Tdoc List
2020-11-27 14:49
Agenda | Topic | TDoc | Title | Source | Type | For | Avail | Treated | Decision | Wdrn | Replaced-by | Replaces |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Agenda and Meeting Objectives | S3‑202800 | Agenda | SA WG3 Chair | agenda | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑202803 | Process for SA3#101e meeting | SA WG3 Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑203479 | Process and agenda presentation for SA3#101e | WG chair | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
2 | Meeting Reports | S3‑202801 | Report from SA3#100Bis-e meeting | MCC | report | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑202802 | Report from SA3#100-e meeting | MCC | report | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑202804 | Report from last SA | SA WG3 Chair | report | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
3 | Reports and Liaisons from other Groups | S3‑202815 | TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur | InterDigital Communications | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202821 | LS response to TCCA on Public Safety | GSMA 5G Joint-Activity (5GJA) | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202823 | Use of 256-bit block Rijndael in Milenage-256 | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202824 | Answer to ETSI SAGE LS dated 5 June 2020 regarding the use of 256-bit block Rijndael in Milenage-256 | TCA (Trusted Connectivity Alliance) | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202830 | LS on MuDe functionality | C1-206625 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202831 | LS on AUSF/UDM discovery based on SUCI information | C4-204337 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202836 | LS on propagation of user consent related information during Xn inter-PLMN handover | R3-204378 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑202851 | Observations and questions on 256-bit security goals | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202852 | Independent evaluation of SNOW V | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑202853 | LS on Physical layer assisted lightweight AKA (PL-AKA) protocol for the Internet of things | ITU-T SG17 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202854 | Comments on physical layer assisted lightweight AKA (PL-AKA) protocol for the Internet of things | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202855 | LS on threats of service disruption, SIP message alteration and content eavesdropping in 5G networks | ITU-T SG17 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202856 | LS on Security requirements for vertical services supporting Ultra Reliable and Low Latency Communication (URLLC) in the 5G non-public networks | ITU-T SG17 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202857 | LS on SG17 new work item 'Security Methodology for Zero-Touch Massive IoT Deployment | ITU-T SG17 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑202858 | LS on SG17 new work item “Security aspect on electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) vehicle” | ITU-T SG17 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202859 | LS on draft ITU-T X.nsom-sec ‘Security requirements and architecture for network slice management and orchestration’ | ITU-T SG17 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202860 | LS on the stage 2 aspects of MINT (SP-200654 / C1-205332) | SP-200880 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202862 | LS on Rel-17 schedule | SP-200888 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑203079 | Reply LS to ETSI SAGE on use of 256-bit block Rijndael in Milenage-256 | THALES | LS out | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203550 | |||
S3‑203291 | Discussion on performance requirements of crypto algorithms in virtualized gNB implementations | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203326 | Notes from joint ETSI SAGE / SA3 conf call on 256bit keys | NTT DOCOMO | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203338 | 256-bit algorithms based on SNOW 3G or SNOW V | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑203492 | LS on Physical layer assisted lightweight AKA (PL-AKA) protocol for the Internet of things | Ericsson España S.A. | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203498 | Reply LS on threats of service disruption, SIP message alternation and content eavesdropping in 5G networks | SK Telecom | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203500 | Reply LS on Observations and questions on 256-bit security goals | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203550 | Reply LS to ETSI SAGE on use of 256-bit block Rijndael in Milenage-256 | THALES | LS out | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203079 | |||
4.1 | Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15) | S3‑202808 | NRF authorization during NF service consumer Access Token Get Request | Mavenir | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203497 | |
S3‑202809 | NRF authorization during NF service consumer Access Token Get Request | Mavenir | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203496 | |||
S3‑203053 | Clarification on PLMN ID verification in Rel15 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203054 | Clarification on PLMN ID verification in Rel16 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203144 | Verification of Serving Network Name in AUSF | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203145 | SEPP including PLMN-ID and verification of Serving Network Name in AUSF | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203056 | Modification policy clarification in Rel15 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203057 | Modification policy clarification in Rel16 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203142 | Corrections for the NRF token request service | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203537 | |||
S3‑203143 | Corrections for the NRF token request service | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203538 | |||
S3‑203194 | R15 NFc and NFp alignment in static authorization | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203195 | R16 NFc and NFp alignment in static authorization | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203196 | R15 Access Token Get Service - removal of ambigiouty | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203537 | |||
S3‑203197 | R16 Access Token Get Service - removal of ambigiouty | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203538 | |||
S3‑203198 | R15 Authorization of NF service access - removal of ambigious terminology | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203199 | R16 Authorization of NF service access - removal of ambigious terminology | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203200 | R15 Authorization of NF service access - service requst process steps | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203502 | |||
S3‑203201 | R16 Authorization of NF service access - service requst process steps | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203503 | |||
S3‑202889 | NAS COUNT storage for multiple PLMN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203476 | |||
S3‑203020 | Secondary authentication revocation rel15 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203515 | |||
S3‑203021 | Secondary authentication revocation rel16 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203516 | |||
S3‑203249 | [Rel-15]Correction to derivation of KSN for dual connectivity | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203250 | [Mirror]Correction to derivation of KSN for dual connectivity | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑202813 | Clarification to SEAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201873 | |||
S3‑202814 | Clarification to SEAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑202805 | Draft LS: Misalignment on requirement for access token request between TS 29.510 and 33.501 | Mavenir | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203495 | |||
S3‑202806 | SA3 and CT4 misalignment on token request for Discovery and NFManagement | Mavenir | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202807 | NRF authorization during NF service consumer Access Token Get Request | Mavenir | draftCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202832 | LS on Misalignments on HTTP message format over N32-f | C4-204409 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑203006 | Draft LS to CT6 on the NAS COUNTs storage | Apple | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203534 | |||
S3‑203052 | Discussion on verification of PLMN ID | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203055 | Reply LS on Misalignments on HTTP message format over N32-f | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203522 | |||
S3‑203071 | Discussion paper on TAU reject issue during MME handover | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Decision | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203141 | [DRAFT] reply-LS on Misalignments on HTTP message format over N32-f | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203322 | Proposal to introduce draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis to TS 33.501 | Ericsson | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑203324 | Notes from conf call on NAS COUNT storage | NTT DOCOMO | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203325 | Notes from second conf call on NAS COUNT storage | NTT DOCOMO | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203476 | NAS COUNT storage for multiple PLMN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202889 | |||
S3‑203495 | LS: Misalignment on requirement for access token request between TS 29.510 and 33.501 | Mavenir | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202805 | |||
S3‑203496 | NRF authorization during NF service consumer Access Token Get Request | Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202809 | |||
S3‑203497 | NRF authorization during NF service consumer Access Token Get Request | Mavenir, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202808 | |||
S3‑203502 | R15 Authorization of NF service access - service requst process steps | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203200 | |||
S3‑203503 | R16 Authorization of NF service access - service requst process steps | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203201 | |||
S3‑203515 | Secondary authentication revocation rel15 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203020 | |||
S3‑203516 | Secondary authentication revocation rel16 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203021 | |||
S3‑203523 | Modification policy clarification in Rel16 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑203534 | LS to CT6 on the NAS COUNTs storage | Apple | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203006 | |||
S3‑203537 | Corrections for the NRF token request service | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203142 | |||
S3‑203538 | Corrections for the NRF token request service | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203143 | |||
4.2 | Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16) | S3‑202900 | Update the pre-condition in clause 4.2.2.1.1, 4.2.2.1.2, 4.2.2.1.9, 4.2.2.1.10 and 4.2.2.1.11 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑203085 | Correction of test case for access token verification failure handling in different PLMN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203539 | |||
S3‑203086 | Reference of general SBA/SBI aspect in 33.512 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203103 | Reference of general SBA/SBI aspect in 33.513 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203104 | Reference of general SBA/SBI aspect in 33.514 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203105 | Reference of general SBA/SBI aspect in 33.515 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203107 | Reference of general SBA/SBI aspect in 33.516 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203108 | Reference of general SBA/SBI aspect in 33.519 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203539 | Correction of test case for access token verification failure handling in different PLMN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203085 | |||
