Tdoc List
2022-07-08 14:27
Agenda | Topic | TDoc | Title | Source | Type | For | Avail | Treated | Decision | Wdrn | Replaced-by | Replaces |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Agenda and Meeting Objectives | S3‑221310 | Agenda | SA WG3 Chair | agenda | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑221311 | Process for SA3#107e meeting | SA WG3 Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑221312 | Process and agenda for SA3#107e | SA WG3 Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
2 | Meeting Reports |   | ||||||||||
3 | Reports and Liaisons from other Groups (related to studies in the agenda) | S3‑221315 | LS on user’s consent for EDGEAPP | C3-223780 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑221476 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on user’s consent for EDGEAPP | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221420 | Reply LS on User Consent for EDGEAPP | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221317 | LS on V2X PC5 link for unicast communication with null security algorithm | R5-222035 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑221405 | Reply LS about V2X PC5 unicast link with null security algorithm | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221590 | |||
S3‑221535 | DRAFT Reply LS on V2X PC5 link for unicast communication with null security algorithm | Lenovo | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221590 | ||||
S3‑221584 | Null algorithm is not security deactivation | Lenovo | draftCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑221393 | Reply LS on Clarification on MBS Security Keys | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221665 | |||
S3‑221316 | LS to 3GPP CT4 on Identification of source PLMN-ID in SBA | GSMA | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑221536 | Null algorithm is not security deactivation | Lenovo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑221590 | Reply LS on V2X PC5 link for unicast communication with null security algorithm | Lenovo | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221535 | ||||
S3‑221665 | Reply LS on Clarification on MBS Security Keys | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221393 | |||
S3‑221587 | Reply LS on V2X PC5 link for unicast communication with null security algorithm | C1-223972 | LS in | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | ||||
4 | Work areas (No normative work included in this meeting) |   | ||||||||||
5 | Studies areas |   | ||||||||||
5.1 | Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations | S3‑221364 | Addressing the editor’s note in 6.27.2.1.1 of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑221366 | Addressing EN on NR Repeater in 6.27.2.2.4 of Sol#27 | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221368 | Addressing the editor’s note in 6.27.2.2.1of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221370 | LS out on authenticity and replay protection of system information | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V., Ericsson, InterDigital, Apple, Johns Hopkins University APL, NIST | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221612 | |||
S3‑221371 | Evaluation of solution #4 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Ericsson, Apple, Philips | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221464 | 5GFBS - Security risk in lower layers | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221572 | Detection of MitM attacks with secret paging | Lenovo | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑221612 | LS out on authenticity and replay protection of system information | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V., Ericsson, InterDigital, Apple, Johns Hopkins University APL, NIST, Huawei, Nokia, Samsung, Intel | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221700 | S3‑221370 | ||
S3‑221700 | LS out on authenticity and replay protection of system information | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V., Ericsson, InterDigital, Apple, Johns Hopkins University APL, NIST, Huawei, Nokia, Samsung, Intel | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221612 | |||
5.2 | Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation | S3‑221318 | Solution 5 EN on Certificates and Tokens | U.S. National Security Agency | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221648 | ||
S3‑221337 | Updates to Solution #5 | Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, CISA ECD | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221701 | |||
S3‑221701 | Updates to Solution #5 | Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, CISA ECD | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221337 | |||
S3‑221338 | Address EN on Run-time Attestation | Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, CISA ECD | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221702 | |||
S3‑221702 | Address EN on Run-time Attestation | Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, CISA ECD | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221338 | |||
S3‑221339 | Remove EN in clause 6.6.3.4 | Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, CISA ECD | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221392 | Update of KI #3 to contribute an EN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221689 | |||
S3‑221404 | evaluation on solution 5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221670 | |||
S3‑221485 | New solution on boot time attestation at 3GPP function level | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221486 | New solution on trust domain and slice Isolation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221648 | Solution 5 EN on Certificates and Tokens | U.S. National Security Agency | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221318 | ||||
S3‑221670 | evaluation on solution 5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221404 | |||
S3‑221689 | Update of KI #3 to contribute an EN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221392 | |||
S3‑221692 | TR 33 848 v0_13_0 | BT plc | draft TR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.3 | Study on Security Aspects of Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 2 | S3‑221330 | Key issue on Privacy protection over the UE-to-UE Relay | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221677 | |
S3‑221331 | Key Issue on Authorization in the UE-to-UE Relay Scenario | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221608 | |||
S3‑221332 | Key Issue on Security of UE-to-UE Relay | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221609 | |||
S3‑221383 | Integrity and confidentiality of information over the UE-to-UE Relay | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221609 | |||
