung, Interdigital, Nokia,Lenovo, Phillips. BT commented that all operators are the ones who take the risk here, it’s them who decide who to trust.	noted	No
		S3‑223379	Reply LS on protection of the URSP rules from HPLMN	Qualcomm Incorporated	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223911
		S3‑223911	Reply LS on protection of the URSP rules from HPLMN	Qualcomm Incorporated	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223379
		S3‑223173	LS on impact of URSP rule enforcement report to 5GC	S2-2209327	LS in		Yes	Yes	postponed	No
		S3‑223622	LS on impact of URSP rule enforcement report to 5GC (S3-223173)	Apple	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223912
		S3‑223298	Reply LS on impact to URSP rules enforcement report to 5GC	vivo	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesORANGE: what’s the privacy issue? Vivo: it can check how frequeht reports are. Vodafone: UE reporting something because we don’t trust it and by doing that we have privacy concerns. Google: Questions 1 and 3 are OK, but we see a privacy issue here. There is a very detailed profile for the UE. URSP is not known by the user, Qualcomm: we don’t see the privacy issue here. The rules are provided by the operator, who knows what needs to be provided by the UE, Huawei: we don’t see privacy issues in question 1. NAS signal is protected against eavesdroppers. We don’t see an issue in question 2 either. Interdigital: we trust the UE for some things and we don’t trust the UE for other things. It's strange. Vodafone: the UE can be trusted and such mechanism is not needed. Google agreed that there was no issue to be fixed here. Misbehaving UE can be dealt with in RAN5.	revised	No	S3‑223912
		S3‑223912	Reply LS on impact to URSP rules enforcement report to 5GC	vivo	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223298
		S3‑223800	Discussion paper on a way forward for LS on protection of the URSP rules from HPLM	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Discussion	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223167	Reply LS on Inter-PLMN Handover of VoLTE calls and idle mode mobility of IMS sessions	S2-2207697	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223184	LS from NG to 3GPP SA3 on IMS Data Channel Security Mode	GSMA	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑223844	Reply LS on the IMS Data Channel Security Mode	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesNokia: LI aspects to be handled in SA3-LI? BT: end to end would be an issue. IF you can turn it off or provide the keys it should be OK.	revised	No	S3‑223913
		S3‑223913	Reply LS on the IMS Data Channel Security Mode	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223844
		S3‑223169	LS Reply on EAC Mode for NSAC	S2-2209260	LS in		Yes	YesHuawei clarified that there was no change in SA3 specs.	noted	No
		S3‑223170	Response LS on Identifier availability for Lawful Interception during Inter-PLMN handover	S2-2209262	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223862	Response LS on Identifier availability for Lawful Interception during Inter-PLMN handover	S3i220660	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223171	Response LS on Clarifications for AF specific UE ID retrieval	S2-2209270	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223180	Forward on S6-222332, LS on Network federation interface for Telco edge consideration	S6-222543	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑223584	Reply LS on Network federation interface for Telco edge consideration	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson had issues with point 3 to be taken offline. Nokia had also issues with point 3.	revised	No	S3‑223914
		S3‑223914	Reply LS on Network federation interface for Telco edge consideration	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223584
		S3‑223174	LS on Satellite coverage data transfer to a UE using UP versus CP	S2-2209684	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223176	LS on Time Synchronization Status notification towards UE(s)	S2-2209876	LS in		Yes	Yes	postponed	No
		S3‑223213	Reply LS on Time Synchronization Status notification towards UE(s)	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	Information	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223915
		S3‑223915	Reply LS on Time Synchronization Status notification towards UE(s)	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,Ericsson	LS out	Information	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223213
		S3‑223848	Reply LS on Time Synchronization Status notification towards UE(s)	Ericsson	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei needed time to consider this.	merged	No	S3‑223915
		S3‑223177	Reply LS on User plane solution for 5GC information exposure to UE	S2-2209910	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223147	5G capabilities exposure for factories of the future - identified gaps	5G-ACIA	LS in		Yes	YesThe Chair commented that SA will answer to the GSMA. There was no time to gather all answers to 5G-ACIA so it was decided to postpone for the next meeting encouraging all parties interested in solve all these questions.	postponed	No
		S3‑223182	LS on new work item X.5Gsec-ctrl: Security controls for operation and maintenance of 5G network systems	ITU-T SG17	LS in		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223199	TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur	InterDigital, Inc.	other	Information	Yes	YesAlec (Interdigital) presented this report. 1. TCG – Highlights Publication of new or revised deliverables (incremental changes from the status reported at SA3#108-e) • TCG Measurement and Attestation RootS (MARS) Library – publication Q4 2022 • TCG Component Class Registry – public review October 2022 • TCG Storage Component Class Registry – public review October 2022 • TCG PC Client Platform Physical Presence Interface – public review July 2022 • TCG DICE Endorsement Architecture for Devices – public review May 2022 • TCG EK Credential Profile for TPM 2.0 – public review March 2022 • TCG Cyber Resilient Module & Building Block Requirements – public review March 2022 • TCG Canonical Event Log Format – published February 2022 2. Meetings • TCG Members Meeting Hybrid F2F (Vancouver, BC) 21-23 February 2022 • MP WG meets every Monday at 10-11 ET • TMS WG meets every Monday and Friday at 12-13 ET • CyRes WG meets every Wednesday at 11-12:30 ET 3. Conclusion	noted	No
		S3‑223612	LS to inform about the new GSMA Task Force	GSMA	LS in		Yes	YesIIT Bihlai: asked whether GSMA was considering the recommendations of NIST Post Quantum Competition in preparing the road-map to adoption of Post Quantum Cryptography in its task force. ORANGEL we need chipmakers and manufacturers to participate in this task force (companies who are not GSMA members can be invited). Todor suggested to send them info on the SA3 study in the 256 bit-study. ORANGE clarified that the roadmap of algorithms from different organizations like NIST would be the first step as an overview of the quantum computing work. Apple:TR 33.801 has no information on the Quantum algorithms yet. Will the GSMA impact the work in SA3? Vodafone: we have made progress since that TR. There is a collection of things that we can send them with a LS, including SAGE's work on 256-bit algorithms. ORANGE: GSMA cannot change 3GPP's work, the decisions are taken here. OPPO: what input from UE vendors? ORANGE replied that an assesment needed to be done on the impact on the devices by the UE vendors. MCC commented that the TR was 3GPP internal only and it was important to clarify this to GSMA.ORANGE agreed and commented that GSMA had seen the TR already as it was a public document, MCC commented that it had to be pointed out very carefully that the internal TR was only for information and nothing can be considered normative in them. Apple: no necessary to reply, everything is public already.There are no questions for us. Apple objected to this LS. NCSC: this information is useful for them.	noted	No
		S3‑223916	Reply to: LS to inform about the new GSMA Task Force	ORANGE	LS out	approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223902	Specification of the 256-bit air interface algorithms	ETSI SAGE	LS in		Yes	YesKDDI was happy to trigger a Study Item based on this work. IDEMIA: SA3's prefreence is AES rather than Rijvendel. Let’s ask SAGE to publish the details on AES as well. MCC commented that ETSI needed to investigate how to share the work of SAGE as it was not clear whether this needed to be confidential. A registration with the French anuthorities needed to be done most likely as well, as ETSI would be the host of the algorithms. In the mean time a SID or a WID could be started in SA3 to use SAGE's output. Apple: companies need to study this information internally. We need more time.	postponed	No
4	Work areas (Rel-18)
4.1	New WID on Security Assurance Specification for Management Function (MnF)	S3‑223533	Editorial changes to the living document for MnF SCAS	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224121
		S3‑224121	Editorial changes to the living document for MnF SCAS	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223533
		S3‑223541	Updates to clause 4.2 of MnF SCAS	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223567	Living document for MnF SCAS	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224122
		S3‑224122	Living document for MnF SCAS	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223567
		S3‑223571	Updates to clause 4.3 of MnF SCAS	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224123
		S3‑224123	Updates to clause 4.3 of MnF SCAS	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223571
		S3‑224163	Draft TS 33.526	Huawei	draft TS	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
4.2	New WID on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products	S3‑223458	Adding description about overview of vendor development and product lifecycle processes and test laboratory accreditation to clause 6.1	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224080
		S3‑224080	Adding description about overview of vendor development and product lifecycle processes and test laboratory accreditation to clause 6.1	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223458
		S3‑223459	Adding description about audit and accreditation of vendor development and product lifecycle processes to clause 6.2	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224081
		S3‑224081	Adding description about audit and accreditation of vendor development and product lifecycle processes to clause 6.2	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223459
		S3‑223460	Adding description about Audit and accreditation of test laboratories to clause 6.3	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224082
		S3‑224082	Adding description about Audit and accreditation of test laboratories to clause 6.3	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223460
		S3‑223461	Adding description about monitoring to clause 6.4	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223553	Adding description about SCAS instantiation documents creation to clause 7.1	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223554	Adding description about network product development process and network product lifecycle management to clause 7.2	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223555	Adding description about SCAS instantiation evaluation overview to clause 7.2	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223556	Adding description about content and process of SCAS instantiation evaluation to clause 7.2	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224083
		S3‑224083	Adding description about content and process of SCAS instantiation evaluation to clause 7.2	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223556
		S3‑223564	Adding description about testing to clause 7.2	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223572	Adding description about self-declaration to clause 7.3	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223575	Adding contents into clause 7.5 and 7.6	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223632	Adding description about partial compliance and use of SECAM requirements in network product development cycle to clause 7.4	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224084
		S3‑224084	Adding description about partial compliance and use of SECAM requirements in network product development cycle to clause 7.4	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223632
		S3‑223633	Adding missing content from last implementation	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223634	Adding clause 4.4 in TR 33.927	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224085
		S3‑224085	Adding clause 4.4 in TR 33.927	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223634
		S3‑223637	Adding clause 5 Generic assets and threats in TR 33.927	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223640	Adding clause 6 in TR 33.927	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224086
		S3‑224086	Adding clause 6 in TR 33.927	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223640
		S3‑223642	Proposal to add 4.1 in TS33.527	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑224096	Draft TR 33.936	China Mobile	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑224097	Draft TR 33.927	China Mobile	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
4.3	New WID on Mission critical security enhancements phase 3	S3‑223186	[33.180] R18 MC client clarification	Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
4.4	New WID on Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for 5G Rel-17 Features	S3‑223933	Adding non-Uu user plane text cases to TS 33.511	Qualcomm Incorporated	draftCR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223206	Clarification for IPSec in UPF interfaces	Keysight Technologies UK Ltd	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑224089	Clarification for IPSec in UPF interfaces	Keysight Technologies UK Ltd	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223207	Correction of requirement references in UPF test case	Keysight Technologies UK Ltd	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223208	Update gNB test case for UP integrity protection	Keysight Technologies UK Ltd	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223493	New Test Case on UP IP policy selection in S1 Handover	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223494	New Threat on Bidding down prevention for UP IP Policy	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223495	New Test Case on Bidding down prevention for UP IP Policy	Huawei, HiSilicon	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223506	living doc to TR33.926	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224155
		S3‑224155	living doc to TR33.926	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223506
		S3‑223507	living doc to TR33.216	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224156
		S3‑224156	living doc to TR33.216	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223507
		S3‑223508	living doc to TS33.117	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223509	Update requirement and add new test case to clause 4.2.3.4.3.1	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223510	Update requirement and add new test case to clause 4.2.3.4.3.2	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223607	add test case to include SNPN snenario in PLMNID verification	Huawei, HiSilicon	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
4.5	New WID on Security Assurance Specification for the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) Anchor Function Function (AAnF)	S3‑223205	New SCAS test case for AUSF	Keysight Technologies UK Ltd	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223422	Adding AKMA subscription and AKMA context asynchronization threats to TR 33.926	ZTE Corporation	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223423	Security Assurance Requirement and Test for AKMA subscription data and AKMA context synchronization	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223457	Adding a test case of AKMA key strorage and update	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223674	Adding AAnF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑224098	Draft TR 33.537	China Mobile	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑224135	Living document for AAnF SCAS – draftCR to TR 33.926	China Mobile	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
4.6	New WID on SCAS for split-gNB product classes	S3‑223342	Draft CR: Introducing split gNBs into TR 33.926	Qualcomm Incoporated	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224169	S3‑222322
		S3‑224169	Draft CR: Introducing split gNBs into TR 33.926	Qualcomm Incoporated	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223342
		S3‑223343	Proposed text for gNB-CU part of draft CR to TR 33.926	Qualcomm Incoporated	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑221815
		S3‑223344	Proposed text for gNB-CU-CP part of draft CR to TR 33.926	Qualcomm Incoporated	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑221816
		S3‑223345	Add user plane threats for gNB-DU to the draft CR to TR 33.926	Qualcomm Incoporated	other	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223346	Correcting the threats references for the gNB-CU	Qualcomm Incoporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223347	Adding user plane test cases for the gNB-CU	Qualcomm Incoporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223348	Correcting the threats references for the gNB-CU-CP	Qualcomm Incoporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223349	Adding test cases for the gNB-CU-CP	Qualcomm Incoporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223350	Correcting the threats references for the gNB-CU-UP	Qualcomm Incoporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223351	Adding test cases for the gNB-CU-UP	Qualcomm Incoporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223352	Correcting the threats references for the gNB-DU	Qualcomm Incoporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223353	Adding user plane test cases for the gNB-DU	Qualcomm Incoporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223354	Adding non-501 test cases for the gNB-CU	Qualcomm Incoporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑224103	Draft TR 33.742	Qualcomm	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
4.7	Service Based Architecture (Rel-15/16/17)	S3‑223203	Clarification on N32-f connection establishment with TLS	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223951	S3‑221841
		S3‑223951	Clarification on N32-f connection establishment with TLS	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223203
		S3‑223260	Discussion on authorization issue in inter NF mobility	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Information	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223261	Clarification on authorization for inter NF mobility	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesEricsson: not needed. It can be done in CT3, CT4. Mavenir: we support this CR. This doesn’t need a study.Not sure that the CR reflects the discussion paper. The Chair asked if it was ageed that there was a problem here. Ericsson agreed but the question was for which group. Ericsson had an input for solving this issue in CT3,CT4.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223404	Revise the pre-requisite of access token request	China Telecommunications	CR		Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223399	Revise the pre-requisite of access token request(mirror)	China Telecommunications	CR		Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223590	Discussion on notification URI disclosure in "Subscribe-Notify" scenarios	Huawei, HiSilicon	discussion	Discussion	Yes	YesHuawei clarified that the issue can be solved by CT4 and identified by SA3. Ericsson: there could be different solutions apart from this one and we would ike to discuss them in the next meeting.	noted	No
		S3‑223591	LS on notification URI disclosure	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223672	Editor's note resolution on NF instance id in cert profile	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR		Yes	YesHuawei: fine with the note, some rewording suggested.This had to be taken offline.	agreed	No
