Tdoc List
2021-03-15 10:37
Agenda | Topic | TDoc | Title | Source | Type | For | Avail | Treated | Decision | Wdrn | Replaced-by | Replaces |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Agenda and Meeting Objectives | S3‑210810 | Agenda | WG Chair | agenda | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑210811 | E-meeting procedures | WG Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑211171 | Study item management and planning | WG Chair | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211173 | Process and agenda presentation for SA3#102Bis-e | SA WG3 chair | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
2 | Studies areas |   | ||||||||||
2.1 | Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations | S3‑210975 | MitM FBS Detection | Huawei, HiSilicon, Philips | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211261 | |
S3‑211027 | 5GFBS-Adding evaluation for solution#4 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211028 | 5GFBS-Adding evaluation for solution#17 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211029 | 5GFBS-Adding evaluation for solution#19 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211030 | 5GFBS-Conclusion for key issue#2 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211071 | Conclusions for KI #2 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211072 | Evaluation on UE behavior on detection of false signature | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211073 | Evaluation on signing key management | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211109 | Solution for KI#2 using PKC without requiring tight time sync | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211329 | |||
S3‑211116 | Editorials Solution #24 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑211128 | New annex of TR 33.809 – attack taxonomy for 5G UE over radio interfaces | CableLabs, NTT Docomo, Philips, Deutsche Telekom AG | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211235 | |||
S3‑211131 | Discussion for MitM attack | Samsung | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211132 | [5GFBS] Identifying MitM attack | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211154 | pCR to 33.809 - addition of new key issue on false detections | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211155 | pCR to 33.809 - addition of solution to False positive detections | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑211235 | New annex of TR 33.809 – attack taxonomy for 5G UE over radio interfaces | CableLabs, NTT Docomo, Philips, Deutsche Telekom AG | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211128 | |||
S3‑211261 | MitM FBS Detection | Huawei, HiSilicon, Philips | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210975 | |||
S3‑211329 | Solution for KI#2 using PKC without requiring tight time sync | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211109 | |||
S3‑211345 | Draft TR 33.801 | Apple | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
2.2 | Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products | S3‑210936 | Scope of SECAM SCAS | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210937 | Scope of VNP evaluation | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210938 | SECAM Assurance Level | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210939 | SECAM Vendor Role | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210940 | VNP SCAS Instantiation | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211257 | |||
S3‑210941 | GVNP Type 2 hardening unnecessary service or protocol | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210942 | GVNP Type 2 hardening unsupported component | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210943 | GVNP Tyype 2 hardening unused function | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210944 | GVNP Type 2 hardening unused software | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210945 | Operational Environmental Security Assumptions | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210946 | Monitoring | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210947 | Dispute Resolution | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210948 | Operator Acceptance Aspect | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210949 | Discussion on GVNP Type 1 assets protection | Futurewei Technologies | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210950 | GVNP Type 1 assets protection | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211013 | Clarifying the GVNP lifecycle in clause 5.2.5.5.7.1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211014 | Modifying test case in clause 5.2.5.5.7.2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211015 | Clarifying for the security requirements and test cases in clause 5.2.5.7.7.2 and 5.2.5.7.7.3 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211016 | Adding vendor development and product lifecycle processes and test laboratory accreditation into Clause 6 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211017 | proposal for way forward | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211257 | VNP SCAS Instantiation | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210940 | |||
S3‑211325 | TR 33.818 v0.11.0 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
2.3 | Study on User Plane Integrity Protection | S3‑210899 | New Solution for Interworking from 5GS to EPS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211299 | |
S3‑210900 | Conclusion for Key Issue #7 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211150 | Update on Solution #21: Interworking handover from EPS to 5GS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211189 | |||
S3‑211151 | Update on Solution #22: S1 handover | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211190 | |||
S3‑211152 | Update on Solution #23: X2 handover | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211153 | Update on Solution #24: Interworking handover from 5GS to EPS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211191 | |||
S3‑211167 | Update of key issue #7 with X2 handover and S1 handover | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211168 | New solution for source eNB pre-configured with neighbour target eNB’s support of UP IP | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211192 | |||
S3‑211169 | Use of criticality information | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211186 | TR 33.853 v1.5.0 | VODAFONE Group Plc | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211189 | Update on Solution #21: Interworking handover from EPS to 5GS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211150 | |||
S3‑211190 | Update on Solution #22: S1 handover | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211151 | |||
S3‑211191 | Update on Solution #24: Interworking handover from 5GS to EPS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211153 | |||
S3‑211192 | New solution for source eNB pre-configured with neighbour target eNB’s support of UP IP | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211168 | |||
S3‑211299 | New Solution for Interworking from 5GS to EPS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210899 | |||
2.4 | Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation | S3‑210829 | Administration of the virtualisation fabric | NCSC | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211340 | ||
S3‑211340 | Administration of the virtualisation fabric | NCSC | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210829 | |||
S3‑210839 | Update on Ki#27 Image Snapshot and VNF Mobility. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211341 | |||
S3‑211341 | Update on Ki#27 Image Snapshot and VNF Mobility. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210839 | |||
S3‑211339 | TR 33.848 v0.7.0 | BT plc | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
2.5 | Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS | S3‑210818 | Reply to LS on Resynchronisations | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑210841 | Editor note removal on SQNms protection by concealment with SUPI with f5 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211181 | |||