S3‑221406 | New Key Issue on security of ProSe groupcast communications | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221418 | Authorization in the UE-to-UE relay scenario | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221608 | |||
S3‑221419 | Privacy of information over the UE-to-UE Relay | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221677 | |||
S3‑221421 | Key issue on Authorization in the UE-to-UE relay scenario | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221608 | |||
S3‑221422 | Key issue on Integrity and confidentiality of information over the UE-to-UE | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221609 | |||
S3‑221423 | Key issue on Secondary authentication of Remote UE via L3 UE-to-Network relay without N3IWF | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221426 | Key issue on authorization in multi-path transmission for UE-to-Network Relay scenario | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221427 | Key issue on authorization in the UE-to-UE relay scenario | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221608 | |||
S3‑221428 | Key issue on Integrity and confidentiality of information over the UE-to-UE Relay | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221609 | |||
S3‑221429 | Key issue on Privacy of information over the UE-to-UE Relay | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221677 | |||
S3‑221430 | Key issue on Support direct communication path switching between PC5 and Uu | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221446 | Key issue on UE Identity protection during UE-to-UE relay discovery | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221693 | |||
S3‑221447 | Key issue on Privacy protection over the UE-to-UE Relay | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221677 | |||
S3‑221491 | pCR to TR33.740 Key Issue on Integrity and confidentiality of information over the UE-to-UE Relay | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221609 | |||
S3‑221495 | pCR to TR33.740 Key Issue on Authorization in the UE-to-UE relay scenario | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221608 | |||
S3‑221496 | pCR to TR33.740 Key Issue on Privacy of information over the UE-to-UE Relay | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221677 | |||
S3‑221503 | Remote UE Security Establishment via U2U Relay | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221609 | |||
S3‑221505 | U2U Relay Trust Model | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221699 | |||
S3‑221699 | U2U Relay Trust Model | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑221505 | |||
S3‑221519 | New Key Issue: Security for UE-to-UE Relay discovery | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221693 | |||
S3‑221548 | Key Issue on Security for UE-to-UE Relay Discovery | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221693 | |||
S3‑221549 | Key Issue on Security of UE-to-UE Relay Communication | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221609 | |||
S3‑221425 | Add context to the architecture clause | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221640 | |||
S3‑221489 | pCR to TR33.740 Clause Introduction and Scope | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221490 | pCR to TR 33.740 Clause 4 Security Aspects of 5G ProSe | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221640 | |||
S3‑221608 | Key Issue on Authorization in the UE-to-UE Relay Scenario | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd., Huawei, HiSilicon, China Telecomunication, ZTE, CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221331 | |||
S3‑221609 | Key Issue on Security of UE-to-UE Relay | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd., Huawei, HiSilicon, China Telecomunication, ZTE, CATT, Xiaomi, OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221332 | |||
S3‑221640 | pCR to TR 33.740 Clause 4 Security Aspects of 5G ProSe | CATT, ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221490 | |||
S3‑221643 | TR 33.740 v0.1.0 Study on security aspects of Proximity Based Services (ProSe) in 5G System (5GS) phase 2 | CATT | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221677 | Privacy of information over the UE-to-UE Relay | Huawei, HiSilicon, Interdigital, ZTE, ChinaTelecom, CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221419 | |||
S3‑221693 | New Key Issue: Security for UE-to-UE Relay discovery | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221519 | |||
5.4 | Study on privacy of identifiers over radio access | S3‑221340 | New key issue on users identified by Priority Access | Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, CISA ECD, Peraton Labs, Interdigital, Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221642 | |
S3‑221517 | Scope of SUPI Type IMSI in KI#1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221518 | Addition of threats due to EAP in KI#1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221465 | IDPrvc - Security issue on C-RNTI | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221460 | Padding-based solution to the leakage of the length of SUPI through SUCI. | Ericsson LM | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221462 | Hash-based solution to the leakage of the length of SUPI through SUCI | Ericsson LM | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221463 | Map-based solution to the leakage of the length of SUPI through SUCI | Ericsson LM | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221329 | New solution for Key issue #1 | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221431 | SUPI padding solution on Key issue #1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221378 | Solution for Privacy aspects of variable length user identifiers | Nokia Japan | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221410 | New solution for key issue 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221641 | New key issue on users identified by Priority Access | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑221642 | New key issue on users identified by Priority Access | Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, CISA ECD, Peraton Labs, Interdigital, Apple, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221340 | |||
S3‑221696 | TR 33.870 | InterDigital, Inc. | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
5.5 | Study on Standardising Automated Certificate Management in SBA | S3‑221585 | Key Issue for Management of Automated Bulk Certificate updates for SBA leading to temporary service unavailability | Nokia Japan | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑221380 | |
