Tdoc List
2020-10-26 16:11
Agenda | Topic | TDoc | Title | Source | Type | For | Avail | Treated | Decision | Wdrn | Replaced-by | Replaces |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Agenda and Meeting Objectives | S3‑202300 | Agenda | SA WG3 Chair | agenda | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202352 | ||
S3‑202301 | Process for SA3#100Bis-e meeting | SA WG3 Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202352 | Agenda | SA WG3 Chair | agenda | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202397 | S3‑202300 | |||
S3‑202397 | Agenda | SA WG3 Chair | agenda | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202352 | ||||
S3‑202670 | Process and agenda for SA3#100bis-e | SA WG3 Chair | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
2 | Rel-17 Study areas |   | ||||||||||
2.1 | Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations | S3‑202337 | System Information Protection using SNPN Credentials | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202373 | Reply LS to SA3 on FBS detection | R2-1914224 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑202383 | Reply LS to RAN2 on FBS detection | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202448 | 5GFBS-RRCResumeRequest message protection | Apple, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202449 | 5GFBS-Add a NOTE in the key issue#7 on the MitM attack | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202464 | Updates to solution #20 (6.20.2.1) | CableLabs, Philips International B.V, Apple, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202718 | |||
S3‑202466 | Updates to solution #20 (6.20.2.4) | CableLabs, Philips International B.V, Apple, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202719 | |||
S3‑202467 | Updates to solution #20 (6.20.2.5.1) | CableLabs, Philips International B.V, Apple, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202468 | Updates to solution #20 (adding Assessment using Annex A.3) | CableLabs, Philips International B.V, Apple, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202720 | |||
S3‑202531 | New solution for KI#3 | Philips International B.V., CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202532 | Clarification Key Issue #7 | Philips International B.V., CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202691 | |||
S3‑202540 | 5GFBS: Accuracy of Loaction Estimate for Solution#22 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202541 | 5GFBS: FBS pretending to be in a different PLMN for Solution#22 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202699 | |||
S3‑202542 | 5GFBS: FBS Detection in Network Sharing Scenario for Solution#22 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202543 | 5GFBS: Support of Multiple FBS Detection for Solution#22 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202556 | Clarification Solution #23 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202738 | |||
S3‑202557 | Updates to solution #20 (6.20.2.2.2) | Philips International B.V., CableLabs, Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202737 | |||
S3‑202558 | Updates to solution #20 (6.20.2.5.1 (verification)) | Philips International B.V., CableLabs, Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202602 | pCR: Conclusion of Key issue#5 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Huawei | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202603 | Update of Solution#15 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202782 | |||
S3‑202624 | Evaluation for Solution#13 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202625 | Evaluation for Solution#17 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202626 | Solution for Resumecause protection | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202630 | Certificate based solution for Protecting System Information Messages with Digital Signature in an NPN | MITRE Corporation, AT&T, InterDigital, DoD, NTIA, CISA/ECD, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202717 | |||
S3‑202662 | pCR to 33.809 Enhanced Description of Key Issue #7 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202691 | |||
S3‑202691 | pCR to 33.809 Enhanced Description of Key Issue #7 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202662 | |||
S3‑202699 | 5GFBS: FBS pretending to be in a different PLMN for Solution#22 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202541 | |||
S3‑202717 | Certificate based solution for Protecting System Information Messages with Digital Signature in an NPN | MITRE Corporation, AT&T, InterDigital, DoD, NTIA, CISA/ECD, Charter Communications, SoftHandover Consulting, Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202630 | |||
S3‑202718 | Updates to solution #20 (6.20.2.1) | CableLabs, Philips International B.V, Apple, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202464 | |||
S3‑202719 | Updates to solution #20 (6.20.2.4) | CableLabs, Philips International B.V, Apple, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202466 | |||
S3‑202720 | Updates to solution #20 (adding Assessment using Annex A.3) | CableLabs, Philips International B.V, Apple, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202468 | |||
S3‑202737 | Update_solution_20_sec_6.20.2.2.2 | Philips International B.V., CableLabsCableLabs, Philips International B.V, Apple, Deutsche Telekom AG | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202557 | |||
S3‑202738 | Clarification Solution #23 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202556 | |||
S3‑202740 | Draft TR 33.809-5GFBS | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202782 | Update of Solution#15 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202603 | |||
2.2 | Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products | S3‑202371 | Re LS on Accreditation for Virtualised Network Products (VNPs) | GSMA SECAG | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑202544 | SCAS VNP: DoS Attack via Changing Virtualized Resource | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202545 | SCAS VNP: Secure Execution Environment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202546 | SCAS VNP: Software Tampering | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202696 | |||
S3‑202547 | SCAS VNP: Threats on VNF-VNFM Interface | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202548 | SCAS VNP: VM Escape and Hypervisor Escape | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202549 | SCAS VNP: Security requirements on the interface between VNF and VNFM | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202559 | Clarifying summary of threats for GVNP | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202696 | |||
S3‑202560 | Security functional requirements derived from 3GPP specifications – general SBA/SBI aspects | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202561 | Adding hardening requirements for GVNP of type 1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202562 | Adding hardening requirements for GVNP of type 2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202563 | Adding hardening requirements for GVNP of type 3 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202564 | Adding basic vulnerability testing requirements for GVNP | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202565 | Adding vendor development and product lifecycle processes and test laboratory accreditation into Clause 6 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202566 | Adding evaluation and SCAS instantiation into clause 7 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202567 | Adding test case into clause 5.2.5.5.8.5.1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202568 | Adding test case into clause 5.2.5.6.6.1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202569 | Adding conclusion into clause 8 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202679 | TR 33.818 v0.8.0 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑202696 | SCAS VNP: Software Tampering | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202546 | |||