S3‑210842 | Update to mapping table | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210843 | Assuring SUCI generation by legitimiate SUPI owner using KSUCI | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211182 | |||
S3‑210844 | Update to Solution 4.5 AUTS SQNMS solution for 5GS to add a note | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210845 | Evaluation of solution 2.3 Unified authentication response message by UE | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211177 | |||
S3‑210846 | Evaluation of solution 2.2 Encryption of authentication failure message types by UE with new keys derived from K_AUSF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210847 | Evaluation of solution 2.4 MAC-S based solution | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211178 | |||
S3‑210848 | MAC, SYNCH failure cause concealment solution | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211183 | |||
S3‑210849 | Key issue risk assessment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210851 | TR 33.846: update of solution #4.7 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211181 | |||
S3‑210852 | TR 33.846: evaluation of solution #3.1 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211210 | |||
S3‑210853 | TR 33.846: impacts of solutions | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211211 | |||
S3‑210854 | TR 33.846: conclusion for KI #4.1 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210875 | Update comparison table for solution 2.7 and 6.4 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211211 | |||
S3‑210876 | EN resolution on null scheme for solution 2.7 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211213 | |||
S3‑210877 | Text editing update on solution 2.7 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211184 | |||
S3‑210878 | Solution of mitigating the SUPI guessing attacks | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210879 | Resolve the EN in Sol#4.6 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210880 | Update mapping table in clause 6.0 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210914 | New solution to mitigate the SUPI guessing attack | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211304 | |||
S3‑210915 | Update for solution #3.1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211305 | |||
S3‑210992 | SUCI Linkability attack | NEC | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211236 | |||
S3‑211018 | Update key issue #2.2 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211049 | |||
S3‑211019 | Solution to Key issue #2.2 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211050 | |||
S3‑211020 | Update key issue #3.2 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211026 | |||
S3‑211026 | Update key issue #3.2 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile, ZTE, Huawei | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211020 | |||
S3‑211049 | Update key issue #2.2 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211018 | |||
S3‑211050 | Solution to Key issue #2.2 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211324 | S3‑211019 | ||
S3‑211057 | Some proposed text for the assessment of attack risk table | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211336 | |||
S3‑211086 | Editorial updates to 33846-0100 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211184 | |||
S3‑211147 | TR 33.846: evaluation of solution #2.2 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211208 | |||
S3‑211148 | TR 33.846: conclusion for KI #2.1 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211177 | Evaluation of solution 2.3 Unified authentication response message by UE | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210845 | |||
S3‑211178 | Evaluation of solution 2.4 MAC-S based solution | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210847 | |||
S3‑211180 | TR 33.846: evaluation of solution #2.2 | THALES | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑211181 | Editor note removal on SQNms protection by concealment with SUPI with f5 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Thales | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210841 | |||
S3‑211182 | Assuring SUCI generation by legitimiate SUPI owner using KSUCI | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210843 | |||
S3‑211183 | MAC, SYNCH failure cause concealment solution | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210848 | |||
S3‑211184 | Editorial updates to 33846-0100 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211086 | |||
S3‑211208 | TR 33.846: evaluation of solution #2.2 | THALES, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211147 | |||
S3‑211210 | TR 33.846: evaluation of solution #3.1 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210852 | |||
S3‑211211 | TR 33.846: impacts of solutions | THALES, ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210853 | |||
S3‑211213 | EN resolution on null scheme for solution 2.7 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210876 | |||
S3‑211236 | SUCI Linkability attack | NEC | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210992 | |||
S3‑211287 | Draft TR 33.846 v0.11.0 Study on authentication enhancements in the 5G System (5GS) | Ericsson Hungary Ltd | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211304 | New solution to mitigate the SUPI guessing attack | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210914 | |||
S3‑211305 | Update for solution #3.1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210915 | |||
S3‑211324 | Solution to Key issue #2.2 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211050 | |||
S3‑211336 | Some proposed text for the assessment of attack risk table | Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211057 | |||
2.6 | Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication |   | ||||||||||
2.7 | Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems | S3‑210831 | TR 33.854 Solution#3 evaluation | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211251 | |
S3‑210832 | TR 33.854 Solution#5 evaluation | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211252 | |||
S3‑210833 | TR 33.854 Solution#12 evaluation | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211254 | |||
S3‑210834 | TR 33.854 Update for KI#4 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211255 | |||
S3‑210835 | TR 33.854 Update for KI#6 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd., Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211256 | |||
S3‑210836 | TR 33.854 Conclusion for KI#4 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210837 | TR 33.854 Conclusion for KI#1 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210838 | TR 33.854 Conclusion for KI#2 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210896 | New solution to prevent malicious revocation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210898 | New solution to provide consisitent PDU session security for C2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210976 | add evaluation to solution 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211262 | |||
S3‑210977 | add evaluation to solution 11 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211263 | |||
S3‑211053 | Adding the revocation functionality to solution #14 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211331 | |||
S3‑211054 | Adding the revocation functionality to solution #13 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211333 | |||
S3‑211115 | UAS: Update to solution #2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211212 | |||
S3‑211122 | Update to Solution#7 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211249 | |||
S3‑211124 | Resolving EN on UAVC Change | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211250 | |||
S3‑211125 | Update to Solution#15 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211253 | |||
S3‑211212 | UAS: Update to solution #2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211115 | |||