S3‑203547 | Living CR to 33.514 | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑203548 | Living CR to 33.517 | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
4.3 | Mission Critical security (Rel-16) | S3‑202834 | Reply LS on ETSI Plugtest reports | ETSI MCX Plugtests | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑202880 | [33.180] R16 Fix terminology | Airbus | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203551 | |||
S3‑203551 | [33.180] R16 Fix terminology | Airbus | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202880 | |||
S3‑202881 | [33.180] R17 Fix terminology | Airbus | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203552 | |||
S3‑203552 | [33.180] R17 Fix terminology | Airbus | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202881 | |||
4.4 | Enhancements for Security aspects of Common API Framework for 3GPP Northbound APIs (Rel-16) |   | ||||||||||
4.5 | Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (Rel-16) |   | ||||||||||
4.6 | Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16) | S3‑202883 | Re-using of access token in indirect communication with delegated discovery | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203499 | S3‑201802 |
S3‑203148 | Token-based authorization for subsequent service requests in model D | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203499 | |||
S3‑203146 | Resolving Editor's Note on SCP performing token-based authorization on behalf of Network Functions | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203536 | |||
S3‑203147 | Resolving Editor's Notes on SCP authorization | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203501 | |||
S3‑203203 | NF-SCP Authorization | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203501 | |||
S3‑203204 | SCP-SCP Authorization | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203153 | Clarification on format for subjectAltName | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203205 | Making NF instance id in SBA certificate profile mandatory to support | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203050 | NF information addition in SBA certificate profile | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203049 | Input parameters of access token request addition and verification | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203520 | |||
S3‑203290 | Token-based authorization for indirect communication in roaming case | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203149 | Assertions: partial protection of the message | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203150 | Assertions: protection of service response | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203151 | Assertion requirement by the producer | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203152 | Access token requirement by the producer | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203202 | R16 NF Service Consumer authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203499 | Re-using of access token in indirect communication with delegated discovery | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Mavenir, Huawei, HiSilicon, CableLabs | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202883 | |||
S3‑203501 | NF-SCP Authorization | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203203 | |||
S3‑203536 | Resolving Editor's Note on SCP performing token-based authorization on behalf of Network Functions | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203146 | |||
4.7 | Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16) | S3‑202869 | CR Removal of AKMA changes to TS 33.501 in Rel-16 | China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑202870 | CR Removal of AKMA changes to TS 33.220 in Rel-16 | China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203488 | |||
S3‑202872 | CR for AKMA changes to TS 33.501 in Rel-17 | China Mobile International Ltd | CR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203486 | ||||
S3‑202873 | CR for AKMA changes to TS 33.220 in Rel-17 | China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203487 | |||
S3‑203211 | Update of the reference point interface names of AKMA | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203493 | |||
S3‑202903 | AAnF selection by AF | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202967 | Adding AAnF selection | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203213 | AKMA Anchor Function selection clause | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202902 | A new A-KID derivation after a new primary authentication | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202904 | AKMA key lifetime expiration in clause 5.2 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202905 | Kakma and A-KID refresh in clause 6.1 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203535 | |||
S3‑202906 | Kausf storing in AUSF | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203535 | |||
S3‑202963 | Adding details of AKMA key generation in the UE | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203482 | |||
S3‑203029 | Storage of the AKMA keys in the UE | THALES | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202908 | Rewording Kaf refresh | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202909 | the lifetime of KAF expiration | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑202901 | Clarification of RID in clause 6.1 for AKMA | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202907 | Resolution of editor's note on other parameter in clause 6.3 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202910 | UDM notifies AAnF AKMA context removal | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202944 | Corrections of clause 6.1 | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203535 | |||
S3‑202945 | Editorial modifications of AKMA | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203037 | AKMA: Adding missing service definition | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203518 | |||
S3‑203191 | Sending UE identifier to the AKMA AF | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203192 | Addition of UDM sending GPSI of the UE for AKMA | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203025 | Aware of AF‘s AKMA service capability in the UE | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202833 | LS on information of stage 3 aspects for AKMA | CP-202255 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202847 | LS on Reference point interface names for AKMA | S2-2008003 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202848 | Regulatory LI compliance of AKMA | S3i200477 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202868 | New WID on removal AKMA from Rel-16 | China Mobile | WID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑202871 | Revised WID of AKMA | China Mobile | WID revised | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203485 | ||||
S3‑202950 | Reply LS on Regulatory LI compliance of AKMA | China Mobile | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203181 | Specifying existing Ua protocols for use with AKMA | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203212 | Discussion on the AAnF selection | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203482 | Adding details of AKMA key generation in the UE | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202963 | |||
S3‑203485 | Revised WID of AKMA | China Mobile | WID revised | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202871 | ||||
S3‑203486 | CR for AKMA changes to TS 33.501 in Rel-17 | China Mobile International Ltd | CR | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202872 | ||||
S3‑203487 | CR for AKMA changes to TS 33.220 in Rel-17 | China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202873 | |||
S3‑203488 | CR Removal of AKMA changes to TS 33.220 in Rel-16 | China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202870 | |||
S3‑203493 | Update of the reference point interface names of AKMA | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203211 | |||
S3‑203494 | LS on AKMA Anchor Function selection | Ericsson España S.A. | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203518 | AKMA: Adding missing service definition | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Agreement | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑203037 | |||
S3‑203535 | Corrections of clause 6.1 | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202944 | |||
4.8 | Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16) | S3‑202825 | LS on 5G-GUTI reallocation after paging of a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode with suspend indication | C1-200967 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑202861 | LS on 5G GUTI re-allocation | SP-200883 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
4.9 | Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16) | S3‑203169 | Issues during authentication for N5GC and N5CW | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑203171 | Authentication method selection for N5CW | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203311 | Selecting the authentication method for devices that do not support 5GC NAS over WLAN access | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202887 | Error correction and clarification of Annex O | CableLabs | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203507 | |||
S3‑203170 | Authentication method selection and SUPI retrieval for N5GC | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203309 | Anonymous SUCI for N5GC | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203507 | Error correction and clarification of Annex O | CableLabs | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑202887 | |||
4.10 | Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16) | S3‑202826 | LS on NSSAA at inter-PLMN mobility | C1-206508 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑202842 | LS on Clarification on AAA-Server address | C4-203452 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202843 | LS Response on Clarification on AAA-Server address | S2-2007826 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑203022 | Slice privacy protection in NSSAA related procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203023 | Correction to the Nnssaaf_NSSAA_RevocationNotification services | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203024 | clean up to the Nnssaaf_NSSAA services | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203038 | LS reply on clarification on AAA server address | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203098 | Discussion on SN-ID in NSSAA | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203099 | Serving network ID in NSSAA | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203100 | Discussion on validity period of NSSAA results | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203101 | validity peirod of NSSAA result | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203102 | Clarification on binding of NSSAI and UE ID at AAA-S | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203106 | Addessing EN on transmitting NSSAI to AAA | China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203257 | Discussion on the need for a validity timer | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203258 | Discussion on the need for SN ID at the AAA-S side | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203259 | [DRAFT] LS on the need for SN-ID in NSSAA procedure | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
4.11 | Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16) |   | ||||||||||
4.12 | Security aspects of SEAL (Rel-16) |   | ||||||||||
4.13 | Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16) | S3‑202827 | LS on the re-keying procedure for NR SL | R2-2005978 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑202828 | Reply LS on the re-keying procedure for NR SL | C1-206576 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202882 | Corrections on security establishment | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑202952 | Clarification on cross-layer indication triggered by updating the security context | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203480 | |||