S3‑221381 | Update KI #6 for a new security threat | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221661 | |||
S3‑221382 | New solution for KI #6 Relation between certificate management lifecycle and NF management lifecycle | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221473 | A solution for certificate and NF lifecycle management relation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221658 | |||
S3‑221408 | New solution for key issue 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221671 | |||
S3‑221475 | A new solution of using CMP for certificate enrolment and renewal | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221659 | |||
S3‑221409 | New solution for key issue 3 and 4 based on OCSP | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221672 | |||
S3‑221474 | A new solution for using attestation to build initial trust for certificate management | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221501 | Solution for secure initial enrolment of NF certificates | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221620 | ||||
S3‑221552 | New solution on Cross-Certification Based Trust Chain in the SBA Architecture | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221644 | |||
S3‑221553 | New solution on Interconnection CA Based Trust Chain in the SBA Architecture | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221645 | |||
S3‑221380 | Key Issue for Management of Automated Bulk Certificate updates for SBA leading to temporary service unavailability | Nokia Japan | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221585 | |||
S3‑221618 | Solution for secure initial enrolment of NF certificates | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑221619 | Draft TR 33.876 Study on Standardising Automated Certificate Management in SBA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221620 | Solution for secure initial enrolment of NF certificates | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221501 | ||||
S3‑221644 | New solution on Cross-Certification Based Trust Chain in the SBA Architecture | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221552 | |||
S3‑221645 | New solution on Interconnection CA Based Trust Chain in the SBA Architecture | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221553 | |||
S3‑221658 | A solution for certificate and NF lifecycle management relation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221473 | |||
S3‑221659 | A new solution of using CMP for certificate enrolment and renewal | Ericsson, Intel, Verizon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221475 | |||
S3‑221661 | Update KI #6 for a new security threat | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221381 | |||
S3‑221671 | New solution for key issue 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221408 | |||
S3‑221672 | New OCSP based solution for key issue 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221409 | |||
5.6 | New SID on AKMA phase 2 | S3‑221351 | Update in KI1 for encryption keys | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221635 | |
S3‑221356 | Key Issue for AKMA roaming scenario | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221635 | |||
S3‑221435 | Update the Key issue of AKMA roaming | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221635 | |||
S3‑221529 | Adding security threat and requirements to KI#1 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221635 | |||
S3‑221457 | New key issue of multiple AAnF sets in AKMA roaming scenario | LG Electronics France | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221558 | New KI Multiple registrations in AKMA scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221352 | Solution on AKMA roaming | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221634 | |||
S3‑221384 | new solution for AKMA roaming when both UE and AF are in VPLMN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221662 | |||
S3‑221385 | new solution for AKMA roaming when UE is in visited network but the AF in Home network. | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221433 | New solution about the roaming AKMA architecture of the AF inside and outside the HPLMN | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221651 | |||
S3‑221434 | New solution about the roaming AKMA architecture of the AF inside and outside the VPLMN | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221652 | |||
S3‑221459 | New solution of AKMA anchor key registration to the AAnF in VPLMN after primary authentication | LG Electronics France | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221596 | |||
S3‑221554 | KI#1, New Sol AKMA Application key request via proxy and NEF in roaming scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221555 | KI#1, New Sol Proxy-based AKMA Application key request in roaming scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221571 | AKMA roaming and LI | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221592 | |||
S3‑221432 | Discussion on the regulatory control point in AKMA roaming | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221456 | Discussion paper of AKMA roaming | China Mobile | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221581 | Discussion about the roaming architecture | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| endorsed | No | ||||
S3‑221458 | Solution of introducing AP into AKMA | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221688 | |||
S3‑221466 | AKMA - New solution on AP | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221688 | |||
S3‑221516 | AKMA Application Proxy solution based on GBA procedures | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221688 | |||
S3‑221556 | KI#2, New Sol Authentication via proxy AKMA scenarios. | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221557 | KI#2, New Sol Authentication via proxy and NEF in AKMA scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221592 | AKMA roaming and LI | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221571 | |||
S3‑221596 | New solution of AKMA anchor key registration to the AAnF in VPLMN after primary authentication | LG Electronics France | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221459 | |||
S3‑221634 | Solution on AKMA roaming | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221352 | |||
S3‑221635 | Update in KI1 for encryption keys | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221351 | |||
S3‑221651 | New solution about the roaming AKMA architecture of the AF inside and outside the HPLMN | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221433 | |||
S3‑221652 | New solution about the roaming AKMA architecture of the AF inside and outside the VPLMN | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221434 | |||