S3‑211249 | Update to Solution#7 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211122 | |||
S3‑211250 | Resolving EN on UAVC Change | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211124 | |||
S3‑211251 | TR 33.854 Solution#3 evaluation | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210831 | |||
S3‑211252 | TR 33.854 Solution#5 evaluation | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210832 | |||
S3‑211253 | Update to Solution#15 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211125 | |||
S3‑211254 | TR 33.854 Solution#12 evaluation | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210833 | |||
S3‑211255 | TR 33.854 Update for KI#4 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210834 | |||
S3‑211256 | TR 33.854 Update for KI#6 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd., Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210835 | |||
S3‑211262 | add evaluation to solution 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210976 | |||
S3‑211263 | add evaluation to solution 11 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210977 | |||
S3‑211331 | Adding the revocation functionality to solution #14 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211053 | |||
S3‑211333 | Adding the revocation functionality to solution #13 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211054 | |||
S3‑211346 | Draft TR 33.854 | Qualcomm | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
2.8 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC | S3‑210816 | Reply LS on IP address to GPSI translation | S2-2009339 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑210855 | Discussion paper on GPSI translation to Temperary UE id | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210856 | Reply LS on GPSI translation for Edge AS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211059 | |||
S3‑210868 | Add evaluation to solution#5 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211268 | |||
S3‑210869 | Add evaluation to solution#6 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211269 | |||
S3‑210870 | Modification on solution #6 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210871 | Remove EN in solution#5 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210881 | Resolving the EN of solution #7 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210882 | Resolving the EN of solution #17 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210883 | Conclusion for key issue 9 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211318 | |||
S3‑210930 | Address Editor's Note in solution 11 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210931 | Address Editor's Note in solution 8 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210932 | Evaluation of solution #14 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210952 | New Solution for Authentication and Authorization between EEC and ECS/EES | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211326 | |||
S3‑210955 | Evaluation of solution#9 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211327 | |||
S3‑210969 | EC: Conclusion for KI #9 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211318 | |||
S3‑210970 | EC: Update Solution #13 to include CP option | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210971 | EC: Discussion for the authorization during EDN relocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210972 | EC: Update of solution #22 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211319 | |||
S3‑210973 | EC: New solution for the authorization during EDN relocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211320 | |||
S3‑210974 | EC: Conclusion for Key issue #5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210978 | Proposal for conclusion for Key Issue 1,2,4,6 | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑210979 | Updates to solution 4 | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211281 | ||||
S3‑210980 | Updates to solution 12 | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211282 | ||||
S3‑211023 | Resolution of Editor’s Notes in Solution#7 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211232 | |||
S3‑211035 | MEC-New key issue on EEC ID privacy protection | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211036 | MEC-New solution for key issue#10 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211176 | |||
S3‑211037 | MEC-Modification on key issue#4 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211058 | Discussion on the LS on providing UE identity based on IP address | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211059 | Reply LS on IP address to GPSI translation | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211060 | Using TLS with AKMA to protect EDGE-1 and EDGE-4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211337 | |||
S3‑211110 | Secondary authentication for Session Breakout | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211111 | [Draft] LS on Secondary authentication for Session Breakout | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211114 | EC: Update to solution #17 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211222 | |||
S3‑211172 | Reply LS on IP address to GPSI translation | S2-2101307 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑211176 | MEC-New solution for key issue#10 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211036 | |||
S3‑211222 | EC: Update to solution #17 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211114 | |||
S3‑211232 | Resolution of Editor’s Notes in Solution#7 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211023 | |||
S3‑211268 | Add evaluation to solution#5 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210868 | |||
S3‑211269 | Add evaluation to solution#6 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210869 | |||
S3‑211281 | Updates to solution 4 | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210979 | ||||
S3‑211282 | Updates to solution 12 | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210980 | ||||
S3‑211318 | EC: Conclusion for KI #9 | Huawei, Hisilicon, ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210969 | |||
S3‑211319 | EC: Update of solution #22 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210972 | |||
S3‑211320 | EC: New solution for the authorization during EDN relocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210973 | |||
S3‑211321 | TR 33.839 v0.5.0 | Huawei, Hisilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211326 | New Solution for Authentication and Authorization between EEC and ECS/EES | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210952 | |||
S3‑211327 | Evaluation of solution#9 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210955 | |||
S3‑211337 | Using TLS with AKMA to protect EDGE-1 and EDGE-4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211060 | |||
2.9 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS | S3‑210819 | LS on Security Requirements for Sidelink/PC5 Relays | S2-2004750 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210820 | New Solution for privacy with Layer-2 based UE-to-UE Relay and Adaptation Layer | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210821 | Privacy considerations for Adaptation Layer and Layer-2 based UE-to-UE Relay | InterDigital, Inc. | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210823 | DRAFT LS on Layer-2 based UE-to-UE Relay utilizing Adaptation Layer | InterDigital, Inc. | LS out | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210824 | Solution for privacy handling with Layer-3 based UE-to-UE Relay | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210825 | TR 33.847 Update for solution #10 | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211240 | |||
S3‑210826 | TR 33.847 Update for solution #24 | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211242 | |||
S3‑210827 | TR 33.847 Update for solution #25 | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210828 | Updated Solution #22: Representation of identities during broadcast | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211179 | |||
