Tdoc List
2022-05-27 16:05
Agenda | Topic | TDoc | Title | Source | Type | For | Avail | Treated | Decision | Wdrn | Replaced-by | Replaces |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Agenda and Meeting Objectives | S3‑220601 | Agenda | WG Chair | agenda | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑220603 | Process for SA3#107e meeting | WG Chair | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220606 | Process and agenda for SA3#107e | WG Chair | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221142 | |||
S3‑221142 | Process and agenda for SA3#107e | WG Chair | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220606 | |||
2 | Meeting Reports | S3‑220602 | Report from SA3#106e | MCC | report | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑220604 | Report from last SA | WG Chair | report | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑220605 | Meeting notes from SA3 leadership | WG Chair | report | No |
No
| reserved | No | |||||
3 | Reports and Liaisons from other Groups | S3‑220608 | LS to 3GPP CT4 on Identification of source PLMN-ID in SBA | GSMA | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑220649 | Reply LS on User Controlled PLMN Selector with Access Technology in Control plane solution for steering of roaming in 5GS | S1-220187 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220610 | ||||
S3‑220648 | LS on new parameters for SOR | C1-214118 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220609 | ||||
S3‑220651 | Reply LS on UE capabilities indication in UPU | C1-223177 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220612 | ||||
S3‑220660 | LS on 3GPP TS 29.244 | BBF | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220621 | ||||
S3‑221147 | LS on 3GPP TS 29.244 | BBF | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑220666 | Reply LS on LTE User Plane Integrity Protection | R2-2203663 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220627 | ||||
S3‑220667 | LS on EPS fallback enhancements | R2-2204236 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | S3‑220628 | ||||
S3‑220668 | Reply LS on EPS fallback enhancements | S2-2203590 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220629 | ||||
S3‑220879 | Disucssion on security aspect of EPS fallback enhancements in Rel-17 | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220880 | LS to RAN2 on EPS fallback enhancements | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221162 | |||
S3‑221064 | Reply LS on EPS fallback enhancements | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221162 | |||
S3‑221109 | Reply LS on EPS fallback enhancements | Nokia Corporation | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221162 | ||||
S3‑221110 | Discussion on LS on EPS fallback enhancements | Nokia Corporation | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑220669 | Reply LS on User Plane Integrity Protection for eUTRA connected to EPC | R3-222610 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220630 | ||||
S3‑220670 | Reply LS on UE providing Location Information for NB-IoT | C1-222100 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220631 | ||||
S3‑220671 | Reply LS on UE providing Location Information for NB-IoT | R3-222858 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220632 | ||||
S3‑220672 | LS Response to LS on UE providing Location Information for NB-IoT | S2-2201333 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220633 | ||||
S3‑220673 | LS on V2X PC5 link for unicast communication with null security algorithm | R5-222035 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | S3‑220634 | ||||
S3‑220674 | Reply LS on reply to SA6 about new SID on Application Enablement for Data Integrity Verification Service in IOT | S1-220185 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220635 | ||||
S3‑220678 | LS reply on RAN2 agreements for paging with service indication | S2-2201838 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220639 | ||||
S3‑220680 | LS on MINT functionality for Disaster Roaming | S5-222575 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220641 | ||||
S3‑220682 | LS on Inter-PLMN Handover of VoLTE calls and idle mode mobility of IMS sessions | S3i220244 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑220683 | TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur | InterDigital, Inc. | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220662 | LS on UE location during initial access in NTN | R2-2201881 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220623 | ||||
S3‑220665 | LS on UE location in connected mode in NTN | R2-2204257 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | S3‑220626 | ||||
S3‑220664 | Reply LS on UE location during initial access in NTN | R3-222861 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220625 | ||||
S3‑221081 | NTN - Reply LS on UE location in connected mode in NTN(R2-2204257) | Apple | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221106 | Reply LS on UE location in connected mode in NTN | Nokia Corporation | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑221082 | NTN - Reply LS on NTN specific user consent (R2-2201754) | Apple | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221268 | |||
S3‑221107 | Reply LS on Reply LS on NTN specific User Consent | Nokia Corporation | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221268 | ||||
S3‑221063 | LS reply on UE location in connected mode in NTN | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221268 | |||
S3‑220609 | LS on new parameters for SOR | C1-214118 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220648 | ||||
S3‑220610 | Reply LS on User Controlled PLMN Selector with Access Technology in Control plane solution for steering of roaming in 5GS | S1-220187 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220649 | ||||
S3‑220612 | Reply LS on UE capabilities indication in UPU | C1-223177 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220651 | ||||
S3‑220621 | LS on 3GPP TS 29.244 | BBF | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220660 | ||||
S3‑220623 | LS on UE location during initial access in NTN | R2-2201881 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220662 | ||||
S3‑220624 | LS on UE location during initial access in NTN | R2-2202057 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220663 | ||||
S3‑220625 | Reply LS on UE location during initial access in NTN | R3-222861 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220664 | ||||
S3‑220626 | LS on UE location in connected mode in NTN | R2-2204257 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220665 | ||||
S3‑220627 | Reply LS on LTE User Plane Integrity Protection | R2-2203663 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220666 | ||||
S3‑220628 | LS on EPS fallback enhancements | R2-2204236 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220667 | ||||
S3‑220629 | Reply LS on EPS fallback enhancements | S2-2203590 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220668 | ||||
S3‑220630 | Reply LS on User Plane Integrity Protection for eUTRA connected to EPC | R3-222610 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220669 | ||||
S3‑220631 | Reply LS on UE providing Location Information for NB-IoT | C1-222100 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220670 | ||||
S3‑220632 | Reply LS on UE providing Location Information for NB-IoT | R3-222858 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220671 | ||||
S3‑220633 | LS Response to LS on UE providing Location Information for NB-IoT | S2-2201333 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220672 | ||||
S3‑220634 | LS on V2X PC5 link for unicast communication with null security algorithm | R5-222035 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220673 | ||||
S3‑220635 | Reply LS on reply to SA6 about new SID on Application Enablement for Data Integrity Verification Service in IOT | S1-220185 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220674 | ||||
S3‑220639 | LS reply on RAN2 agreements for paging with service indication | S2-2201838 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220678 | ||||
S3‑220641 | LS on MINT functionality for Disaster Roaming | S5-222575 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220680 | ||||
S3‑220663 | LS on UE location during initial access in NTN | R2-2202057 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑220624 | ||||
S3‑221162 | Reply LS on EPS fallback enhancements | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221064 | |||
S3‑221254 | Reply LS on the Indication of Network Assisted Positioning method | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220872 | |||
S3‑221268 | LS reply on Reply LS on NTN specific User Consent and UE location in connected mode in NTN | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221063 | |||
S3‑221151 | LS on authentication type and related information of MSGin5G service | C1-223957 | LS in | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | ||||
S3‑221152 | Reply to: LS on authentication type and related information of MSGin5G service | China Mobile | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
4 | Work areas |   | ||||||||||
4.1 | New WID on Security Assurance Specification for Management Function (MnF) | S3‑220885 | 33.926-Clarifications of the scope of OAM functions in the GNP model | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑220886 | 33.926-Rewrite the 5G MnF GNP model | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221258 | |||
S3‑220887 | 33.926-Add new assets to the OAM functions | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221259 | |||
S3‑220888 | 33.926-Add a new threat | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221260 | |||
S3‑220889 | 33.526 - update clause 4.2.3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220890 | 33.526 - update clause 4.2.4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220891 | 33.526 - update clause 4.2.5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220893 | Living document for MnF SCAS: draftCR to TR 33.926 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221301 | |||
S3‑221301 | Living document for MnF SCAS: draftCR to TR 33.926 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220893 | |||
S3‑221166 | new draft TS 33.526 MnF SCAS | Huawei Technologies Sweden AB | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221171 | 33.926-Add a new threat | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑221258 | 33.926-Rewrite the 5G MnF GNP model | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220886 | |||
S3‑221259 | 33.926-Add new assets to the OAM functions | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220887 | |||
S3‑221260 | 33.926-Add a new threat | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220888 | |||
4.2 | New WID on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products | S3‑220840 | Modfiy Scope of TR 33.936 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑220781 | adding overview and Scope of a SECAM SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220782 | adding Scope of SECAM evaluation and accreditation for 3GPP virtualized network products | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220783 | adding the contents of chapters 4.5 to 4.7 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220784 | adding the contents of chapters 4.8 to 4.10 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220785 | adding content to clause 5.1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220786 | Adding description about general content of SCAS document and ToE to clause 5.2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220787 | adding description about SPD to clause 5.2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220788 | adding description about methodology of security requirements to clause 5.2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220789 | adding description about improvement of SCAS and new potential security requirements to clause 5.3 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220790 | adding description about basic vulnerability testing requirements for GVNP to clause 5.4 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220841 | Modfiy Scope of TS 33.927 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220775 | Proposal to add overview in clause 4 Generic Virtulizated Network Product(GVNP) class | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220776 | Proposal to add clause 4.2 Minimum set of functions defining the GVNP class | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220777 | Proposal to add introduction in clause 4.3 Generic virtualized network product model | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220778 | Proposal to add GVNP model of type 1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220769 | Supplement to generic virtualised network product model | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220779 | Proposal to add GVNP model of type 2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220780 | Proposal to add GVNP model of type 3 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220839 | Modfiy Scope of TS 33.527 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
