

14 September, 2001

Sophia Antipolis, France

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3GPP TSG SA WG3 Security — S3#20

S3-010443

16 - 19 October, 2001

Sydney, Australia

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3GPP TSG-CN1 Meeting #19  
Helsinki, Finland, 27.-31. August 2001

*Tdoc N1-011344*

**Title:** Response to Liaison Statement on "Progressing the work in SA3 and CN1 on the IP Multimedia core network subsystem"

**Source:** TSG\_CN WG1

**To:** TSG\_SA WG3

**cc:** SA WG2, SA WG5, CN WG4, CN WG5

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**1. Overall Description:**

WG CN1 thanks SA3 for their liaison S3-010404 → N1-011035. We have responses to the following points raised in the liaison.

**Concerning point 4:**

SA3 understands that multiple public identities can exist for a single private identity, and that the private identity will be used as the basis for authentication. Can a call be terminated towards a public identity that is not currently registered, if an associated public identity for that subscriber is registered?

We understand that multiple some public user identities can be aliases for other public user identities, and these would not normally be separately registered. Also, some emergency calls can be made from terminals that are not registered. We assume that SA2 will provide further information on these cases.

**Concerning point 8:**

SA3 is assuming that currently only the registration and re-registration is authenticated, based on the private identity.

This is what is currently being followed in CN1, pending any other requirements from elsewhere.

**Concerning point 10:**

The current working assumption in SA3 is that re-registrations are always routed towards the S-CSCF that is currently serving that UE. Whilst there appears to be confusion surrounding this assumption, it is based on the current stage 2 specification, 23.228- Can CN1 or SA2 confirm the accuracy of our assumption?

We believe SA2 are studying this.

**Concerning point 12:**

The hiding of IP addresses associated with the user plane media has not been considered by SA3. Should such an IP address be given to the UE at the far end? This IP address is used by the UE for the entire duration of the (SIP signalling) PDP context. The far end UE could use the IP address to establish a session directly to that IP address, thus bypassing the IMS nodes. There may be security/fraud implications with this and SA3 will study this further.

A separate liaison statement covers questions of privacy of the above issue.

**2. Actions:**

For information only.

**3. Date of Next CNx Meetings:**

CN1_20	15 <sup>th</sup> – 19 <sup>th</sup> October 2001	Brighton, U.K.
CN1_21	26 <sup>th</sup> – 30 <sup>th</sup> November 2001	Cancun, Mexico