S3‑210830 | Updated Solution #23: Initial key with validity time | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211185 | |||
S3‑210850 | TR 33.847: Solution #18 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210865 | EN resolution for KI#1 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210866 | Update for Sol#13 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211174 | |||
S3‑210867 | Evaluation for Sol#13 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211175 | |||
S3‑210874 | ProSE Direct Discovery Clarification in Out-of-Coverage Scenarios | MITRE Corporation | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑210884 | Removing ENs of Solution #3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211202 | |||
S3‑210885 | Removing ENs of Solution #4 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211203 | |||
S3‑210891 | Update and add evaluation to Solution #7 in TR 33.847 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211295 | |||
S3‑210892 | Address Editor's Note in Solution #27 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211296 | |||
S3‑210893 | Address Editor's Note in Solution #28 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211297 | |||
S3‑210894 | Update details and add evaluation to Solution #26 in TR 33.847 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210895 | Propose to resolve EN in KI#16 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210897 | new solution for PC5 one-to-one rekeying | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211298 | |||
S3‑210921 | Update solution#11 to meet privacy requirement | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210922 | Add evaluation to solution#11 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211309 | |||
S3‑210923 | Address Editors Note in evaluation of solution #5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211328 | |||
S3‑210924 | Add conclusion to KI#10 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210925 | Add evaluaition to solution#29 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211310 | |||
S3‑210926 | Add evaluaition to solution#30 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211311 | |||
S3‑210929 | Address the remaining ENs in solution 15 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211312 | |||
S3‑210994 | pCR to TR33.847- Update Solution#29 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211272 | |||
S3‑210995 | pCR to TR33.847- Update Solution#30 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211273 | |||
S3‑211032 | ProSe-enhancement on discovery procedure | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211033 | ProSe-Security solution during reselection via UE-to-UE relay | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211034 | ProSe-Editorial in key issue#11 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211048 | Security policy consistency during UE-to-UE relay path switch | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211063 | Authorization of remote UE in L3 U2N relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211291 | |||
S3‑211064 | New Key Issue on security policy handling for 5G Prose services | Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑210482 | |||
S3‑211065 | EN resolution for solution #18 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211066 | EN resolution and evaluation for solution #20 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211292 | |||
S3‑211067 | Update the evaluation for solution #3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211289 | |||
S3‑211068 | Update the evaluation for solution #4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211290 | |||
S3‑211087 | ProSe: Update to solution #5 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211328 | |||
S3‑211088 | ProSe: Retrieve Discovery keys for UE-to-network relays | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211229 | |||
S3‑211089 | ProSe: Update to solution #21 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211230 | |||
S3‑211090 | ProSe: Update to solution #6 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑211101 | ProSe: Updating Key Issue #1 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211102 | ProSe: Updating Key Issue #9 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211103 | ProSe: Updating Key Issue #12 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211104 | ProSe: Updating Key Issue #16 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211105 | ProSe: Adding a New Key Issue on Security Policies for PC5 Direct Link | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211106 | ProSe: Adding a New Key Issue on Security Policy with UE-to-Network Relay | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211107 | ProSe: Adding a New Key Issue on Security Policy with UE-to-UE Relay | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211108 | Reply LS to LS on Security Requirements for Sidelink/PC5 Relays | Xiaomi Technology | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211129 | [ProSe] Evaluation for solution#1 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211198 | |||
S3‑211130 | [ProSe] Resolving ENs in solution#1 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211199 | |||
S3‑211149 | Resolving editor’s note in solution #32 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211258 | |||
S3‑211174 | Update for Sol#13 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210866 | |||
S3‑211175 | Evaluation for Sol#13 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210867 | |||
S3‑211179 | Updated Solution #22: Representation of identities during broadcast | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesSome of the content of 874
| approved | No | S3‑210828 | |||
S3‑211185 | Updated Solution #23: Initial key with validity time | TNO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210830 | |||
S3‑211198 | [ProSe] Evaluation for solution#1 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211129 | |||
S3‑211199 | [ProSe] Resolving ENs in solution#1 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211130 | |||
S3‑211202 | Removing ENs of Solution #3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210884 | |||
S3‑211203 | Removing ENs of Solution #4 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210885 | |||
S3‑211229 | ProSe: Retrieve Discovery keys for UE-to-network relays | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211088 | |||
S3‑211230 | ProSe: Update to solution #21 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211089 | |||
S3‑211240 | TR 33.847 Update for solution #10 | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210825 | |||
S3‑211242 | TR 33.847 Update for solution #24 | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210826 | |||
S3‑211258 | Resolving editor’s note in solution #32 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211149 | |||
S3‑211272 | pCR to TR33.847- Update Solution#29 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210994 | |||
S3‑211273 | pCR to TR33.847- Update Solution#30 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210995 | |||
S3‑211274 | Draft TR 33.847 v0.5.0 Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS | CATT | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211289 | Update the evaluation for solution #3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211067 | |||
S3‑211290 | Update the evaluation for solution #4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211068 | |||
S3‑211291 | Authorization of remote UE in L3 U2N relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211063 | |||
S3‑211292 | EN resolution and evaluation for solution #20 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211066 | |||
S3‑211295 | Update and add evaluation to Solution #7 in TR 33.847 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210891 | |||
S3‑211296 | Address Editor's Note in Solution #27 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210892 | |||