4.3 | New WID on Mission critical security enhancements phase 3 |   | ||||||||||
4.4 | New WID on Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for 5G Rel-17 Features | S3‑220739 | Adding a test case for gNB in TS 33.511 clause 4.2.2.1.4 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑221090 | New threat on Kausf handing | Huawei,HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221091 | threat modifications for token verification | Huawei,HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221230 | |||
S3‑221092 | threat modifications for SEPP | Huawei,HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221231 | |||
S3‑221230 | threat modifications for token verification | Huawei,HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221091 | |||
S3‑221231 | threat modifications for SEPP | Huawei,HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221092 | |||
S3‑221263 | draftCR to TR 33.926 for SCAS 5G Ph2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
4.5 | New WID on Security Assurance Specification for the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) Anchor Function Function (AAnF) | S3‑220689 | New test case for confidentiality, integrity and replay protection between AAnF and AUSF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221156 | |
S3‑220690 | New threat for confidentiality, integrity and replay between AAnF and AUSF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220691 | New test case for confidentiality, integrity and replay protection between AF/NEF and AAnF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221159 | |||
S3‑220692 | New threat for confidentiality, integrity and replay between AAnF and AF/NEF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220741 | Adding AAnF critical assets and threats to TS 33.926 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑220742 | Adding Network product class description for the AAnF to TS 33.926. | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑220743 | AKMA subscription asynchronization_Test_Case | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220767 | Adding AAnF critical assets and threats to TS 33.926 | ZTE Corporation | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220768 | Adding Network product class description for the AAnF to TS 33.926 | ZTE Corporation | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220808 | Skeleton for TS33.537(SCAS for AAnF) | China Mobile | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220809 | Scope of TS 33.537 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221156 | New test case for confidentiality, integrity and replay protection between AAnF and AUSF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220689 | |||
S3‑221157 | New threat for confidentiality, integrity and replay between AAnF and AUSF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221159 | New test case for confidentiality, integrity and replay protection between AF/NEF and AAnF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220691 | |||
S3‑221160 | New threat for confidentiality, integrity and replay between AAnF and AF/NEF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221167 | Living document for AAnF SCAS: draftCR to TR 33.926 | China Mobile | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221168 | draft TS 33.537 | China Mobile | draft TS | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
4.6 | New WID on SCAS for split-gNB product classes | S3‑220988 | Proposed skeleton for TS 33.742 | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221196 | |
S3‑220989 | Proposed scope for TS 33.742 | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220990 | Discussion on how to document test cases in TS 33.742 | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221196 | Proposed skeleton for TR 33.742 | Qualcomm Incorporated | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220988 | |||
S3‑221201 | TS 33.742 v1.0.0 | Qualcomm Austria RFFE GmbH | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
4.7 | Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe (Rel-17) | S3‑220679 | Reply to LS on new reference point name for the interface between PKMF and UDM in 5G ProSe | S2-2203018 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220640 | ||
S3‑221003 | pCR to TS33.503 Abbreviations update | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221281 | |||
S3‑220966 | Reference point name | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221182 | |||
S3‑221005 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 4.2 Update reference point name between 5G PKMF and UDM | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221182 | |||
S3‑221025 | 33.503: Updates in Clause 4.2 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221026 | 33.503: Updates in Clause 5.2.5 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220847 | Clarification on restricted discovery procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220851 | Add subclause about the restricted discovery for UE-to-Network relay | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221302 | |||
S3‑220997 | CR to ProSe TS – An update on MIC calculation for discovery message | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220998 | CR to ProSe TS – Clarification on discovery message protection | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221000 | Update on 5G ProSe restricted discovery procedure for U2N relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221302 | |||
S3‑221302 | Update on 5G ProSe restricted discovery procedure for U2N relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221000 | |||
S3‑221027 | 33.503: Updates in Clause 6.1.3.2 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221189 | |||
S3‑221028 | 33.503: Clarifiacation on MIC Check in Open Discovery | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221029 | 33.503: General Description for ProSe U2N Relay Discovery Security | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221030 | 33.503: Add Security Requirement for ProSe U2N Relay Discovery | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221031 | 33.503: Control Plane based Security Procedure for ProSe U2N Relay Discovery | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221032 | 33.503: User Plane based Security Procedure for ProSe U2N Relay Discovery | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221033 | 33.503: Derivation of Discovery Keys for ProSe U2N Relay Discovery | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221141 | Relay Discovery clarifications | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220874 | Security capability negotiation during unicast establishment after restricted discovery | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220968 | Rephrasing Clause 6.2.1 to emphasize that security parameters for PC5 Direct Communication are determined during Direct Discovery | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221272 | |||
S3‑220969 | Restructure of security requirements for 5G ProSe UE-to-network relay | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221007 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Update security requirements of UE-to-Network Relay | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221012 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Update security requirements of Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221013 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Remove unnecessary description from UP-based and CP-based procedures | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221015 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Solution for co-existence of UP and CP security options | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221284 | |||
S3‑221034 | 33.503: Updates to General Security Requirements for U2N Relay Communication | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221206 | |||
S3‑221035 | 33.503: Updates to Security Requirements for U2N Relay Communication via L3 Relay UE | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221207 | |||
S3‑221036 | Discussion on PC5 Key Hierarchy for ProSe U2N Relay Communication | Xiaomi Technology | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220746 | Remove the EN in the clause 6.3.3.2.2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221296 | |||
S3‑220842 | Adding UDM Services for SUCI deconceal and authorization information retrieval | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221241 | |||
S3‑220843 | Remote UE Identity provisioning in UE-to-Network Relay communication security procedure over user plane | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221271 | |||
S3‑220869 | Clarification on PRUK ID | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221252 | |||
S3‑220881 | Clarification on the description of PRUK | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221255 | |||
S3‑220967 | Remote UE Report in UP based solution | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221271 | |||
S3‑220971 | Discussion on UE ID privacy for Remote UE Report | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220972 | PLMN ID in Direct Security Mode Failure | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221183 | |||
S3‑220973 | KNRP key derivation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221297 | |||
S3‑220994 | PC5 security policy provisioning for user-plane L3 U2N relay solution | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221294 | |||
S3‑221294 | PC5 security policy provisioning for user-plane L3 U2N relay solution | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220994 | |||
S3‑220995 | Clarification on the PC5 link establishment for user-plane L3 U2N relay solution | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220999 | CR to ProSe TS – Removing an Editor’s Note in user plane based U2N procedure | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221296 | |||
S3‑221296 | CR to ProSe TS – Removing an Editor’s Note in user plane based U2N procedure | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220999 | |||
S3‑221001 | CR to ProSe TS - Clarification on Knrp derivation for U2N relay over user plane | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221297 | |||
S3‑221297 | CR to ProSe TS - Clarification on Knrp derivation for U2N relay over user plane | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221001 | |||
S3‑221037 | Discussion on Security for ProSe U2N Relay Communication over User Plane | Xiaomi Technology | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221038 | 33.503: Update to Security Procedure over User Plane | Xiaomi Technology, China Telecom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221039 | 33.503: PRUK Derivation for ProSe U2N Relay Security over User Plane | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221140 | UP based security selection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital, LGE, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220706 | Clarify relationship between KAUSF, KAUSF_P and 5G PRUK | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221282 | |||