S3‑202884 | Security policy handling | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑202953 | Propose to improve the user plane security policy handling logic | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203481 | |||
S3‑203051 | Clarification on the security policy handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203521 | |||
S3‑203480 | Clarification on cross-layer indication triggered by updating the security context | Huawei, Hisilicon, LG Electronics | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202952 | |||
S3‑203481 | Proposal for improvement of the user plane security policy handling logic | Huawei, Hisilicon, Interdigital | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202953 | |||
S3‑203483 | Reply LS on the re-keying procedure for NR SL | LG Electronics Inc. | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
4.14 | Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17) | S3‑203219 | Living document for TS 33.220: SBA support for Zh and Zn interfaces | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203545 | |
S3‑203220 | Living document for TS 33.223: SBA support for Zpn | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203546 | |||
S3‑203221 | pCR to living document for TS 33.223: Resolving EN for private ID in Nbsp_Gba_PushInfo service operation response | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203508 | |||
S3‑203222 | LS on the SBA for GBA | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203223 | pCR to living document for TS 33.220: Resolving EN for GBA AKA | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203224 | pCR to living document for TS 33.223: Resolving EN for GBA AKA | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203225 | pCR to living document for TS 33.220: Resolving EN for HSS | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203509 | |||
S3‑203226 | pCR to living document for TS 33.223: Resolving EN for HSS | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203510 | |||
S3‑203508 | pCR to living document for TS 33.223: Resolving EN for private ID in Nbsp_Gba_PushInfo service operation response | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203221 | |||
S3‑203509 | pCR to living document for TS 33.220: Resolving EN for HSS | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203225 | |||
S3‑203510 | pCR to living document for TS 33.223: Resolving EN for HSS | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203226 | |||
S3‑203545 | Living document for TS 33.220: SBA support for Zh and Zn interfaces | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203219 | |||
S3‑203546 | Living document for TS 33.223: SBA support for Zpn | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203220 | |||
4.15 | Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17) | S3‑203072 | IMS SCAS: living doc for the threats | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203528 | |
S3‑203073 | IMS SCAS: new test case on synchronization failure handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203529 | |||
S3‑203074 | IMS SCAS: adding threats related to IMS signalling transport | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203530 | |||
S3‑203075 | IMS SCAS: new test case on the IMS signaling protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203531 | |||
S3‑203076 | IMS SCAS: adding threats related to Resynchronization failure | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203532 | |||
S3‑203077 | IMS SCAS: Adding the general requirements | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203533 | |||
S3‑203078 | IMS SCAS: Adding the assets and threats of the new NFs | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203111 | SCAS IMS: Removal of the sub-clause for SBA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203540 | |||
S3‑203113 | Threat of bidding down attack on security association | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203541 | |||
S3‑203114 | SCAS IMS: New Sub-Test Case against Bidding-down on Security Association | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203542 | |||
S3‑203517 | Draft TS 33.226 v0.3.0 | Huawei, Hisilicon | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203528 | IMS SCAS: living doc for the threats | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203072 | |||
S3‑203529 | IMS SCAS: new test case on synchronization failure handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203073 | |||
S3‑203530 | IMS SCAS: adding threats related to IMS signalling transport | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203074 | |||
S3‑203531 | IMS SCAS: new test case on the IMS signaling protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203075 | |||
S3‑203532 | IMS SCAS: adding threats related to Resynchronization failure | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203076 | |||
S3‑203533 | IMS SCAS: Adding the general requirements | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203077 | |||
S3‑203540 | SCAS IMS: Removal of the sub-clause for SBA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203111 | |||
S3‑203541 | Threat of bidding down attack on security association | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203113 | |||
S3‑203542 | SCAS IMS: New Sub-Test Case against Bidding-down on Security Association | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203114 | |||
4.16 | Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17) | S3‑202972 | living CR to TS 33.511 | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑202973 | Living CR toTR33.926 for eSCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203512 | |||
S3‑202974 | Living CR to TS33.117 | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203513 | |||
S3‑203059 | Threats related to security enforcement configuration for TSC services | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203524 | |||
S3‑203060 | New test case on security enforcement configuration for TSC services | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203525 | |||
S3‑203069 | Threats related to security enforcement configuration for 5G LAN services | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203526 | |||
S3‑203070 | New test case on security enforcement configuration for 5G LAN services | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203527 | |||
S3‑203115 | Updated Threat Analysis of Incorrect Verification of Access Tokens | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203543 | |||
S3‑203117 | Update of the Test Case for Access Token Verification Failure Handling | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203544 | |||
S3‑203118 | Threat analysis of inter-PLMN routing using the incorrect reference | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203119 | Test case for correct handling of inter-PLMN routing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203140 | Threat analysis of target API root tampering | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203157 | Test case for correct handling of the custom HTTP header with PRINS security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203512 | Living CR toTR33.926 for eSCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202973 | |||
S3‑203513 | Living CR to TS33.117 | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202974 | |||
S3‑203524 | Threats related to security enforcement configuration for TSC services | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203059 | |||
S3‑203525 | New test case on security enforcement configuration for TSC services | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203060 | |||
S3‑203526 | Threats related to security enforcement configuration for 5G LAN services | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203069 | |||
S3‑203527 | New test case on security enforcement configuration for 5G LAN services | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203070 | |||
S3‑203543 | Updated Threat Analysis of Incorrect Verification of Access Tokens | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203115 | |||
S3‑203544 | Update of the Test Case for Access Token Verification Failure Handling | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203117 | |||
4.17 | Security Assurance Specification for Service Communication Proxy (SECOP) (Rel-17) |   | ||||||||||
4.18 | Security Assurance Specification for 5G NWDAF (Rel-17) | S3‑203125 | Proposal to add introduction and NWDAF-specific security functional requirements | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203489 | |
S3‑203126 | Proposal to add security requirement and test cases for hardening about NWDAF | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203127 | Proposal to add security requirement and test cases for basic vulnerability testing about NWDAF | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203489 | Proposal to add introduction and NWDAF-specific security functional requirements | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203125 | |||
S3‑203490 | draft TS 33.521v0.2.0 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | draft TS | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
4.19 | Security Assurance Specification for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) (Rel- 17) | S3‑202977 | Threat analysis on no new created child SA | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202978 | Check whether the N3IWF creats a child SA for PDU session | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
4.20 | Security Assurance Specification for Inter PLMN UP Security (Rel-17) |   | ||||||||||
4.21 | eSCAS_5G for Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization Function (NSSAAF) | S3‑202975 | skeleton of NSSAAF SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203514 | |
S3‑202976 | The scope of NSSAAF SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203514 | skeleton of NSSAAF SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202975 | |||
S3‑203549 | TS 33.326 | Huawei, Hisilicon | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
4.22 | Mission critical security enhancements phase 2 |   | ||||||||||
4.23 | Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS | S3‑203186 | Extend UPIP support in 5GS for all 5GC connected RAN architecture (NG-RAN) options | Qualcomm Incorporated | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203511 | |
S3‑203511 | Extend UPIP support in 5GS for all 5GC connected RAN architecture (NG-RAN) options | Qualcomm Incorporated | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203186 | |||
4.24 | New work item proposals | S3‑202911 | Discussion on New WID on security of Access Traffic Steering, Switch and Splitting (ATSSS) support in 5GS | ZTE Corporation | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202912 | New WID on security of Access Traffic Steering, Switch and Splitting (ATSSS) support in 5GS | ZTE Corporation | WID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203112 | New WID on adapting BEST for use in 5G networks | KPN N.V. | WID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203484 | |||
S3‑203484 | New WID on adapting BEST for use in 5G networks | KPN N.V. | WID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203112 | |||
4.25 | Other work areas (no release restrictions) | S3‑203058 | Clarification on security policy configuration for TSC services | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑203068 | Clarification on security policy configuration for 5G LAN services | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203253 | Support for mutual authentication between network entities | Samsung, Verizon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203491 | |||
S3‑202819 | Editorial corrections to NDS/AF | Juniper Networks | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202810 | |||
S3‑203109 | Enforcement of password change after initial login R15 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203110 | Enforcement of password change after initial login R16 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203039 | SHA-1 deprecation in GBA | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203519 | |||
S3‑203313 | Aligning TLS in 33.222 with the current 3GPP TLS profile | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203505 | |||