2.3 | Study on User Plane Integrity Protection | S3‑202344 | Clarification for Solution 11 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑202354 | LS on mandatory support of full rate user plane integrity protection for 5G | C1-205392 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202357 | Response LS to TSG SA on mandatory support of full rate user plane integrity protection for 5G | R2-2008643 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202359 | Reply LS on mandatory support of full rate user plane integrity protection for 5G | R3-205653 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202365 | Reply LS on Updated User Plane Integrity Protection advice | S2-2006180 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202366 | LS on mandatory support of full rate user plane integrity protection for 5G | S2-2006181 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202509 | Discussion on SA2 LS and CR in S3-202366 | Futurewei | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202536 | Summary of editors notes and way forwards for UPIP - TR33.853 | VODAFONE Group Plc | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202578 | UPIP: Update to solution #11 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202727 | |||
S3‑202579 |
UPIP: Conclusion on | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202580 | UPIP: New solution to resolve KI#1 for Option (eUTRA with EPC) | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202728 | |||
S3‑202599 | pCR to TR33.853 - Conclusions for Option 1 and 3 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202608 | DRAFT LS to RAN3 on UPIP solutions for LE | VODAFONE Group Plc | LS out | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202634 | pCR to TR33.853 - Updates to Solution#15 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202639 | Restricting handovers to RAN nodes that don’t support UP IP | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202707 | |||
S3‑202640 | pCR: Solution for UP IP for EPC connected RAN options | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202723 | |||
S3‑202656 | pCR to TR33.853 - Updates to solution #14 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202659 | pCR to TR33.853 - Updates to solution #14 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Agreement | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202707 | Restricting handovers to RAN nodes that don’t support UP IP | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202639 | |||
S3‑202723 | pCR: Solution for UP IP for EPC connected RAN options | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202640 | |||
S3‑202727 | UPIP: Update to solution #11 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202578 | |||
S3‑202728 | UPIP: New solution to resolve KI#1 for Option (eUTRA with EPC) | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202580 | |||
2.4 | Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation |   | ||||||||||
2.5 | Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS | S3‑202313 | evaluation of solution 2.1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202314 | Security requirement of SUCI replay | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202315 | update solution 4.3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202316 | update solution 4.4 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202317 | Solution of Mitigation against the SUPI replay attack | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202374 | Reply to LS on Resynchronisations | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑202437 | Discussion on editor notes in SQNms concealment solution | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202438 | Ed.note resolution on SQNms protection by concealment when 5G-GUTI is received | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202439 | Ed.note resolution on backward compatibility in solution SQNms protection by concealment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202440 | Discussion_paper_on_editor_notes_SQN protection during re-synchronisation | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202441 | Ed.note resolution in solution summary of sol.4.4 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202788 | |||
S3‑202442 | Ed.note resolution on backward compatibility in evaluation of sol.4.4 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202443 | KI update on SUCI replay | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202444 | Solution for avoiding linkability by SUCI replay and SUPI guessing attack | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202445 | Editorial updates of solution titles | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202786 | |||
S3‑202446 | Comparison of different solutions for Key issue#4.1 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202447 | Conclusion to key issue 4.1 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202494 | pCR: 33.846: Updates on key issue #2.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202747 | |||
S3‑202495 | pCR: 33.846: Conclusion on key issue #3.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202571 | Complementary to key issue to mitigate the SUPI guessing attacks | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202710 | |||
S3‑202572 | Discussion on a unified solution needs to the key issue #2.1 and key issue #4.1 | China Mobile | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202573 | Propose a conclusion for the key issue #2.1 and key issue #4.1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202636 | Conclusion for Key Issue #2.1 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202637 | Conclusion for Key Issue #4.1 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202643 | Some evaluation of solution#2.1 in TR 33.846 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201930 | |||
S3‑202644 | Some evaluation of solution #2.2 in TR 33.846 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201931 | |||
S3‑202645 | Some evaluation of solution #2.3 in TR 33.846 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202711 | S3‑201932 | ||
S3‑202646 | Some evaluation of solution #2.5 in TR 33.846 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202712 | S3‑201933 | ||
S3‑202647 | Proposing a conclusion for key issue #4.1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑201935 | |||
S3‑202710 | Complementary to key issue to mitigate the SUPI guessing attacks | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202571 | |||
S3‑202711 | Some evaluation of solution #2.3 in TR 33.846 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202645 | |||
S3‑202712 | Some evaluation of solution #2.5 in TR 33.846 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202646 | |||
S3‑202735 | Draft TR 33.846 v0.8.0 Study on authentication enhancements in the 5G System (5GS) | Ericsson Hungary Ltd | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202747 | pCR: 33.846: Updates on key issue #2.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202494 | |||
S3‑202786 | Editorial updates of solution titles | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202445 | |||
S3‑202788 | Ed.note resolution in solution summary of sol.4.4 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202441 | |||
2.6 | Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication | S3‑202305 | Evaluation of Solution 2 | NCSC | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202675 | ||
S3‑202306 | Evaluation of Solution 3 | NCSC | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202676 | ||||
S3‑202307 | Evaluation of Solution 4 | NCSC | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202677 | ||||
S3‑202308 | New solution for KI2: Storage of LTK in UDR | NCSC | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202680 | ||||
S3‑202311 | New Solution for KI3: Transfer of LTK between UDR and UDM/ARPF | NCSC | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑202404 | New solution for KI4 - Encrypted storage of OPc in UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202671 | |||
S3‑202405 | New solution for KI5 - Encrypted transfer of OPc out of UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202406 | New solution for KI6 - Encrypted storage of OP in UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202672 | |||