		S3‑223677	Correct SCP certificate profile	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223678	Correct SCP certificate profile	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223679	Clarify SEPP intra-domain certificate profile	Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesCableLAbs: roaming interface? Ericsson: to be done later.	agreed	No
		S3‑223680	Clarify SEPP intra-domain certificate profile	Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223681	Correct NF certificate profile	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223682	SEPP to include and verify the source PLMN-ID	Ericsson, Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesHuawei didn’t agree with the first paragraph. Mavenir: CT4 approved this already.We have to include the PLMN id, this has arrived in GSMA. Huawei still had concerns despite that. Ericsson: this is coming from an approved draft CR.It should not be taken back. NTT-Docomo: The deployment limitations are not detailed. They should be added here. Maybe with an editor's note. Mavenir: GSMA is already using this information based on CT4, not SA3.	revised	No	S3‑223953	S3‑221998
		S3‑223953	SEPP to include and verify the source PLMN-ID	Ericsson, Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑223682
		S3‑223683	SEPP to include and verify the source PLMN-ID	Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Mavenir	draftCR	Approval	Yes	YesMCC clarified that this was already approved in a previous meeting, so it wasn’t necessary to resubmit it unless there were changes. It could be noted but it had to be taken into account that the content was approved before already.	noted	No		S3‑221998
		S3‑223684	Clarification on access token requests for NF Producers of a specific NF type and token-based authorization for indirect communication with delegated discovery	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223954
		S3‑223954	Clarification on access token requests for NF Producers of a specific NF type and token-based authorization for indirect communication with delegated discovery	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑223684
		S3‑223709	TargetNFServiceSetId to be part of access token claims	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesNokia: brought back because people thought this was a new feature when it is an alignment instead. Ericsson: changes are on the wrong clause. Huawei had issues with caoturing Service Set in the token. This had to be taken offline.	revised	No	S3‑223955	S3‑221840
		S3‑223955	TargetNFServiceSetId to be part of access token claims	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223709
		S3‑223398	Revise the pre-requisite of access token request	China Telecommunications	CR		Yes	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223825	Clarification on N32-f connection establishment with TLS - SNPN use case	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes		S3‑221841
4.8	Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe (Rel-17)	S3‑223409	Figure CR in 6.3.3.3.2 of TS33.503	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.,CATT	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223956
		S3‑223552	Update to UE-to-Network relay security procedures	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223956
		S3‑223703	Renaming 5GPRUK, 5GPRUK ID, PRUK and PRUK ID	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223956
		S3‑223956	Renaming 5GPRUK, 5GPRUK ID, PRUK and PRUK ID	Ericsson,China Telecom, Huawei, HiSilicon,CATT	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223703
		S3‑223368	Corrections in privacy protection of 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay procedure	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223957
		S3‑223957	Corrections in privacy protection of 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay procedure	Qualcomm Incorporated,eijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223368
		S3‑223772	Correction to privacy protection of UP-PRUK ID and RSC in DCR	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223957
		S3‑223463	Clarifies to the match report procedures under UE-to-Network relay scenario	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223958
		S3‑223743	Match Report in U2N Relay Discovery Security Procedure	Xiaomi Technology	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223958
		S3‑223958	Match Report in U2N Relay Discovery Security Procedure	Xiaomi Technology,Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223743
		S3‑223427	Add a Note to address the subscription synchronization between PAnF and UDM	ZTE Corporation	CR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson preferred this option to make it implementation dependent. Supported by Nokia.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223429	Clarification of subscription information in PAnF	ZTE Corporation	CR	Approval	Yes	YesMCC commented that the reference to TS23.501 was missing. This was revised to address Huawei comments.	revised	No	S3‑223960
		S3‑223960	Clarification of subscription information in PAnF	ZTE Corporation	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223429
		S3‑223573	CR on Remote UE Authorization check before using 5GPRUK generate KNR_ProSe	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR		Yes	YesInterdigital: we don’t see the need of this new interface, we prefer the ZTE version in 429 where an existing interface is impacted. Ericsson didn’t support this CR.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223428	Add functionality description of PAnF	ZTE Corporation	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223961
		S3‑223961	Add functionality description of PAnF	ZTE Corporation,CATT	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223428
		S3‑223671	CR to TS33.503 PAnF definition and reference point to UDM	CATT	CR	Approval	Yes	YesDepedent on 671.	merged	No	S3‑223961
		S3‑223430	Add FC Value in 33.503	ZTE Corporation	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223705	Nudm servcie operation correction	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223962
		S3‑223962	Nudm servcie operation correction	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑223705
		S3‑223822	Discussion on RID used in ProSe	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	YesInterdigitak: there is no routing id for PAnF. Huawei disagreed to have separate IDs. Ericsson agreed with Huawei and Interdigital. ZTE as well.	noted	No
		S3‑223823	include RID of AUSF in DCR	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223824	include RID of AUSF in CP PRUK ID	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223819	Discussion on Serving Network Name used in ProSe	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223820	use relay UE SNN to generate AV for ProSe authentication	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223821	use remote UE SNN to generate AV for ProSe authentication	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223316	Handling of PRUK desynchronization issue with 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesQualcomm: this is better handled in CT1. Interdigital: there is a security issue that we can handle.	agreed	No
		S3‑223462	Clarifies to clause 6.3.5 to include the CP mechanism key identifier	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223956
		S3‑223702	Correction to authentication mechanism selection	Ericsson, Xiaomi	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224161
		S3‑224161	Correction to authentication mechanism selection	Ericsson, Xiaomi	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223702
		S3‑223704	Correcting the handling of synchronisation error	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesQualcomm: no need to update the existing text.The problem is addressed already.	revised	No	S3‑224133
		S3‑224133	Correcting the handling of synchronisation error	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223704
		S3‑223706	CP-PRUK refresh	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223742	DDNFM Selection during U2N Relay Discovery Security Procedure	Xiaomi Technology, Ericsson	CR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital had several issues, including some that may be under SA2's scope. This was taken offline.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223744	Security Method Check during U2N Relay Discovery Procedure	Xiaomi Technology	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223745	Updates to Key Definitions	Xiaomi Technology	CR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm couldn’t agree with these changes. Interdigital couldn’t agree either.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223315	Alignment of Link Identifier Update (LIU) procedure	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesQualcomm: this is not missing in the existent specification. It is already covered. Interdiigta didn’t agree, the spec wasn't referring to the privacy related procedure. Qualcomm needed to check the spec. ZTE: this is existent in SA2 but not in SA3. Just one line referring to SA2. Interdigital: the SA2 refers to us, it creates a loop.	revised	No	S3‑224170
		S3‑224170	Alignment of Link Identifier Update (LIU) procedure	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223315
		S3‑223318	Resolution of Remote UE permanent identity in Remote UE Report procedure (CP)	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223319	Resolution of Remote UE permanent identity in Remote UE Report procedure (UP)	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223320	Discussion on Lawful Interception support for 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223321	LS on support for Lawful Intercept target identities for 5G ProSe Remote UE	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223367	LS on Source user info in Direct Communication Request in UE-to-Network Relay	Qualcomm Incorporated	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital: too late for Rel-17. Huawei disagreed with this LS.	noted	No
		S3‑223431	Allocate FC Value for 33.503	ZTE Corporation	CR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223557	Allocate FC Value for 33.503	ZTE Corporation	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224171
		S3‑224171	Allocate FC Value for 33.503	ZTE Corporation	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223557
4.9	All topics (Rel-15/16/17/18 )	S3‑223164	Reply LS on Security architecture for 5G multicast/broadcast services	S2-2207390	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑223172	Reply LS on the impact of MSK update on MBS multicast session update procedure	S2-2209287	LS in		Yes	Yes	postponed	No
		S3‑223527	CR on control-plane procedure in MBS	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm agreed with this proposal but had some minor wording comments. MCC: number the Notes.	revised	No	S3‑223917
		S3‑223917	CR on control-plane procedure in MBS	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑223527
		S3‑223528	Reply LS on the impact of MSK update on MBS multicast session update procedure	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223918
		S3‑223918	Reply LS on the impact of MSK update on MBS multicast session update procedure	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223528
		S3‑223365	Clarification on 5G MBS user-plane procedure	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223920
		S3‑223529	CR on authentication in user plane procedure in MBS	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223920
		S3‑223920	CR on authentication in user plane procedure in MBS	Huawei, HiSilicon,Qualcomm	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223529
		S3‑223366	Reply LS on Security architecture for 5G multicast/broadcast services	Qualcomm Incorporated	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223919
		S3‑223530	Reply LS on Security architecture for 5G multicast/broadcast services	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223919
		S3‑223919	Reply LS on Security architecture for 5G multicast/broadcast services	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223530
		S3‑223266	AKMA API enhancement based on the LS	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesQualcomm: SA3 decided to have the separate service for security isolation purposes. Docomo: separate APIs makes sense.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223265	LS reply on AKMA API	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223921
		S3‑223921	LS reply on AKMA API	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223265
		S3‑223424	Add Context_Remove into table 7.1.1-1	ZTE Corporation	CR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: is this FASMO? Isn’t this OAM? ZTE: we are open to discuss the relationship with OAM. Huawei: this is not needed.Services to be consumed by MnF are not up to SA3. ZTE: this is not a new service, it was missing in the table.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223425	Add MnF in clause 6.6.1and 6.7	ZTE Corporation	CR	Approval	Yes	YesDependent on the previous CR.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223426	Add one note about AKMA subscription data and AKMA context asynchronization in clause 6.6.1	ZTE Corporation	CR	Approval	Yes	YesNokia: I agree with the issue. This is also related with the OAM question on the previous CRs. Huawei: the note seems to be a strict requirement, not appropriate.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223711	AAnF sending GPSI to internal AKMA AF	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	CR	Approval	Yes	YesNokia: no need to introduce this conversion at the AAnF. Qualcomm: we discussed this for long and it has been raised by Qualcomm. Some operators already said that they don’t want to provide the SUPI for security reasons.It can be a compromise to add this in Release 18 instead of Rel-17. This is needed as AKMA cannot be used in many services. China Mobile: This should be a service requirement. Verizon (remotely) supported China Mobile and Qualcomm. Huawei supported this, it was needed. Nokia: this is one more layer of trust. This will open other security issues.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223831	KAF lifetime recommendations and Ua* protocol requirements	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesLenovo: nor pursued, as this is studied in Rel-18 already. Qualcomm: this clarification is welcome. OPPO: we don’t support this because there is a study in Rel-18 already. Huawei: this requires reformulation. Samsung: we see multiple issues with maximizing the lifetime of KAF. Lenovo: conclude the issue in Rel-18 and bring this CR back.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223646	Rel-15 Correcting the OAuth 2.0 roles in CAPIF	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesHuawei: remove first sentence. Nokia needed some offline discussion for this as well.	revised	No	S3‑223922
		S3‑223922	Rel-15 Correcting the OAuth 2.0 roles in CAPIF	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223646
		S3‑223647	Rel-16 Correcting the OAuth 2.0 roles in CAPIF	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223923
		S3‑223923	Rel-16 Correcting the OAuth 2.0 roles in CAPIF	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223647
		S3‑223648	Rel-17 Correcting the OAuth 2.0 roles in CAPIF	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223924
		S3‑223924	Rel-17 Correcting the OAuth 2.0 roles in CAPIF	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223648
		S3‑223619	CR on AES-GCM/GMAC in IMS SIP security	Apple	CR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: not convinved that in this use case there are multiple IP tunnels, so there are no issues here.	revised	No	S3‑223925
		S3‑223925	CR on AES-GCM/GMAC in IMS SIP security	Apple	CR	Approval	Yes	YesRevised due to file not being able to be opened.	not pursued	No		S3‑223619
		S3‑223588	Addressing authentication and authorization for EDGE-9	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223650	Correction and clarification in user consent requirements	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesHuawei didn’t agree with the removal of the sentence. Let the operator decide. Nokia: let's not use stage 3 arguments here. Huawei: we will cause misalignment if we remove the requirement.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223777	CR_33.501 R17 Remove the redundant part of Figure I.2.3.2-1	Xiaomi Communication	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223781	CR_33.501 R17 Update step 15 of clause I.2.2.2.1	Xiaomi Communication	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223845	Clarification on AF authorization for the NSACF notification procedure	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223926
		S3‑223926	Clarification on AF authorization for the NSACF notification procedure	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑223845
		S3‑223846	Alignment of NSACF notification procedure with existing procedures	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223860	Verification of NSSAIs for preventing slice attack	CableLabs, Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesHuawei: the SBA study has this key issue for Rel-18, although this was presented in Rel-16 and Rel-17 already. Nokia: the WID associated is coming for this meeting. Mavenir: why cat-F? Nokia: it's addressing a vulnerability. It was commented that since there was an associated WID this could be cat-B. Verizon supported this CR. Conditionally agreed depending on the status of the WID for this meeting.	agreed	No
		S3‑223332	Resolving the EN on CAA level ID during UUAA procedures	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesLenovo preferred not to pursue this document. Interdigital: step 7 is OK. Qualcomm: just turning the editor's note into a note.	not pursued	No		S3‑221827
		S3‑223927	Resolving the EN on CAA level ID during UUAA procedures	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223333	Resolving the ENs on CAA level ID during revocation	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesLenovo didn’t agree with this CR. This was taken offline.	revised	No	S3‑223928	S3‑221828
		S3‑223928	Resolving the ENs on CAA level ID during revocation	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223333
		S3‑223418	Address ENs in revocation procedures	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesLenovo had issues with this contribution as well.	merged	No	S3‑223928
		S3‑223419	Address ENs in UUAA procedures	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223927
		S3‑223522	Editorial change on USS authorization	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223889	[MCPTT] 33179 R13 Incorrect example	Airbus	CR	Decision	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223944
		S3‑223944	[MCPTT] 33179 R13 Incorrect example	Airbus	CR	Decision	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224172	S3‑223889
		S3‑224172	[MCPTT] 33179 R13 Incorrect example	Airbus	CR	Decision	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223944
		S3‑223890	[MCSec] 33180 R14 Incorrect example	Airbus	CR	Decision	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223891	[eMCSec] Mirror 33180 R14 Incorrect example	Airbus	CR	Decision	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223892	[MCXSec] Mirror 33180 R14 Incorrect example	Airbus	CR	Decision	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223893	[MCXSec2] Mirror 33180 R14 Incorrect example	Airbus	CR	Decision	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223896	[MCPTT] 33179 R13 Incorrect reference	Airbus	CR	Decision	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223897	[MCSec] 33180 R14 Incorrect reference	Airbus	CR	Decision	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223898	[eMCSec] 33180 R15 Incorrect reference (Mirror)	Airbus	CR	Decision	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223899	[MCXSec] 33180 R16 Incorrect reference (Mirror)	Airbus	CR	Decision	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223900	[MCXSec2] 33180 R17 Incorrect reference (Mirror)	Airbus	CR	Decision	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223187	Clarification of hashing	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	YesMavenir: state of art non cryptographic? BSI: not broken. Mavenir: you need to use a standard term for that, it is ambiguous. BT: this is a TS, we specify down to the last bits of the algorithm. Requirement is fine, link up to the appropriate NIST document in line with previous comments. BSI: we can add the NIST document and cross check with a BSI guideline,	not pursued	No