S3‑203314 | Aligning TLS in 33.310 with the current 3GPP TLS profile | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑203315 | Correcting use of (D)TLS in 33.501 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203506 | |||
S3‑202986 | Handling of security parameters during authentication procedure | NEC | CR | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | |||||
S3‑203251 | Handling of KAUSF upon successful primary authentication | Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202951 | Handling of new Kausf during authentication procedure | NEC | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203227 | Selection of latest KAUSF for SoR/UPU and storage of KAUSF in the UE and AUSF | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202947 | Correct NAS uplink COUNT for KgNB/KeNB derivation | MediaTek Inc. | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202948 | Correction to inter-AMF mobility key derivation function | MediaTek Inc. | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑203004 | Authentication procedure during Xn handover procedure | NEC | CR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203474 | ||||
S3‑202810 | Editorial corrections to NDS/AF | Juniper Networks | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202819 | |||
S3‑202946 | NAS uplink COUNT used for AS SMC at radio bearer establishment | MediaTek Inc. | discussion | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203005 | DISC Authentication procedure during Xn handover procedure | NEC | discussion | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203047 | Discussion on MITM attack in vertical LAN | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203048 | LS on MITM Attack in CAG | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203228 | LS on successful authentication event on the UE for 5G AKA | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203252 | Discussion on the UE handling newly generated KAUSF | Samsung | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203474 | Authentication procedure during Xn handover procedure | NEC | CR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203475 | S3‑203004 | |||
S3‑203475 | Authentication procedure during Xn handover procedure | NEC | CR | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑203474 | ||||
S3‑203491 | Support for mutual authentication between network entities | Samsung, Verizon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203253 | |||
S3‑203505 | Aligning TLS in 33.222 with the current 3GPP TLS profile | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203313 | |||
S3‑203506 | Correcting use of (D)TLS in 33.501 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203315 | |||
S3‑203519 | SHA-1 deprecation in GBA | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203039 | |||
S3‑203520 | Input parameters of access token request addition and verification | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203049 | |||
S3‑203521 | Clarification on the security policy handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203051 | |||
S3‑203522 | Reply LS on Misalignments on HTTP message format over N32-f | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203055 | |||
5.1 | Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations | S3‑202835 | Reply LS to SA3 on FBS detection | R2-1914224 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑202866 | pCR Update to solution #20 (6.20.2.5.1) Trust Anchors in UE of TR 33.809 | Deutsche Telekom AG | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202891 | Additions to Key Issue#7 on MitM detection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202892 | Solution proposal for KI#7MitM detection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202893 | Updates to solution #20 (6.20.4) | CableLabs, Interdigital, Apple, Deutsche Telekom AG, Intel, Rogers Communications, Philips | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203470 | |||
S3‑202943 | Detection of MiTM False Base Station | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202983 | New solution for KI#3 | Philips International B.V., CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203364 | |||
S3‑202984 | Clarification Solution #23 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203007 | 5GFBS-Edotorial change in Clause 4 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203008 | 5GFBS- Edotorial change in Clause 5.2.1 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203452 | |||
S3‑203158 | 5GFBS: Accuracy of Loaction Estimate for Solution#22 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203160 | 5GFBS: Legitimate BS detected as FBS for Solution#22 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203310 | Updates to solution #20 (6.20.2.2.4) | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203471 | |||
S3‑203364 | UE&Network-assisted UE avoidance and Network detection of FBS | Philips International B.V., CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202983 | |||
S3‑203447 | TR 33.809-5GFBS | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203452 | 5GFBS- Edotorial change in Clause 5.2.1 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203008 | |||
S3‑203470 | Updates to solution #20 (6.20.4) | CableLabs, Interdigital, Apple, Deutsche Telekom AG, Intel, Rogers Communications, Philips | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202893 | |||
S3‑203471 | Updates to solution #20 (6.20.2.2.4) | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203310 | |||
5.2 | Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products | S3‑202969 | Missing details in clause 4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202982 | Discussion Paper for virtualization SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑203128 | Editorial correction on TR 33.818 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203344 | |||
S3‑203129 | Adding hardening requirements for GVNP of type 1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203346 | |||
S3‑203130 | Adding hardening requirements for GVNP of type 2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203347 | |||
S3‑203131 | Adding hardening requirements for GVNP of type 3 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203132 | Adding basic vulnerability testing requirements for GVNP | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203348 | |||
S3‑203133 | Adding vendor development and product lifecycle processes and test laboratory accreditation into Clause 6 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203134 | Adding evaluation and SCAS instantiation into clause 7 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203135 | Adding test case into clause 5.2.5.5.8.5.1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203349 | |||
S3‑203136 | Adding test case into clause 5.2.5.6.6.1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203137 | Adding impact to existing SECAM-SCAS documents into clause 8.1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203138 | proposal for way forward | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203161 | SCAS VNP: Adding Definitions for ETSI NFV Terms | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203403 | |||
S3‑203162 | SCAS VNP: DoS Attack via Changing Virtualized Resource | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203404 | |||
S3‑203163 | SCAS VNP: Secure Execution Environment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203405 | |||
S3‑203164 | SCAS VNP: Threats on VNF-VNFM Interface | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203406 | |||
S3‑203166 | SCAS VNP: VM Escape and Hypervisor Escape | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203167 | SCAS VNP: Security requirements on the interface between VNF and VNFM | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203407 | |||
S3‑203344 | Editorial correction on TR 33.818 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203128 | |||
S3‑203346 | Adding hardening requirements for GVNP of type 1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203129 | |||
S3‑203347 | Adding hardening requirements for GVNP of type 2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203130 | |||
S3‑203348 | Adding basic vulnerability testing requirements for GVNP | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203132 | |||
S3‑203349 | Adding test case into clause 5.2.5.5.8.5.1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203135 | |||
S3‑203350 | draft TR33.818 v0.9.0 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑203403 | SCAS VNP: Adding Definitions for ETSI NFV Terms | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203161 | |||
S3‑203404 | SCAS VNP: DoS Attack via Changing Virtualized Resource | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203162 | |||
S3‑203405 | SCAS VNP: Secure Execution Environment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203163 | |||
S3‑203406 | SCAS VNP: Threats on VNF-VNFM Interface | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203164 | |||
S3‑203407 | SCAS VNP: Security requirements on the interface between VNF and VNFM | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203167 | |||
5.3 | Study on User Plane Integrity Protection | S3‑202979 | UP IP-Update solution #11 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203454 | |
S3‑203009 | UPIP-EN addressing in solution#19 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203010 | UPIP-Evaluation in Solution#18 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203453 | |||
S3‑203173 | Resolving the ENs in solution #18 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203377 | |||
S3‑203174 | Resolving EN in solution #19 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203175 | Best effort UP IP for EPS | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203385 | |||
S3‑203280 | UPIP: Remove Editor note in evaluation clause in solution #11 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203374 | |||
S3‑203281 | UPIP: Configuration of the UP IP policy | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203282 | UPIP: Resolve EN about X2 HO in Solution #11 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203375 | |||
S3‑203283 | UPIP: Resolve EN in Solution #17 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203378 | |||
S3‑203284 | UPIP: New solutions for interworking handover from EPS to 5GS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203379 | |||
S3‑203285 | UPIP: New solution for S1 handover | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203381 | |||
S3‑203286 | UPIP: New solution for X2 handover | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203382 | |||
S3‑203287 | UPIP: New solutions for interworking handover from 5GS to EPS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203384 | |||
S3‑203288 | UPIP: Conclusion on UE connects to EPC via eUTRA | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203335 | Draft TR 33.853 v1.2.0 | Samsung | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203374 | UPIP: Remove Editor note in evaluation clause in solution #11 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203280 | |||
S3‑203375 | UPIP: Resolve EN about X2 HO in Solution #11 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203282 | |||
S3‑203377 | Resolving the ENs in solution #18 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203173 | |||
S3‑203378 | UPIP: Resolve EN in Solution #17 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203283 | |||
S3‑203379 | UPIP: New solutions for interworking handover from EPS to 5GS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203284 | |||
S3‑203381 | UPIP: New solution for S1 handover | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203285 | |||
S3‑203382 | UPIP: New solution for X2 handover | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203286 | |||
S3‑203383 | Draft TR 33.853 v1.3.0 | Vodafone GmbH | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203384 | UPIP: New solutions for interworking handover from 5GS to EPS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203287 | |||
S3‑203385 | Best effort UP IP for EPS | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203175 | |||
S3‑203453 | UPIP-Evaluation in Solution#18 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203010 | |||