S3‑220707 | Clarify the necessity of refreshing 5G PRUK during CP-based Security Procedure | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221242 | |||
S3‑220734 | Update Security procedure over CP with using PRUK ID in DCR | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.,, Samsung, LG Electronics, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Verizon Wireless, MITRE, Convida Wireless LLC, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221242 | |||
S3‑220735 | 5GPRUK/5GPRUK ID Storage Options and Way Forward | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd., Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220736 | PAnF supported services discussion | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220737 | Update Security procedure over CP with using PRUK ID in DCR (alt#2) | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221242 | |||
S3‑220744 | Add some context about 5G PRUK ID reject cases in the clause 6.3.3.3.2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220745 | Clarification on AUSF instance store in UDM | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220747 | Update the clause 6.3.3.3.3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221282 | |||
S3‑220815 | EN resolution for Secondary Authentication for Remote UE with L3 U2N relay without N3IWF(Alt1) | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220816 | EN resolution for Secondary Authentication for Remote UE with L3 U2N relay without N3IWF(Alt2) | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221174 | |||
S3‑220817 | Revocation_ReAuth for Secondary Authentication for Remote UE | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221175 | |||
S3‑220827 | Delete of CP based solution | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220828 | Delete of Secondary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220829 | Address EN of secondary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220844 | Remote UE authorization check in UE-to-Network Relay communication security procedure over control plane | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220845 | Resolving the EN on the needs and usage of 5GPRUK ID | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221242 | |||
S3‑220846 | Format of 5GPRUK ID | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221243 | |||
S3‑220850 | Key derivation related clarification in CP-based UE-to-Network relay procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221245 | |||
S3‑220852 | Terminology alignment for 5G ProSe Remote UE specific authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220868 | Clarification on KAUSF_P | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221282 | |||
S3‑220882 | Clarification on the secondary authentication procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221256 | |||
S3‑220883 | Update general clause for secondary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221257 | |||
S3‑220894 | Discussion for key storage and derivation in UE-to-Network security procedure over Control Plane | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220934 | Security protocol over CP with 5G AKA to establishPC5 keys | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220936 | Security protocol over CP with 5G ProSe security context in the USIM | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220965 | Corrections to CP based solution | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220970 | Remote UE Report in CP based solution | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221014 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Clarification text for Kausf_p | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221282 | |||
S3‑221016 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Update security procedure over Control Plane | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221242 | |||
S3‑221137 | CP based security selection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital, LGE, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221138 | derive 5GPRUK based on Kausf_p | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital, LGE, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221282 | |||
S3‑221139 | authorization of remote UE | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital, LGE, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220848 | Clarification on the security of L2 U2NW | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221244 | |||
S3‑221040 | 33.503: Updates in Clause 6.3.4 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221208 | |||
S3‑220825 | Integrity protection of DCR message | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221295 | |||
S3‑220826 | Clarification on the privacy protection of DCR | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220996 | CR to ProSe TS - Address the Editor’s Notes in clause 6.3.5 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221295 | |||
S3‑221295 | CR to ProSe TS - Address the Editor’s Notes in clause 6.3.5 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220996 | |||
S3‑220748 | Update the clause 7.4.2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221243 | |||
S3‑220830 | Add a new clause for 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay with N3IWF support | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221238 | |||
S3‑220974 | CR for Prose changes to TS 33.220 in Rel-17 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221006 | pCR to TS33.503 Wording update | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220640 | Reply to LS on new reference point name for the interface between PKMF and UDM in 5G ProSe | S2-2203018 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220679 | ||||
S3‑220855 | Clarification | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑221174 | EN resolution for Secondary Authentication for Remote UE with L3 U2N relay without N3IWF(Alt2) | LG Electronics Inc., Interdigital | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220816 | |||
S3‑221175 | Revocation_ReAuth for Secondary Authentication for Remote UE | LG Electronics Inc., Interdigital | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220817 | |||
S3‑221182 | Reference point name | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220966 | |||
S3‑221183 | PLMN ID in Direct Security Mode Failure | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220972 | |||
S3‑221189 | 33.503: Updates in Clause 6.1.3.2 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221027 | |||
S3‑221206 | 33.503: Updates to General Security Requirements for U2N Relay Communication | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221034 | |||
S3‑221207 | 33.503: Updates to Security Requirements for U2N Relay Communication via L3 Relay UE | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221035 | |||
S3‑221208 | 33.503: Updates in Clause 6.3.4 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221040 | |||
S3‑221238 | Add a new clause for 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay with N3IWF support | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220830 | |||
S3‑221241 | Adding UDM Services for SUCI deconceal and authorization information retrieval | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220842 | |||
S3‑221242 | Resolving the EN on the needs and usage of 5GPRUK ID | Huawei, HiSilicon, Interdigital, LG Electronics, ChinaTelecom,Xiaomi, CATT, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220845 | |||
S3‑221243 | Format of 5GPRUK ID | Huawei, HiSilicon, ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220846 | |||
S3‑221244 | Clarification on the security of L2 U2NW | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220848 | |||
S3‑221245 | Key derivation related clarification in CP-based UE-to-Network relay procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220850 | |||
S3‑221252 | Clarification on PRUK ID | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220869 | |||
S3‑221255 | Clarification on the description of PRUK | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220881 | |||
S3‑221256 | Clarification on the secondary authentication procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220882 | |||
S3‑221257 | Update general clause for secondary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220883 | |||
S3‑221271 | Remote UE Report in UP based solution | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220967 | |||
S3‑221272 | Rephrasing Clause 6.2.1 to emphasize that security parameters for PC5 Direct Communication are determined during Direct Discovery | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220968 | |||
S3‑221281 | pCR to TS33.503 Abbreviations update | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221003 | |||
S3‑221282 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Clarification text for Kausf_p | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221014 | |||
S3‑221284 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Solution for co-existence of UP and CP security options | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221015 | |||
S3‑221286 | Draft TS 33.503 v0.4.0 Security Aspects of Proximity based Services (ProSe) in the 5G System (5GS) | CATT | draft TS | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221149 | 5G Prose questions on CP for show-of-hands | Interdigital,CATT | other | Presentation | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221150 | Questions of show hand on ProSe CP-based solution | CATT | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221299 | Cover page TS 33.503 | CATT | TS or TR cover | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
4.8 | Enhanced security for Phase 2 network slicing (Rel-17) | S3‑220799 | Address EN on alignment to SA2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑221047 | Resolving the alignment related EN for NSACF Subscription/unsubscription procedure | Xiaomi Communication | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220800 | Address EN on AF Authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221050 | Update Subscription and unsubscription procedure of NSACF notification service | Xiaomi Communication | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221061 | Clarification on AF authorization for the NSACF notification procedure | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
4.9 | Security Aspects of eNPN (Rel-17) | S3‑220837 | Format of anonymous SUCI | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑220838 | LS on anonymous SUCI | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220863 | Address Ens for NPN | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220912 | Definition of Anonymous SUCI | Ericsson, Qualcomm | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221170 | |||
S3‑220913 | UDM interaction for Anonymous SUCI | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221267 | |||
S3‑220914 | Removing Editor’s note on using only null-scheme SUCI | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220915 | Anonymous SUCI for onboarding | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220916 | Clarification SUPI privacy for NPN | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221002 | Resolving Editor’s note on using only null-scheme SUCI | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221202 | |||
S3‑221008 | Resolution of editor's note relating to anonymizing SUPI or skipping default credential identifier. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221009 | Resolution of editor's note relating to usage of SUPI as a verifiable identifier | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221010 | Resolution of editor’s note relating to exclusive use of anonymized SUCI. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221011 | Resolution of inconsistency in SUCI usage during UE onboarding. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221273 | |||
S3‑221049 | Resolving the Editor’s Notes for UE onboarding in SNPNs | Xiaomi Communication, Ericsson | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221195 | |||
S3‑221111 | Derivation of SUPI from default UE credentials | Ericsson, CableLabs, Intel, Qualcomm, Philips | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑220940 | |||