		S3‑223188	Clarification of authorization verification	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	YesMavenir: this is adding authorization but it is not saying how to do it. BT: the principle of adding it is fine.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223189	Clarification of brute force mitigation mechanism verification	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: change step 7. It is describing another condition, it shouldn’t be a new step. It should be a NOTE. BT: the requirement makes it mandatory, but it looks like we are weakening the requirement with the note.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223945	Clarification of brute force mitigation mechanism verification	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223190	Clarification of privilege escalation methods to check for	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: what kind of used capabilities? BSI: We can clarify that. NTT_Docomo: add how to check in the execution steps.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223946	Clarification of privilege escalation methods to check for	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223191	Clarification of service reachability restriction verification	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	YesMCC: all these CRs have the wrong WID. It should be eSCAS_5G. Some changes in the text were proposed as well. BT: there is a danger of adding requirements from the back door in the test cases. We need to discuss offline, whether the test cases are for existent requirements or defining new ones.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223947	Clarification of service reachability restriction verification	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223192	Clarification of auto-launch verification	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: remove the check in the RAN and Core Network field in the cover page. Vodafone: "any kind of autostart file" is ambiguous. BT: don’t replace any kind with "all". We should not forbid all kinds of autostart files as we need something for operational reasons. Maybe "unauthorised". Vodafone: it depends on where you are in the operational process. BT meant when the service was not built, still fresh. BSI: we need to discuss this internally.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223193	Clarification of SYN Flood attack prevention test	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital: format is not defined here. Mavenir: are we making this use case vendor specific? On the first precondition. BT had also issues with the execution steps.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223194	Clarification of privilege verification	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: it conflicts with the original purpose. We need to discuss offline.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223197	Clarification of CGI/Scripting component directory check	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	YesMavenir: about all these CRs. They are all for Release 17, which is frozen. These enhancements are good, but these are being used out there.We need time to check that these are expansions or new tests. If they are new they should go for Release 18, otherwise they are impacting on current implementations. Huawei: these proposals could go to a draft CR in Release 18. BT: from the ENISA perspective we may have to do these in Release 17 anyway, otherwise somebody else would take this task, Not keen on delaying to Release 18 just because they are difficult. Mavenir: just one meeting cycle to make sure that these are added properly.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223198	Clarification of SSI System Command Excecution test	BSI (DE)	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223602	Clarification on TC_ IP_MULTICAST_HANDLING	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223603	Clarification on TC_ IP_MULTICAST_HANDLING	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223604	Clarification on IP_FWD_DISABLING	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: the note is referring to the removed sentence so it should be deleted as well.	revised	No	S3‑223929
		S3‑223929	Clarification on IP_FWD_DISABLING	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223604
		S3‑223605	Clarification on IP_FWD_DISABLING	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223930
		S3‑223930	Clarification on IP_FWD_DISABLING	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223605
		S3‑223880	Remove password complexity criteria, password expiry and password history requirements	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesHuawei didn’t understand the change. Vodafone had the same question. Ericsson: the tests were created years ago, the guidelines have been updated. China Mobile: we don’t want this change, it would weaken the requirements. NCSC: this doesn’t necessarily reduce the security, the length of the password is more important. Jeff (NIST) agreed: longer passwords are more secure according to the studies. Mavenir: the combination is also important (e.g. capital letters). Docomo: list of non acceptable passwords would help. Make it harder to create memorable passwords.	revised	No	S3‑223931
		S3‑223931	Remove password complexity criteria, password expiry and password history requirements	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑223880
		S3‑223884	Remove password complexity criteria, password expiry and password history requirements	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223932
		S3‑223932	Remove password complexity criteria, password expiry and password history requirements	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑223884
		S3‑223336	Corrections to the test cases in TS 33.511	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223337	Corrections to the test cases in TS 33.511	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223338	Corrections to the threat references in TS 33.511	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223339	Corrections to the threat references in TS 33.511	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223340	Adding non-Uu user plane text cases to TS 33.511	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesMCC commented that this should be Rel-18. To be added to the draft CR for Rel-18 in tdoc 933.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223341	Adding non-Uu user plane text cases to TS 33.511	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223334	Correction to the gNB threats in TR 33.926	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesIt needed to be taken offline for discussions with Lenovo.	agreed	No
		S3‑223335	Correction to the gNB threats in TR 33.926	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No
		S3‑223582	Discussion on IMS SCAS status	Huawei, HiSilicon	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223583	LS on IMS SCAS to GSMA	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223934
		S3‑223934	LS on IMS SCAS to GSMA	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223583
		S3‑223854	Authentication for UE behind 5G-RG and FN-RG using NSWO	CableLabs	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesEricsson: this is not a small correction but a major feature. CableLabs: no new feature, no major impact here. Qualcomm, AT&T: not a correction or alignment. It was taken offline to check the SA2 spec.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223835	Living document for DUMMY: draftCR to TS 33.535, IETF OSCORE as AKMA Ua* protocol	Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom	draftCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: this depends on the agreement on the WID.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223730	Living document for SERP: draftCR to TS 33.501 on the Protection of the RRC Resume Request message	Samsung	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223847	Living document for SERP: draftCR to TS 33.501 on the Protection of the RRC Resume Request message	Ericsson, Apple	draftCR	Approval	Yes	YesQuakcomm: there is a lot of contradicting text across the CR.	noted	No
		S3‑223613	SERP - LS on security protection on RRCResumeRequest message	Apple	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223631	User consent clarification	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesHuawei: not needed.It's a legal statement, not appropriate for this specification. NTT-Docomo:I don’t know the purpose of this. Google: this defintion of user consent is too narrow. Nokia supported the above companies. Qualcomm: maybe useful to have a clarification, because this sounds confusing. Offline work could improve this. Nokia: the first sentence already does the job. BT: first and second change are incompatible. GDPR is data protection not privacy. This was taken offline.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223517	Discussion on Kiab handling in IAB migration	Huawei, HiSilicon	discussion	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223518	CR on Kiab handling in IAB migration_new psk	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223519	CR on Kiab handling in IAB migration_old psk	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223950
		S3‑223950	CR on Kiab handling in IAB migration_old psk	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑223519
		S3‑223735	[IAB] IAB inter-CU topology adaptation procedure	Samsung	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223520	LS on Kiab handling in IAB migration	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223773	CR_33.501 R15 Update A.18 to define SoR-XMAC-IUE	Xiaomi Communication	CR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: why Rel-15? It is better to start in Release 16. The Chair commented that this wasn’t FASMO and MCC confirmed that if implementations were not affected below Rel-18 starting the change in Rel-18 was fine. It was commented that it was better not to create a Rel-18 version of TS 33.501 for this so eventually the change was agreed for Rel-17. Huawei: add missing reference.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223775	CR_33.501 R16 Update A.18 to define SoR-XMAC-IUE (mirror)	Xiaomi Communication	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223779	CR_33.501 R17 Update A.18 to define SoR-XMAC-IUE (mirror)	Xiaomi Communication	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223935
		S3‑223935	CR_33.501 R17 Update A.18 to define SoR-XMAC-IUE (mirror)	Xiaomi Communication	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223779
		S3‑223778	CR_33.501 R17 Update A.17 for SoR transparent container	Xiaomi Communication	CR	Approval	Yes	YesDocomo: it should be normative "shall" instead of "should" and don’t make it a note.	revised	No	S3‑223936
		S3‑223936	CR_33.501 R17 Update A.17 for SoR transparent container	Xiaomi Communication	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223778
		S3‑223774	CR_33.501 R15 Update A.20 to define UPU-XMAC-IUE	Xiaomi Communication	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223776	CR_33.501 R16 Update A.20 to define UPU-XMAC-IUE (mirror)	Xiaomi Communication	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223780	CR_33.501 R17 Update A.20 to define UPU-XMAC-IUE (mirror)	Xiaomi Communication	CR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: reference missing here. It was agreed to make the change only in Rel-17.	revised	No	S3‑223937
		S3‑223937	CR_33.501 R17 Update A.20 to define UPU-XMAC-IUE (mirror)	Xiaomi Communication	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223780
		S3‑223331	Clarification to the UPU procedures	Qualcomm Incorporated	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesQualcomm: CT4 created a non backwards compatible change it will be treated next meeting.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223262	Correction in UPU procedure to align with stage 3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesQualcomm: the UE cannot make the decision whether the network included the UDP header or not. Othe UDP header is ptional in one interface mandatory in other interfaces. Huawei supports Qualcomm. The UE will always get the header. This had to be taken offline.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223263	Correction in UPU procedure to align with stage 3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223264	UPU procedure align with stage 3 for AMF not registered case	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesQualcomm: the not should read "if step 1…". NTT-Docomo: I don’t think this is a note, it is mandatory behaviour. Huawei didn’t fully understand what it was needed, but agreed that this should not be a note.	revised	No	S3‑223938
		S3‑223938	UPU procedure align with stage 3 for AMF not registered case	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑223264
		S3‑223707	Clarification to multiple registrations in different PLMNs\access types	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesNokia didn’t agree with the wording.CT4 specs are clear. NTT-Docomo: this should be specified somewhere else instead of putting a long text. Just refer to the place where it is written in CT4.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223807	Discussion paper on restriction for multi registrations in two PLMNs	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	YesNO need to endorse, we discuss the CRs.	noted	No
		S3‑223809	Add restriction for multi registrations in two PLMNs	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesHuawei: we don’t agree with the notes. Qualcomm: we don’t agree with this CR. The problem is solved in the network not in the UE, and the change is not simple. Huawei: we think it is a valid case but we miss a different network here. We are not sure how to solve this. Ericsson: we are fine with the CRs. BT: this is just a small piece of a bigger puzzle, we feel. Huawei: even with two different internal implementations you can still maintain two paralel NAS connections with the same or different PLMNs.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223811	Add restriction for multi registrations in two PLMNs	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223416	Address issue in NSSAA procedures for multiple registration	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesEricsson commented that this had been brought for several years and we sent our comments several times. They noted that this wasn’t applicable for a frozen release either. Nokia: same comments as Ericsson. They had another proposal in tdoc 810.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223417	Address issue in NSSAA procedures for multiple registration (mirror)	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223808	Discussin paper on control on NSSAA procedures for multi registrations in two PLMNs	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223810	control on NSSAA procedures for multi registrations in two PLMNs	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesEricsson: second sentence in first change should be a NOTE. NOTE 1 may not be applied in certain cases. Qualcomm: this is SA3 stuff, irrelevant for security. Interdigital: some changes are not really coming from SA2 at all. The Chair queried whether some LS to SA2 would answer the questions and get some clarification.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223812	control on NSSAA procedures for multi registrations in two PLMNs	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No
		S3‑223202	CR NRF deployments	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Mavenir, Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesMavenir: conclusion of the key issue in the study should be this CR. Nokia: we want a parallel WID to capture the normative content together with the study.	agreed	No		S3‑221867
		S3‑223394	User plane security for Non-SBA based interfaces	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Approval	Yes	YesNTT-Docomo: clarify that it shall be used unless security is provided by other means. Ericsson: N4 is not an user interface. Docomo: shall be used instead of supported. MCC: remove the revision marks on the cover page.	revised	No	S3‑223949	S3‑221789
		S3‑223949	User plane security for Non-SBA based interfaces	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223394
		S3‑223414	Address EN1 on S-NSSAI mapping	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	YesEricsson: the SA2 term is aligned with SA3 actually.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223415	Address EN2 on AF Authorization	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223926
		S3‑223606	clarification on PLMN ID verification in SNPN	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223941
		S3‑223941	clarification on PLMN ID verification in SNPN	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223606
		S3‑223662	SECOP correction	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR		Yes	YesEricsson: start in an earlier release. This is a correction. Huawei: check the baseline, we think this was addressed already.	revised	No	S3‑223942
		S3‑223942	SECOP correction	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	-	Yes	Yes	not pursued	No		S3‑223662
		S3‑223685	Aligning DNS and ICMP security for non-3GPP access with 3GPP access	Ericsson	CR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	endorsed	No
		S3‑223782	CR_33.501 R17 Update Subscription and unsubscription procedure of NSACF notification service	Xiaomi Communication	CR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223926
		S3‑223214	Introduction of DTLS 1.3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	CR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223456	Adding AAnF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	CR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223901	[MCXSec3] 33180 R18 Incorrect reference (Mirror)	Airbus	CR	Decision	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223150	LS on anonymous user access to an AF	C3-224730	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑223943	SECOP correction	Nokia	CR	Agreement	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223948	LS on NSSAA procedures for multiple registrations	Huawei	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
5	Rel-18 Studies
5.1	Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations	S3‑223284	FBS - Way forward for solutions based on digital signatures addressing KI#2	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223372	Conclusion for KI #2	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223732	Conclusion for key issue#2	Samsung, Intel, Apple	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesORANGE: what are we protecting from? We have been getting the same conclusion after several years and I still object to this. BT: given the discussions on post quantum activities in NIST we are not ready to conclude until we decide how we should work in the post-quantum environment, where we would need to rework a lot of stuff. If I had to choose I would go for Qualcomm's proposal. Cablelabs: digital signature based solution is supported by us, but we will ready when the post quantum situation arrives. At the moment we should agree on this. Huawei: there is an editor's note to be resolved, we are not concluded. Intel: solution 19 works only in RRC connected state. Nokia: ten solution proposals for key issue 2. Whatever solution we select will have a tricky part. Maybe we should categorise the solutions and consider a risk assessment. Vodafone liked Nokia's comment. They also said that the problem was if the user could not connect due to the whole digital signature process. ORANGE: not enough evaluation for this solution. We should stop this study, it has been running for too long. CableLabs: let's do security, not performance.ORANGE replied that it was about solutions that work. BT: either solution achieves the purpose of the study, which is stopping False Base Stations. CableLabs: replay attack can be mitigated with this solution, we make it extremely hard for the FSB to attack like this. Qualcomm: not diffficult to listen to the message and rebroacast. CalbleLabs: with timestamp it is harder because we can detect the delay. The Chair commented that there were multiple regulator agencies asking for solutions and that there were papers looking at the TR and pointing out the lack of solutions. ORANGE replied that they didn’t oppose to the purpose, but it was the current state of the TR that didn’t allow progress.E.g. there is no way to handle the bidding down attacks. This can be solved with a new study in 6G. Qualcomm: ask the regulators what threats need to be addressed. The Chair replied that PWS and SIP protection. Qualcomm replied that for PWS there were application layer solutions, no impact on the network, and even that was difficult for some countries. The Chair commented that one of the problems was that regulators didn’t come to SA3, so it was pretty hard to progress. BT: PWS had a good solution in the beginning but no regulator agreed on who held the root key. BT commented that ENISA would come the next day so some input could be gathered. Google: we support digital signature. Shared model is not relevant. ORANGE: no authentication related, this is for FSBs. Qualcomm: time to close the study so as not to repeat the same discussions again and again. Apple: lack of progress is the result of objections of some companies.	noted	No