S3‑202407 | New solution for KI7 - Encrypted transfer of OP out of UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202671 | New solution for KI4 - Encrypted storage of OPc in UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202404 | |||
S3‑202672 | New solution for KI6 - Encrypted storage of OP in UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202406 | |||
S3‑202675 | Evaluation of Solution 2 | NCSC | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202305 | ||||
S3‑202676 | Evaluation of Solution 3 | NCSC | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202306 | ||||
S3‑202677 | Evaluation of Solution 4 | NCSC | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202307 | ||||
S3‑202680 | New solution for KI2: Storage of LTK in UDR | NCSC | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202308 | ||||
2.7 | Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems | S3‑202345 | Update ot KI#6 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑202386 | A solution to UAV/UAV-C pairing authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon, InterDigital | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202387 | A solution to TPAE authentication and authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202388 | A solution to C2 communication security | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202389 | A solution to RID information protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202390 | A solution to UAS ID privacy protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202391 | Addressing EN in Sol1 on UAS registration IE | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202392 | Addressing EN in Sol1 on UAS registration Accept | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202692 | |||
S3‑202415 | Solution for UAV A&A during registration | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202702 | |||
S3‑202416 | Solution for UAV A&A using EAP-based PDU Secondary authentication | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202703 | |||
S3‑202417 | Solution for UAV A&A using API-based PDU Secondary authentication | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202704 | |||
S3‑202418 | Update for KI#5 Privacy protection of UAS identities | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202479 | New solution to verify the location information | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202772 | |||
S3‑202600 | Broadcast privacy | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202607 | Solution on UAS Authentication and Authorization | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202722 | |||
S3‑202609 | Solution on UAS Security Aspects | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202610 | [UAS] Update to KI#6 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202628 | Solution on UAV and UAV-C Pairing Authorization and Security Aspects | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202635 | A new solution for UAS authentication and authorization | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202690 | |||
S3‑202641 | Authentication and authorisation of UAVs | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202642 | Obtaining UAV location information from the PLMN | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202709 | |||
S3‑202690 | A new solution for UAS authentication and authorization | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202635 | |||
S3‑202692 | Addressing EN in Sol1 on UAS registration Accept | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202392 | |||
S3‑202702 | Solution for UAV A&A during registration | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202415 | |||
S3‑202703 | Solution for UAV A&A using EAP-based PDU Secondary authentication | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202416 | |||
S3‑202704 | Solution for UAV A&A using API-based PDU Secondary authentication | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202417 | |||
S3‑202709 | Obtaining UAV location information from the PLMN | Qualcomm Incorporated, Interdigital | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202642 | |||
S3‑202722 | Solution on UAS Authentication and Authorization | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202607 | |||
S3‑202772 | New solution to verify the location information | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202479 | |||
S3‑202787 | TR 33.854 v0.2.0 | Qualcomm Incorporated | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
2.8 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC | S3‑202318 | NEF discovers AUSF in solution 2 of TR33.839 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑202319 | Derivation of Kedge ID in UE | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202320 | Add some references and abbrevations | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202321 | Clean up | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202322 | New solution for key issue 6 Edge3 protection | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202744 | |||
S3‑202323 | New solution for key issue 6 type B interface protection | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202744 | |||
S3‑202343 | Reply LS for IP address to GPSI translation | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202753 | |||
S3‑202348 | New solution on Authentication between EEC and EES | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202756 | |||
S3‑202349 | New solution on Authentication between EEC and ECS | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202757 | |||
S3‑202350 | update to KI#10 User's consent for exposure of information to Edge Applications | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202351 | New solution on Security of Network Information Provisioning to Local Applications | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202759 | |||
S3‑202364 | LS on checking security issue for Solution 22 in TR 23.748 | S2-2006033 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202370 | LS on IP address to GPSI translation | S6-200947 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202450 | MEC-Reply LS to SA6 (S6-200947) on the protection of user’s consent | Apple | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202753 | |||
S3‑202463 | Key issue on the binding relationship for the UE IDs | CATT | pCR | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑202465 | Key issue on the binding relationship for the UE IDs | CATT | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202483 | EC: New solution on authentication and authorization between EEC and ECS | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202742 | |||
S3‑202484 | EC: New Key issue on authorization during Edge Data Network change | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202743 | |||
S3‑202485 | EC: New solution on transport security for EDGE-1-9 interfaces | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202744 | |||
S3‑202500 | Solution on Authentication and Authorization between the Edge Enabler Client and the Edge Configuration Server | CATT | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202776 | ||||
S3‑202501 | Solution on Authentication and Authorization between the EEC and the EES when the ECS is deployed by the ECSP | CATT | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202777 | ||||
S3‑202502 | Solution on Authentication and Authorization between the EEC and the EES when the ECS is deployed by the MNO | CATT | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202778 | ||||
S3‑202503 | Solution on the service capability exposure to the EAS | CATT | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202779 | ||||
S3‑202510 | Discussion on SA2 LS on EC Solution #22 | Futurewei | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202516 | Onboarding and authentication/authorization framework for Edge Enabler Server with Edge Configuration Server | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202731 | |||
S3‑202521 | Updates to Solution 3 | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202524 | Reply LS on checking Security issue for Solution 22 in TR 23.748 | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202678 | ||||