S3‑221112 | Removing EN on UE being uniquely identifiable and verifiably secure | Ericsson, CableLabs, Intel, Qualcomm, Xiaomi, Philips | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑220941 | |||
S3‑220688 | Clarifications to secondary authentication for UE onboarding | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | CR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221210 | ||||
S3‑220939 | Corrections and clarifications to secondary authentication during UE onboarding | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221210 | |||
S3‑220937 | Terminology correction for security of UE onboarding | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑220938 | PWS for Non-Public Networks | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑220942 | Implementation correction of CR1309 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑221048 | Update Figure: I.2.2.2.2-1 for consistent service operation names | Xiaomi Communication | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221267 | |||
S3‑220940 | Derivation of SUPI from default UE credentials | Ericsson, CableLabs, Intel, Qualcomm | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221111 | |||
S3‑220941 | Removing EN on UE being uniquely identifiable and verifiably secure | Ericsson, CableLabs, Intel, Qualcomm, Xiaomi | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221112 | |||
S3‑221017 | Discussion on usage of identifier during UE onboarding in SNPNs | Lenovo | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221020 | Resolving Editor’s Note related to UE onboarding | Lenovo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221195 | |||
S3‑221022 | Update to clause I.2.2.2.2 for Onboarding clarifications | Lenovo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221267 | |||
S3‑221170 | Configuration of Anonymous SUCI | Ericsson, Qualcomm | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220912 | |||
S3‑221195 | Resolving Editor’s Note related to UE onboarding | Lenovo, Xiaomi Communication | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑221020 | |||
S3‑221202 | Resolving Editor’s note on using only null-scheme SUCI | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑221002 | |||
S3‑221210 | Corrections and clarifications to secondary authentication during UE onboarding | Ericsson, Intel | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220939 | |||
S3‑221267 | UDM interaction for Anonymous SUCI | Ericsson, Lenovo, Xiaomi | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220913 | |||
S3‑221273 | Resolution of inconsistency in SUCI usage during UE onboarding. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑221011 | |||
4.10 | Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services (Rel-17) | S3‑220650 | LS on the impact of MSK update on MBS multicast session update procedure | C1-221747 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220611 | ||
S3‑220658 | LS on Clarification on MBS Security Context (MSK/MTK) Definitions | C4-222303 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | S3‑220619 | ||||
S3‑220958 | Reply LS on Clarification on MBS Security Context (MSK/MTK) Definitions | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221155 | |||
S3‑221155 | Reply LS on Clarification on MBS Security Context (MSK/MTK) Definitions | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220958 | |||
S3‑221145 | LS on Security architecture for 5G multicast/broadcast services | S4-220531 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑220871 | Reply LS on security architecture for 5G multicast-broadcast services | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221158 | |||
S3‑221146 | Response LS on Clarifications on Nmbstf_MBCDistributionSession service | S4-220575 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑221148 | Reply LS on secondary authentication for multicast PDU session | S2-2201311 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220675 | ||||
S3‑220923 | Removing EN on secondary authentication | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221247 | |||
S3‑220858 | Removing the Editor’s Note and add clarifications in the security mechanisms for MBS | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221247 | |||
S3‑220860 | Enhancement for service announcement | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221249 | |||
S3‑221135 | MBS capability exchange and delivery method | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220859 | Clarifications on the control-plane and user-plane procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221248 | |||
S3‑220870 | Clarifications on the multicast security context handling in session creation procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221253 | |||
S3‑220611 | LS on the impact of MSK update on MBS multicast session update procedure | C1-221747 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220650 | ||||
S3‑220619 | LS on Clarification on MBS Security Context (MSK/MTK) Definitions | C4-222303 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220658 | ||||
S3‑220636 | Reply LS on secondary authentication for multicast PDU session | S2-2201311 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220675 | ||||
S3‑220675 | Reply LS on secondary authentication for multicast PDU session | S2-2201311 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221148 | S3‑220636 | |||
S3‑221158 | Reply LS on security architecture for 5G multicast-broadcast services | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220871 | |||
S3‑221233 | Clarification on the NSWO in the UE side | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑221098 | |||
S3‑221234 | Removing the Ens on the SCP authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑221099 | |||
S3‑221247 | Removing the Editor’s Note and add clarifications in the security mechanisms for MBS | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220858 | |||
S3‑221248 | Clarifications on the control-plane and user-plane procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220859 | |||
S3‑221249 | Enhancement for service announcement | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220860 | |||
S3‑221253 | Clarifications on the multicast security context handling in session creation procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220870 | |||
S3‑221262 | Reply LS on Clarification on MBS Security Keys | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221154 | ||||
S3‑221153 | LS on Clarification on MBS Security Keys | C4-223302 | LS in | Information | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | ||||
S3‑221154 | Reply to: LS on Clarification on MBS Security Keys | Huawei | LS out | Approval | No |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221262 | |||
4.11 | Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC (Rel-17) | S3‑220652 | LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | C3-221735 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | S3‑220613 | ||
S3‑220653 | Reply LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | S6-220976 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220614 | ||||
S3‑220654 | Reply LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | S2-2203426 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220615 | ||||
S3‑220918 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221161 | |||
S3‑221080 | MEC - Reply LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval (C3-221735) | Apple | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221161 | |||
S3‑220676 | Reply LS to GSMA OPG on Further Operator Platform Group questions following SDO Workshop | SP-220346 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220637 | ||||
S3‑220677 | Reply LS on Further GSMA OPAG questions following SDO Workshop | S2-2201721 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220638 | ||||
S3‑220681 | Reply LS to ETSI MEC on MEC Federation and interest to collaborate | S6-220931 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220642 | ||||
S3‑220922 | Clarification of access token usage in EC | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221274 | |||
S3‑221120 | Clarification on selected EDGE authentication method indication | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221130 | Editorial corrections and technical clarifications | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221275 | S3‑220921 | ||
S3‑220613 | LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | C3-221735 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220652 | ||||
S3‑220614 | Reply LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | S6-220976 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220653 | ||||
S3‑220615 | Reply LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | S2-2203426 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220654 | ||||
S3‑220637 | Reply LS to GSMA OPG on Further Operator Platform Group questions following SDO Workshop | SP-220346 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220676 | ||||
S3‑220638 | Reply LS on Further GSMA OPAG questions following SDO Workshop | S2-2201721 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220677 | ||||
S3‑220642 | Reply LS to ETSI MEC on MEC Federation and interest to collaborate | S6-220931 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220681 | ||||
S3‑220921 | Editorial corrections and technical clarifications | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221130 | |||
S3‑221161 | Reply LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220918 | |||
S3‑221235 | Draft TR 33.739 0.1.0 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221274 | Clarification of access token usage in EC | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220922 | |||
S3‑221275 | Editorial corrections and technical clarifications | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑221130 | |||
4.12 | Non-seamless WLAN Offload in 5GS (Rel-17) | S3‑220655 | LS on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | S2-2203253 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | S3‑220616 | ||
S3‑220656 | Reply LS on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | C3-222487 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220617 | ||||
S3‑220657 | Reply LS on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | C4-222436 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220618 | ||||
S3‑220697 | LS reply on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221220 | |||
S3‑221019 | Draft LS on NSWO security | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220698 | NSWO alignment with SA2 specs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221216 | |||
S3‑221098 | Clarification on the NSWO in the UE side | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221233 | |||
S3‑220818 | Summary for Non-Seamless WLAN offload authentication in 5GS | Nokia Solutions & Networks (I) | WI summary | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221018 | NSWO security revisited | Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220616 | LS on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | S2-2203253 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220655 | ||||
S3‑220617 | Reply LS on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | C3-222487 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220656 | ||||
S3‑220618 | Reply LS on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | C4-222436 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220657 | ||||
S3‑221216 | NSWO alignment with SA2 specs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220698 | |||
S3‑221220 | LS reply on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220697 | |||
4.13 | Security Aspects of User Consent for 3GPP services (Rel-17) | S3‑220622 | Reply LS on NTN specific User Consent | R2-2201754 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220661 | ||
S3‑220661 | Reply LS on NTN specific User Consent | R2-2201754 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220622 | ||||
S3‑220864 | Address EN for UC3S | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220865 | Clarification on Enforcement Point for User Consent | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