		S3‑223733	Updates to Solution#7 SI verification using Digital Signatures	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223734	Resolving EN of solution#7 (TR 33.809)	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223614	5GFBS - Addressing UE bahaviors on signature verification	Apple	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223883	Addressing the editor’s note in 6.27.2.1.1 of Sol#27	CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223885	Addressing EN on NR Repeater in 6.27.2.2.4 of Sol#27	CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223886	Addressing the editor’s note in 6.27.2.2.1of Sol#27	CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223285	FBS - Additions in solution #25	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223286	FBS - Evaluation of solution #25	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223373	Conclusion for KI #3	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223420	Update to solution #25	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223615	5GFBS - Reply LS on authenticity and replay protection of system information	Apple	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223708	LS on Evaluation of Digital Signature schemes for the false base station study	Oy LM Ericsson AB	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223731	Reply LS on authenticity and replay protection of system information	Samsung, Apple, CableLabs	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: we cannot reply if there is no consensus here. Apple: this is not really the case. ORANGE and Qualcomm pointed out that any outgoing LS on this topic would be objected.	noted	No
5.2	Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation	S3‑223387	Address EN on PACF and MANO Communication	Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, CISA ECD	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224065
		S3‑224065	Address EN on PACF and MANO Communication	Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, CISA ECD	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223387
		S3‑223393	Address EN on Verifying Attestation Results for NRF and PACF	Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, CISA ECD	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223496	Evaluation on Solution 5	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223608	New solution on boot time attestation at 3GPP function level	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson objected to this contribution.	noted	No
		S3‑224066	LS on embedding MnF in PACF security function	John Hopkins Univeristy	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: there was no agreement to send an LS during the breakout session.	noted	No
5.3	Study on Security Aspects of Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 2	S3‑223233	New Key issue for Updating security policy parameters when device is out of 5G coverage	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	YesInterdigital: we don’t accept new key issues if there are no requirements. Qualcomm agreed with that statement. Not clear what problem we are trying to solve. ORANGE: We can add requirements later but not in this meeting.	noted	No
		S3‑223421	Discussion for L2 UE-to-Network Relay Multi-Path Security	OPPO	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223447	KI for L2 UE-to-Network Relay Multi-Path Security	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm,Nokia and Ericsson: we cannot agree with this key issue.	noted	No
		S3‑223623	New KI: Support for Emergency service over UE-to-Network Relaying	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital,Huawei and Vodafone: some more conten tneeds to be added to the threats. MCC: just refer to the TR, no need to say SA2 and Release 18 here.	revised	No	S3‑223996
		S3‑223996	New KI: Support for Emergency service over UE-to-Network Relaying	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223623
		S3‑223721	Key Issue for secure ProSe multi-path transmission for UE-to-Network relay	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson, Qualcomm didn’t agree with this.Some support from Nokia.	noted	No
		S3‑223817	new KI for path switching between two indirect network communication paths	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm couldn’t agree with this key issue. No necessity to align the security policies between both relay services.	noted	No
		S3‑223247	Update KI#5	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223963
		S3‑223963	Update KI#5	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223247
		S3‑223894	KI #3 update: authorization synchronization	MITRE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223248	New solution for KI#5	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: incorrect solution. Not clear which protection methods to use. Vodafone: evaluation doesn't highlight some of the issues. Evaluation need to be ctritical.	revised	No	S3‑224029
		S3‑224029	New solution for KI#5	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223248
		S3‑223369	A new solution for UE-to-UE Relay discovery message protection for Model A discovery	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesORANGE: remove the evaluation part and put an editor's note.	revised	No	S3‑223997
		S3‑223997	A new solution for UE-to-UE Relay discovery message protection for Model A discovery	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223369
		S3‑223370	A new solution for UE-to-UE Relay discovery message protection for Model B discovery	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223998
		S3‑223998	A new solution for UE-to-UE Relay discovery message protection for Model B discovery	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223370
		S3‑223371	A new solution for secure PC5 link establishment for UE-to-UE Relay	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital: Only works when relay is in coverage. XIaomii: security can be provided by the application layer.	revised	No	S3‑223999
		S3‑223999	A new solution for secure PC5 link establishment for UE-to-UE Relay	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223371
		S3‑223469	New solution to establish UE-to-UE security	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223964
		S3‑223964	New solution to establish UE-to-UE security	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223469
		S3‑223624	Support Emergency Service over UE-to-Network Relay	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224005
		S3‑224005	Support Emergency Service over UE-to-Network Relay	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223624
		S3‑223664	pCR to TR33.740 Solution for U2U Relay discovery message security	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223965
		S3‑223965	pCR to TR33.740 Solution for U2U Relay discovery message security	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223664
		S3‑223722	New solution for hop-by-hop security establishment for the UE-to-UE Relay	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223966
		S3‑223966	New solution for hop-by-hop security establishment for the UE-to-UE Relay	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223722
		S3‑223766	New solution on security for discovery integrated into PC5 link establishment	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223967
		S3‑223967	New solution on security for discovery integrated into PC5 link establishment	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223766
		S3‑223818	security solution for path switching between two indirect network communication paths	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223276	ProSe - Evaluation Solution #10	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: further evaluation is FFS, on the choice for the application layer.	revised	No	S3‑224006
		S3‑224006	ProSe - Evaluation Solution #10	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223276
		S3‑223277	ProSe - Evaluation Solution #15	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: incorrect baseline, I cannot see what editor's note was removed. Phillips admitted the omission of revision marks here. Interdigital: add editor's note in evaluation. Ericsson needed clarification on the evaluation, proposing more editor's notes. The Chair proposed to come back in the next meeting with an update of this.	noted	No
		S3‑223278	ProSe - Minnor editorial corrections in Solution #10	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223279	ProSe - Minnor updates in Solution #10	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223310	Update TR 33.740 solution #1	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223969
		S3‑223969	Update TR 33.740 solution #1	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223310
		S3‑223311	Update TR 33.740 solution #2	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: we need the alignment with SA2. This was taken offline.	approved	No
		S3‑223312	Update TR 33.740 solution #12	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: we need more time to evaluate this, an editor's note is needed.	revised	No	S3‑224000
		S3‑224000	Update TR 33.740 solution #12	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223312
		S3‑223313	Update TR 33.740 solution #13	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm proposed to add an editor's note on the evaluation FFS	revised	No	S3‑224001
		S3‑224001	Update TR 33.740 solution #13	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223313
		S3‑223314	Update TR 33.740 solution #14	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224007
		S3‑224007	Update TR 33.740 solution #14	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223314
		S3‑223400	Update to solution#5 in TR 33.740 - align with SA2	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital: alignment with SA2 is needed.	revised	No	S3‑223970
		S3‑223970	Update to solution#5 in TR 33.740 - align with SA2	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223400
		S3‑223401	Update to solution#5 in TR 33.740 - remove the EN	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223451	Update to ProSe Security Sol#6	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: there is SA2 content. OPPO: this is a TR, not normative.	revised	No	S3‑223972
		S3‑223972	Update to ProSe Security Sol#6	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223451
		S3‑223452	Address ENs in Sol#6 for ProSe Security	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223453	Add Evaluation for ProSe Security Sol#6	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital, Qualcomm proposed editor's notes.	revised	No	S3‑224008
		S3‑224008	Add Evaluation for ProSe Security Sol#6	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223453
		S3‑223475	Evaluate to the solution #3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223973
		S3‑223476	Evaluate to the solution #5	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224009
		S3‑224009	Evaluate to the solution #5	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223476
		S3‑223477	Evaluate to the solution #15	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223968
		S3‑223968	Evaluate to the solution #15	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223477
		S3‑223478	Evaluate to the solution #20	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223626	Evaluation to solution #3	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: third paragraph already exists in security details. Huawei didn’t agree with this paragraph either. Interdigital: add an editor's note for alignment with SA2.	revised	No	S3‑223973
		S3‑223973	Evaluation to solution #3	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223626
		S3‑223627	Evaluation to solution #4	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesIntgerdigital: we still need to analyze the auth token included in the DCR message, it may lead to privacy issues. Huawei: not sure if the evaluation is needed, because we need to address first the editor's note on the need for auth token (under step2).	noted	No
		S3‑223628	Resolve EN of U2U determination in target UE in Solution3	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223629	Resolve EN of Direct Communication Invite in Solution3	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital: we don’t agree with the removal of the editor's note.	revised	No	S3‑224002
		S3‑224002	Resolve EN of Direct Communication Invite in Solution3	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223629
		S3‑223636	pCR to TR33.740 Update Solution16 for removing ENs	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223974
		S3‑223974	pCR to TR33.740 Update Solution16 for removing ENs	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223636
		S3‑223638	pCR to TR33.740 Update Solution17 for removing ENs	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: why are you excluding the PCF now?	revised	No	S3‑224003
		S3‑224003	pCR to TR33.740 Update Solution17 for removing ENs	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223638
		S3‑223641	pCR to TR33.740 Update Solution18 for removing ENs	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223643	pCR to TR33.740 Evaluation of Solution16	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital: key issue#3 is not fully covered.	revised	No	S3‑223975
		S3‑223975	pCR to TR33.740 Evaluation of Solution16	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223643
		S3‑223644	pCR to TR33.740 Evaluation of Solution17	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224004
		S3‑224004	pCR to TR33.740 Evaluation of Solution17	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223644
		S3‑223659	pCR to TR33.740 Evaluation of Solution18	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223723	Updates to solution#19 and resolving EN #2 and #3	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223724	Updates to solution#19 and resolving EN #5	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm needed more clarification how the new text addresses the editor's note on the impact on the protocol stack. Huawei: this is not addressing layer 3. An editor's note was added about this.	revised	No	S3‑223976
		S3‑223976	Updates to solution#19 and resolving EN #5	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223724
		S3‑223763	Update to solution #8 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223764	Update to solution #9 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223765	Update to solution #20 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson didn’t understand step 2 as it appeared as a new interface and how it aligned with SA2 architecture. Qualcomm also had several issues.	revised	No	S3‑223977
		S3‑223977	Update to solution #20 in TR 33.740	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223765
		S3‑223470	Conclusion on UE-to-UE relay security	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital: note it because the solution needs reworking in another contribution. Ericsson and Qualcomm had the same comment.	revised	No	S3‑224095
		S3‑224095	Conclusion on UE-to-UE relay security	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223470
		S3‑223471	Conclusion on UE-to-UE relay Authorisation	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesCATT had a different view, they had their own proposal in 667. Samsung asked to postpone boht conclusions.	revised	No	S3‑223995
		S3‑223995	Conclusion on UE-to-UE relay Authorisation	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223471
		S3‑223666	pCR to TR33.740 Conclusion of key issue #1	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223667	pCR to TR33.740 Conclusion of key issue #3	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei had issues with this conclusion. Ericsson also wanted to postpone this. Interdigital thought it was too early for this conclusion.	noted	No
		S3‑223661	pCR to TR33.740 Update Abbreviations	CATT	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223322	Living document to TS 33.503 for Prose Secondary Authentication	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	draftCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223625	[Draft] LS on ProSe Secondary Authentication	Ericsson	LS out	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223971	Draft TR 33.740	CATT	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.4	Study on privacy of identifiers over radio access	S3‑223200	PCR to 33.870 Changes to Solution #2	InterDigital, Inc.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224069
		S3‑224069	PCR to 33.870 Changes to Solution #2	InterDigital, Inc.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223200
		S3‑223201	PCR to 33.870 - New clause for mapping solutions and KIs	InterDigital, Inc.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223223	PCR to 33.870 - Aggregate changes	InterDigital, Inc.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223237	New solution for prevention of detection of priority access	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223238	EN removal for privacy prevention of NAI solution	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224114
		S3‑224114	EN removal for privacy prevention of NAI solution	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223238
		S3‑223376	Resolution of an EN in solution #8	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223377	Evaluation of solution #8	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224176
		S3‑224176	Evaluation of solution #8	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223377
		S3‑223406	Remove EN to Key Issue #2	Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, InterDigital, Apple, CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223446	Remove EN and Provide Evaluation for Solution #4	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224174
		S3‑224174	Remove EN and Provide Evaluation for Solution #4	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223446
		S3‑223540	Updates to solution 3 based on pseudonyms	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224134
		S3‑224134	Updates to solution 3 based on pseudonyms	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: we need the evaluation uniform for all solutions. Ericsson agreed.	approved	No		S3‑223540
		S3‑223561	Policy-based C-RNTI and TMSI refresh	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223578	Resolution of EN in solution #8	THALES, Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223826	Updating Solution #9: Concealing length of SUPIs in SUCIs by padding the SUPIs	Oy LM Ericsson AB	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223870	Update to Solution #1 in ID Privacy	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224033
		S3‑224033	Update to Solution #1 in ID Privacy	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223870
		S3‑224164	Draft TR 33.870	Interdigital	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.5	Study on Standardising Automated Certificate Management in SBA	S3‑223380	Evaluation for Solution #3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: private CA term is misleading. CableLabs: change the privacy terminology.	revised	No	S3‑223986
		S3‑223986	Evaluation for Solution #3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223380
		S3‑223381	Evaluation for Solution #11	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: questionable as optimization.Fine to keep it for the record but not good for normative work.	revised	No	S3‑223987
		S3‑223987	Evaluation for Solution #11	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223381