S3‑202525 | Discussion on LS on checking security issue for Solution 22 in TR 23.748 | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202527 | Updates to Key Issue 3 and 6 | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202733 | ||||
S3‑202528 | New solution for key issue 1,2, 4,6 | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202729 | |||
S3‑202570 | reply LS on security analysis for Solution 22 in TR 23.748 | China Mobile | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202678 | |||
S3‑202598 | update to KI#10 User's consent for exposure of information to Edge Applications | Huawei, Hiliscon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202758 | |||
S3‑202605 | Authentication and Authorization with the Edge Data Network | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202781 | |||
S3‑202618 | Corrections to Key issue #6 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202733 | |||
S3‑202619 | Moving Key issue #10 to FS_UC3S | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202758 | |||
S3‑202620 | Resolving editor’s note on AKMA key derivation | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202621 | Resolving editor’s note on MAC-I calculation | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202697 | |||
S3‑202678 | reply LS on security analysis for Solution 22 in TR 23.748 | China Mobile | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202570 | |||
S3‑202697 | Resolving editor’s note on MAC-I calculation | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202621 | |||
S3‑202729 | New solution for key issue 1,2, 4,6 | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202528 | |||
S3‑202731 | Onboarding and authentication/authorization framework for Edge Enabler Server with Edge Configuration Server | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202516 | |||
S3‑202733 | Updates to Key Issue 3 and 6 | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202527 | ||||
S3‑202741 | EC: New solution on authentication and authorization between EEC and ECS | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202742 | EC: New solution on authentication and authorization between EEC and ECS | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202483 | |||
S3‑202743 | EC: New Key issue on authorization during Edge Data Network change | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202484 | |||
S3‑202744 | EC: New solution on transport security for EDGE-1-9 interfaces | Huawei, Hisilicon, ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202485 | |||
S3‑202753 | Reply LS for IP address to GPSI translation | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202343 | |||
S3‑202756 | New solution on Authentication between EEC and EES | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202348 | |||
S3‑202757 | New solution on Authentication between EEC and ECS | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202349 | |||
S3‑202758 | update to KI#10 User's consent for exposure of information to Edge Applications | Huawei, Hisilicon, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202598 | |||
S3‑202759 | New solution on Security of Network Information Provisioning to Local Applications | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202351 | |||
S3‑202764 | Draft TR 33.839 - FS_eEDGE_SEC | Huawei, Hisilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202776 | Solution on Authentication and Authorization between the Edge Enabler Client and the Edge Configuration Server | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202500 | |||
S3‑202777 | Solution on Authentication and Authorization between the EEC and the EES when the ECS is deployed by the ECSP | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202501 | |||
S3‑202778 | Solution on Authentication and Authorization between the EEC and the EES when the ECS is deployed by the MNO | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202502 | |||
S3‑202779 | Solution on the service capability exposure to the EAS | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202503 | |||
S3‑202781 | Authentication and Authorization with the Edge Data Network | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202605 | |||
2.9 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS | S3‑202312 | New KI for TR 33.847 – privacy of identities for UE2N path switch | InterDigital Communications, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202346 | New key issue on security of one-to-one communication over PC5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202754 | |||
S3‑202347 | New solution on security establishment of one-to-one PC5 communication | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202755 | |||
S3‑202368 | LS on security issues for 5G ProSe | S2-2006589 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202375 | Solution for authorization and security with UE-to-Network relay using Remote | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202376 | New KI for TR 33.847 – privacy of identities for UE2UE Relay path switch | InterDigital Communications, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202377 | New KI for TR 33.847 – security for UE2N path switch | InterDigital Communications, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202705 | |||
S3‑202378 | New KI for TR 33.847 – security for UE2UE Relay path switch | InterDigital Communications, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202706 | |||
S3‑202379 | TR 33.847 - New key issue on security protection misalignment in L3 UE2NW relay | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202380 | TR 33.847 - Solution for handling security policy misalignment over ProSe L3 UE2NW relay | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202381 | TR 33.847 - KI on authorization for UE2NW relay | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202393 | New key issue on groupcast security | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202763 | |||
S3‑202395 | New KI - Operator control of ProSe direct communication | KPN | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202403 | New KI - UE identity protection during ProSe discovery | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202673 | |||
S3‑202408 | Draft LS reply to SA WG2 LS on security issues for 5G ProSe | CATT | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202689 | |||
S3‑202409 | pCR to TR33.847- Reuse LTE security mechanism for 5G ProSe open discovery | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202773 | |||
S3‑202410 | pCR to TR33.847- Reuse LTE security mechanism for 5G ProSe restricted discovery | CATT | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202774 | ||||
S3‑202411 | pCR to TR33.847- Key Issue on security of one-to-many communications | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202763 | |||
S3‑202412 | pCR to TR33.847- Group communication for commercial services | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202413 | New KI for TR 33.847 – security for support of Non-IP traffic | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202708 | |||
S3‑202414 | New KI for TR 33.847 – privacy of ProSe entities while supporting Non-IP traffic | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202713 | |||
S3‑202433 | Discussion on S2-2006589 on PRoSe L2 and L3 solutions in SA2 TR | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202434 | Reply LS to S2-2006589 on Security issues for 5G PRoSe | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202689 | |||
S3‑202451 | ProSe- New solution on security of UE-to-UE relay | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202780 | |||
S3‑202469 | New solution on Key management in discovery procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202769 | |||
S3‑202470 | New solution on discovery protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202771 | |||