S3‑221662 | new solution for AKMA roaming when both UE and AF are in VPLMN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221384 | |||
S3‑221687 | draft TR 33.737 | China Mobile | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221688 | Solution of introducing AP into AKMA | China Mobile, Apple, Qualcomm | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221458 | |||
5.7 | Study of Security aspect of home network triggered primary authentication | S3‑221386 | Skeleton update | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221663 | |
S3‑221387 | new KI in interworking | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221388 | new KI in SoR/UPU counter wraparound | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221389 | new KI in Kakma refresh | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221664 | |||
S3‑221524 | Corrections to TR 33.741 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221391 | New KI on race condition | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221580 | KI#2 update to remove the signalling overhead for KAF | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221390 | AUSF triggered the primary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221525 | Solution to enable HN triggered Primary Authentication with AUSF | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221526 | Solution to enable HN triggered Primary Authentication with UDM | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221589 | |||
S3‑221530 | New solution on HN initiated re-authentcation via AUSF | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221601 | |||
S3‑221551 | New solution on AUSF initiated Primary Authentication | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221353 | Solution on HN triggering primary authentication for various scenarios | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221633 | |||
S3‑221415 | New solution UDM triggered primary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221675 | |||
S3‑221436 | Home network triggered authentication solution for 4G to 5G interworking on Key issue #1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221653 | |||
S3‑221498 | New solution on KI#1 AMF based solution | NEC Corporation | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221697 | ||||
S3‑221515 | Solution using UDM to trigger authentication | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221606 | |||
S3‑221531 | New solution on UDM initiated re-authentcation based on AUSF request | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221602 | |||
S3‑221532 | New solution for Kaf refresh | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221550 | New solution on UDM initiated Primary Authentication | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221646 | |||
S3‑221354 | Solution on Kaf refresh without primary authentication -UA* | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221355 | Solution on Kaf refresh without primary authentication- AAnF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221437 | Kaf update solution without triggering primary authentication on Key issue #2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221472 | New solution Security procedure of KAF refresh-MAC | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221480 | New solution Security procedure of KAF refresh-Counter | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221481 | New solution Security procedure of KAF-Nonce | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221497 | New solution on KI#1 UE based solution | NEC Corporation | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑221576 | Discussion about the home triggered primary authentication for interworking | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221577 | Conclusion for the primary authentication upon interworking from EPS to 5GS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221578 | Discussion about the need for initiating home triggered primary authentication for the SoR/UPU use case. | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221579 | Conclusion for the primary authentication upon SoR and UPU counter wrap around. | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221589 | Solution to enable HN triggered Primary Authentication with UDM | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221526 | |||
S3‑221601 | New solution on HN initiated re-authentcation via AUSF | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221530 | |||
S3‑221602 | New solution on UDM initiated re-authentcation based on AUSF request | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221531 | |||
S3‑221606 | Solution using UDM to trigger authentication | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221515 | |||
S3‑221633 | Solution on HN triggering primary authentication for various scenarios | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221353 | |||
S3‑221646 | New solution on UDM initiated Primary Authentication | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221550 | |||
S3‑221653 | Home network triggered authentication solution for 4G to 5G interworking on Key issue #1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221436 | |||
S3‑221663 | Skeleton update | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221386 | |||
S3‑221664 | new KI in Kakma refresh | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221389 | |||
S3‑221675 | New solution UDM triggered primary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221415 | |||
S3‑221679 | TR 33.741 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑221697 | New solution on KI#1 AMF based solution | NEC Corporation | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221498 | ||||
5.8 | Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation for 5G - phase 3 | S3‑221451 | Anomaly in Multivendor NWDAF Framework | Intel | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑221453 | Revision on KI#2 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221454 | KI on Security for NWDAF-assisted application detection | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221533 | Key issue on Cyber-attack detection supported by NWDAF | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221603 | |||
S3‑221365 | New solution on authorization of AI/ML model retrieving | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221595 | |||
S3‑221452 | Authorization and Authentication of ML model transfer | Intel | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221639 | ||||
S3‑221470 | Solution for AI-ML model authorization and retrieval | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221615 | |||
S3‑221570 | AI/ML model storage and sharing security | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221591 | |||