S3‑211297 | Address Editor's Note in Solution #28 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210893 | |||
S3‑211298 | new solution for PC5 one-to-one rekeying | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210897 | |||
S3‑211309 | Add evaluation to solution#11 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210922 | |||
S3‑211310 | Add evaluaition to solution#29 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210925 | |||
S3‑211311 | Add evaluaition to solution#30 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210926 | |||
S3‑211312 | Address the remaining ENs in solution 15 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210929 | |||
S3‑211328 | ProSe: Update to solution #5 | Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211087 | |||
2.10 | Study on security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT | S3‑210916 | Conclusion on key issue 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211306 | |
S3‑210998 | Draft CR 33.501 updates to TSC Annex L | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑210999 | Requirement and solution on multiple working domains | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211226 | |||
S3‑211000 | KI4 update on NEF-AF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211228 | |||
S3‑211001 | Solution update on NEF-AF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211002 | Annex on asmmetric delay attacks | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Deutsche Telekom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211227 | |||
S3‑211003 | Annex on Security considerations for integration with TSN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211079 | IIOT: Resolve EN in solution #2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211080 | IIOT: Update to KI#3 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211243 | |||
S3‑211081 | IIOT: Conclusion on KI#4 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211246 | |||
S3‑211082 | IIOT: Conclusion on KI#1 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211306 | |||
S3‑211112 | IIoT: Update to solution #3 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211215 | |||
S3‑211113 | IIoT: Update to and conclusion on KI #2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211216 | |||
S3‑211215 | IIoT: Update to solution #3 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211112 | |||
S3‑211216 | IIoT: Update to and conclusion on KI #2 | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211113 | |||
S3‑211226 | Requirement and solution on multiple working domains | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210999 | |||
S3‑211227 | Annex on asmmetric delay attacks | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Deutsche Telekom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211002 | |||
S3‑211228 | KI4 update on NEF-AF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211000 | |||
S3‑211243 | IIOT: Update to KI#3 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211080 | |||
S3‑211246 | IIOT: Conclusion on KI#4 | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211081 | |||
S3‑211306 | Conclusion on key issue 1 | Huawei, Hisilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210916 | |||
S3‑211343 | Draft TR 33.851 | Nokia | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
2.11 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services | S3‑210814 | Reply LS on 5MBS progress and issues to address | R2-2102480 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑210857 | Secure framewrok for MBS key distribution | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211278 | |||
S3‑210886 | Update Solution#8 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211188 | |||
S3‑210917 | Conclusion on key issue 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210918 | New solution to update the MBS keys | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211307 | |||
S3‑210919 | Resolving the Editor's Notes in solution 2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211308 | |||
S3‑210920 | Updating and resolving the Editor's Notes in solution 8 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210933 | Add evaluation to solution 1 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211270 | |||
S3‑210934 | Add evaluation to solution 2 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211271 | |||
S3‑210935 | Add evaluation to solution 8 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210963 | MBS: Updates to solution #4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210964 | MBS: Evaluation to solution #4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211317 | |||
S3‑210965 | MBS: Conclusion to key issue #1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211069 | EN resolution of Solution #1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211070 | 5G MBS traffic protection at service-layer | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211294 | |||
S3‑211120 | Modification to address FFS about key update after re-authentication in Solution 2 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211308 | |||
S3‑211127 | Improve description of key update in Solution 2 by refering to Solution 9 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211144 | [Solution] Key generation and distribution mechanism for MBS | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211197 | |||
S3‑211188 | Update Solution#8 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210886 | |||
S3‑211197 | [Solution] Key generation and distribution mechanism for MBS | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211144 | |||
S3‑211270 | Add evaluation to solution 1 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210933 | |||
S3‑211271 | Add evaluation to solution 2 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210934 | |||
S3‑211278 | Secure framewrok for MBS key distribution | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210857 | |||
S3‑211293 | Draft TR 33.850 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑211294 | 5G MBS traffic protection at service-layer | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211070 | |||
S3‑211307 | New solution to update the MBS keys | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210918 | |||
S3‑211308 | Resolving the Editor's Notes in solution 2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210919 | |||
S3‑211313 | Reply LS on 5MBS progress and issues to address | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑211317 | MBS: Evaluation to solution #4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210964 | |||
2.12 | Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks | S3‑210840 | Resolving UE ID privacy and format EN in solution 16 | Alibaba Group | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211187 | |
S3‑210887 | New solution on control plane based provisioning - PS to AUSF | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210888 | New solution on control plane based provisioning - PS to UDM | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210906 | New Solution for Security for Provisioning of SNPN Credentials without Initial Credential | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210907 | New Solution for Security for Provisioning of SNPN Credentials with initial credential | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210908 | New Solution for Security for Provisioning of PNI-NPN Credentials with initial credential | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210909 | Solution Update for Solution #5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211301 | |||
S3‑210910 | Solution Update for Solution #12 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211302 | |||
S3‑210911 | Conclusion for Key Issue #1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210953 | Editor notes removal | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211314 | |||