4.14 | Srevice Based Architecture (Rel-15/16/17) | S3‑220724 | Clarification on separate handling of N32-c and N32-f | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Mavenir, Lenovo, Deutsche Telekom, NCSC, Xiaomi, BT, AT&T, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220589 | |
S3‑220725 | Clarification on separate handling of N32-c and N32-f | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Mavenir, Lenovo, Deutsche Telekom, NCSC, Xiaomi, BT, AT&T, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220590 | |||
S3‑220726 | Clarification on separate handling of N32-c and N32-f | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Mavenir, Lenovo, Deutsche Telekom, NCSC, Xiaomi, BT, AT&T, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220591 | |||
S3‑220728 | Authorization of N32-f connection establishment with TLS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221283 | |||
S3‑220729 | Authorization of N32-f connection establishment with TLS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221285 | |||
S3‑220731 | Resolving EN on authorization between SCPs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221234 | |||
S3‑221099 | Removing the Ens on the SCP authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221234 | |||
S3‑220765 | Adding authorization for delegated discovery | China Telecommunications | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220766 | Adding authorization for delegated discovery(mirror) | China Telecommunications | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220943 | Clarification on the certificate profile for SCP and SEPP | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220944 | SEPP interconnect certificate profile | Ericsson | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220945 | Clarification on CN-ID when it is presented in the certificate | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221211 | |||
S3‑220946 | Clarification on CN-ID when it is presented in the certificate | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221212 | |||
S3‑220947 | Clarification on the format of callback URI in the NF certificate profile | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220948 | Clarification on the format of callback URI in the NF certificate profile | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220949 | Clarification on access token requests for NF Producers of a specific NF type and token-based authorization for indirect communication with delegated discovery | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220950 | Clarification on access token requests for NF Producers of a specific NF type and token-based authorization for indirect communication with delegated discovery | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220952 | LS on PLMN ID used in Roaming Scenarios | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221214 | |||
S3‑220951 | SEPP to include and verify the source PLMN-ID | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Mavenir | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221213 | |||
S3‑220953 | SEPP handling of PLMN-ID in Roaming scenarios for PLMNs supporting more than on PLMN-ID | Ericsson | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220954 | Clarification of SNI usage for NF clients and servers | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221100 | Clarification on IV usage on N32-f protection-R15 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221101 | Clarification on IV usage on N32-f protection-R16 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221102 | Clarification on IV usage on N32-f protection-R17 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221103 | Clarification on handling of the incoming N32-f message in the pSEPP side – R15 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221104 | Clarification on handling of the incoming N32-f message in the pSEPP side – R16 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221105 | Clarification on handling of the incoming N32-f message in the pSEPP side – R17 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221131 | Verification of NSSAIs for preventing slice attack | CableLabs, Ericsson,Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220468 | |||
S3‑221133 | Checking S-NSSAI against authoritative information source | CableLabs,Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221108 | CableLabs, Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CableLabs | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑221163 | LS on handling of the modification policy in the IPX and receiving SEPP | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221211 | Clarification on CN-ID when it is presented in the certificate | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220945 | |||
S3‑221212 | Clarification on CN-ID when it is presented in the certificate | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220946 | |||
S3‑221213 | SEPP to include and verify the source PLMN-ID | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Mavenir | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220951 | |||
S3‑221214 | LS on PLMN ID used in Roaming Scenarios | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220952 | |||
S3‑221283 | Clarification on N32-f connection establishment with TLS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220728 | |||
S3‑221285 | Clarification on N32-f connection establishment with TLS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220729 | |||
4.15 | Security Assurance -All NFs (Rel-15/16/17) | S3‑220749 | Correction on clause F.2.1 in TS 33.926-R16 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑220750 | Correction on clause F.2.1 in TS 33.926-R17 mirror | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑220751 | Update the test case in TS 33.216 clause 4.2.2.1.10 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220875 | Delete Use Case on Finding the right NF instance are serving the UE | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑220876 | Delete Threat Analysis on Finding the right NF instance are serving the UE | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
4.16 | Rel-15/16/17 maintenance (All topics) | S3‑220659 | LS on Indication of Network Assisted Positioning method | C4-222306 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | S3‑220620 | ||
S3‑220872 | Reply LS on the Indication of Network Assisted Positioning method | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221254 | |||
S3‑220699 | LS reply on High-reliability requirement of UAV | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221254 | |||
S3‑220985 | Reply LS on Indication of Network Assisted Positioning method | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221254 | |||
S3‑220700 | High-reliability requirement of UAV | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220984 | Clarification on ‘high reliability’ location information | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221192 | |||
S3‑220803 | Address EN on UAV ID | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220979 | Resolving the EN on CAA level ID during UUAA procedures | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220804 | Address EN on UAV re-auth | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221173 | |||
S3‑220964 | Resolving of EN in Clause 5.2.1.4 UUAA re-authentication procedure | Lenovo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221173 | |||
S3‑220980 | Resolving the ENs related to re-authentication | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221173 | |||
S3‑220960 | Correction to Clause 5.2.1.5 UUAA Revocation | Lenovo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221193 | |||
S3‑220961 | Correction to Clause 5.2.2.4 UUAA Revocation | Lenovo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221194 | |||
S3‑220977 | Adding terms and abbreviations | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑220978 | Adding text for the Overview clause | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221197 | |||
S3‑220981 | Resolving the ENs on CAA level ID during revocation | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220982 | Removing EN on USS authorisation | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑220983 | Removing EN on TPAE | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑220986 | Resolving the ENs on protection of UAS data | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221198 | |||
S3‑220693 | Aligning text for AKMA procedure | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑220694 | Clarification on anonymization api | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221215 | |||
S3‑220752 | Correct AAnF service in clause 6.3 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221227 | |||
S3‑220753 | NF selects AAnF in clause 6.7 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221228 | |||
S3‑220770 | Clarification on the description about AAnF | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221203 | |||
S3‑220807 | AAnF sending GPSI to internal AKMA AF | China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220805 | Issue of NSSAA in multiple registration | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220806 | Include SN ID in NSSAA procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221088 | editorial changes of ENSI | Huawei,HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑221089 | mirror-editorial changes of ENSI | Huawei,HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑220861 | Alignment with RAN2 for LTE UP IP | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220862 | Address EN for LTE UP IP | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221298 | |||
S3‑220959 | UP IP: mapping of EPS integrity algorithm to NR integrity algorithm | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221177 | |||
S3‑221143 | Avoid linkage between security functions and UE Radio Access Capabilities | VODAFONE | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221298 | |||
S3‑221298 | Avoid linkage between security functions and UE Radio Access Capabilities | VODAFONE | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑221143 | |||
S3‑220962 | Clarification to multiple registrations in different PLMNs | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220963 | Clarification to multiple registrations in different PLMNs | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221132 | Discussion on security procedure during registration procedure over two different PLMN | NEC Corporation | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221134 | Update to NAS security context procedure when UE is registering over two different PLMNs | NEC Corporation | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220685 | Clarifications to secondary authentication PDU Session Container | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | CR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221291 | ||||
S3‑221291 | Clarifications to secondary authentication PDU Session Container | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | CR | - | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220685 | |||
S3‑220686 | Clarifications to secondary authentication PDU Session Container | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | CR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221292 | ||||
S3‑221292 | Clarifications to secondary authentication PDU Session Container | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | CR | - | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220686 | |||
S3‑220687 | Clarifications to secondary authentication PDU Session Container | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | CR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221293 | ||||
S3‑221293 | Clarifications to secondary authentication PDU Session Container | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | CR | - | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220687 | |||
S3‑220991 | Discussion on Ua security protocol identifier for PSK TLS 1.3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220317 | |||