S3‑221367 | New solution on Using Federated-Learning-related Analytics Id for authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221369 | New solution on topology hiding in data and analytics exchange in roaming case | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221471 | Solution for access control and anonymization for data and analytics exchange in roaming | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221616 | |||
S3‑221469 | Solution for anomalous NF behaviour detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221617 | |||
S3‑221591 | AI/ML model storage and sharing security | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221570 | |||
S3‑221595 | New solution on authorization of AI/ML model retrieving | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221365 | |||
S3‑221603 | Key issue on Cyber-attack detection | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221533 | |||
S3‑221615 | Solution for AI-ML model authorization and retrieval | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221470 | |||
S3‑221616 | Solution for access control and anonymization for data and analytics exchange in roaming | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221471 | |||
S3‑221617 | Solution for anomalous NF behaviour detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221469 | |||
S3‑221639 | Authorization and Authentication of ML model transfer | Intel | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221452 | ||||
S3‑221657 | draft TR 33.738 0.2.0 | China Mobile Group Device Co. | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.9 | Study on Security Enhancement of support for Edge Computing — phase 2 | S3‑221320 | New key issue on UE privacy protection and authorization in NW exposure of UE traffic related information to AF | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑221322 | New key issue on Authorization for ACR | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221323 | New key issue on ACR security | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221411 | New KI on Authentication and Authorization between V-ECS and H-ECS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221673 | |||
S3‑221412 | New KI on Transport security for the EDGE10 interface | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221413 | New KI on Authentication and Authorization between AC and EEC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221477 | Updates to authentication and authorization key issue | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221487 | New KI on data protection for the fast and efficient network exposure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221488 | New KI on how to authorize PDU session to support local traffic routing to access an EHE in the VPLMN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221683 | |||
S3‑221357 | Solution for Key Issue #2.2 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221704 | |||
S3‑221704 | Solution for Key Issue #2.2 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221357 | |||
S3‑221377 | New solution Authentication mechanism selection in EDGE | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221694 | |||
S3‑221379 | New solution Authentication mechanism selection among EEC, ECS, and EES | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221695 | |||
S3‑221399 | Authentication mechanism selection between the EEC and ECS/EES | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221438 | ECS EES authentication method information provisioning solution on Key issue #2.2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221654 | |||
S3‑221467 | MEC - Negotiation procedure for the authentication and authorization | Apple | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221678 | |||
S3‑221527 | Authentication mechanism selection between EEC and ECS | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221599 | |||
S3‑221528 | Authentication mechanism selection between EEC and EES | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221600 | |||
S3‑221559 | KI#2.1, New Sol Authentication and authorization between EEC hosted in the roaming UE and ECS | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221611 | |||
S3‑221560 | KI#2.1, New Sol Authentication and authorization between EEC hosted in the roaming UE and EES | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221613 | |||
S3‑221561 | KI#2.2, New Sol 5GC-based authentication mechanism selection between EEC and ECS or EES | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221614 | |||
S3‑221468 | HN-auth-NAS based HN triggered authentication | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221599 | Authentication mechanism selection between EEC and ECS | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221527 | |||
S3‑221600 | Authentication mechanism selection between EEC and EES | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221528 | |||
S3‑221611 | KI#2.1, New Sol Authentication and authorization between EEC hosted in the roaming UE and ECS | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221559 | |||
S3‑221613 | KI#2.1, New Sol Authentication and authorization between EEC hosted in the roaming UE and EES | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221560 | |||
S3‑221614 | KI#2.2, New Sol 5GC-based authentication mechanism selection between EEC and ECS or EES | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221561 | |||
S3‑221654 | ECS EES authentication method information provisioning solution on Key issue #2.2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221438 | |||
S3‑221673 | New KI on Authentication and Authorization between V-ECS and H-ECS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221411 | |||
S3‑221678 | MEC - Negotiation procedure for the authentication and authorization | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221467 | |||
S3‑221683 | New KI on how to authorize PDU session to support local traffic routing to access an EHE in the VPLMN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221488 | |||
S3‑221685 | Draft TR 33.739 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221694 | New solution Authentication mechanism selection in EDGE | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221377 | |||
S3‑221695 | New solution Authentication mechanism selection among EEC, ECS, and EES | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221379 | |||