		S3‑223382	Resolving EN and evaluation for Solution #10	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson had some issues with the evaluation. ExtendedKeyUsage not only for client and server TLS. Vodafone: evaluation is incomplete. Huawei: this is not new.	noted	No
		S3‑223383	Resolving EN and evaluation for Solution #12	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesCisco liked the contribution overall, but the initial trust is mentioned as implementation specific. Some more content was needed here. Point the solution. Vodafone: evaluation should be a quick analysis not a repetition of what is above. It should be completed or removed. Huawei: third party interaction needs to be standardised? Too ambitious. Good for the record but not good for normative phase. Ericsson suggested adding some editor's notes.	revised	No	S3‑223991
		S3‑223991	Resolving EN and evaluation for Solution #12	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223383
		S3‑223514	address EN for solution #8 and add evaluation	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: impact on OAM interfaces. MCC: reword to remove the "must".	revised	No	S3‑223992
		S3‑223992	address EN for solution #8 and add evaluation	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223514
		S3‑223515	address EN for solution #9 and add evaluation	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson wanted to have some more issues captured in the evaluation. MCC: check spelling and add reference to TS 23.501.	revised	No	S3‑223993
		S3‑223993	address EN for solution #9 and add evaluation	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223515
		S3‑223543	Update to solution #3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: revocation is done by the authorities. We are not OK with the note.	revised	No	S3‑223994
		S3‑223994	Update to solution #3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223543
		S3‑223407	Clarify the use of cross-certificates	China Telecommunications	pCR		Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223385	Preliminary conclusion for KI #1	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: we support the conclusion,the analysis not so much. Ericsson: clarification on the conclusion needed. CableLabs: include ACME as part of the solution. The Chair replied that this was discarded before. Google: we are not against this proposal, we just want an editor's note opening the door for enhancements in other studies. The Chair replied that SA3 didn’t include such notes and that enhancements were always part of studies. ORANGE: the conclusion has an editor's note about this already. Huawei: don’t make it dependent on ACME or we will object.	approved	No
		S3‑223516	add conclusion for KI # 6	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223384	Solution for ensuring the management of bulk certificate updates	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: not OK, we prefer Huawei solution in 544 from the operations point of view. Nokia: opinion of operators? Nokia: this is a study phase, it's not about liking/not liking. Huawei: both solutions can go in, but the other solution is the one which will go to normative work. The Chair commented that objecting to competing solutions was not the way to go in a study. You can compare later and decide. ORANGE: what we include in the TR must be agreed by consensus. Qualcomm: don’t include any solution that comes in a study, it needs to be viable so the companies can make better use of the time when evaluating them later. Huawei: we don’t understand the link to the radio celll network oad. This should be removed.	revised	No	S3‑224139
		S3‑224139	Solution for ensuring the management of bulk certificate updates	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223384
		S3‑223544	Policy based certificate update/renewal	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224140
		S3‑224140	Policy based certificate update/renewal	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223544
		S3‑223895	Proposal Solution #XX ACME use in 3GPP	Google Inc.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: we need more time to study the proposal in the context of SBA. Nokia: similar comments to Ericsson. This doesn’t explain how ACME fits in the SBA. We have certificates already defined in TS 33.310. IPX is out of scope. Huawei: related more to IPX, it looks like it’s in scope of GSMA. CableLabs supported this as an option to be added to the TR as further analysis Google: not IPX but 5GC.We are happy to clarify further on how this worls in TS 33.310. Ericsson: it's a new protocol in telecoms. Token signing will not work without DNS and many other dependecies that need to be checked. Nokia: timing is an issue here, we would like to conclude the key issue next meeting.	noted	No
		S3‑223827	PCR to TR33.876 - Addition of Key Issue - Protection of private keys at rest	Vodafone España SA	pCR	Agreement	Yes	YesHuawei: no need for a solution. It's more like a deployment guidelines. Vodafone confirmed this.	merged	No	S3‑224138
		S3‑223828	PCR to 33.876 - Addition of Key Issue: security of internal NF service communicaitons	Vodafone España SA	pCR	Agreement	Yes	YesVodafone: securing services to services talking together. Ericsson agreed with the contribution.	revised	No	S3‑224138
		S3‑224138	PCR to 33.876 - Addition of Key Issue: security of internal NF service communicaitons	Vodafone España SA	pCR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223828
		S3‑224165	Draft TR 33.876	Nokia	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.6	New SID on AKMA phase 2	S3‑223215	Terminology update of solution #6	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223267	alignment for solution1 for vAAnF or a new NF	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223268	alignment for solution1 related to internal AF	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223269	solution 1 evaluation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224078
		S3‑224078	solution 1 evaluation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223269
		S3‑223287	AKMA - Evaluation Solution #10	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224010
		S3‑224010	AKMA - Evaluation Solution #10	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223287
		S3‑223432	Address EN and add evaluation for solution 9	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224032
		S3‑224032	Address EN and add evaluation for solution 9	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223432
		S3‑223433	Address EN and update solution 3	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223436	Update the solution 4	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223579	Resolution of ENs in solution #14	THALES	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224115
		S3‑224115	Resolution of ENs in solution #14	THALES	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223579
		S3‑223580	Update of LI requirements on solution #5	LG Electronics France	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224057
		S3‑224057	Update of LI requirements on solution #5	LG Electronics France	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223580
		S3‑223581	Update of LI requirements on solution #12	LG Electronics France	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224058
		S3‑224058	Update of LI requirements on solution #12	LG Electronics France	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223581
		S3‑223717	Resolving EN and adding evaluation for solution#13	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224030
		S3‑224030	Resolving EN and adding evaluation for solution#13	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223717
		S3‑223785	KI#1 New sol AKMA roaming for external AF in the Data Network	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224071
		S3‑224071	KI#1 New sol AKMA roaming for external AF in the Data Network	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223785
		S3‑223832	New solution for AKMA roaming with VPLMN AKMA Support NF for inbound roamers	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224141
		S3‑224141	New solution for AKMA roaming with VPLMN AKMA Support NF for inbound roamers	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223832
		S3‑223455	Discussion Paper on evaluations and conclusions of key issue#1	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	YesQualcomm: merge solutions for the next meeting, since we need to pick up components from different solutions. Ericsson: focus on the conclusions now and it will help find the solutions.	noted	No
		S3‑223270	KI1 conclusion	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223675	Conclusion for KI#1 case 2	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesIt was commented the role of LI aspects here. NTT-Docomo: if the AF is in VPLMN no normative work is required.	revised	No	S3‑224137
		S3‑224137	Conclusion for KI#1 case 2	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223675
		S3‑223434	Conclusion for KI#1	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223505	conclusion on AKMA roaming	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesDiscussions on LI aspects. Mark (National Technical Assistance) : uncomfortable with conclusions that forget about LI aspects. An editor's note on this was added. Vodafone: if this affects the visited network I have an issue.	revised	No	S3‑224136
		S3‑224136	conclusion on AKMA roaming	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223505
		S3‑223271	Discussion on privacy issue in AKMA	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223272	key issue on AKMA privacy	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223715	Key Issue on KAF refresh	Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, OPPO, ZTE	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm didn’t agree with this contribution. The Kecs refresh needs to be studied further. The key issue needs to be rewritten to algin with the study approved in SA.	noted	No
		S3‑223716	New solution on AKMA KAF refresh	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223435	Update the Key issue of AKMA roaming	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223535	Discussion	Huawei, HiSilicon	discussion	Discussion	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑224109	Draft TR 33.737	China Mobile	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.7	Study of Security aspect of home network triggered primary authentication	S3‑223359	Adding a K_AUSF refresh use case	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223511	Update KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224011
		S3‑224011	Update KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223511
		S3‑223274	KI#1 conclusion	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑224013
		S3‑223361	Proposed conclusion for the study	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑224013
		S3‑223542	Conclusion on KI#1 and KI#2 in TR 33.741	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑224013
		S3‑223610	Discussion paper on way forward for conclusion	Huawei, HiSilicon	discussion	Discussion	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223720	Conclusion on KI#1	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑224013
		S3‑223769	Conclusion on KI#1	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑224013
		S3‑223840	Conlusions	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: I will object if you are tie with any use case. It should be generic. Nokia: generic statements will open new discussions. We have three use cases clearly defined. Huawei: different use cases will have specific issues. Let's leave this for the normative work. Ericsson wanted to handle the interworking case. Qualcomm: plesae address this use case in a different way (another WID or CR, etc…), this is supposed to be generic.	revised	No	S3‑224013
		S3‑224013	Conlusions	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223840
		S3‑223273	solution 1 evaluation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224014
		S3‑224014	solution 1 evaluation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesAddressing Ericsson's and Lenovo's comments.	approved	No		S3‑223273
		S3‑223360	Adding an evaluation of solution #5	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesLenovo: this solution opens to any AMF and we would like to see the use case for this scenario.	revised	No	S3‑224015
		S3‑224015	Adding an evaluation of solution #5	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223360
		S3‑223437	Add evaluation to solution #3	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223438	Add some context to solution #3	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224017
		S3‑224017	Add some context to solution #3	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223438
		S3‑223439	Removal of Editor’s Notes of solution #3	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223502	Update solution2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224018
		S3‑224018	Update solution2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223502
		S3‑223503	update the 5.1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesLenovo: it doesn’t capture correctly the key issues.	approved	No
		S3‑223718	Resolving EN and adding evaluation for solution#9	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223719	Resolving EN and adding evaluation for solution#6	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224019
		S3‑224019	Resolving EN and adding evaluation for solution#6	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223719
		S3‑223768	Update to solution #7 in TR 33.741	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223836	Solution #11 updates	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223837	Solution #11 evalution	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224020
		S3‑224020	Solution #11 evalution	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223837
		S3‑223838	Solution #12 updates	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223839	Solution #12 evalution	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224021
		S3‑224021	Solution #12 evalution	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223839
		S3‑223872	Update to Solution #8 in HONTRA	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224022
		S3‑224022	Update to Solution #8 in HONTRA	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223872
		S3‑224016	draft TR 33.741	Huawei	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.8	Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation for 5G – phase 3	S3‑223688	Update of Key Issue #3 "Security for AI/ML model storage and sharing" on authorization by the NF which generated the AI/ML model	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223217	Update of solution #4	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson wasn't sure that the editor's notes were addressed here. Huawei had also some issues with the key management editor's notes.	revised	No	S3‑224146
		S3‑224146	Update of solution #4	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223217
		S3‑223389	Resolving ENs and evaluation for Solution #7	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224144
		S3‑224144	Resolving ENs and evaluation for Solution #7	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223389
		S3‑223392	Evaluation for Solution #3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: this is really complex. Nokia: I can revised to capture the complexity in the evaluation. Huawei suggested another editor's note.	revised	No	S3‑224145
		S3‑224145	Evaluation for Solution #3	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223392
		S3‑223563	Updates to solution 2: remove EN E2E protection	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224147
		S3‑224147	Updates to solution 2: remove EN E2E protection	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223563
		S3‑223657	Authorization of AI/ML model sharing between different vendors and usage of one-time URLs	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: align with SA2's conclusion.Capture implementation in IETF in a note. Nokia had also some issues, the contribution had to be revised.	revised	No	S3‑224148
		S3‑224148	Authorization of AI/ML model sharing between different vendors and usage of one-time URLs	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223657
		S3‑223689	Solution on Token based Authorization of AI/ML Model sharing between different vendors(ADRF)	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesIntel: we support this contribution and co-sign it. Huawei: align with SA2 conclusions.	revised	No	S3‑224149
		S3‑224149	Solution on Token based Authorization of AI/ML Model sharing between different vendors(ADRF)	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223689
		S3‑223690	Solution on Authorization of AI/ML Model sharing between different vendors(MTLF)	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: alignment with SA2. Nokia: maybe consider this a use case of the previous contribution.I can live with it.	revised	No	S3‑224150
		S3‑224150	Solution on Authorization of AI/ML Model sharing between different vendors(MTLF)	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223690
		S3‑223691	New solution for KI#3 to support authorization of AI/ML model sharing By NWDAF containing MTLF(local auth)	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesNokia: not ok with this solution. This key issue should always use OATH. Huawei: this needs more work. Relationship between inputs and outputs? Add editor's notes to capture our questions.	revised	No	S3‑224151
		S3‑224151	New solution for KI#3 to support authorization of AI/ML model sharing By NWDAF containing MTLF(local auth)	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223691
		S3‑223391	Evaluation for Solution #5	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224079
		S3‑224079	Evaluation for Solution #5	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223391
		S3‑223660	Add evaluation to Solution #8	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224077
		S3‑224077	Add evaluation to Solution #8	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223660
		S3‑223663	New solution on protection of data and analytics exchange in roaming case using Secure Multi-party Computation	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224075
		S3‑224075	New solution on protection of data and analytics exchange in roaming case using Secure Multi-party Computation	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223663
		S3‑223665	Update to solution#8	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224076
		S3‑224076	Update to solution#8	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223665
		S3‑223388	Solution for authorization in FL	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223560	FL GROUP AUTHORIZATION OF NWDAF(S) IN 5GC	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223687	New solution for KI#2 to support authorization of participant NWDAFs in FL	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223390	Evaluation for Solution #6	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223874	Update to Solution #9 in eNA Ph3	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223216	New solution addressing KI#6	Lenovo, Nokia	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223875	Cyber attack detection	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223645	Add conclusion to key issue #1	China Mobile (Suzhou) Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑224178	Draft TR 33.738	China Mobile	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.9	Study on Security Enhancement of support for Edge Computing — phase 2	S3‑223228	New Solution of authorization for EDGE-9 reference point	InterDigital Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223362	Method negotiation using TLS 1.3	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesSamsung: overheard when sending the parameters. NTT-Docomo: small issue.	revised	No	S3‑223940
		S3‑223940	Method negotiation using TLS 1.3	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223362