S3‑220992 | Adding a Note about the new Ua security protocol identifier for TLS 1.3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221199 | S3‑220318 | ||
S3‑220993 | Adding a new Ua security protocol identifier for TLS 1.3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220319 | |||
S3‑220695 | UPU procedure alignment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220696 | UPU procedure alignment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220849 | Rel-16 Add clarifications to unicast procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑220873 | Rel-17 Add clarifications to unicast procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑220647 | LS on ETSI Plugtest #6 Observation 10.1.11 | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220917 | Updates to 33.434 for CoAP usage | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑220935 | Editorial correction and clarification to 33.501 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑221119 | [SBA] CR to update NF profile for inter-slice access | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑220643 | CR on Modernization of the Integrity & Encryption Algorithms between UE and P-CSFC | Deutsche Telekom AG | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221076 | CR - 33501 - Clarification on Fast re-authentication | Apple | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221077 | CR - 33501 - Clarification on the NAS COUNT for KeNB derivation | Apple | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221144 | E1 interface security requirements | VODAFONE | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑220620 | LS on Indication of Network Assisted Positioning method | C4-222306 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220659 | ||||
S3‑220646 | DP on Modernization of the Integrity & Encryption Algorithms between UE and P-CSFC (for SIP Sessions). | Deutsche Telekom AG | discussion | Discussion | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑221173 | Resolving of EN in Clause 5.2.1.4 UUAA re-authentication procedure | Lenovo, Huawei HiSilicon, Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220964 | |||
S3‑221177 | UP IP: mapping of EPS integrity algorithm to NR integrity algorithm | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220959 | |||
S3‑221192 | Clarification on ‘high reliability’ location information | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220984 | |||
S3‑221193 | Correction to Clause 5.2.1.5 UUAA Revocation | Lenovo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220960 | |||
S3‑221194 | Correction to Clause 5.2.2.4 UUAA Revocation | Lenovo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220961 | |||
S3‑221197 | Adding text for the Overview clause | Qualcomm Incorporated, Lenovo | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220978 | |||
S3‑221198 | Resolving the ENs on protection of UAS data | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220986 | |||
S3‑221199 | Adding a Note about the new Ua security protocol identifier for TLS 1.3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220992 | |||
S3‑221203 | Clarification on the description about AAnF | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220770 | |||
S3‑221215 | Clarification on anonymization api | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220694 | |||
S3‑221227 | Correct AAnF service in clause 6.3 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220752 | |||
S3‑221228 | NF selects AAnF in clause 6.7 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220753 | |||
5 | Studies areas |   | ||||||||||
5.1 | Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations | S3‑221072 | 5GFBS - Conclusion for solution#17 | Apple. Ericsson, Intel, Nokia, Deutsche Telekom, CableLabs, LGE, OPPO, Xiaomi, Huawei, NIST, Telecom Italia, AT&T | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesThe Chair declared this document as a Working agreement, having recorded Ericsson's objection in the present report.
| approved | No | ||
S3‑221073 | 5GFBS - Draft LS to RAN plenary on the conlcusion of solution#17 | Apple | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221075 | 5GFBS - Security risk in lower layers | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220710 | Addressing the editor’s note in 6.27.2.1.1 of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220711 | Addressing the editor’s note in 6.27.2.1.7 of sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220712 | Addressing the editor’s note in 6.27.2.2.1of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220713 | Addressing the editor’s note #1 in 6.27.2.2.4 of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220714 | Addressing the editor’s note #2 in 6.27.2.2.4 of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220715 | Removing incorrect texts in 6.27.2.2.4 of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220716 | Removing redundant texts in 6.27.2.2.4 of Sol# | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220717 | Removing unrelated texts in 6.27.2.2.4 of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220718 | LS out on authenticity and replay protection of system information | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220792 | Update to solution #25 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220793 | Evaluation of solution #4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220794 | Conclusion for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221084 | Detection of MitM attacks with secret paging | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221266 | TR 33.809 | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.2 | Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation | S3‑220705 | Evaluation of Solution #5 | Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, CISA ECD | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑220866 | Update for solution 5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221250 | |||
S3‑220898 | Adding evaluation for Sol#6 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220976 | Adding conclusions and recommendations related to KI#13 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221087 | corrections on measurements flow of solution#5 | Huawei,HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221115 | KI#27 update - requirements | MITRE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221190 | |||
S3‑221190 | KI#27 update - requirements | MITRE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221115 | |||
S3‑221250 | Update for solution 5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220866 | |||
5.3 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS | S3‑220754 | Key issue on authorization in multi-path transmission for UE-to-Network Relay scenario | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑220755 | Key issue on authorization in the UE-to-UE relay scenario | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220756 | Key issue on Integrity and confidentiality of information over the UE-to-UE Relay | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220757 | Key issue on Privacy of information over the UE-to-UE Relay | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220758 | Key issue on Support direct communication path switching between PC5 and Uu | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221114 | New Key Issue on UE-to-UE Relay Trust Model | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221116 | New KI: Remote UE Security Establishment via UE-to-UE Relay | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
5.4 | Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture | S3‑220727 | Security improvements of N32 connection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑220932 | Update to KI on roaming hub | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220933 | Requirement to KI on roaming hub | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221287 | |||
S3‑221287 | Requirement to KI on roaming hub | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220933 | |||
S3‑220931 | Trust in SEPP deployment scenarios | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221136 | New KI for Authentication of PLMNs over IPX | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220955 | New KI, NRF validation of NFc for access token requests | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221096 | Update of Solution #12 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221232 | |||
S3‑221097 | Update of Solution #9 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220730 | Resolution EN authorization method negotiation per KI7-Sol9 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220732 | New sol. for KI7 on authorization mechanism negotiation | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220733 | Conclusion on authorization method negotiation | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220910 | Rapporteur update to TR 33.875 | Nokia | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑221232 | Update of Solution #12 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221096 | |||
S3‑221280 | TR 33.875-120 | Nokia UK | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
5.5 | Study on enhanced security for network slicing Phase 2 | S3‑221051 | eNS2_Sec: Solution #1 update | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑220795 | KI#2 update - threats and requirements | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221181 | |||
S3‑220796 | New solution for part 1 of KI#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220797 | New solution for part 2 of KI#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220798 | Conclusion for part 2 of KI#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221184 | |||
S3‑221164 | LS to SA2 on NSAC | Huawei Technologies R&D UK | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑221181 | KI#2 update - threats and requirements | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220795 | |||
S3‑221184 | Conclusion for part 2 of KI#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220798 | |||
S3‑221187 | draft TR 33.874 | Huawei Technologies R&D UK | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑221300 | Coversheet TR 33.874 | Huawei | TS or TR cover | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.6 | Study on privacy of identifiers over radio access | S3‑220701 | New content for Terms clause on key properties of privacy | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑220702 | TR 33.870 – Informative Annex A | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220645 | DP on Post-Quantum Secure Subscription Concealed Identifier | Deutsche Telekom AG | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220644 | New KI on Post-Quantum Secure Subscription Concealed Identifier | Deutsche Telekom AG | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220911 | New key issue on SUPI length disclosed by SUCI | Ericsson, Apple, AT&T, Cable Labs, China Southern Power Grid Co, Convida Wireless LLC, Intel, Interdigital, Johns Hopkins University APL, Lenovo, LGE, Mavenir, MITRE, NCSC, Oppo, Phillips, Samsung, Telefonica, US NIST, US NSA, Verizon Wireless, Xiaomi, ZT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221180 | |||
S3‑221078 | IDPrvc - Security issue on C-RNTI | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220703 | New key issue on TMGI Privacy | InterDigital, Inc., Convida | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220704 | New key issue on PIN ID Privacy | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220759 | New solution on key issue SUPI length disclosed by SUCI. | China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd, ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221180 | New key issue on SUPI length disclosed by SUCI | Ericsson, Apple, AT&T, Cable Labs, China Southern Power Grid Co, Convida Wireless LLC, Intel, Interdigital, Johns Hopkins University APL, Lenovo, LGE, Mavenir, MITRE, NCSC, Oppo, Phillips, Samsung, Telefonica, US NIST, US NSA, Verizon Wireless, Xiaomi, ZT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220911 | |||