5.10 | Study on Personal IoT Networks Security Aspects | S3‑221319 | New key issue on Protecting Identification of PIN and PIN Privacy | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑221321 | New key issue on Secure Communication of between PINEs | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221325 | New key issue on Secure policy and parameters provisioning for PIN | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221327 | New key issue on Authorization of PINE | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221328 | New key issue on PIN and PINE discovery authorization | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221335 | New Key Issue on controlling access of PIN elements to 5G network | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221676 | |||
S3‑221417 | Authentication and authorization to PINE behind PEGC and PEMC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221676 | |||
S3‑221440 | Key issue on secure data transfer between PEGC PEMC and PIN NF | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221502 | Proposed skeleton for TR 33.882 | vivo Mobile Communication (S) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221504 | Scope of TR 33.882 | vivo Mobile Communication (S) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221506 | New KI for authentication of PINE | vivo Mobile Communication (S) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221676 | |||
S3‑221507 | New Key Issue for controlling of remote provisioning | vivo Mobile Communication (S) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221564 | New KI: Secure authentication of PINE | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221676 | |||
S3‑221565 | New KI: Secure provisioning of credentials for non-3GPP device via PEGC | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221656 | TR 33.882 v0.1.0 | vivo | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221676 | Authentication and authorization to PINE behind PEGC and PEMC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221417 | |||
5.11 | Study on SNAAPP security | S3‑221314 | skeleton for draft TR 33.884 SNAAPP security(FS_SNAAPPY) | NTT DOCOMO | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑221336 | New Key Issue on Securing API invocation from UE applications | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221660 | |||
S3‑221359 | pCR to 33.884, scope | NTT DOCOMO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221478 | A new key issue on authentication and authorization of UE in UE originated API invocation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221660 | |||
S3‑221479 | A new key issue on user consent in API invocations | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221582 | pCR to 33.884, key issues from scope objective 1 | NTT DOCOMO | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑221597 | draft TR 33.884 | DOCOMO Communications Lab. | draft TR | No |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑221626 | draft - LS reply on CAPIF authorization roles related to FS_SNAAPP – documenting state of discussion after SA3#107e-AdHoc - to be noted | DOCOMO Communications Lab. | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑221660 | A new key issue on authentication and authorization of UE in UE originated API invocation | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221478 | |||
S3‑221586 | LS on CAPIF authorization roles related to FS_SNAAPP | S6-221771 | LS in | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | ||||
5.12 | Study on enhanced security for network slicing Phase 3 | S3‑221372 | Skeleton of TR33.886 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑221373 | Scope of TR33.886 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221628 | |||
S3‑221374 | New KI-providing VPLMN slice information to roaming UE | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221629 | |||
S3‑221375 | New KI-temprory slices and slice authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221630 | |||
S3‑221376 | New KI on NSAC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221631 | |||
S3‑221628 | Scope of TR33.886 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221373 | |||
S3‑221629 | New KI-providing VPLMN slice information to roaming UE | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221374 | |||
S3‑221630 | New KI-temprory slices and slice authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221375 | |||
S3‑221631 | New KI on NSAC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221376 | |||
S3‑221632 | Draft TR 33.886 for eNS3 | Huawei | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
5.13 | Study on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2 | S3‑221341 | Skeleton for 5WWC Ph2 study | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑221342 | Scope of 5WWC study | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221636 | |||
S3‑221343 | Key issue on authentication of AUN3 device not supporting EAP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221344 | Key issue on authentication of AUN3 device supporting EAP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221637 | |||
S3‑221345 | Key issue on Authentication of UE behind RG and connected via NSWO | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221346 | Key issue on Security aspect of slice information exposure of N3IWF/TNGF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221638 | |||
S3‑221416 | authentication and authorization to N3GPP device behind 5G-RG | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221636 | Scope of 5WWC study | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221342 | |||
S3‑221637 | Key issue on authentication of AUN3 device supporting EAP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221344 | |||
S3‑221638 | Key issues on Security aspect of slice information exposure of N3IWF/TNGF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221346 | |||
S3‑221703 | draft 33.887 v0.1.0 Study on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2 | Nokia | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.14 | Study on the security aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) for the NG-RAN | S3‑221573 | TR skeleton | Ericsson | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑221574 | Content for the scope clause of the technical report | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221575 | Initial content for the background clause of the technical report | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221649 | |||
S3‑221649 | Initial content for the background clause of the technical report | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221575 | |||