S3‑202471 | Update key issue #1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202472 | Update key issue #2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202486 | 5G ProSe: New key issue on UE-to-UE Relay or UE-to-Network Relay selection | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202487 | 5G ProSe: New solution on e2e authentication between two UE2 in the UE-to-UE relay scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202537 | LS on Security Requirements for Sidelink/PC5 Relays | S2-2004750 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑202582 | ProSe: Protection of the PC3 interface | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202700 | |||
S3‑202583 | ProSe: key management for UE-to-Network Relay and Remote UE | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202701 | |||
S3‑202611 | [5G_ProSe] Updates to solution#1 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202683 | |||
S3‑202612 | [5G_ProSe] Updates to solution#2 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202684 | |||
S3‑202613 | New KI for security policy handling in ProSe relay communication | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202614 | Solution for security policy handling in ProSe relay communication | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202632 | New Key Issue on privacy of PDU session parameters | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202648 | Solution for secure PC5 link establishment for UE-to-network relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202649 | Solution to establish end-to-end security for the L3 UE-to-network relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202650 | Solution for secure PC5 link establishment for UE-to-UE relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202664 | Solution for authorization and security with UE-to-Network relay using Remote | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202665 | Solution for authorization and security with UE-to-Network relay using Remote UE network primary authentication | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202714 | |||
S3‑202666 | Architectural model corrections | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202673 | New KI - UE identity protection during ProSe discovery | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202403 | |||
S3‑202683 | [5G_ProSe] Updates to solution#1 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202611 | |||
S3‑202684 | [5G_ProSe] Updates to solution#2 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202612 | |||
S3‑202689 | Reply LS to S2-2006589 on Security issues for 5G PRoSe | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202434 | |||
S3‑202700 | ProSe: Protection of the PC3 interface | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202582 | |||
S3‑202701 | ProSe: key management for UE-to-Network Relay and Remote UE | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202583 | |||
S3‑202705 | KI for TR 33.847 – adding security for UE2N path switch in KI#3 | InterDigital Communications, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202377 | |||
S3‑202706 | Modification of KI for TR 33.847 – security for UE2UE Relay path switch | InterDigital Communications, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202378 | |||
S3‑202708 | New KI for TR 33.847 – security for support of Non-IP traffic | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202413 | |||
S3‑202713 | New KI for TR 33.847 – privacy of ProSe entities while supporting Non-IP traffic | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202414 | |||
S3‑202714 | Solution for authorization and security with UE-to-Network relay using Remote UE network primary authentication | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202665 | |||
S3‑202736 | New Key issue on groupcast security | Huawei Device Co., Ltd | pCR | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑202754 | New key issue on security of one-to-one communication over PC5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202346 | |||
S3‑202755 | New solution on security establishment of one-to-one PC5 communication | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202347 | |||
S3‑202763 | New key issue on groupcast security | Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202393 | |||
S3‑202769 | New solution on Key management in discovery procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202469 | |||
S3‑202770 | Update key issue #2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202771 | New solution on discovery protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑202470 | |||
S3‑202773 | pCR to TR33.847- Reuse LTE security mechanism for 5G ProSe open discovery | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202409 | |||
S3‑202774 | pCR to TR33.847- Reuse LTE security mechanism for 5G ProSe restricted discovery | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202410 | |||
S3‑202775 | Draft TR 33.847 v0.2.0 Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS | CATT | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202780 | ProSe- New solution on security of UE-to-UE relay | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202451 | |||
2.10 | Study on security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT | S3‑202324 | New solution for key issue #1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202739 | |
S3‑202453 | KI on boundary 5GS TSN user plane interfaces | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202454 | Requirements for KI on boundary 5GS TSN user plane interfaces | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202455 | KI details update on time synchronization messages | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202456 | Requirements for KI on time synchronization messages | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202457 | KI details update on multiple working domains | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202458 | Requirements for KI on multiple working domains | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202459 | Solution - Authentication of TSN nodes sending time synchronization messages | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202460 | Solution - Authorization of incoming time synchronization messages based on policies | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202575 | IIOT: New key issue for protection of AF-NEF interface | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202694 | |||
S3‑202576 | IIOT: New solution for protection of AF-NEF interface | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202698 | |||
S3‑202577 | IIOT: Update to solution #2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202694 | IIOT: New key issue for protection of AF-NEF interface | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202575 | |||
S3‑202698 | IIOT: New solution for protection of AF-NEF interface | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202576 | |||
S3‑202739 | New solution for key issue #1 | ZTE Corporation, Nokia,Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202324 | |||
S3‑202791 | TR_33.851_IIoT_Sec | Nokia Germany | draft TR | No |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
2.11 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services | S3‑202452 | 5MBS-New key issue for PTP mode | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202475 | Abbreviation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202476 | Editorial change to key issue 2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202477 | New solution to protect MBS traffic in transport layer | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202761 | |||
S3‑202478 | New solution to protect MBS traffic in service layer | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202762 | |||
S3‑202491 | pCR: New solution to 5G MBS authentication and authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202492 | pCR: Revocation of authorization of MBS communication service | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202745 | |||
S3‑202493 | pCR: New solution to MBS traffic protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202746 | |||
S3‑202651 | AS security for MBS traffic protection | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202761 | |||
S3‑202745 | pCR: Revocation of authorization of MBS communication service | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202492 | |||