S3‑203454 | UP IP-Update solution #11 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202979 | |||
5.4 | Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation |   | ||||||||||
5.5 | Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS | S3‑202811 | Discussion paper for evaluation update of solution #4.3 in TR 33.846 | Deutsche Telekom AG | discussion | Decision | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202812 | pCR: Evaluation update of solution #4.3 in TR 33.846 | Deutsche Telekom AG | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202850 | Reply to LS on Resynchronisations | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑202913 | Discussion on key issue 4.1 in TR 33.846 | ZTE Corporation | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202914 | New solution for key issue# 4.1 in TR 33.846 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202915 | Conclusion for Key Issue #4.1 in TR 33.846 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202916 | Solution of Mitigation against the SUPI replay attack | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202917 | Update solution#2.1 in TR 33.846 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202958 | New solution to mitigate SUPI guessing and SUCI replay attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203080 | TR 33.846: evaluation of solution #2.1 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203081 | TR 33.846: evaluation of solution #2.2 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203393 | |||
S3‑203082 | TR 33.846: evaluation of solution #2.4 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203083 | TR 33.846: conclusion for Key Issue #2.1 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203084 | TR 33.846: conclusion for Key Issue #4.1 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203120 | Solution to address the Key issue #2.2 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203121 | Update to Key issue #2.2 on SUCI Replay in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203122 | Need a unified solution to the key issue #2.1 and key issue #4.1 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203123 | Propose a conclusion for the key issue #2.1 and key issue #4.1 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203178 | Some evaluation of solution #2.2 in TR 33.846 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203394 | S3‑202644 | ||
S3‑203179 | Proposing a conclusion for key issue #4.1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑202647 | |||
S3‑203218 | Editorial corrections | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203327 | Applicability of KIs to Solution on SQNms protection by concealment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203328 | Ed.note resolution on backward compatibility in solution SQNms protection by concealment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203329 | Solution update - SQNms protection by concealment in USIM | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203330 | New solution - SQNms protection by concealment in ME | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203331 | Extension of KI on linkability attack | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203332 | KI-Solution mapping table | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203372 | |||
S3‑203333 | Editorial MCC requested correction | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203376 | |||
S3‑203372 | KI-Solution mapping table | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203332 | |||
S3‑203376 | Editorial MCC requested correction | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203333 | |||
S3‑203388 | Draft TR 33.846 v0.9.0 Study on authentication enhancements in the 5G System (5GS) | Ericsson España S.A. | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203393 | TR 33.846: evaluation of solution #2.2 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203081 | |||
S3‑203394 | Some evaluation of solution #2.2 in TR 33.846 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203178 | |||
5.6 | Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication | S3‑203018 | TR 33.845: solution #4 | THALES, KPN | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑203256 | Conclusions for TR 33.845 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203289 | Evaluation for Solution #1 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203342 | |||
S3‑203294 | Evaluation for Solution #2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203343 | |||
S3‑203301 | Evaluation for Solution #9 and Solution #11 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203306 | removal of Editor’s Notes | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203345 | |||
S3‑203336 | Draft TR 33.845 v0.5.0 | Samsung R&D Institute UK | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203342 | Evaluation for Solution #1 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203289 | |||
S3‑203343 | Evaluation for Solution #2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203294 | |||
S3‑203345 | removal of Editor’s Notes | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203306 | |||
S3‑203380 | Draft TR 33.845 v0.6.0 | Vodafone GmbH | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.7 | Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems | S3‑202822 | Support of UAVs in 3GPP system and interfacing with USS/UTM | GSMA | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑202874 | TR 33.854 Update for solution#3 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203352 | |||
S3‑202875 | TR 33.854 Update for solution#4 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203353 | |||
S3‑202876 | TR 33.854 Update for solution#5 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203354 | |||
S3‑202877 | TR 33.854 Update for KI#2 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203390 | |||
S3‑203088 | Addressing EN in KI#2: scope of pairing authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203390 | |||
S3‑203089 | Addressing EN in KI#3: scope of TPAE A&A | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203090 | Addressing EN in KI#6: scope of RID security protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203091 | Addressing EN in KI#7: scope of C2 Security | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203092 | A solution to TPAE A&A | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203093 | A solutin to UAV and UAV-C pairing authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon, InterDigital | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203387 | |||
S3‑203094 | A solution to RID information protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203095 | A solution to C2 communication security | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203176 | Authentication and authorisation of UAVs | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203386 | S3‑202641 | ||
S3‑203177 | Modification of the pairing key issue | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203390 | |||
S3‑203230 | Optimized_UAS_Enabled_Authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203371 | ||||
S3‑203231 | DHIES encryption to avoid UAV spoofing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑203292 | UAS: Update of solution #2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203296 | Update to KI #2 on Pairing authorization for UAV and UAVC | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203390 | |||
S3‑203298 | Update to Solution #7 on UAS Authentication | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203300 | Update to Solution 7 to align on UAS NF | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203303 | Update to Solution #7 to resolve EN in UAS Authentication | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203352 | TR 33.854 Update for solution#3 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202874 | |||
S3‑203353 | TR 33.854 Update for solution#4 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202875 | |||
S3‑203354 | TR 33.854 Update for solution#5 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202876 | |||
S3‑203371 | Optimized_UAS_Enabled_Authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203230 | ||||
S3‑203386 | Authentication and authorisation of UAVs | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203176 | |||
S3‑203387 | A solutin to UAV and UAV-C pairing authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon, InterDigital | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203093 | |||
S3‑203390 | Modification of the pairing key issue | Qualcomm Incorporated, Interdigital, Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203177 | |||
S3‑203467 | TR 33.854 v0.3.0 | Qualcomm Incoporated | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.8 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC | S3‑202839 | LS on IP address to GPSI translation | S2-2005923 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑202849 | Reply LS on IP address to GPSI translation | S6-202008 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202896 | Editoral modifications in TR 33.839 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203441 | |||
S3‑202897 | Update key issue #1 in TR 33.839 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203433 | |||
S3‑202898 | Update Key issue #2 in TR 33.839 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203434 | |||
S3‑202899 | Update Solution #6 in TR 33.839 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203435 | |||
S3‑202918 | Update solution 14 in TR 33.839 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202927 | Update Solution #10 in TR 33.839 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203437 | |||
S3‑202928 | Update Solution #15 in TR 33.839 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202931 | Authentication and Authorization Framework for EDGE-4 interfaces using Primary authentication and proxy interface | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203412 | ||||
S3‑202932 | Updates to Solution 4 | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203413 | ||||
S3‑202933 | Updates to Solution 12 | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203414 | ||||
S3‑203011 | MEC-Addressing the EN on key hierachy in solution#2 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203012 | MEC-Addressing the EN on EEC ID in solution#2 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203013 | MEC-Adding the ENs in solution#7 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203027 | Add reference TR33.867 and clean up | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203441 | |||
S3‑203028 | Security between the SMF and LDNSR | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203032 | EC:New key issue on protecting UPF in customer network | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203033 | EC: New Key issue on user privacy for UPF in customer network | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203034 | EC: New key issue on N4 protection for UPF in customer network | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203045 | EC: Editor notes removal | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203457 | |||
S3‑203064 | EC: New solution on Edge Data Network authentication and authorization for key issue #4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203065 | EC: New solution on authorization during Edge Data Network change | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203443 | |||
S3‑203066 | EC: new solution on exposure for key issue #8 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203067 | EC: Framework on the EEC authentication and authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203444 | |||
S3‑203154 | New Solution to KI#1, 2, 3, 6: TLS and HTTP Digest with AKMA | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203355 | |||
S3‑203248 | Resolving editor’s note on using TLS based on AKMA PSK | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203319 | Removal of EN on AMF routing | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203460 | |||
S3‑203320 | Removal of EN on ECS in HPLMN | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203461 | |||