S3‑221650 | Draft TR 33.877 v0.1.0 Study on the security aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) for the NG-RAN | Ericsson España S.A. | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.15 | Study on security support for Next Generation Real Time Communication services | S3‑221482 | skeleton for NGRTC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑221483 | Scope of TR 33.890 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221484 | New KI on 3rd party ID | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221682 | |||
S3‑221546 | Key Issue on Authorization for Third Party Specific User ID Usage | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221682 | |||
S3‑221547 | Key Issue on Verification of the Third Party User Specific ID | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221682 | |||
S3‑221682 | New KI on 3rd party ID | Huawei, HiSilicon, Xiaomi, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221484 | |||
S3‑221686 | DraftTR_33.890 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.16 | Study on security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2 | S3‑221361 | Key issue on connected and idle mode mobility | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑221362 | Key issue on non-3GPP access in SNPN’s | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221681 | |||
S3‑221363 | Key issue on providing access to localised services | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221450 | Authentication and Authorization for Localized Services | Intel | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑221492 | Scope for Study on security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221493 | New Key Issue "Security of non-3GPP access for SNPN" | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221681 | |||
S3‑221494 | New Key Issue "Hosting network and UE mutual authentication" | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221562 | New KI: Home control enhancement for eNPN | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221563 | New KI: Support for secure non-3GPP access for NPN | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221681 | |||
S3‑221681 | New Key Issue "Security of non-3GPP access for SNPN" | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Xiaomi, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221493 | |||
S3‑221684 | draft TR 33.858 v0.1.0 | Ericsson | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.17 | Study on Security of Phase 2 for UAS, UAV and UAM | S3‑221333 | Key Issue on Direct C2 Security | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221610 | |
S3‑221334 | Key Issue on Direct C2 Authorization | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221407 | New Key Issue on security enhancement of C2 communication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221610 | |||
S3‑221514 | Key issue for security of unicast connection | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221605 | |||
S3‑221512 | Proposed skeleton for TR 33.891 | Qualcomm Incorporated | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221513 | Proposed scope for TR 33.891 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221604 | |||
S3‑221534 | Key issue on Privacy and security aspects of broadcasting Remote ID | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221604 | Proposed scope for TR 33.891 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221513 | |||
S3‑221605 | Key issue for security of unicast connection | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221514 | |||
S3‑221607 | Draft TR 33.891 v0.1.0 | Qualcomm Incorporated | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221610 | Key Issue on Direct C2 Security | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd., Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221333 | |||
5.18 | Study to enable URSP rules to securely identify Applications | S3‑221567 | Skeleton for TR 33.892 FS_USIA | Lenovo | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221593 | |
S3‑221568 | Scope for TR 33.892 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221569 | KI on determination of additional information for application identification | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221594 | |||
S3‑221593 | Skeleton for TR 33.892 FS_USIA | Lenovo | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221567 | |||
S3‑221594 | KI on determination of additional information for application identification | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221569 | |||
S3‑221690 | Draft TR 33.892 | Lenovo | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
5.19 | Study on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning | S3‑221537 | 33.893: Draft Skeleton | Xiaomi Technology | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑221538 | 33.893: Scope | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221441 | Add context to the architecture assumption | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221622 | |||
S3‑221539 | 33.893: Architecure Assumptions | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221622 | |||
S3‑221398 | New key issue on privacy protection for Ranging/Sidelink positioning with the assistance of assistant UE | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221623 | |||
S3‑221455 | Key issue on Privacy protection for Network assisted Sidelink Positioning | China Telecomunication Corp. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221623 | |||
S3‑221540 | 33.893: New Key Issue on Privacy | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221623 | |||
S3‑221442 | Key issue on discovery message protection between reference UEs and target UEs | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221624 | |||
S3‑221542 | 33.893: New Key Issue on Discovery Security | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221624 | |||
S3‑221443 | Key issue on security of network based sidelink positioning | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221445 | Key issue on security of UE based sidelink positioning | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221543 | 33.893: New Key Issue on Direct Communication Security | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221444 | Key issue on security of service exposure to a UE | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221541 | 33.893: New Key Issue on Authorization for Ranging/SL Positioning Service | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221647 | |||
S3‑221360 | Key issue on application impersonation | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221622 | 33.893: Architecure Assumptions | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221539 | |||
S3‑221623 | 33.893: New Key Issue on Privacy | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221540 | |||
S3‑221624 | 33.893: New Key Issue on Discovery Security | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221542 | |||