S3‑202746 | pCR: New solution to MBS traffic protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202493 | |||
S3‑202760 | Draft TR 33.850 | Huawei, Hisilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202761 | New solution to protect MBS traffic in transport layer | Huawei, Hisilicon, Qualcomm | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202477 | |||
S3‑202762 | New solution to protect MBS traffic in service layer | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202478 | |||
2.12 | Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks | S3‑202325 | Updates to key issue #1 Credentials owned by an external entity | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202326 | Reply LS on architectures for access to SNPNs using credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202327 | New key issue on UE onboarding for SNPN | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202715 | |||
S3‑202328 | Reply LS on on-boarding and remote provisioning | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202332 | New Key Issue on Provisioning of PNI-NPN credentials | Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202748 | |||
S3‑202333 | Clarification on Key Issue #2 | Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202749 | |||
S3‑202334 | New Solution for Network Access Authentication with Credentials owned by an AAA external to the SNPN | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202750 | |||
S3‑202335 | New Key Issue on Secure Connection Establishment for UE Onboarding for SNPN | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202336 | Reply LS on security issue for on-boarding and remote provisioning | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202751 | |||
S3‑202360 | LS on architectures for access to SNPNs using credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | S2-2004385 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑202363 | LS on security issue for on-boarding and remote provisioning | S2-2005949 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202394 | New key issue on authentication and authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202482 | New KI on service authorization between SNPNs | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202508 | New solution for Key Issue #1 | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202721 | |||
S3‑202512 | New key issue on UE accessing most preferred serving NPN | Futurewei | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202513 | Add Provisioning Server Term | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202732 | |||
S3‑202514 | Add terms related to Onboarding | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202715 | |||
S3‑202515 | Add Terms Default Credentials and DCS | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202522 | Key issue for UE onboarding for provisioning | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202715 | |||
S3‑202526 | Solution to UE onboarding for non-public networks | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202535 | Key issue on remote provisioning of non-3GPP credentials for PNI-NPN | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202538 | New solution to KI#1: Primary authentication between an SNPN and third-party AAA server using EAP | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202681 | |||
S3‑202539 | New solution to KI#1: Primary authentication between an SNPN and third-party AAA server using EAP-TTLS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202682 | |||
S3‑202550 | Update of key issue on provisioning of credentials | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202715 | |||
S3‑202552 | Update of KI#3 (Security impacts from supporting IMS voice and IMS services in SNPNs) | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202553 | New Solution to KI#3: Authentication to IMS Core using SNPN credentials | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202554 | New Solution to KI#3: Authentication to IMS Core using credentials generated with AKMA | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202555 | New Solution to KI#3: Authentication to IMS Core using credentials generated from the KAUSF | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202585 | Securing initial access for UE onboarding between UE and SNPN | Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon, Qualcomm Incorporated, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, InterDigital | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202715 | |||
S3‑202586 | Definition of Provisioning Server | Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon, InterDigital, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202588 | Discussion on provisioning server | Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon, InterDigital, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, China Mobile | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202606 | Network access authentication with credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202783 | |||
S3‑202631 | [DRAFT] Reply-LS on AAA based solutions for credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202633 | [DRAFT] reply LS on security issues for on-boarding and remote provisioning | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202652 | Reply LS on architectures for access to SNPNs using credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202653 | pCR: Solution for KI#1 in TR 33.857 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202724 | |||
S3‑202654 | eNPN scope | THALES, Orange, Idemia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202658 | Proposed TR Assumptions on credentials | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202663 | Scope of TR 33.857 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202681 | New solution to KI#1: Primary authentication between an SNPN and third-party AAA server using EAP | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202538 | |||
S3‑202682 | New solution to KI#1: Primary authentication between an SNPN and third-party AAA server using EAP-TTLS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202539 | |||
S3‑202715 | Securing initial access for UE onboarding between UE and SNPN | Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon, Qualcomm Incorporated, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, InterDigital, ZTE Corporation, Intel, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202585 | |||
S3‑202716 | Draft TR 33857 v020 Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks (NPN) | Ericsson | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202721 | New solution for Key Issue #1 | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202508 | |||
S3‑202724 | pCR: Solution for KI#1 in TR 33.857 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202653 | |||
S3‑202732 | Add Provisioning Server Term | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202513 | |||
S3‑202748 | New Key Issue on Provisioning of PNI-NPN credentials | Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson, China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑202332 | |||
S3‑202749 | Clarification on Key Issue #2 | Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑202333 | |||
S3‑202750 | New Solution for Network Access Authentication with Credentials owned by an AAA external to the SNPN | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202334 | |||
S3‑202751 | Reply LS on security issue for on-boarding and remote provisioning | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202336 | |||
S3‑202783 | Network access authentication with credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202606 | |||
2.13 | Study on security aspects of the Disaggregated gNB Architecture | S3‑202330 | Scope for TR 33.840 | China Telecom, Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202660 | |
S3‑202331 | key issue on security configuration differentiation in CU-UPs | China Telecom | pCR | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202473 | Add content to clause 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202768 | |||