S3‑210954 | Conclusions on KI#5 Roaming-related security mechanisms for SNPNs | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210956 | NPN: New solution to key issue #1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210984 | Updates to solution 14: Add detailed steps | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211283 | |||
S3‑210985 | Updates to solution 14: Removal of Editor’s notes and Evaluation | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210991 | Proposal for conclusion for Key Issue 4 | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑210996 | Proposal for conclusion for Key Issue 4 | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑210997 | Proposal for conclusion for Key Issue 4 -rev | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑211004 | Solution to KI#2 (Provisioning of credentials) using AKMA | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211005 | Resolving CP provisioning EN in solution #10 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211006 | Add evaluation to Solution #10 "Secure initial access to an SNPN onboarding network" | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211007 | Updates to solution#10 on PS address | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211206 | |||
S3‑211008 | Solution for privacy protection during initial access | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211009 | Solution for providing secure onboarding without client authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211244 | |||
S3‑211024 | A new onboarding solution addressing KI#2 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211025 | Update of Solution#6 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211233 | |||
S3‑211044 | High-level conclusions to KI#4 "Securing initial access for UE onboarding between UE and SNPN" | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211074 | pCR: Further conclusions for KI #1 | Qualcomm Incorporated, CableLabs, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211075 | pCR: Conclusions for KI #4 | Qualcomm Incorporated, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211076 | pCR: Addressing the EN in solution #4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211259 | |||
S3‑211077 | pCR: Addressing the SUPI privacy EN in solution #11 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211078 | pCR: Addressing the PS discovery EN in solution #11 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211260 | |||
S3‑211123 | pCR: Conclusion for KI #1 on receiving KAUSF from AAA | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211126 | pCR: Conclusion for KI #1 on addressing security threat against KAUSF | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211187 | Resolving UE ID privacy and format EN in solution 16 | Alibaba Group | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210840 | |||
S3‑211206 | Updates to solution#10 on PS address | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211007 | |||
S3‑211233 | Update of Solution#6 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211025 | |||
S3‑211244 | Solution for providing secure onboarding without client authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211009 | |||
S3‑211259 | pCR: Addressing the EN in solution #4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211076 | |||
S3‑211260 | pCR: Addressing the PS discovery EN in solution #11 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211078 | |||
S3‑211283 | Updates to solution 14: Add detailed steps | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210984 | |||
S3‑211301 | Solution Update for Solution #5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210909 | |||
S3‑211302 | Solution Update for Solution #12 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210910 | |||
S3‑211314 | Editor notes removal | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210953 | |||
S3‑211347 | Draft TR TR 33.857 | Ericsson | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
2.13 | Study on security aspects of the Disaggregated gNB Architecture |   | ||||||||||
2.14 | Study on User Consent for 3GPP services | S3‑210813 | Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting | R2-2010894 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑210817 | LS on propagation of user consent related information during Xn inter-PLMN handover | R3-204378 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑210872 | Add new key issue for user consent in TR 33.867 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211267 | |||
S3‑210873 | Add use case mapping part for Key Issue #1 in TR 33.867 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210901 | Discussion Paper on Source of User Consent | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210902 | Add Text for Source of User Consent for eNA | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210903 | New Use Case for MEC | Huawei, HiSilicon, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210904 | Analysis for UC3S | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210905 | New Solution for UE Related Analytics of NWDAF | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211300 | |||
S3‑210951 | More clarification on scope | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210993 | New Solution for User Consent for Exposure of information to Edge Applications in Real Time | China Unicom | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211342 | ||||
S3‑211342 | New Solution for User Consent for Exposure of information to Edge Applications in Real Time | China Unicom | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210993 | |||
S3‑211011 | Reply LS on propagation of user consent related information during Xn inter-PLMN handover | Ericsson France S.A.S | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211330 | |||
S3‑211061 | Discussion on the LS on the user consent for trace reporting | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211062 | Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211338 | |||
S3‑211083 | KI on Processing user consent depending on the regulatory and regional demands | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211267 | |||
S3‑211084 | KI on Modification or revocation of user consent | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211085 | KI on User consent for data collection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211267 | |||
S3‑211136 | Correction to clause 5A.1.1 in TR 33.867 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211137 | Key Issue on user consent for UE data analytics using NWDAF | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211267 | |||
S3‑211138 | Update on scope of User Consent | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211193 | |||
S3‑211193 | Update on scope of User Consent | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211138 | |||
S3‑211214 | KI on Modification or revocation of user consent | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑211267 | Add new key issue for user consent in TR 33.867 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210872 | |||
S3‑211300 | New Solution for UE Related Analytics of NWDAF | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210905 | |||
S3‑211330 | Reply LS on propagation of user consent related information during Xn inter-PLMN handover | Ericsson France S.A.S | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211011 | |||
S3‑211332 | TR 33.867 | Huawei;HiSilicon | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑211338 | Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211062 | |||
2.15 | Study on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service | S3‑211134 | Resolving ENs in Solution#1 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211200 | |
S3‑211200 | Resolving ENs in Solution#1 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211134 | |||
S3‑211323 | draft TR 33.862 0.4.0 | China Mobile | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
2.16 | Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2 | S3‑210912 | Solution Update for Solution #2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211303 | |
S3‑211010 | Solution for KI#1.3 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211234 | |||