		S3‑223363	Common authentication method between EEC and ECS/EES	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223440	Add conclusion to KI#2.2	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223441	Add evaluation to solution #6	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223448	Resolving ENs in Solution #9 for Edge Security	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223449	Resolving ENs in Solution #10 for Edge Security	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223450	Resolving ENs in Solution #11 for Edge Security	OPPO	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223545	Conclusion on KI#2.5:Authentication and Authorization between AC and EEC	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223546	Addressing the ENs in solution 15	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223547	Addressing the ENs in solution 16	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223548	Evaluation to solution 15	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223549	Evaluation to solution 16	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223551	Evaluation to solution 18	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224028
		S3‑224028	Evaluation to solution 18	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223551
		S3‑223585	Conclusion on KI2.3 Authentication and Authorization between V-ECS and H-ECS	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson needed some more clarification.More things needed to be included here. Samsung didn’t agree with this contribution.	revised	No	S3‑224023
		S3‑224023	Conclusion on KI2.3 Authentication and Authorization between V-ECS and H-ECS	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223585
		S3‑223586	Conclusion on KI2.2 Authentication mechanism selection	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223939
		S3‑223939	Conclusion on KI2.2 Authentication mechanism selection	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223586
		S3‑223587	Conclusion on KI1.1 How to authorize PDU session to support local traffic routing to access an EHE in the VPLMN	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: more information is needed from SA2, maybe an LS would help.	approved	No
		S3‑223616	MEC - New key issue on AF specific identifier	Apple	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224012
		S3‑224012	MEC - New key issue on AF specific identifier	Apple	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No		S3‑223616
		S3‑223617	MEC- Addressing the EN#1 in solution#7	Apple	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223618	MEC- Addressing the EN#2 in solution#7 on default authentication mechanism	Apple	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223651	A new solution for EEC authentication	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223652	Updating solution #17	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223653	Resolving ENs in solution #13	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224025
		S3‑224025	Resolving ENs in solution #13	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223653
		S3‑223654	Evaluation of solution #13	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesIT was clarified that existing AKMA mechanisms refer to Release 17 AKMA.	revised	No	S3‑224026
		S3‑224026	Evaluation of solution #13	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223654
		S3‑223655	Evaluation of solution #14	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224027
		S3‑224027	Evaluation of solution #14	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223655
		S3‑223656	Evaluation of solution #17	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223725	Resolving EN in solution#4	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223726	Resolving EN in solution#3	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223727	Resolving EN and adding evaluation for solution#21	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223728	Discussion paper on authentication mechanism selection	Samsung	discussion	Discussion	Yes	YesApple didn’t propose Proposal 1. Ericsson supported proposal 1 but not proposal 2.	noted	No
		S3‑223729	Conclusion for KI#2.2	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223784	KI #2.2, New sol on authentication mechanism selection method for edge scenarios	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223795	Resolve EN in Sol #5	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑224024	Draft TR 33.739	Huawei	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.10	Study on Personal IoT Networks Security Aspects	S3‑223280	PIN - Addressing EN#1 in Solution #4	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesThales disagrees. It's addressing matters out of scope of this key issue. IDEMIA: we don’t want having credentials here.	revised	No	S3‑224073
		S3‑224073	PIN - Addressing EN#1 in Solution #4	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223280
		S3‑223281	PIN - Addressing EN#2 in Solution #4	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224059
		S3‑224059	PIN - Addressing EN#2 in Solution #4	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223281
		S3‑223282	PIN - Addressing EN#3 in Solution #4	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesORANGE: you mean 5GS user plane? Phillips said yes and ORANGE asked to clarify it. Thales: we disagree with the statement on the credentials.	revised	No	S3‑224074
		S3‑224074	PIN - Addressing EN#3 in Solution #4	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223282
		S3‑223283	PIN - Addressing EN#4 in Solution #4	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesThales: QoS associated with the authentication? Phillips: to protect the first hop. In case of attack the QoS is impacted. Huawei: provided QoS value is not concluded in SA2.	revised	No	S3‑224060
		S3‑224060	PIN - Addressing EN#4 in Solution #4	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223283
		S3‑223304	Update solution for PINE authentication over CP	vivo	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: hard to read, spkit into different clauses. ORANGE: evaluation FFS, hard to confirm in this meeting. Qualcomm: SA2's scope, we can note this. Vivo: Authentication is SA3's scope. This is also transparent to 5GC.	noted	No
		S3‑223306	Sol#3 Resolution of EN on authorization of PEGC	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital: The editor's note is not satisfied. Nokia: it is an editor's note added by ourselves.	revised	No	S3‑224088
		S3‑224088	Sol#3 Resolution of EN on authorization of PEGC	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223306
		S3‑223307	Sol#3 Resolution of EN on identification of PINE	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223308	Sol#3 Adding Evaluation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson, Qualcomm: first paragraph needs rewording.	revised	No	S3‑224062
		S3‑224062	Sol#3 Adding Evaluation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223308
		S3‑223521	Addressing the ENs in solution 1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224063
		S3‑224063	Addressing the ENs in solution 1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223521
		S3‑223300	New solution for AF manipulate PIN	vivo	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesNTT-Docomo: not obvious how the key issue is being solved. Not agains this but it needs more text. Qualcomm: remove evaluation. Nokia was in line with previous comments.	revised	No	S3‑224064
		S3‑224064	New solution for AF manipulate PIN	vivo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223300
		S3‑223301	New solution for PINE authentication and authorization by PEMC	vivo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223302	New solution for PINE authentication and authorization over 5G UP	vivo	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesORANGE didn’t agree with this evaluation.	noted	No
		S3‑223303	New solution for remote provisioning of credential for PINE	vivo	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesORANGE: nothing about provisioning in key issue 1. Thales supported this.	noted	No
		S3‑223309	Ki#1 New Solution using AKMA	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesORANGE: last sentence on AKMA? You propose to modify a TS, which hasn’t been agreed in a WID. Does this mean that when we go normative you will modify AKMA? Vodafone: this limits the operators who use AKMA. Qualcomm: in the figure: Ipsec with AKMA is not needed in the figure, it is already protected. This is not related to EAP. Huawei agreed with Qualcomm.	noted	No
		S3‑223378	Solution for KI#1: Authentication and Authorization of PINE	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital: step 5 executed while PEGC processes PINE data transfer request? Qualcomm revised to clarify this.	revised	No	S3‑224067
		S3‑224067	Solution for KI#1: Authentication and Authorization of PINE	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223378
		S3‑223305	Interim conclusions on KI#1	vivo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223196	LS on Support PIN application architecture and interaction	S6-223028	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑223299	Reply LS on Support PIN application architecture and interaction	vivo	LS out	Approval	Yes	YesThales: we don’t address provisioning of credentials. Qualcomm: on Q6 we can say that SA3 is studying the key issue and stop there. ORANGE: there is no key issue for credential provisioning, you need to start with that.	revised	No	S3‑224068
		S3‑224068	Reply LS on Support PIN application architecture and interaction	vivo	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223299
		S3‑224061	Draft TR 33.882	Vivo	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.11	Study on SNAAPP security	S3‑223488	Address EN for solution 1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224101
		S3‑224101	Address EN for solution 1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223488
		S3‑223290	Sol#3 Resolution of EN on CAPIF support	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223291	Sol#3 Resolution of EN on visibility of application	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224038
		S3‑224038	Sol#3 Resolution of EN on visibility of application	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223291
		S3‑223292	Sol#3 Resolution of EN on prearranged policies	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224039
		S3‑224039	Sol#3 Resolution of EN on prearranged policies	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223292
		S3‑223293	Sol#3 Resolution of EN on authorization of third party	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224040
		S3‑224040	Sol#3 Resolution of EN on authorization of third party	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223293
		S3‑223294	Sol#3 Resolution of EN on AKMA Usage	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224041
		S3‑224041	Sol#3 Resolution of EN on AKMA Usage	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223294
		S3‑223295	Sol#3 Resolution of EN on Mutual Authentication	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223296	Sol#3 Resolution of EN on Client Credential Grant	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223297	Sol#3 Adding Evaluation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224042
		S3‑224042	Sol#3 Adding Evaluation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223297
		S3‑223876	Update to Solution #4 in SNAAPPY	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223658	A solution for authorization before allowing access to resources	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223738	New Solution on User Authorization in API Invocation	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223739	New Solution on Resource owner Authorization in API Invocation using AKMA	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223792	KI#2, New Sol UE credential based API invocation procedure	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223790	KI#2, New Sol OAuth 2.0 based API invocation procedure	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223867	New solution: PKCE flow based authorization	DOCOMO Communications Lab.	pCR		Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223871	new solution: Subscriber vs. user authorization	DOCOMO Communications Lab.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223877	Solution to address KI#2 in SNAAPPY	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223791	KI#2, New Sol on User authorization revocation for API invocation procedure	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223489	Conclusion for key issue #2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223873	Conclusion to use oAuth based authorization	DOCOMO Communications Lab.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑224106	Draft TR 33.884	NTT-Docomo	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑224167	LS reply on CAPIF authorization roles related to FS_SNAAPP	S6-223489	LS in	discussion	Yes	Yes	postponed	No
		S3‑224168	LS reply on SNAAPP requirements clarifications	S6-223488	LS in	discussion	Yes	Yes	postponed	No
5.12	Study on enhanced security for network slicing Phase 3	S3‑223412	Discussion on KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	discussion	Discussion	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223209	Update to KI#1 providing VPLMN slice information to roaming UE	NEC Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223410	Update to KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesThales: SA2 didn’t decide the parameters for the UDM and they are under scope of CT1. We don’t know if there is need for security. That's why Thales didn’t provide requirements in 577.	noted	No
		S3‑223442	Update to KI#1 providing VPLMN slice information to roaming UE	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223577	Update of KI #1	THALES	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesVodafone: if you are going to use Steering of Roaming here we will object.	noted	No
		S3‑223796	Update to KI#1	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223878	Update to KI#1 Providing VPLMN slice information to roaming UE	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223813	update to KI#2 temporary network slice	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223413	Update to KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223815	update to KI#3 network slice admission control	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223210	New solution to KI#1: Protection of SoR related information from UE to home network	NEC Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223411	New solution to KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223443	New solution to KI#1 protecting capability indication in UE initiated VPLMN slice-based SoR	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223786	KI#1 New sol on enhanced slice aware information protection	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223787	KI#1 New sol on Integrity protection for network triggered UE capability indication procedure.	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223788	KI#1 New sol on Integrity protection for UE initiated capability indication procedure	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223814	solution for KI#2 temporary network slice for NSSAA	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223816	security solution for KI#3 network slice admission control	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
5.13	Study on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2	S3‑223252	Discussion paper of WWC SID update for TNAP mobility	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,CableLabs, Lenovo, Apple	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223253	New SID on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs, Lenovo, Apple	SID revised	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei didn’t agree with the changes in the justification. ORANGE and Thales didn’t agree with the sentence on AUN3 devices. This was removed. Revised to address these and other comments,	revised	No	S3‑224047
		S3‑224047	Revised SID on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs, Lenovo, Apple	SID revised	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223253
		S3‑223259	evaluation for solution 1	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224048
		S3‑224048	evaluation for solution 1	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesAdding Huawei's comments on impact on existing network functions.	approved	No		S3‑223259
		S3‑223497	A new solution to KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223498	conclusion to KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223851	Addressing EN in Solution 2	CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: SUCI protection instead of SUPI encryption. Lenovo: only ther user name not the whole NAI.	revised	No	S3‑224049
		S3‑224049	Addressing EN in Solution 2	CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223851
		S3‑223852	Addressing EN in Solution 3	CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesSame comments as the previous contribution.	revised	No	S3‑224050
		S3‑224050	Addressing EN in Solution 3	CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223852
		S3‑223853	Addressing EN in Solution 4	CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224051
		S3‑224051	Addressing EN in Solution 4	CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223853
		S3‑223856	Conclusions for KI#1	CableLabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224052
		S3‑224052	Conclusions for KI#1	CableLabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223856
		S3‑223499	Update KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224152
		S3‑224152	Update KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223499
		S3‑223500	Solution to KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224153
		S3‑224153	Solution to KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223500
		S3‑223501	Conclusion to KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224154
		S3‑224154	Conclusion to KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223501
		S3‑223257	TNAP mobility solution with rand value	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs,	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: add evaluation clause.	revised	No	S3‑224053
		S3‑224053	TNAP mobility solution with rand value	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs,	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223257
		S3‑223258	TNAP mobility solution with count	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs,	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224054
		S3‑224054	TNAP mobility solution with count	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs,	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223258
		S3‑223364	Proposed solution for TNAP mobility	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesCableLab: key derivation needs to be verified. Qualcomm: we are using IEEE specs. CableLabs: editor's note just to check, we may not have to change anything. Nokia: we need to analyse the key generation.	revised	No	S3‑224055
		S3‑224055	Proposed solution for TNAP mobility	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223364
		S3‑223512	update KI#4	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223881	Solution to address KI#4 in 5WWC	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223513	a new KI on TNAP mobility with full authentication	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesCableLabs: not sure this is needed. It is already in SA2 spec. Qualcomm: this exists already.	noted	No
		S3‑223611	A new solution on TNAP mobility with full authentication	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223857	Key issue on authentication of UE behind RG	CableLabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesErcisson: there are Rel-16 procedures for this. Offloading only? Qualcomm: related to the CR with the UE behind the RG? CableLabs confirmed. Qualcomm: then this is not in scope of the study. We need more discussion on the architecture before considering this key issue and the CR. CableLabs: this is part of the objectives of the Study.	noted	No
		S3‑223858	Solution for authentication of UE behind RG using NSWO	CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223859	Key issue on authentication of N5CW devices behind RG	CableLabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei didn’t agree with this contribution.	noted	No
		S3‑223887	Key issue on authentication of AUN3 device without 5G credentials	CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223255	Scope section alignment	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223256	TNAP mobility architecture assumptions	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223254	updating the existing solution mapping	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑224056	Draft TR 33.887	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.14	Study on the security aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) for the NG-RAN	S3‑223479	Update to KI#2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224159