S3‑202474 | New key issue on security enhancement | Huawei, HiSilicon;China Telecom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202480 | Key issue on the protection of multi-CU-UPs connectivity | CATT | pCR | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑202481 | Key issue on the protection of multi-CU-UPs connectivity | CATT | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202511 | New key issue hosting third-party CU-UP | Futurewei | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202590 | Not ruling out impact on UE/RAN/CN | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202591 | Separate UP-keys per CU-UP instance | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202592 | CU-UPs supported by DC | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202604 | Key Issue on Impact of Simultaneous CU-UP applying common UP security | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Deutsche Telekom, Samsung, Altiostar | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202660 | Scope for TR 33.840 | China Telecom, Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202792 | S3‑202330 | ||
S3‑202768 | Add content to clause 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202473 | |||
S3‑202792 | Scope for TR 33.840 | China Telecom, Huawei, HiSilicon, CATT, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Deutsche Telekom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202660 | |||
S3‑202793 | TR33.840 v0.1.0 | China Telecommunications | draft TR | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
2.14 | Study on User Consent for 3GPP services | S3‑202302 | Skeleton of TR 33.866 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑202338 | Skeleton of User Consent for 3GPP services | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202752 | |||
S3‑202339 | Scope of User Consent for 3GPP Services | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202340 | Comparison with TR 33.849 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202341 | New Key Issue on Enabling User Consent for NF service consumption | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202342 | New Key Issue on Enabling User Consent for NF capability exposure | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202358 | LS on propagation of user consent related information during Xn inter-PLMN handover | R3-204378 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑202369 | Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting | S5-204542 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202435 | Key Issue on Generic User consent | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202587 | Reply LS on propagation of user consent related information during Xn inter-PLMN handover | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202589 | Discussion on user consent study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202693 | |||
S3‑202622 | Transfer of Key issue #10 from FS_eEDGE_SEC | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202623 | Potential Requirement on user's consent for exposure of information to Edge Applications | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202693 | Discussion on user consent study | Ericsson, Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202589 | |||
S3‑202752 | Skeleton of User Consent for 3GPP services | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202338 | |||
S3‑202784 | draft TR 33.867 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202785 | draft TR 33.867 | Huawei Technologies Sweden AB | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
2.15 | New SID on security aspects of the MSGin5G Service | S3‑202304 | Skeleton for TR 33.862 | China Mobile | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑202533 | Scope for TR 33.862 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202615 | Key issue: Transport security for the MSGin5G interfaces | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202685 | |||
S3‑202616 | Key issue: Authentication and authorization between 5GMSGS client and MSGin5G server | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202686 | |||
S3‑202617 | Key issue: Authentication and authorization between Application Server and MSGin5G server | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202685 | Key issue: Transport security for the MSGin5G interfaces | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202615 | |||
S3‑202686 | Key issue: Authentication and authorization between 5GMSGS client and MSGin5G server | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202616 | |||
S3‑202765 | draftTR 33.862 | China Mobile | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
2.16 | Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2 | S3‑202303 | Scope for TR 33.866 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202309 | Skeleton for TR 33.866 | China Mobile | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202674 | |||
S3‑202361 | LS on user consent requirements for analytics | S2-2004560 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202367 | LS on method for collection of data from the UE | S2-2006292 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑202382 | TR 33.866 - new KI on user consent for NWDAF | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202396 | Reply LS on user consent requirements for analytics | Nokia | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202789 | ||||
S3‑202419 | Structuring key issues per SID objectives | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202674 | |||
S3‑202420 | KI on UE data collection protection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202421 | KI on NF data collection protection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202422 | KI on Abnormal UE behavior detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202766 | |||
S3‑202423 | KI on Abnormal NF behavior detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202766 | |||
S3‑202424 | KI on Protection of data in transit between multiple NWDAF instances | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202425 | KI on Privacy preservation for transmitted data between multiple NWDAF instances | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202790 | |||
S3‑202426 | KI on user consent and authorization for inter-NWDAF data transfer | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202517 | New Key Issue on NWDAF assisting in Detecting DoS Attack on Network Entities | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202766 | |||
S3‑202518 | Scope of eNA Security | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202519 | New Key Issue on Avoiding using Misleading or Untrusted Information for Data Analysis | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202520 | Reply LS on User consent requirements for analytics | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202789 | |||
S3‑202530 | A new key issue on security of data collection from UE | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202534 | Key issue on cyber-attacks detection supported by NWDAF | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202766 | |||
S3‑202574 | New Key issue on reporting of base station involved in cyber attack | NEC Europe Ltd | discussion | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202584 | |||
S3‑202584 | New Key issue on reporting of base station involved in cyber attack | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202668 | S3‑202574 | ||
S3‑202601 | Key Issue on detection of MitM attacks | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202766 | |||
S3‑202661 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on securing data collection from UE | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202668 | New Key issue on reporting of base station involved in cyber attack | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑202584 | |||
S3‑202674 | Skeleton for TR 33.866 | China Mobile | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202309 | |||
S3‑202766 | Key issue on cyber-attacks detection supported by NWDAF | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202534 | |||
S3‑202767 | draftTR 33.866 | China Mobile | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202789 | Reply LS on user consent requirements for analytics | Nokia | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202396 | ||||