S3‑221290 | TR 33.870-020 | Interdigital | draft TR | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.7 | Study on Standardising Automated Certificate Management in SBA | S3‑220823 | New KI for security of certificate update | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221236 | |
S3‑220824 | New KI for Security protection of certificate enrolment | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221237 | |||
S3‑220919 | A new key issue for single automated certificate management protocol and procedures | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221277 | |||
S3‑220928 | Key issue on CMPv2 adoption and initial NF trust during certificate enrolment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221237 | |||
S3‑220920 | A new key issue for the relation between NF lifecycle and certificate lifecycle | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221278 | |||
S3‑220925 | Key issue on Relation between NF and Certificate lifecycle management | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221278 | |||
S3‑220924 | Update of the introduction and scope of TR 33.876 skeleton | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220927 | Key issue on Multiple certificates to be associated with a Network Function | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221223 | |||
S3‑221046 | Key Issue on Trust Chain of Certificate Authority Hierarchy | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221204 | |||
S3‑220926 | Key issue on Network Function instances identifiers | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221224 | |||
S3‑220929 | Key issue on Certificates revocation procedures | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221225 | |||
S3‑220930 | Key issue on Automated certificate management for Network Slicing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221226 | |||
S3‑221204 | Key Issue on Trust Chain of Certificate Authority Hierarchy | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221046 | |||
S3‑221223 | Key issue on Multiple certificates to be associated with a Network Function | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220927 | |||
S3‑221224 | Key issue on Network Function instances identifiers | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220926 | |||
S3‑221225 | Key issue on Certificates revocation procedures | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220929 | |||
S3‑221226 | Key issue on Automated certificate management for Network Slicing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220930 | |||
S3‑221236 | New KI for security of certificate update | Huawei, HiSilicon, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220823 | |||
S3‑221237 | New KI for Security protection of NF certificate enrolment | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220824 | |||
S3‑221270 | Draft TR 33.876 Study on Standardising Automated Certificate Management in SBA | Nokia Poland | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221277 | A new key issue for single automated certificate management protocol and procedures | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220919 | |||
S3‑221278 | A new key issue for the relation between NF lifecycle and certificate lifecycle | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220920 | |||
5.8 | New SID on AKMA phase 2 | S3‑220810 | Skeleton for TR 33.737(AKMA ph2) | China Mobile | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑220811 | Scope of TR 33.737 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221288 | |||
S3‑220812 | Architectural Asumptions in TR 33.737 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220813 | Key issue of AKMA roaming | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221218 | |||
S3‑220901 | Key issue on AKMA Roaming Scenario | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221218 | |||
S3‑221057 | New key issue on AKMA application key request in home routed and local-breakout scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221218 | |||
S3‑221058 | New key issue on Secure AAnF service request in roaming scenarios of AKMA | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221059 | New key issue on secure architecture for roaming scenarios in AKMA | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221122 | New Key Issue on AKMA Roaming | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221218 | |||
S3‑221123 | New solution on AKMA Roaming | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221124 | New solution on pushing AKMA context to visited PLMN | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220814 | Key issue of introducing application proxy into AKMA | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221289 | |||
S3‑220902 | KI on AP function introduction | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221289 | |||
S3‑221052 | New key issue on authentication proxy architecture for AKMA | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221289 | |||
S3‑221053 | New key issue on protecting application servers with different security requirements | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221054 | New key issue on secure AKMA application key request in AKMA supporting authentication proxy | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221289 | |||
S3‑221055 | New key issue on secure authorization for AKMA supporting authentication proxy | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221056 | New key issue on secure identification of authentication proxy and application server in AKMA scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221079 | AKMA - New key issue of introducing AP to AKMA architecture | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221289 | |||
S3‑220760 | Discussion paper on AKMA application context removal. | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220761 | Discussion paper on AKMA interworking | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220762 | New KI on AKMA interworking | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220897 | New KI AKMA Kaf refresh | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221219 | |||
S3‑220899 | New solution Security procedure of KAF refresh-MAC | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220900 | New solution Security procedure of KAF refresh-Counter | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220906 | New solution Security procedure of KAF-Nonce | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221169 | draft TR 33.737 | China Mobile | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221218 | Key issue on AKMA Roaming Scenario | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CMCC, Lenovo, Xiaomi, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220901 | |||
S3‑221288 | Scope of TR 33.737 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220811 | |||
S3‑221289 | Key issue of introducing application proxy into AKMA | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220814 | |||
5.9 | New Study of Security aspect of home network triggered primary authentication | S3‑220831 | Skeleton of HNTRA | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑220832 | Scope of HNTRA | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220833 | Adding a usecase of interworking from EPS to 5G | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221205 | |||
S3‑221045 | New Use Case for Security of Interworking | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221205 | |||
S3‑220819 | A use case of HONTRA in SoR protection service suspension | LG Electronics France | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221261 | |||
S3‑220821 | A use case of HONTRA in UPU protection service suspension | LG Electronics France | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221261 | |||
S3‑221043 | New Use Case for Continuity of Steering of Roaming Service Delivery | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221261 | |||
S3‑221044 | New Use Case for Continuity of UE Parameters Update Service Delivery | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221261 | |||
S3‑220892 | Adding a usecase of SoR Counter Wrap around | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221261 | |||
S3‑220835 | Adding a usecase of Kakma refresh | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221240 | |||
S3‑220708 | New KI on Home network triggered primary authentication | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221239 | |||
S3‑220822 | A Key issue in UPU protection service suspension | LG Electronics France | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221239 | |||
S3‑220820 | A Key issue in SoR protection service suspension | LG Electronics France | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221239 | |||
S3‑221083 | HN-auth-NAS based HN triggered authentication | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220834 | KI on Scalability of the home triggered primary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221239 | |||
S3‑221126 | New Solution on UDM initiated re-authentication based on AUSF request | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220904 | Key issue on HN triggering primary reauthentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221239 | |||
S3‑221127 | New solution on HN initiated re-authentication via AUSF | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220905 | Reauthentication during the handover | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221239 | |||
S3‑221128 | New solution on UDM triggered key update procecdure based on AAnF request | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221041 | Key Issue on Refresh of Long Lived Key KAUSF | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221239 | |||
S3‑221129 | New solution on UPU based re-authentication procedure | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221042 | Key Issue on Security of Interworking | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221239 | |||
S3‑221125 | New Key issue on HN initiated Re-authentication | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221239 | |||
S3‑220836 | KI on Signalling overhead | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221219 | |||
S3‑220903 | Key issue on KAF refresh without primary reauthentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221219 | |||
S3‑221093 | Adding a key issue of Multiple registrations | Huawei,HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221205 | New Use Case for Security of Interworking | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221045 | |||
S3‑221219 | Key issue on KAF refresh without primary reauthentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon, OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220903 | |||
S3‑221239 | KI on Scalability of the home triggered primary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon, China telecom, LG Electronics, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220834 | |||
S3‑221240 | Adding a usecase of Kakma refresh | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220835 | |||
S3‑221261 | Adding a usecase of SoR Counter Wrap around | Huawei, HiSilicon, LG Electronics France, Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220892 | |||
S3‑221264 | TR 33.741 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
5.10 | New Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation for 5G - phase 3 | S3‑220771 | draft_TR_33.738- skeleton for eNA security ph3 | China Mobile | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑220772 | Scope of TR 33.738 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220773 | Overview of TR 33.738 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220720 | Key issue on Security for data and analytics exchange in roaming | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221269 | |||
S3‑220738 | New KI on Topology Hiding in Data and Analytics Exchange | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221269 | |||
S3‑220774 | KI on Protection of data and analytics exchange in roaming case | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221269 | |||
S3‑220740 | New KI on authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221176 | |||
S3‑220721 | Key issue on Security for AIML model storage | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221221 | |||