		S3‑224159	Update to KI#2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223479
		S3‑223830	New Key issue on the security of the information transfer of the RAN AI/ML framework	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesNokia: we support this key issue. Ericsson: RAN3 hasn’t finished, that’s why we have the editor's note. Qualcomm: we revisit when RAN3 is done, so we can note this.	noted	No
		S3‑224160	Draft TR 33.877	Ericsson	draft TR	discussion	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.15	Study on security support for Next Generation Real Time Communication services	S3‑223597	EN addressing for solution#2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224157
		S3‑224157	EN addressing for solution#2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223597
		S3‑223598	Adding conclusion to KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223599	New solution to KI#2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224158
		S3‑224158	New solution to KI#2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223599
		S3‑223600	Discussion on way forward for KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223601	Adding conclusion to KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223841	Resolve 4 ENs in Solution#1	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224142
		S3‑224142	Resolve 4 ENs in Solution#1	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223841
		S3‑223842	Add Evaluation for Solution#1	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224143
		S3‑224143	Add Evaluation for Solution#1	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223842
		S3‑223843	New solution: How to avoid e2ae limitation and achieve e2e security for IMS Data Channel	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224124
		S3‑224124	New solution: How to avoid e2ae limitation and achieve e2e security for IMS Data Channel	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223843
		S3‑224179	Draft TR 33.890	Huawei	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.16	Study on security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2	S3‑223168	Questions for SUCI protection requirements for non-3GPP (WLAN) access to SNPN	S2-2207700	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑223175	Progress and open issues for NPN enhancements in Rel-18	S2-2209860	LS in		Yes	Yes	replied to	No
		S3‑223574	draft_Reply LS to Progress and open issues for NPN enhancements in Rel-18	Intel	LS out		Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑224175
		S3‑223374	SUCI protection for non-3GPP (WLAN) access to SNPN	Qualcomm Incorporated	discussion	Discussion	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223375	Reply LS on Progress and open issues for NPN enhancements in Rel-18	Qualcomm Incorporated	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224175
		S3‑224175	Reply LS on Progress and open issues for NPN enhancements in Rel-18	Qualcomm Incorporated	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223375
		S3‑223491	Reply LS on Progress and open issues for NPN enhancements in Rel-18	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223218	Solution for Trusted non-3GPP Access for SNPN	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224034
		S3‑224034	Solution for Trusted non-3GPP Access for SNPN	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesAdding an editor's note on the evaluation.	approved	No		S3‑223218
		S3‑223219	Solution for Untrusted non-3GPP Access for SNPN	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: why do we need something new for untrusted?	revised	No	S3‑224035
		S3‑224035	Solution for Untrusted non-3GPP Access for SNPN	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesAdding an editor's note on the evaluation.	approved	No		S3‑223219
		S3‑223804	Proposal for a solution for KI#1 - Anonymous authentication during connection establishment in trusted non-3GPP network access	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223490	New solution on Reusing N3GPP authentication for NPN	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224037
		S3‑224037	New solution on Reusing N3GPP authentication for NPN	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223490
		S3‑223669	Removal of ENs in Sol#3	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223668	Solution to KI#1 – NSWO in SNPN	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223670	Conclusions for KI#1	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesIDEMIA: NSWO doesn’t apply to SNPN according to SA2. Lenovo had an alternative solution. Thales: too soon to conclude during this meeting, we have several options. Nokia agreed, too soon. Qualcomm: don’t conclude in this meeting.	noted	No
		S3‑223558	Access to localized services using existing mechanisms	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesThales: provisioning is not defined in 3GPP.	revised	No	S3‑224043
		S3‑224043	Access to localized services using existing mechanisms	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223558
		S3‑223559	Access to localized services using AKMA mechanisms	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesORANGE: better not add provisioning in the TR. AKMA can be used to secure the connection. Add no impact on normative work. Qualcomm and Thales objected to the contribution.	noted	No
		S3‑223693	New Solution to KI#2: Authentication for UE access to hosting network	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesThales: in addition to the primary auth or directly the secondary authentication? Ericsson: mostly about primary auth.	revised	No	S3‑224044
		S3‑224044	New Solution to KI#2: Authentication for UE access to hosting network	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223693
		S3‑223789	KI#2 New sol Mutual authentication between UE and hosting network	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesInterdigital didn’t agree with this contribution. ORANGE didn’t understand the contribution.	noted	No
		S3‑223805	Proposal for a solution to KI#2 - PALS authentication through onboarding procedure and afterwards registration	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224045
		S3‑224045	Proposal for a solution to KI#2 - PALS authentication through onboarding procedure and afterwards registration	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223805
		S3‑223806	Proposal for a solution to KI#2 - PALS authentication through onboarding procedure and afterwards registration	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224046
		S3‑224046	Proposal for a solution to KI#2 - PALS authentication through onboarding procedure and afterwards registration	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223806
		S3‑223793	New KI on Protect prioritized list of hosting networks in hosting network scenarios	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: we don’t need a key issue, we can go directly to the conclusion, it's very small. Qualcomm supported this. ORANGE as well.	noted	No
		S3‑223794	New Sol on Protection of prioritized list of hosting networks	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223694	Preliminary conclusions to KI#2: Authentication for UE access to hosting network	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223227	Key issue on SN Name binding for Kausf in SNPN using AAA server for primary authentication	InterDigital Communications	pCR		Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223692	Security aspects of Support for enhanced mobility by enabling support for idle and connected mode mobility between SNPNs without new network selection	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesNokia: normative work "seems" to be transparent? It is transparent. Qualcomm: ley issue for a SA2 document? We don’t need this. Ericsson: it was in our objectives, in our scope.	noted	No
		S3‑224036	Draft TR 33.858	Ericsson	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.17	Study on Security of Phase 2 for UAS, UAV and UAM	S3‑223355	Proposed key issue on the privacy of 3GPP identifiers used to transport Broadcast Remote ID	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑222754
		S3‑223356	Proposed solution on the privacy of 3GPP identifiers used to transport broadcast remote ID	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑222756
		S3‑223323	Evaluation Solution #4	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224116
		S3‑224116	Evaluation Solution #4	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223323
		S3‑223324	Evaluation Solution #5	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223357	Proposed resolution of pairing EN in solution #3	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223358	Proposed resolution of DAA credentials EN in solution #3	Qualcomm Incorporated	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223879	Update to Solution #2 in UAS	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223325	Conclusion TR 33.891 KI #1	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224117
		S3‑224117	Conclusion TR 33.891 KI #1	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223325
		S3‑223466	Add conclusion to KI#1 about Direct C2 security	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑224117
		S3‑223467	Add conclusion to KI#2 about DAA unicast security	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224093
		S3‑224093	Add conclusion to KI#2 about DAA unicast security	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223467
		S3‑223326	Conclusion TR 33.891 KI #3	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224118
		S3‑224118	Conclusion TR 33.891 KI #3	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223326
		S3‑223327	Conclusion TR 33.891 KI #4	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224119
		S3‑224119	Conclusion TR 33.891 KI #4	InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223327
		S3‑223473	Add conclusion to KI#4 about privacy protection over PC5 link for C2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑224119
		S3‑223474	Add conclusion to KI#5 about DAA unicast privacy	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224094
		S3‑224094	Add conclusion to KI#5 about DAA unicast privacy	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223474
		S3‑223468	Add conclusion to KI#6 about Privacy for 3GPP ID in DAA	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑224112	Draft TR 33.891	Qualcomm	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.18	Study to enable URSP rules to securely identify Applications	S3‑223799	Proposal for a KI on injection of authentication data	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223222	Evaluation Update of Solution #2	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223550	Updates to evalution of solution 2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223802	Resolution to editor’s note in solution 1 concerning threat mitigation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223803	Resolution to editor’s note in solution 1 concerning the provisioning of security material	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223576	Solution on prevention of URSP rule misuse by a non-genuine application using home network anchor	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224177
		S3‑224177	Solution on prevention of URSP rule misuse by a non-genuine application using home network anchor	Intel	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223576
		S3‑223221	Conclusion for KI#1	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑224180	Draft TR 33.892	Lenovo	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.19	Study on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning	S3‑223289	Ranging - Update Key Issue #1- privacy risks of exposing positioning reference signals	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQuakcomm: postpone this key issue proposal. Ericsson and Xiaomi had the same concerns.	noted	No
		S3‑223531	Addressing the editor's note in sol#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesXiaomi: you need to define what is in the configuration or not.This was taken offline.	revised	No	S3‑223982
		S3‑223982	Addressing the editor's note in sol#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223531
		S3‑223288	Ranging - New solution KI#1, #2, #3	Philips International B.V.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223752	33.893: New Solution on Security Policy based Protection for Ranging Communication	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224130
		S3‑224130	33.893: New Solution on Security Policy based Protection for Ranging Communication	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223752
		S3‑223753	33.893: New Solution on Security Policy based Protection for Ranging Result sent to SL Positioning Client UE	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: more time to analyze according to SA2's solutions.An editor's note was added.	revised	No	S3‑224131
		S3‑224131	33.893: New Solution on Security Policy based Protection for Ranging Result sent to SL Positioning Client UE	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223753
		S3‑223746	33.893: Additional Roles for Authorization in KI#2	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224128
		S3‑224128	33.893: Additional Roles for Authorization in KI#2	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223746
		S3‑223748	33.893: Resolve the Editor’s Notes in Solution #2	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesHuawei: UE not reachable, how to notify it?	approved	No
		S3‑223532	Adding an editor's note to sol#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223749	33.893: Resolve the Editor’s Note in Solution #4	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223750	33.893: Evaluation for Solution #4	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223754	33.893: New Solution on Authorization of SL Positioning Client UE for Obtaining Ranging Result	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223756	33.893: New Solution on Role Verification during Discovery based on Discovery Keys	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223755	33.893: New Solution on Token-based Authorization of the Role of the UE during Discovery	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223630	New solution with authorization tokens exchanged after PC5 security establishment	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223465	New solution of security for the Ranging SL positioning device discovery	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223767	New solution on Ranging/SL Positioning discovery and link establishment procedure for V2X capable UEs	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223747	33.893: Update to Key Issue #4	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223402	Update to solution#6 in TR 33.893 - add authorization check step	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223403	Update to solution#6 in TR 33.893 - SLPK ID usage	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223751	33.893: Evaluation for Solution #6	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223464	New solution for protecting direct communnication	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223230	New Key issue for Detecting ranging triggered DoS attacks	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑224129	Draft TR 33.893	Xiaomi	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.20	Study on Security and Privacy of AI/ML-based Services and Applications in 5G	S3‑223249	Update Annex A	OPPO, Xidian	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223250	Key issue on user consent for FL UE members	OPPO, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Inter Digital	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesApple: agree with key issue, but we would like to reword the first requirement. Qualcomm didn’t agree with this contribution. There is another key issue on this already. User consent is part of privacy. Ericsson agreed with Qualcomm. Qualcomm: we need to wait for SA2 what purpose this is for to understand better the issue. We may not need user consent. OPPO: the SA2 study on this is clear, we understand that user consent is necessary. Nokia: SA2 has an editor's note referring to SA3 user consent in TR 23.800-70, clause 8.3. This was taken offline.	noted	No
		S3‑223444	New KI - User consent for application layer AIML operation	ZTE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm: key issue#3 may not go anywhere in SA2 as I got from my colleague in that WG. We need more analysis as we are not sure if user consent is needed. This key issue is not needed. Nokia: something needs to be studied in SA3, we should prepare something. Qualcomm: come back with use cases and then we can discuss whether this is needed. There were discussions on whether an LS was needed to ask SA2 and Interdigital stated that this would delay progress a bit deal; a show of hands could solve the issue.	noted	No
		S3‑223224	Discussion paper on 5GC AIML system capability	InterDigital Communications	discussion	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: this is not what SA2 is doing. This is impossible to be addressed by us. We are not the right group, this is not a federated learning security group. Qualcomm also had their issues with this.	noted	No
		S3‑223226	New key issue on Federated Learning AIML model protection	InterDigital Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223225	New key issue on Federated Learning AIML model privacy protection	InterDigital Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223275	Key issue on Security criteria of UE selection for AIML	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Inter Digital	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: this is out of scope of our work. Qualcomm: irrelevant from security point of view.	noted	No
		S3‑223480	New Solution reusing exisiting mechanism for privacy protection for 5GC assistance information exposure to AF	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223481	New Solution reusing existing mechanism for authorization of 5GC assistance information exposure to AF	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223980
		S3‑223980	New Solution reusing existing mechanism for authorization of 5GC assistance information exposure to AF	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223481
		S3‑223783	KI #1, New Sol on UE profile based 5GC assistance information exposure authorization	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223981
		S3‑223981	KI #1, New Sol on UE profile based 5GC assistance information exposure authorization	Xiaomi Communication	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesAdding editor's notes.	approved	No		S3‑223783
		S3‑223978	Draft TR 33.898	OPPO	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223979	LS on clarification for user consent for AI/ML	Huawei	LS out	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
5.21	Study on applicability of the Zero Trust Security principles in mobile networks	S3‑223396	New KI: Maturity model for ZTS in 5GC	MITRE Corporation, US National Security Agency	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223397	New KI: MFA for NF in 5GC	MITRE Corporation	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223863	Key Issue #1 Update	Lenovo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Rakuten Mobile Inc., Interdigital, US National Security Agency, Motorola Solutions, Johns Hopkins University APL, Intel, Center for Internet Security, China Mobile, ZTE, CableLabs, China Telecom, Verizon, Convida Wirele	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224031
		S3‑224031	Key Issue #1 Update	Lenovo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Rakuten Mobile Inc., Interdigital, US National Security Agency, Motorola Solutions, Johns Hopkins University APL, Intel, Center for Internet Security, China Mobile, ZTE, CableLabs, China Telecom, Verizon, Convida Wirele	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223863