S3‑203321 | Removal of EN on replay attack | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203339 | LS on clarification regarding EEC ID | Ericsson LM | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑203355 | New Solution to KI#1, 2, 3, 6: TLS and HTTP Digest with AKMA | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203154 | |||
S3‑203360 | Reply LS on IP address to GPSI translation | Samsung | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑203412 | Authentication and Authorization Framework for EDGE-4 interfaces using Primary authentication and proxy interface | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202931 | ||||
S3‑203413 | Updates to Solution 4 | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202932 | ||||
S3‑203414 | Updates to Solution 12 | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202933 | ||||
S3‑203433 | Update key issue #1 in TR 33.839 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202897 | |||
S3‑203434 | Update Key issue #2 in TR 33.839 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202898 | |||
S3‑203435 | Update Solution #6 in TR 33.839 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202899 | |||
S3‑203436 | Draft TR 33.839 v0.3.0 | HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Co. Ltd. | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203437 | Update Solution #10 in TR 33.839 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202927 | |||
S3‑203441 | Add reference TR33.867 and clean up | Huawei, Hisilicon, CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203027 | |||
S3‑203443 | EC: New solution on authorization during Edge Data Network change | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203065 | |||
S3‑203444 | EC: Framework on the EEC authentication and authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203067 | |||
S3‑203457 | EC: Editor notes removal | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203045 | |||
S3‑203460 | Removal of EN on AMF routing | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203319 | |||
S3‑203461 | Removal of EN on ECS in HPLMN | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203320 | |||
5.9 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS | S3‑202816 | Modified KI#5 for TR 33.847 – privacy of identities for UE2N path switc | InterDigital Communications, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203358 | |
S3‑202817 | Update of KI#8 for TR 33.847 – privacy of identities for UE2UE Relay path switch | InterDigital Communications, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203362 | |||
S3‑202818 | New solution for TR 33.847 – Privacy handling for Layer-3 UE-to-UE Relay based on IP routing | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203369 | |||
S3‑202820 | TR 33.847 Update for solution #10 | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203269 | |||
S3‑202838 | LS on Security Requirements for Sidelink/PC5 Relays | S2-2004750 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑202846 | LS on SA2 progress on UE-to-Network Relay and UE-to-UE Relay | S2-2007945 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202864 | TR 33.847- new KI on security policy handling in ProSe UE2NW relay | Samsung, LG Electronics, InterDigital, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202865 | TR 33.847-Solution for secondary authentication in relay communication | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203351 | |||
S3‑202954 | Update Sol#3 to resolve EN | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202955 | Update Sol#4 to resolve EN | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202956 | Update to Sol#7 to address EN and add evaluation | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203425 | |||
S3‑202957 | Propose to resolve EN in the security requirement of KI#12 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203426 | |||
S3‑202968 | security solution for UE-to-Network Relay based on Layer 2 Relay | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203430 | |||
S3‑202970 | New Key issue on supporting security flexibility | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202971 | Delete Editor's Note in solution 9 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203431 | |||
S3‑203014 | ProSe-Modification in key issue#1 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203448 | |||
S3‑203015 | ProSe-Modification in key issue#6 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203016 | pCR to TR33.847-Rapporteur cleaning up work | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203017 | pCR to TR33.847-Update Solution#3 for removing some ENs | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203440 | |||
S3‑203019 | pCR to TR33.847-Update Solution#4 for removing some ENs | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203026 | Solution on key management for UE-to-network relay | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203432 | |||
S3‑203061 | 5G ProSe: New key issue on UE-to-UE Relay or UE-to-Network Relay selection | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203062 | 5G ProSe: New solution on UE-to-UE Relay or UE-to-Network Relay selection | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203063 | 5G ProSe: New solution on e2e authentication between two UE2 in the UE-to-UE relay scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203442 | |||
S3‑203087 | A solution for groupcast security and privacy | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203462 | |||
S3‑203182 | Solution for secure PC5 link establishment for UE-to-network relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203416 | S3‑202648 | ||
S3‑203183 | Solution to establish end-to-end security for the L3 UE-to-network relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203417 | S3‑202649 | ||
S3‑203184 | Solution for secure PC5 link establishment for UE-to-UE relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203418 | S3‑202650 | ||
S3‑203210 | ProSe: Handling of AF’s for key managment | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203373 | |||
S3‑203229 | New Solution for KI#11: Masked representation of identities | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203341 | |||
S3‑203269 | TR 33.847 Update for solution #10 | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203391 | S3‑202820 | ||
S3‑203305 | Update to Key Issue #12 – Validity and refresh of security context | KPN N.V. | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203426 | ||||
S3‑203307 | Update to Key Issue #12 – Out of coverage scenario | KPN N.V. | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑203308 | New Solution for KI#12: Initial key with validity time | KPN N.V. | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203340 | ||||
S3‑203318 | New Key Issue on privacy of PDU session parameters | Philips International B.V., Interdigital | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203396 | |||
S3‑203334 | TR 33.847: GBA-based solution to protect PC3 interface | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203340 | New Solution for KI#12: Initial key with validity time | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203308 | |||
S3‑203341 | New Solution for KI#11: Masked representation of identities | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203229 | |||
S3‑203351 | TR 33.847-Solution for secondary authentication in relay communication | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202865 | |||
S3‑203358 | Modified KI#5 for TR 33.847 – privacy of identities for UE2N path switch | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202816 | |||
S3‑203362 | Update of KI#8 for TR 33.847 – privacy of identities for UE2UE Relay path switch | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202817 | |||
S3‑203369 | New solution for TR 33.847 – Privacy handling for Layer-3 UE-to-UE Relay based on IP routing | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202818 | |||
S3‑203373 | ProSe: Handling of AF’s for key managment | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203210 | |||
S3‑203391 | TR 33.847 Update for solution #10 | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203269 | |||
S3‑203396 | New Key Issue on privacy of PDU session parameters | Philips International B.V., Interdigital | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203318 | |||
S3‑203416 | Solution for secure PC5 link establishment for UE-to-network relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203182 | |||
S3‑203417 | Solution to establish end-to-end security for the L3 UE-to-network relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203183 | |||
S3‑203418 | Solution for secure PC5 link establishment for UE-to-UE relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203184 | |||
S3‑203425 | Update to Sol#7 to address EN and add evaluation | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202956 | |||
S3‑203426 | Propose to resolve EN in the security requirement of KI#12 | Huawei, Hisilicon, KPN | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202957 | |||
S3‑203430 | security solution for UE-to-Network Relay based on Layer 2 Relay | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202968 | |||
S3‑203431 | Delete Editor's Note in solution 9 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202971 | |||
S3‑203432 | Solution on key management for UE-to-network relay | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203026 | |||
S3‑203440 | pCR to TR33.847-Update Solution#3 for removing some ENs | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203017 | |||
S3‑203442 | 5G ProSe: New solution on e2e authentication between two UE2 in the UE-to-UE relay scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203063 | |||
S3‑203448 | ProSe-Modification in key issue#1 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203014 | |||
S3‑203459 | Draft TR 33.847 v0.3.0 Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS | CATT | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203462 | A solution for groupcast security and privacy | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203087 | |||
5.10 | Study on security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT | S3‑203043 | New requirement on key issue #2 of TR 33.851 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑203044 | New solution on key issue #2 of TR 33.851 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203190 | Revised SID on IIoT Security | Qualcomm Incorporated | SID revised | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203208 | IIoT: Update to solution #1 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203209 | IIoT: New solution for protection of time synchronisation messages | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203232 | Requirements for KI on multiple working domains | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203233 | Solution on multiple working domains | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203234 | KI update – time synchronization messages | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203235 | KI details Attacks based on asymmetric channel delay | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203236 | KI details TSN AF to NW-TT DS-TT interface security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203237 | KI requirements and solution TSN AF to NW-TT DS-TT interface security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203238 | Annex on Security considerations for integration with TSN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203389 | TR_33.851_IIoT_Sec | Nokia Germany | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
5.11 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services | S3‑202919 | Add some abbreviations for TR 33.850 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203422 | |
S3‑202920 | New solution for key issue#1 in TR 33.850 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203423 | |||
S3‑202921 | Update solution#3 in TR 33.850 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203424 | |||
S3‑202964 | new key issue on the security protection between content provider and 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203427 | |||
S3‑202965 | new solution on the security protection between content provider and 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203428 | |||