S3‑211012 | Solution for KI#1.4 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211207 | |||
S3‑211021 | Removal of solution without any KI | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211022 | Update for KI#1.3 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211038 | Update of scope of TR | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211039 | KI on Ensuring restrictive transfer of ML models between authorized NWDAFs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211237 | |||
S3‑211040 | KI on UE data collection protection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211041 | Solution on Privacy preservation of data | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211238 | |||
S3‑211042 | Solution on Abnormal NF behaviour detection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211239 | |||
S3‑211043 | Update of KI on Security protection of data via Message Framework | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211241 | |||
S3‑211051 | Solution on Providing the Security protection of data via Messaging | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211207 | |||
S3‑211052 | Update on KI on Authorization of consumers for data access via DCCF | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211209 | |||
S3‑211135 | Solution on integrity protection of data transferred between AF and NWDAF | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211201 | |||
S3‑211139 | Solution on analytics for DoS attack detection | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211140 | Solution on analytics for MitM attack detection | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211201 | Solution on integrity protection of data transferred between AF and NWDAF | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211135 | |||
S3‑211207 | Solution on Providing the Security protection of data via Messaging | Ericsson, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211051 | |||
S3‑211209 | Update on KI on Authorization of consumers for data access via DCCF | Ericsson, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211052 | |||
S3‑211234 | Solution for KI#1.3 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211010 | |||
S3‑211237 | KI on Ensuring restrictive transfer of ML models between authorized NWDAFs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211039 | |||
S3‑211238 | Solution on Privacy preservation of data | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑211041 | |||
S3‑211239 | Solution on Abnormal NF behaviour detection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211042 | |||
S3‑211241 | Update of KI on Security protection of data via Message Framework | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211043 | |||
S3‑211303 | Solution Update for Solution #2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210912 | |||
S3‑211322 | draft TR 33.866 0.4.0 | China Mobile | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
2.17 | Study on the security of AMF re-allocation | S3‑210858 | Direct UE connection to Slice AMF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211279 | |
S3‑210889 | Definition of Network Slicing Isolation | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210890 | New key issue on Network Slicing Isolation | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210957 | AMFReal: Evaluation to solution #1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211315 | |||
S3‑210958 | AMFReal: Evaluation to solution #2 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211285 | |||
S3‑210959 | AMFReal: Updates to solution #3 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211316 | |||
S3‑210960 | AMFReal: Evaluation to solution #4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211245 | |||
S3‑210961 | AMFReal: Evaluation to solution #5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑210962 | AMFReal: Evaluation to solution #6 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211247 | |||
S3‑211055 | Addressing the ENs on ngKSI in solution #1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211334 | |||
S3‑211056 | Addressing the EN on determining whether there is an AMF re-allocation in solution #1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211335 | |||
S3‑211091 | AMF reallocation: Update to solution #2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211285 | |||
S3‑211092 | AMF re-allocation: Definition of isolation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211093 | AMF re-allocation: New solution with reroute of Registration Request and protected security context via RAN | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211286 | |||
S3‑211094 | AMF re-allocation: Notes from offline teleconference | Ericsson | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211095 | AMF re-allocation: Update of the assumptions | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211117 | Update to Solution#4 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211245 | |||
S3‑211119 | Update to Solution#6 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211247 | |||
S3‑211121 | Solution to enable Reallocated AMF to serve the UE | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211248 | |||
S3‑211133 | New key issue for Restricted Access in AMF re-allocation | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211141 | Removal of Editor’s Note (1 and 5) in Solution #5 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211194 | |||
S3‑211142 | Resolution of Editor’s Notes and clarification on handling of Legacy UEs in Solution #5 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211195 | |||
S3‑211143 | Removal of Editor’s Note (#4) in Solution #5 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211196 | |||
S3‑211194 | Removal of Editor’s Note (1 and 5) in Solution #5 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211141 | |||
S3‑211195 | Resolution of Editor’s Notes and clarification on handling of Legacy UEs in Solution #5 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211142 | |||
S3‑211196 | Removal of Editor’s Note (#4) in Solution #5 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211143 | |||
S3‑211245 | Update to Solution#4 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211117 | |||
S3‑211247 | Update to Solution#6 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211119 | |||
S3‑211248 | Solution to enable Reallocated AMF to serve the UE | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211121 | |||
S3‑211279 | Direct UE connection to Slice AMF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210858 | |||
S3‑211285 | AMF reallocation: Update to solution #2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211091 | |||
S3‑211286 | AMF re-allocation: New solution with reroute of Registration Request and protected security context via RAN | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211093 | |||
S3‑211288 | Draft TR 33.864 v0.4.0 Study on the security of Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) re-allocation | Ericsson Hungary Ltd | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211315 | AMFReal: Evaluation to solution #1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210957 | |||
S3‑211316 | AMFReal: Updates to solution #3 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210959 | |||
S3‑211334 | Addressing the ENs on ngKSI in solution #1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211055 | |||
S3‑211335 | Addressing the EN on determining whether there is an AMF re-allocation in solution #1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211056 | |||
2.18 | Study on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul | S3‑210815 | LS on using MOBIKE in Integrated Access and Backhaul system | R3-211297 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑210859 | Discussion paper on LS on MOBIKE in IAB | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210860 | draft reply LS on MOBIKE in IAB | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210913 | F1 interface security for IAB in NR-DC mode | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