S3‑221625 | 33.893: New Key Issue on Authorization for Ranging/SL Positioning Service | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑221627 | Draft TR 33.893 | Xiaomi Technology | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221647 | 33.893: New Key Issue on Authorization for Ranging/SL Positioning Service | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221541 | |||
5.20 | Study on Security and Privacy of AI/ML-based Services and Applications in 5G | S3‑221313 | LS on 5GC information exposure to UE | S2-2205286 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑221358 | draft-LS reply on 5GC information exposure to UE | NTT DOCOMO | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221621 | |||
S3‑221511 | Draft LS on 5GC Information Exposure to UE | OPPO | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221621 | |||
S3‑221583 | TR 33.898 Skeleton | OPPO | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221508 | |||
S3‑221509 | Scope of TR 33.898 | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221510 | References in TR 33.898 | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221347 | Key issue on authorization of AIML operations | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221349 | Key issue on securing AIML operation | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221324 | New key issue on Federated Learning AIML model protection | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221350 | Key issue on Security criteria of UE selection for AIML | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221326 | New key issue on Federated Learning AIML model privacy protection | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221566 | New KI: Privacy-preserving federated learning | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221348 | Key issue on authorization of UE accessing the 5G analytics | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221508 | TR 33.898 Skeleton | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221583 | |||
S3‑221598 | draft-LS reply on 5GC information exposure to UE | NTT DOCOMO | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑221621 | LS reply on 5GC information exposure to UE | NTT DOCOMO | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221358 | |||
S3‑221698 | TR 33.898 | OPPO | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.21 | Study on applicability of the Zero Trust Security principles in mobile networks | S3‑221520 | Proposal for TR 33.894 Skeleton | Lenovo | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑221523 | Update of Scope | Lenovo, Rakuten Mobile Inc, Interdigital, US NSA, Motorola Solutions, Johns Hopkins University APL, Intel, Center for Internet Security | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221588 | |||
S3‑221522 | Security Assumptions | Lenovo, Rakuten Mobile Inc., Interdigital, US NSA, Motorola Solutions, Johns Hopkins University APL, Intel, Center for Internet Security | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221439 | new key issue Exposure of Network Capabilities | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221449 | Key Issue on Secure Trust Evaluation | Intel | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑221500 | Key issue on determining and maintaining trust indication in 5G Core | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221521 | Key Issue#1 on Need for continuous Trust evaluation | Lenovo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Rakuten Mobile Inc., Interdigital, US NSA, Motorola Solutions, Johns Hopkins University APL, Intel, Center for Internet Security | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221499 | Key issue on misuse of OAuth 2.0 access token by anomalous Network functions | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221448 | Key Issue on secure storage and limited access to NF credentials | Intel | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑221588 | Update of Scope | Lenovo, Rakuten Mobile Inc, Interdigital, US NSA, Motorola Solutions, Johns Hopkins University APL, Intel, Center for Internet Security | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221523 | |||
S3‑221691 | Draft TR 33.894 for ZTS | Lenovo | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.22 | Study of Security aspects on User Consent for 3GPP Services Phase 2 | S3‑221400 | Skeleton of UC3S_Ph2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑221401 | Scope of UC3S_Ph2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221402 | New key issue on Roaming of eNA | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221668 | |||
S3‑221403 | New Key Issue on NTN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221669 | |||
S3‑221424 | Key Issue for NTN specific user consent for UE location sharing | Nokia Japan | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221669 | ||||
S3‑221544 | 33.896: New Key Issue on NTN Specific User Consent | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑221669 | |||
S3‑221545 | 33.896: New Solution for NTN Specific User Consent | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221668 | New key issue on Roaming of eNA | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221402 | |||
S3‑221669 | New Key Issue on NTN | Huawei, HiSilicon, Xiaomi, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221403 | |||
S3‑221680 | TR 33.896 | HUAWEI TECH. GmbH | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
5.23 | Study on security enhancements for 5G multicast-broadcast services Phase 2 | S3‑221394 | Skeleton of MBS phase2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑221395 | Scope of MBS phase2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑221396 | New key issue on TMGI protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221666 | |||
S3‑221397 | New key issue on security handling in MOCN network sharing scenario | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221667 | |||
S3‑221414 | New key issue on security protection for Ues in RRC inactive state | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑221674 | |||
S3‑221461 | Discussion paper about the security enhancements enabling UE’s receiving Multicast MBS Session data in RRC_INACTIVE state | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑221655 | TR 33.883 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑221666 | New key issue on TMGI protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221396 | |||
S3‑221667 | New key issue on security handling in MOCN network sharing scenario | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221397 | |||
S3‑221674 | New key issue on security protection for Ues in RRC inactive state | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑221414 | |||
6 | Any Other Business |   |