		S3‑223408	Clarify authorization to non-SBA interfaces	China Telecommunications	pCR		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223536	Evaluation of tenet 4 on resource access	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑224125	Evaluation of tenet 4 on resource access	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223865	Update to Tenet #5	Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Charter Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: last line doesn’t have the full picture. Huawei added some comments and this document was revised.	revised	No	S3‑224127
		S3‑224127	Update to Tenet #5	Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Charter Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223865
		S3‑223866	Update to Tenet #6	Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Charter Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223538	Updates to evaluation of tenet 6	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesVodafone: not a critical evaluation and the added paragraph looks like a conclusion, not an evaluation. Ericsson preferred this option to the one in 866.	noted	No
		S3‑223868	Update to Tenet #7	Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Charter Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224126
		S3‑224126	Update to Tenet #7	Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Charter Communications	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223868
		S3‑223539	Updates to evaluation of tenet 7	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑224126
		S3‑223864	Editorial Update for TR 33.894	Lenovo	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223537	Update	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑224162	Draft TR 33.894	Lenovo	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.22	Study of Security aspects on User Consent for 3GPP Services Phase 2	S3‑223231	New key issue on enhancement of user consent for using MDT for NG-RAN AI/ML	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑224113	New key issue on enhancement of user consent for using MDT for NG-RAN AI/ML	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	-	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223395	33.896: Updates to Key Issue on User Consent for NTN	Google Inc.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑224090
		S3‑223483	Key Issue Update on User Consent for NTN	Huawei, HiSilicon, Philips International B.V., Xiaomi, Qualcomm, Apple	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesGoogle, Broadcom: quite a lot of discussions on user consent in RAN groups about this, we need to consider it. Apple: we had quite a few LS on user consent, this key issue is needed. Every LS is a use case. Huawei: basic procedure is the one in defined in Rel-15. After that it is not the basic procedure. Huawei: other groups are waiting for our feedback on user consent since long time ago.	revised	No	S3‑224090
		S3‑224090	Key Issue Update on User Consent for NTN	Huawei, HiSilicon, Philips International B.V., Xiaomi, Qualcomm, Apple	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesQualcomm didn’t agree with the changes and wanted out of the sourcing companies.Apple didn’t agree with the changes either. Vodafone and Ericsson objected to the contribution.	noted	No		S3‑223483
		S3‑223484	New solution on User Consent Architecture for RAN as enforcement point	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223485	Overview of UC3S_Ph2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224091
		S3‑224091	Overview of UC3S_Ph2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223485
		S3‑223486	Conclusion for key issue #1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223562	Guidance for Enforcing User Consent	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224092
		S3‑224092	Guidance for Enforcing User Consent	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223562
		S3‑223565	Conclusion for key issue #2	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223566	LS on User Consent for Roaming	Huawei, HiSilicon	LS out		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223635	Central authorization for user consent handling	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223639	KI and Solution on user consent in roaming	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223757	33.896: Update to Solution #1	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223758	33.896: Update to Solution #2	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223759	33.896: Solution on Obtaining User Consent with Mobility in RAN for KI#2	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223760	33.896: Solution on Obtaining User Consent with Mobility in SN for KI#2	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223770	New solution on User Consent for UE Data Exposure to HPLMN in the Roaming case	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223771	New solution on User Consent for UE Data Exposure to VPLMN in the Roaming case	Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑224181	Draft TR 33.896	Huawei	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.23	Study on security enhancements for 5G multicast-broadcast services Phase 2	S3‑223234	TMGI protection during group Paging	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223235	LS on MOCN TMGI ID impacting MSK, MTK	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	LS out		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223236	EN removal for MOCN solution#2	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223524	Editorial change to TR 33.883	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223525	A new solution on MOCN network sharing scenario	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesSamsung: this is not acceptable from our perspective. Ericsson: this would work if security application layer is enabled.	revised	No	S3‑224182
		S3‑224182	A new solution on MOCN network sharing scenario	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223525
		S3‑223526	A new solution on TMGI protection	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson and Qualcomm had issues with this contribution.	noted	No
		S3‑223736	[MBS] Updates to solution#1 in TR 33.883	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson: how is MTK distributed? MIKEY used here? If so the solution is not workable. Samssung: no mechanism proposed for the distribution of MTK.	noted	No
		S3‑223737	[MBS] Conclusion for Key Issue#1	Samsung	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑224120	Draft TR 33.883	Huawei	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.24	Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture	S3‑223710	Trust in service mesh and standalone SCP implementations	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	YesEricsson didn’t agree on the standalone SCP statement in the last sentence. Nokia: level of trust for co-located SCPs is described already.	revised	No	S3‑224183
		S3‑224183	Trust in service mesh and standalone SCP implementations	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223710
		S3‑223712	Trust in inter-PLMN communication	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223882	Resolving ENs in solution 6.13	CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesThere was disagreement on the removal of the editor's notes. Ths was taken offline.	noted	No
		S3‑223239	Further Analysis for KI#1 in TR 33.875	Mavenir	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223240	Conclusion on KI#1 in TR 33.875	Mavenir	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223984
		S3‑223984	Conclusion on KI#1 in TR 33.875	Mavenir,Nokia,Huawei	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223240
		S3‑223592	Conclusion on KI#1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223984
		S3‑223713	Conclusion on KI1	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223984
		S3‑223714	KI3 update Subscribe-Notify – EN resolution	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223985
		S3‑223985	KI3 update Subscribe-Notify – EN resolution	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Huaweil	pCR	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223714
		S3‑223596	Removing EN in KI#3	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑223985
		S3‑223695	Update of Key Issue #3: Service access authorization in the "Subscribe-Notify" scenarios	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesNokia: this is rewriting the whole key issue, we can't spend time on this. Ericsson: we never agreed on threats and requirements, hence this. Nokia: let's not pursue any normative work for this release. This was supported by CableLabs.	merged	No	S3‑223985
		S3‑223741	KI4 Sol SCP authorization check by NRF	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224070	S3‑222809
		S3‑224070	KI4 Sol SCP authorization check by NRF	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223741
		S3‑223241	Further Analysis for KI#4 in TR 33.875	Mavenir	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesCableLabs: it doesn’t address any editor's notes. We just need the conclusion.	revised	No	S3‑223988
		S3‑223988	Further Analysis for KI#4 in TR 33.875	Mavenir,Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223241
		S3‑223242	Conclusion for KI#4 in TR 33.875	Mavenir	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223989
		S3‑223989	Conclusion for KI#4 in TR 33.875	Mavenir,Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesIt was asked to be minuted: SCP requirements may need an update to ensure that existing security requirements apply to all interfaces from SCP to other entities in the core network,	approved	No		S3‑223242
		S3‑223861	Resolving ENs in solution 6.16	CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesEricsson proposed an editor's note as a consequence of this proposal.	revised	No	S3‑224099
		S3‑224099	Resolving ENs in solution 6.16	CableLabs	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223861
		S3‑223243	Further Analysis for KI#5 in TR 33.875	Mavenir	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223244	Conclusion on KI#5 in TR 33.875	Mavenir	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesMCC commented that the TR needed a cleanup to get rid of references to tdocs, WG's decisions and so on and stick to references to 3GPP specifications instead.	revised	No	S3‑224100
		S3‑224100	Conclusion on KI#5 in TR 33.875	Mavenir	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223244
		S3‑223849	EN deletion in KI5	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑224100
		S3‑223245	Further Analysis for KI#6 in TR 33.875	Mavenir	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223246	Conclusion for KI#6 in TR 33.875	Mavenir	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224102
		S3‑224102	Conclusion for KI#6 in TR 33.875	Mavenir	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223246
		S3‑223593	Solution for authorization negotiation with bootstrapping mechanism	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	YesNokia: No problem with this but the conclusion is not agreable.	approved	No
		S3‑223594	Conclution on KI#7	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224104
		S3‑224104	Conclution on KI#7	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223594
		S3‑223595	LS on authorization negotiation	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223797	KI9 update to sol17 on authorization mechanism negotiation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑224107	KI9 update to sol17 on authorization mechanism negotiation	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	-	No	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223850	pCR to 33.875 - Update of Key Issue 10	Vodafone España SA	pCR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224111
		S3‑224111	pCR to 33.875 - Update of Key Issue 10	Vodafone España SA,Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223850
		S3‑223798	KI10 solution on N32 security profiles	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224108
		S3‑224108	KI10 solution on N32 security profiles	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	-	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223798
		S3‑223328	Resolving Editor’s Note in Solution #20 in TR 33.875	Mavenir	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224110
		S3‑224110	Resolving Editor’s Note in Solution #20 in TR 33.875	Mavenir	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223328
		S3‑223855	KI11 threat clarification	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223696	Evaluation for Solution #21 "Certificate solution for NRF validation of NFc for access token requests"	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223697	Evaluation and update for Solution #22 "Combined certificate and profile solution for NRF validation of NFc for access token requests"	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223329	Analysis for KI#11 in TR 33.875	Mavenir	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223330	Conclusion on KI#11 in TR 33.875	Mavenir	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑223990
		S3‑223990	Solution on KI#11 in TR 33.875	Mavenir,Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223330
		S3‑223888	pCR to 33.875 - Update to Key Issue 13	Vodafone España SA	pCR	Agreement	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223698	Discussion. Key issue #12: Security in Hosted SEPP scenarios	Ericsson	discussion	Discussion	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223699	Update of Key issue #12: Security in Hosted SEPP scenarios	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223700	Solution for KI#12: Security in Hosted SEPP scenarios	Ericsson	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	not treated	No
		S3‑223869	TR rapporteur updates - editorials	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	approved	No
		S3‑223983	Draft TR 33.875	Nokia	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
5.25	Study on Security Aspects of Satellite Access	S3‑223405	Update KI #1 Protection of Satellite Coverage Information used by 5GC/EPC	China Telecom Corporation Ltd.	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑224072
		S3‑223523	update to key issue 1	Huawei, HiSilicon	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	merged	No	S3‑224072
		S3‑223761	33.700-28: Update to Key Issue #1	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224072
		S3‑224072	33.700-28: Update to Key Issue #1	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No		S3‑223761
		S3‑223232	Key Issue for Secure RRC connection setup procedure	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	pCR		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223762	33.700-28: New Key Issue on Protection of UE Unreachability Period retrieved by the UE	Xiaomi Technology	pCR	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑224166	Draft TR 33.700-28	Xiaomi	draft TR	Approval	Yes	Yes	approved	No
6	New Study/Work item proposals	S3‑223211	Discussion paper on open questions regarding 256-bit algorithms	KDDI Corporation	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223212	Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256 bits	KDDI Corporation	SID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	withdrawn	Yes
		S3‑223220	New SID on QUICK optimization for access traffic steering, switching and splitting support in the 5G system architecture; Phase 3	Lenovo	SID new	Approval	Yes	YesKDDI: not critical, no need to do this now. Google: SA2 has decided already to use this. Acronym is wrong: QUIC. Interdigital supported this SID. Nokia: this should be a "quick" study. China Mobile supported this SID. NIST: this is not the place to work on an IETF protocol. Keysight supported this SID. Qualcomm: if we go forward this would be about using TLS or not. CableLabs: true that we shouldn’t interfere with the IETF security protection. The Chair asked if SA3 had the bandwith to add another SID in the SA3 workload. Ericsson: performance decrease that bad? It should be interesting to know.	noted	No
		S3‑223251	Discussion on Ambient IoT Security	OPPO	discussion	Endorsement	Yes	YesKDDI: very early in the process, too unspecific as we wouldn’t know what to endorse here. Interdigital found this paper reasonable. Qualcomm mentioned that SA3 was a better place for the definition of security requirements.	noted	No
		S3‑223445	DTLS for AKMA WID	ZTE Corporation	WID new	Approval	Yes	YesThales: add previous GBA work in the related work items. Qualcomm: add TS 33.222 as impacted specification.	revised	No	S3‑223959
		S3‑223959	DTLS for AKMA WID	ZTE Corporation	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223445
		S3‑223487	New WID on UC3S_Ph2	Huawei, HiSilicon	WID new	Approval	Yes	YesNTT-Docomo: let's wait for the conclusions of the study. KDDI, Qualcomm and Google agreed to wait for another meeting cycle.	noted	No
		S3‑223504	New WID on HONTRA	Huawei, HiSilicon	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224173
		S3‑224173	New WID on HONTRA	Huawei, HiSilicon	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223504
		S3‑223534	New WID on security assurance methodology enhancements	Huawei, HiSilicon	WID new	Agreement	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223568	New SID on 5G Per-QoS Flow User Plane Security Control	Intel, Samsung	SID new	Approval	Yes	YesKDDI: no time to do optimizations. Not sure this is going to be a mini WID either. Qualcomm objected to this. It introduces a lot of complexity. Ericsson also objected to this. Interdigital: why more complex? It looks like you have a solution in mind. NTT-Docomo: privacy for IP address in this case? Intel: we can limit the objectives to make the work shorter. Huawei: it's obvious that it has a significant impact on the system. ORANGE: don’t push for this study unless we have some requirement from SA2. Workload in SA3 is high. Qualcomm objected to this due to security reasons and system complexity introduced with this mechanism. Intel didn’t see any security aspects. ORANGE didn’agree with point 2.	noted	No
		S3‑223569	SCAS process enhancements	Huawei, HiSilicon	CR		Yes	YesEricsson: remove the changes on the skeleton. MCC commented that this meant an exception in the 3GPP drafting rules.They added that some text didn’t really belong to a specification but an internal SA3 guideline that could be maintained. Qualcomm: instead of going one Release after, why not we give several months for SCAS to finish and avoid this previous Release reference? It was agreed to start discussions with MCC and come back in the next meeting with an updated proposal.	not pursued	No
		S3‑223570	Need for Rel-18 study on UP security enhancement	Intel, Samsung	discussion		Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223589	New WID on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC — phase 2	Huawei, HiSilicon	WID new	Approval	Yes	YesDocomo: wait for the TR conclusion. Ericsson supported this WID. OPPO: start work on a draft CR and come back with the WID when it's done. Nokia supported the WID. Qualcomm: we can't keep revising the WID every meeting. I like OPPO's proposal.	noted	No
		S3‑223673	New WID on Security Aspects of Proximity-based Services in 5GS Phase 2	CATT	WID new	Approval	Yes	Yes	noted	No
		S3‑223701	New WID on Security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2	Ericsson	WID new	Agreement	Yes	YesAgreed that it was too early to bring this.	noted	No
		S3‑223829	WID on SBA security	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	WID new		Yes	YesHuawei: reword the objectives so as not to mention key issues. It was commented that the TR hadn’t finished yet so the objectives were complete. Mavenir: add more conclusions to the WID with a revised WID later.	revised	No	S3‑224087	S3‑222254
		S3‑224087	WID on SBA security	Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell	WID new	-	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223829
		S3‑223834	New WID on IETF OSCORE protocol profiles for GBA and AKMA	Ericsson	WID new	Agreement	Yes	YesThales: add TS 33.222 as impacted speciification.	revised	No	S3‑224132
		S3‑224132	New WID on IETF OSCORE protocol profiles for GBA and AKMA	Ericsson	WID new	Agreement	Yes	Yes	agreed	No		S3‑223834
7	CVD and research	S3‑223158	Research highlighting potential need for granular level checks using ""Additional scope"" under the OAuth2.0 Token Access.	GSMA	LS in		Yes	YesNokia: the document admits already that this is very unlikely. CableLabs: postpone to review this.	postponed	No
8	Any Other Business	S3‑223146	SA3 meeting calendar	SA WG3 Chair	other		Yes	Yes	revised	No	S3‑224105
		S3‑224105	SA3 meeting calendar	SA WG3 Chair	other	-	Yes	Yes	noted	No		S3‑223146
		S3‑223952	Presentation from ENISA on EU certification scheme	ENISA	other	Presentation	No	Yes	noted	No