S3‑202966 | Solving the editoral note in solution 2 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203429 | |||
S3‑202985 | Traffic_Key_Update_Need_And_Solution | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203361 | |||
S3‑203031 | MBS:Updates to the solutions for 5G MBS authorization revocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203361 | Key_Update_Need_And_Solution | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202985 | |||
S3‑203422 | Add some abbreviations for TR 33.850 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202919 | |||
S3‑203423 | New solution for key issue#1 in TR 33.850 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202920 | |||
S3‑203424 | Update solution#3 in TR 33.850 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202921 | |||
S3‑203427 | new key issue on the security protection between content provider and 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202964 | |||
S3‑203428 | new solution on the security protection between content provider and 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202965 | |||
S3‑203429 | Solving the editoral note in solution 2 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202966 | |||
S3‑203455 | Draft TR 33.850 | Huawei, Hisilicon | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
5.12 | Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks | S3‑202837 | LS on architectures for access to SNPNs using credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | S2-2004385 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑202844 | LS on NG-RAN broadcast of Onboarding Network information in the SIB | S2-2007849 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202885 | Resolution of editor notes related to usage of MSK vs. EMSK. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202886 | [DRAFT] Reply-LS on NG-RAN broadcast of Onboarding Network information in the SIB. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203402 | |||
S3‑202888 | Updates to solution #3 | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203468 | |||
S3‑202890 | New solution for Key Issue #1 with enhanced security of KAUSF | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203469 | |||
S3‑202922 | New solution on UE onboarding for SNPN with AAA-S as DCS | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203438 | |||
S3‑202923 | New solution on UE onboarding for SNPN with UDM as DCS | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203439 | |||
S3‑202924 | Reply LS on architectures for access to SNPNs using credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203399 | |||
S3‑202929 | Discussion on LS on NG-RAN broadcast of Onboarding Network information in the SIB | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202930 | Reply to LS S2-2007849 on NG-RAN broadcast of Onboarding Network information in the SIB | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203402 | |||
S3‑202939 | Solution to UE onboarding for non-public networks | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Yes |
YesIntel requested to be minuted in the official report that the objection from Orange is not acceptable because it was provided in the last minute, without any prior comment, and without any justification relevant to the document, leaving no possibility to Intel to address their concerns
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202987 | New Solution on Authentication for UE onboarding for SNPN | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202988 | Solution Update for Solution #5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202989 | Discussion for Provisioning of Credentials | Huawei, Hisilicon, China mobile | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202990 | Clarification on Key Issue #2 | Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson, Intel, China Mobile, Philips | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202991 | New Key Issue on Provisioning of PNI-NPN credentials | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Mobile, Philips | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202992 | LS on Clarification on the Scope of eNPN for Provisioning Aspect | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203035 | NPN: New solution to key issue #1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203036 | NPN: Updates to key issue #1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203046 | NPN: New solution to key issue #1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203116 | [DRAFT] LS on DCS mechanisms to authenticate the UE | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203155 | New Solution to KI#3: Authentication to IMS Core using credentials generated with AKMA | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203156 | New Solution to KI#3: Authentication to IMS Core using credentials generated from the KAUSF | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203168 | TR 33.857: scope | THALES, Orange, Idemia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203172 | Solutions sketches for KI#2 (Provisioning of credentials) | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203187 | pCR: High-Level Solution framework for KI#4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203401 | ||||
S3‑203188 | Reply LS on NG-RAN broadcast of Onboarding Network information in the SIB | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203402 | ||||
S3‑203193 | TR 33.857: security assumptions | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203263 | New Key Issue on Provisioning of PNI-NPN credentials | Ericsson, China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203264 | Proposed TR Assumptions on credentials | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203398 | |||
S3‑203265 | Adding Subscription Owner terminology | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203266 | [DRAFT] LS on AAA based solutions for credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203399 | |||
S3‑203267 | New Solution: Secure initial access to an SNPN onboarding network | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203397 | |||
S3‑203268 | [DRAFT] LS on locating the DCS with the help of SUPI or SUCI | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203466 | |||
S3‑203299 | UE accessing most preferred serving NPN | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑203397 | New Solution: Secure initial access to an SNPN onboarding network | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203267 | |||
S3‑203398 | Proposed TR Assumptions on credentials | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203264 | |||
S3‑203399 | LS on AAA based solutions for credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | Ericsson, ZTE | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203266 | |||
S3‑203400 | Draft TR 33857 v030 Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks (NPN) | Ericsson | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203401 | pCR: High-Level Solution framework for KI#4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203187 | ||||
S3‑203402 | Reply LS on NG-RAN broadcast of Onboarding Network information in the SIB | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203188 | ||||
S3‑203438 | New solution on UE onboarding for SNPN with AAA-S as DCS | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202922 | |||
S3‑203439 | New solution on UE onboarding for SNPN with UDM as DCS | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202923 | |||
S3‑203466 | LS on locating the DCS with the help of SUPI or SUCI | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203268 | |||
S3‑203468 | Updates to solution #3 | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202888 | |||
S3‑203469 | New solution for Key Issue #1 with enhanced security of KAUSF | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202890 | |||
5.13 | Study on security aspects of the Disaggregated gNB Architecture | S3‑202980 | LS to RAN3 on Progress on security study for disaggregated gNB | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202981 | CU-UPs key separation | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Telecom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203030 | pCR to TR33.840- Add missing references | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203185 | Key Issue on Impact of Simultaneous CU-UP applying common UP security | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203207 | pCR to TR33.840-New key issue for CU-UPs security policy difference | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203302 | third party gNB-CU-UP | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑203304 | disaggregated gNB secure environment | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑203415 | TR33.840 v0.2.0 | China Telecommunications | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.14 | Study on User Consent for 3GPP services | S3‑202894 | Key Issue on Generic User consent | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202996 | Scope of User Consent for 3GPP Services | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203451 | |||
S3‑202997 | System Architecture for User Consent for 3GPP Services in 5G System | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202998 | Background for User Consent | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202999 | Consideration Factors for User Consent | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203000 | Add two Use Cases for UC3S | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203001 | Structuring key issues per SID objectives | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203002 | Adding general clause to key issue part | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203003 | Reword the reference description | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203244 | Usecase for User Consent in Edge Computing | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203245 | Exposed user information in Edge computing | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203246 | Potential Requirement on user's consent for exposure of information to Edge Applications | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203247 | User consent for exposure of information to Edge Applications | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203297 | user consent in ProSe restricted discovery | Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203451 | Scope of User Consent for 3GPP Services | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202996 | |||
S3‑203458 | Draft TR 33.867 | Huawei,Hisilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.15 | Study on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service | S3‑203139 | Key issue on authentication and authorization between MSGin5G Gateway Client and MSGin5G server | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑203239 | Authentication and authorization between 5GMSGS client and MSGin5G server | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203365 | |||
S3‑203240 | Authentication and authorization between 5GMSGS client and MSGin5G server using secondary authentication | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203366 | |||
S3‑203241 | Transport security for MSGin5G-1 interface | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203365 | Authentication and authorization between 5GMSGS client and MSGin5G server | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203239 | |||
S3‑203366 | Authentication and authorization between 5GMSGS client and MSGin5G server using secondary authentication | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203240 | |||
S3‑203464 | draft TR 33.862 0.2.0 | China Mobile International Ltd | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.16 | Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2 | S3‑202841 | LS on method for collection of data from the UE | S2-2006292 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑202845 | LS on authorization to access data | S2-2007931 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202949 | New Key issue on reporting of base station involved in cyber attack | NEC | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202993 | Add Security Requirement for Key Issue #2.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203449 | |||
