## 3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #36 Shenzhen, China, 23-26 October 2004

CR-Form-v7.1  CHANGE REQUEST										
<b></b>	33	.246	CR 001	l a	rev	<b>4</b> **	Current v	ersion:	6.0.0	[ <b>X</b> ]
For <u>HELP</u> on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ** symbols.										
Proposed change affects: UICC apps ME X Radio Access Network Core Network										
	,			ys stored in	the ME					
			afting group	1						
Work item code:		BMS					Date		/11/2004	
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Reason for change:   The ME behaviour at UICC change and ME power down for ME bat management is unspecified.  This behaviour needs to be specified as it is relevant for security are overhead. If the ME deletes the MSK at power down, then the MBM need to request MSK to the BM-SC (http request) and may need to reconvene an MBMS session after power on. From a security point deletion of these ME stored MBMS keys at power down is not necessary provided that the same UICC is used at power up. Consequently of detecting a UICC change all MBMS keys shall be deleted.						rity and key MBMS us eed to run ( point of vie necessary	y request er will GBA to ew the			
Summary of chai	nge: <mark>Ж</mark>								when the n the e able to	
Consequences if not approved:	æ									
Clauses affected	<b>:</b>	6.1								
Other specs affected:	æ	Y N X X X	Other core Test speci O&M Spec		ons	[#				
Other comments	<i>:</i>									

\*\*\*\*\* Begin of change \*\*\*\*\*

## 6 Security mechanisms

## 6.1 Using GBA for MBMS

GBA[6] is used to agree keys that are needed to run an MBMS Multicast User service. MBMS imposes the following requirements on the MBMS capable UICCs and MEs:

A UICC that contains MBMS key management functions shall implement GBA U.

An ME that supports MBMS shall implement GBA\_U and GBA\_ME, and shall be capable of utilising the MBMS key management functions on the UICC.

Before a user can access an MBMS User service, the UE needs to share GBA-keys with the BM-SC. If no valid GBA-keys are available at the UE, the UE shall perform a GBA run with the BSF of the home network as described within [6] clause 5. The BM-SC will act as a NAF according to [6].

The MSKs for an MBMS User service shall be stored on either the UICC or the ME. Storing the MSKs on the UICC requires a UICC that contains the MBMS management functions (and that is GBA aware) and requires that the BM-SC is GBA\_U aware. As a result of the GBA\_U run in these circumstances, the BM-SC will share a key Ks\_ext\_NAF with the ME and share a key Ks\_int\_NAF with the UICC. This key Ks\_int\_NAF is used by the BM-SC and the UICC as the key MUK to protect MSK deliveries to the UICC as described within subclause 6.3. The key Ks\_ext\_NAF is used as the key MRK within the protocols as described within subclause 6.2.

NOTE: A run of GBA\_U on a GBA aware UICC will not allow the MSKs to be stored on the UICC, if the MBMS management functions are not present on the UICC.

In any other circumstance, a run of GBA results in the BM-SC sharing a key Ks\_(ext)\_NAF with the ME. This key Ks\_(ext)\_NAF is used by the BM-SC and the ME to derive the key MUK and the key MRK (MBMS Request Key). The key MUK is used to protect MSK deliveries to the ME as described within subclause 6.3. The key MRK is used to authenticate the UE towards the BM-SC within the protocols as described within subclause 6.2.

## For ME based key management

- All MBMS keys (MUK, MRK, MSK and MTK) shall be deleted from the ME when a different UICC is inserted. Therefore the ME needs to store in non-volatile memory the last inserted UICC-identity to be able to compare that with the used UICC-identity at UICC insertion and power on.
- All MBMS keys (MRK, MSK and MTK) may be deleted from the ME when the ME is powered down. If the ME does not delete the MBMS keys at power down then the MBMS keys need to be stored in non-volatile memory. The ME should store the MUKs in non-volatile memory in order to be able to authenticate the first MIKEY message of a push solicited pull procedure (cf. clause 6.3.2.2.4).

NOTE: If the ME deletes the MSK at power down, then the MBMS client would need to request MSK to the BM-SC and may need to run GBA to reconvene an MBMS session.

\*\*\*\*\* End of change \*\*\*\*\*