S3‑220722 | Key issue on Security for AIML model sharing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221221 | |||
S3‑220723 | Key issue on Anomalous NF behaviour detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221222 | |||
S3‑221176 | New KI on authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220740 | |||
S3‑221221 | Key issue on Security for AIML model sharing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220722 | |||
S3‑221222 | Key issue on Anomalous NF behaviour detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220723 | |||
S3‑221269 | KI on Protection of data and analytics exchange in roaming case | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220774 | |||
S3‑221279 | Draft TR 33.738 | CMCC | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
5.11 | New Study on Security Enhancement of support for Edge Computing — phase 2 | S3‑220763 | Key issue on security of EAS Discovery Procedure with EASDF | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑220877 | new KI on Authentication and Authorization when EHE in a VPLMN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220878 | New KI on Security for DNS server IP address | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221191 | |||
S3‑220907 | New KI Edge algorithm selection | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221186 | |||
S3‑221060 | New key issue on authentication and authorization problem for the EEC hosted in the roaming UE | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221191 | |||
S3‑220908 | New solution Authentication algorithm selection in EDGE | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220909 | New solution Authentication algorithm selection among EEC, ECS, and EES | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221094 | The Scope of the FS_EDGE_Ph2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221095 | The Skeleton of the FS_EDGE_Ph2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221186 | New KI Edge algorithm selection | OPPO, CMCC, vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑220907 | |||
S3‑221191 | New key issue on authentication and authorization problem for the EEC hosted in the roaming UE | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221060 | |||
6 | New Study/Work item proposals | S3‑220709 | New SID on Personal IoT Networks Security Aspects | vivo, Apple, ZTE, Xiaomi, CATT, OPPO, China Unicom, China Telecom, CableLabs, InterDigital, LGE, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Motorola mobility, Philips | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221265 | S3‑220133 |
S3‑220719 | New SID: Study on SNAAPP securitY | NTT DOCOMO INC. | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221179 | |||
S3‑220764 | Revised SID on AKMA phase2 | ZTE Corporation | SID revised | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220791 | New SID on Study on XR Security | China Mobile | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220801 | Discussion on Rel-18 study for network slicing security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, CATT, CAICT, China Mobile, China Unicom, InterDigital, NEC, Nokia | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220802 | New SID: Rel-18 study for network slicing security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, CATT, CAICT, China Mobile, China Unicom, InterDigital, NEC, Nokia | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221178 | |||
S3‑220853 | New WID on Security aspects of 5G Isolated operation for public safety (IOPS) | Huawei, HiSilicon | WID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220854 | Discussion paper on 5G IOPS | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220856 | New SID on security enhancements for 5G multicast-broadcast services Phase 2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221246 | |||
S3‑220857 | New SID on security enhancements for 5GC LoCation Services Phase 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220884 | Discussion paper on security enhancements for 5GC LoCation Services Phase 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220867 | New SID on Enhancement of User Consent for 3GPP Services | Huawei, HiSilicon | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221251 | |||
S3‑220895 | New SID on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2 | Nokia Solutions & Networks (I) | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221217 | |||
S3‑220896 | Discussion on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2 | Nokia Solutions & Networks (I) | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑220956 | New SID on security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2 | Ericsson, CableLabs, InterDigital, Intel, Xiaomi, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE, China Mobile, LGE, Philips, Lenovo, Samsung | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑220957 | Skeleton for proposed FS_eNPN_Ph2_SEC | Ericsson | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑220975 | Discussion for Study on Zero Trust Security | Lenovo | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221004 | Study on Zero Trust Security | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Interdigital, Verizon, Cablelabs, Mavenir, Johns Hopkins University APL, LG Electronics, Telefonica, NEC, Telia Company, AT&T, Samsung, PCCW Global B.V, China Mobile, Motorola Solutions, Inc, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel, N | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221172 | |||
S3‑220987 | New Study on security of architecture enhancement for UAV and UAM | Qualcomm Incorporated | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221200 | |||
S3‑221021 | Draft skeleton of TR 33.740 | CATT | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221023 | New SID on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning | Xiaomi, Apple, China Mobile, CATT, Huawei, Hisilicon, InterDigital, LGE, Philips, vivo, ZTE, Lenovo, Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Telecom | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221209 | |||
S3‑221024 | New SID on Security Aspects of Satellite Access | Xiaomi, China Mobile, China Telecom | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221062 | New SID on the security aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) for the NR Air Interface and NG-RAN | Ericsson | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221276 | |||
S3‑221065 | New WID on IETF OSCORE Ua* protocol profile for AKMA | Ericsson | WID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221066 | IETF OSCORE as AKMA Ua* protocol | Ericsson, DT | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221067 | Extending the Ua security protocol namespace to include the AKMA OSCORE Ua* protocol | Ericsson, DT | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑221068 | 5G registration via trusted non-3GPP access after NSWO authentication | Lenovo | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221069 | New Study to enable 5G registration via trusted non-3GPP access after NSWO Authentication (FS_5GRTN3) | Lenovo | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221070 | Study to enable URSP rules to securely identify applications | Lenovo | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221071 | New Study to enable URSP rules to securely identify Applications (FS_USIA) | Lenovo, AT&T, Broadcom, CableLabs, CATT, China Mobile, China Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Intel, LG Electronics, Motorola Solutions MSI, NEC, PCCW Global B.V., Verizon, Xiaomi | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑221074 | 5GFBS - new WID on 5GFBS | Apple, US National Security Agency, AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon, CableLabs, Intel, InterDigital, Johns Hopkins University APL, NIST, Xiaomi, OPPO | WID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221185 | |||
S3‑221085 | Discussion on security aspects of NGRTC | Huawei,HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221086 | New SID on NGRTC | Huawei,HiSilicon | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221229 | |||
S3‑221113 | New SID on Security and Privacy of AI/ML-based services and applications in 5G | OPPO, Apple, vivo, Inter Digital, China Mobile, Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221188 | |||
S3‑221117 | Need for Rel-18 study on UP security enhancement | Samsung, CableLabs, Interdigital | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221118 | New SID on 5G User plane security enhancements | Samsung | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221121 | New SID on security aspects of control plane based remote provisioning in Non-Public Networks | Samsung | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221165 | LS on TNAP mobility security aspect | Nokia Solutions & Networks (I) | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221172 | Study on Zero Trust Security | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Interdigital, Verizon, Cablelabs, Mavenir, Johns Hopkins University APL, LG Electronics, Telefonica, NEC, Telia Company, AT&T, Samsung, PCCW Global B.V, China Mobile, Motorola Solutions, Inc, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel,.. | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑221004 | |||
S3‑221178 | Rel-18 study for network slicing security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, CATT, CAICT, China Mobile, China Unicom, InterDigital, NEC, Nokia, Deutsche Telekom, ZTE | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220802 | |||
S3‑221179 | New SID: Study on SNAAPP securitY | NTT DOCOMO INC. | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220719 | |||
S3‑221185 | 5GFBS - new WID on 5GFBS | Apple, US National Security Agency, AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon, CableLabs, Intel, InterDigital, Johns Hopkins University APL, NIST, Xiaomi, OPPO, ZTE | WID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑221074 | |||
S3‑221188 | New SID on Security and Privacy of AI/ML-based services and applications in 5G | OPPO, Apple, vivo, Inter Digital, China Mobile, Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑221113 | |||
S3‑221200 | New Study on on Security for Phase 2 for UAS, UAV and UAM | Qualcomm Incorporated | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220987 | |||
S3‑221209 | New SID on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning | Xiaomi, Apple, China Mobile, CATT, Huawei, Hisilicon, InterDigital, LGE, Philips, vivo, ZTE, Lenovo, Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Telecom | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑221023 | |||
S3‑221217 | New SID on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2 | Nokia Solutions & Networks (I) | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220895 | |||
S3‑221229 | New SID on NGRTC | Huawei,HiSilicon | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑221086 | |||
S3‑221246 | New SID on security enhancements for 5G multicast-broadcast services Phase 2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220856 | |||
S3‑221251 | New SID on Enhancement of User Consent for 3GPP Services | Huawei, HiSilicon | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220867 | |||
S3‑221265 | New SID on Personal IoT Networks Security Aspects | vivo, Apple, ZTE, Xiaomi, CATT, OPPO, China Unicom, China Telecom, CableLabs, InterDigital, LGE, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Motorola mobility, Philips, China Mobile, Qualcomm | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑220709 | |||
S3‑221276 | New SID on the security aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) for the NR Air Interface and NG-RAN | Ericsson | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑221062 | |||
7 | CVD and research | S3‑220600 | Reserved | -- | CR | Agreement | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
8 | Any Other Business | S3‑220607 | Meeting calendar | WG Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑220684 | ||
S3‑220684 | Meeting calendar | WG Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑220607 |