S3‑202790 | KI on Privacy preservation for transmitted data between multiple NWDAF instances | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202425 | |||
2.17 | Study on the security of AMF re-allocation | S3‑202310 | Skeleton of TR 33.864 Study on the security of Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) re-allocation | Ericsson Hungary Ltd | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑202329 | Security requirements on AMF re-allocation | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202496 | pCR: New key issue on solving registration failure in NAS reroute via RAN | Huawei, Hisilicon,China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202497 | pCR: New solution for solving registration failure in AMF re-allocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202498 | pCR: Description of AMF re-allocation procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202581 | New solution for AMF reallocation procedure when 5G NAS security context is rerouted via RAN | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202593 | New key issue for the security of the AMF re-allocation procedures | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202594 | Introduction for the AMF re-allocation security study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202725 | |||
S3‑202595 | Scope for the AMF re-allocation security study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202726 | |||
S3‑202596 | Assumptions for the AMF re-allocation security study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202597 | New solution for NAS re-route via RAN and the use of a well-connected network function | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202629 | Key Issue on Security Context handling issues with AMF re-allocation | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202667 | LS to CT1 on Clarifications on NAS message processing | Nokia Germany | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑202669 | Minutes of the meeting for the offline teleconference on the AMF re-allocation | Ericsson Hungary Ltd | report | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202725 | Introduction for the AMF re-allocation security study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202594 | |||
S3‑202726 | Scope for the AMF re-allocation security study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202595 | |||
S3‑202734 | Draft TR 33.864 v0.1.0 Study on the security of Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) re-allocation | Ericsson Hungary Ltd | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
2.18 | Incoming Lses | S3‑202398 | LS on the stage 2 aspects of MINT | C1-205332 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑202399 | LS on System support for Multi-USIM devices | S2-2006011 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑202400 | LS on System support for Multi-USIM devices | S2-2006037 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202401 | LS on ATSSS Phase 2 Requirements to IETF QUIC Working Group | S2-2006331 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202402 | LS on study items for security on management aspect | S5-204407 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202427 | Discussion on LS S2-2006037 MUSIM busy indication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202428 | Discussion on LS S2-2006011 on MUSIM | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202429 | Reply LS to S2-2006037 MUSIM busy indication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202687 | |||
S3‑202430 | Reply LS to S2-2006011 on MUSIM | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202431 | Discussion on S5-204407 Study items on management aspects | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202432 | Reply LS to SA5 LS on study items for security management aspect | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202688 | |||
S3‑202529 | Discussion on LS new SID Security Study on system enablers for devices having multiple USIMS | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202687 | Reply LS to S2-2006037 MUSIM busy indication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202429 | |||
S3‑202688 | Reply LS to SA5 LS on study items for security management aspect | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202432 | |||
3 | New work and study item proposals | S3‑202384 | Discussion paper for Rel17 SID on network slicing security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, CableLab, CATT, CAICT, China Unicom, China Mobile | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202385 | Rel17 SID on network slice security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, CableLab, CATT, CAICT, China Unicom, China Mobile | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202436 | FS_eSBA_SEC | Nokia | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑202107 | |||
S3‑202461 | Revised SID on IIoT Security - discussion paper | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202462 | Revised SID on Industrial IoT Security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | SID revised | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | SP‑200355 | |||
S3‑202499 | New SID on Study on Security Enhancement of UPF deployed in the customer side | Huawei, Hisilicon | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202523 | New SID on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules (USIM) | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | SID new | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202730 | ||||
S3‑202627 | Revised SID: Study on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul | Samsung | SID revised | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202695 | |||
S3‑202638 | eNPN SID: discussion | THALES, Orange, Idemia | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202655 | eNPN security assumptions | THALES, Orange, Idemia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202657 | eNPN SID revision | THALES, Orange, Idemia | SID revised | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202695 | Revised SID: Study on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul | Samsung | SID revised | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202627 | |||
S3‑202730 | New SID on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules (USIM) | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | SID new | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202523 | ||||
4 | Urgent incoming Lses | S3‑202353 | LS on ETSI Plugtest reports | C1-204693 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑202355 | Reply LS on N32-f Error Responses – Mapping | C4-204391 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202356 | Reply LS on N32-f Protection Policy IE Data-Type Mapping | C4-204392 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202362 | Reply LS on AS rekeying handling | S2-2005909 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202372 | LS on Misalignments on HTTP message format over N32-f | C4-204409 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑202488 | Reply LS on Misalignments on HTTP message format over N32-f | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202489 | JSON object modification | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202490 | JSON object modification | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202504 | Draft LS: Misalignment on requirement for access token request between TS 29.510 and 33.501 | Mavenir | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202505 | SA3 and CT4 misalignment on token request for Discovery and NFManagement | Mavenir | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202506 | NRF authorization during NF service consumer Access Token Get Request | Mavenir | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202507 | NRF authorization during NF service consumer Access Token Get Request | Mavenir | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202551 | reply-LS on Misalignments on HTTP message format over N32-f | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No |