S3‑202994 | LS on Mitigation Aspects for Cyber-Attack Detection | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202995 | Scope of eNA Security | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203450 | |||
S3‑203124 | Requirements to TR 33.866 on key issue 5.2.1 Cyber-attacks Detection | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203449 | |||
S3‑203242 | New KI on Authentication and Authorization of Application clients | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203243 | New KI on Privacy and integrity protection for transmitted data between AF and NWDAF | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203367 | |||
S3‑203260 | Update to key issue 3.1 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203261 | Potential security requirement to KI 2.1 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203262 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on securing data collection from UE | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203270 | eNA study scope | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203450 | |||
S3‑203271 | eNA overview | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203357 | |||
S3‑203272 | KI on Authorization of consumers for data access via DCCF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203273 | KI on privacy preservation for transmitted data | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203370 | |||
S3‑203274 | Requirements to KI on privacy preservation for transmitted data | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203363 | |||
S3‑203275 | KI on Abnormal NF behavior detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203276 | Requirements to KI on Abnormal NF behavior detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203473 | |||
S3‑203277 | Update to KI Cyber-attacks Detection supported by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203278 | Key issue on processing of tampered data | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203359 | |||
S3‑203279 | Solution on processing of tampered data | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203312 | eNA: [DRAFT] Reply LS on securing data collection from UE | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑203316 | Key issue on security of data collection from UE | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203317 | Analytics for MitM Attack Detection | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203323 | Reply to LS on authorization to access data | NTT DOCOMO | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203368 | |||
S3‑203357 | eNA overview | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203271 | |||
S3‑203359 | Key issue on processing of tampered data | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203278 | |||
S3‑203363 | Requirements to KI on privacy preservation for transmitted data | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203274 | |||
S3‑203367 | New KI on Privacy and integrity protection for transmitted data between AF and NWDAF | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203243 | |||
S3‑203368 | Reply to LS on authorization to access data | NTT DOCOMO | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203323 | |||
S3‑203370 | KI on privacy preservation for transmitted data | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203273 | |||
S3‑203449 | Add Security Requirement for Key Issue #2.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202993 | |||
S3‑203450 | Scope of eNA Security | Huawei, Hisilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202995 | |||
S3‑203463 | draft TR 33.866 0.2.0 | China Mobile International Ltd | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑203473 | Requirements to KI on Abnormal NF behavior detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203276 | |||
5.17 | Study on the security of AMF re-allocation | S3‑202829 | LS on Clarification on processing of messages after NAS security establishment | C1-206582 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑202925 | Architecture and security assumptions of AMF re-allocation | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202926 | LS on Clarification of requirements and architecture impacts by network slice isolation | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203040 | AMFREAL: Description of AMF reallocation procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203445 | |||
S3‑203041 | AMFREAL: New key issue on registration failure with AMF reallocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203420 | |||
S3‑203042 | AMFREAL: New solution to registration failure with AMF reallocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203446 | |||
S3‑203180 | AMF re-allocation via RAN using existing security states | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203395 | |||
S3‑203214 | Assumptions for the AMF re-allocation security study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203419 | |||
S3‑203215 | New key issue for the security of the AMF re-allocation procedures | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203420 | |||
S3‑203216 | New solution for AMF re-allocation procedure when 5G NAS security context is rerouted via RAN | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203421 | |||
S3‑203217 | New solution for NAS re-route via RAN and the use of a well-connected network function | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203293 | Key Issue on Security Context handling issues with AMF re-allocation | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203420 | |||
S3‑203295 | Solution to enable NAS Security for AMF reallocation and reroute via RAN Scenario | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203465 | |||
S3‑203392 | Draft TR 33.864 v0.2.0 Study on the security of Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) re-allocation | Ericsson España S.A. | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203395 | AMF re-allocation via RAN using existing security states | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203180 | |||
S3‑203419 | Assumptions for the AMF re-allocation security study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203214 | |||
S3‑203420 | New key issue for the security of the AMF re-allocation procedures | Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon, China Mobile, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203215 | |||
S3‑203421 | New solution for AMF re-allocation procedure when 5G NAS security context is rerouted via RAN | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203216 | |||
S3‑203445 | AMFREAL: Description of AMF reallocation procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203040 | |||
S3‑203446 | AMFREAL: New solution to registration failure with AMF reallocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203042 | |||
S3‑203465 | Solution to enable NAS Security for AMF reallocation and reroute via RAN Scenario | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑203295 | |||
5.18 | Study on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul | S3‑202959 | updating the IAB architecture in key issue#4.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202960 | updating the RLF key issue | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202961 | key issue on security in Inter-CU handover procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202962 | updating the Scope | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203254 | Updates on Rel-16 IAB Conclusions | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203255 | Clean-up of IAB TR 33.824 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑203456 | Draft TR33.824 v0.7.0 | Samsung | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
5.19 | Study on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules | S3‑202840 | LS on System support for Multi-USIM devices | S2-2006011 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑202863 | Skeleton for MUSIM TR | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | other | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑202895 | LS Reply to SA2 on System support for MUSIM devices | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203356 | |||
S3‑202934 | Introduction for MUSIM TR | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | other | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203410 | ||||
S3‑202935 | Key Issue for Busy Indication | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | other | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203408 | ||||
S3‑202936 | Privacy while roaming | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202937 | Key Issue for UE and Paging Server Communication | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | other | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203409 | ||||
S3‑202938 | [DRAFT] Reply to LS S2-2006011 on System support for Multi-USIM devices | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑203356 | ||||
S3‑202940 | Scope for MUSIM TR | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | other | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203410 | ||||
S3‑202941 | NAS Based Solution for Busy Indication | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202942 | Security for Paging Notifications | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑203189 | Multi-USIM security and privacy | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203356 | LS Reply to SA2 on System support for MUSIM devices | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202895 | |||
S3‑203408 | Key Issue for Busy Indication | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | other | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202935 | ||||
S3‑203409 | Key Issue for UE and Paging Server Communication | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | other | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202937 | ||||
S3‑203410 | Scope for MUSIM TR | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | other | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202940 | ||||
S3‑203411 | draft TR Study on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules | Intel | other | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
5.20 | New study item proposals | S3‑203096 | Discussion paper for Rel17 SID on network slicing security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, CableLab, CATT, CAICT, China Unicom, China Mobile, InterDigital | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑203097 | Rel17 SID on network slice security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, CableLab, CATT, CAICT, China Unicom, China Mobile, InterDigital | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203159 | eNPN: revision of SA3 SID | THALES, Orange, Idemia | pCR | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑203165 | eNPN SID revision | THALES, Orange, Idemia | SID revised | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑203206 | FS_eSBA_SEC | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑203504 | |||
S3‑203504 | FS_eSBA_SEC | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Mavenir, CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Verizon, Vodafone, T-Mobile, Docomo, China Mobile, Huawei, HiSilicon, Samsung | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑203206 | |||
5.21 | Other study areas (no release restrictions) |   | ||||||||||
6 | CVD and research | S3‑202878 | A threat of service disruption due to unprotected RRC messages reported by 5G Security Forum in South Korea | SK Telecom | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202879 | A threat on IMS confidentiality reported by 5G Security Forum in South Korea | SK Telecom | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203472 | CVD process update | WG chair | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
7 | Any Other Business | S3‑202867 | New template for the Terms of Reference (ToR) | SA WG3 Chair | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑203337 | SA3 meeting calendar | WG Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑203477 | Draft agenda for SA3#101bis-e | WG chair | agenda | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑203478 | Draft agenda for SA3#102-e | WG chair | agenda | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No |