2.19 | Study on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules | S3‑210861 | Key issue on Paging cause security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210862 | Solution for secure BUSY indication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210863 | Solution for secure paging cause | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210927 | A new solution to protect busy indication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210928 | A new Key issue on paging cause | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210981 | Key issue on security aspects of Paging Cause | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210982 | Conclusion to Key issue 1 | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210983 | Updates to solution 1 | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211280 | |||
S3‑211031 | MUSIM-Addressing the EN in solution#1 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211096 | MUSIM: Resolving the EN regarding SA2’s decision on Busy Indication | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211275 | |||
S3‑211097 | MUSIM: Updating the threat analysis in Key Issue #1 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211276 | |||
S3‑211098 | MUSIM: Updating Key Issue #2 with Threats and Requirements | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211099 | MUSIM: Adding a New Key Issue on User Privacy | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211100 | MUSIM: Updating Solution #1 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211277 | |||
S3‑211145 | Key issue on User authorization for MUSIM optimizations | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211146 | Key Issue on home network authorization for MUSIM optimizations | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211275 | MUSIM: Resolving the EN regarding SA2’s decision on Busy Indication | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211096 | |||
S3‑211276 | MUSIM: Updating the threat analysis in Key Issue #1 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211097 | |||
S3‑211277 | MUSIM: Updating Solution #1 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211100 | |||
S3‑211280 | Updates to solution 1 | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210983 | |||
S3‑211284 | draft TR Study on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules | Intel Deutschland GmbH | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
2.20 | Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture | S3‑210812 | LS on Identification of source PLMN-ID in SBA | C4-210249 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑210822 | Reply-LS on Identification of source PLMN-ID in SBA | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211204 | |||
S3‑210966 | Requirement of subscribe-notification key issue | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210967 | Solution for non-delegated subscribe-notification key issue | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210968 | Update on Key issue #1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211045 | New Key Issue: Roaming case for token-based authorization in indirect communication | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211046 | New Solution to KI#4: Using existing procedures for authorization of SCP to act on behalf of an NF Consumer | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑211047 | New Solution to KI#5: End-to-end integrity protection of HTTP body and method | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211205 | |||
S3‑211118 | LS on end-to-end protection of HTTP message for Indirect communication | CableLabs, Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Bell Labs | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211231 | |||
S3‑211156 | Rapporteurs update to 33.875 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211224 | |||
S3‑211157 | Mapping of solutions to key issues | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211225 | |||
S3‑211158 | KI details added to NRF NF authentication in indirect communication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211170 | |||
S3‑211159 | Service request authenticity verification in indirect communication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211223 | |||
S3‑211160 | NF-SCP authorization | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211220 | |||
S3‑211161 | Service response verification in indirect communication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211217 | |||
S3‑211162 | Authorization of multiple consumers within a NF set | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211163 | KI on Roaming with token based authorization in indirect communication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211164 | Trust model | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211165 | NRF service management | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑211166 | More details on SCP deployment models | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211218 | |||
S3‑211170 | KI details added to End-to-end integrity protection of HTTP messages | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211221 | S3‑211158 | ||
S3‑211204 | Reply-LS on Identification of source PLMN-ID in SBA | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210822 | |||
S3‑211205 | New Solution to KI#5: End-to-end integrity protection of HTTP body and method | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211047 | |||
S3‑211217 | Service response verification in indirect communication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211161 | |||
S3‑211218 | More details on SCP deployment models | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211166 | |||
S3‑211219 | New Solution to KI#4: Using existing procedures for authorization of SCP to act on behalf of an NF Consumer | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑211220 | NF-SCP authorization | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211160 | |||
S3‑211221 | KI details added to End-to-end integrity protection of HTTP messages | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211170 | |||
S3‑211223 | Service request authenticity verification in indirect communication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211159 | |||
S3‑211224 | Rapporteurs update to 33.875 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211156 | |||
S3‑211225 | Mapping of solutions to key issues | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211157 | |||
S3‑211231 | LS on end-to-end protection of HTTP message for Indirect communication | CableLabs, Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Bell Labs | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑211118 | |||
S3‑211344 | Draft TR 33.875 | Nokia | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
2.21 | Study on enhanced security for network slicing Phase 2 | S3‑210864 | key issue on secure connection to RAN slice | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑211265 | |
S3‑210986 | skeleton for eNS2 TR | Huawei, HiSilicon | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211266 | |||
S3‑210987 | Introduction for eNS2 TR | Huawei, HiSilicon | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210988 | Scope of eNS2 study | Huawei, HiSilicon | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211264 | |||
S3‑210989 | New KI - slice authorization under UE quota constraint | Huawei, HiSilicon | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑210990 | New KI - privacy issue on broadcasting slice information | Huawei, HiSilicon | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑211265 | |||
S3‑211264 | Scope of eNS2 study | Huawei, HiSilicon | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210988 | |||
S3‑211265 | New KI - privacy issue on broadcasting slice information | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210990 | |||
S3‑211266 | Draft TR for eNS2 Study | Huawei, HiSilicon | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210986 |