

CHANGE REQUEST

⌘ **33.220 CR XXX** ⌘ rev **-** ⌘ Current version: **6.1.0** ⌘

For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.

Proposed change affects: UICC apps ME Radio Access Network Core Network

Title:	⌘ GBA User Security Settings		
Source:	⌘ Nokia, Siemens		
Work item code:	⌘ SSC-GBA	Date:	⌘ 29/06/2004
Category:	⌘ F	Release:	⌘ Rel-6
	Use <u>one</u> of the following categories: F (correction) A (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release) B (addition of feature), C (functional modification of feature) D (editorial modification) Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP TR 21.900 .		Use <u>one</u> of the following releases: 2 (GSM Phase 2) R96 (Release 1996) R97 (Release 1997) R98 (Release 1998) R99 (Release 1999) Rel-4 (Release 4) Rel-5 (Release 5) Rel-6 (Release 6)

Reason for change:	⌘ The GBA User Security Settings (previously termed GAA user profiles) are not sufficiently specified.
Summary of change:	⌘ Include definition of GBA User Security Settings and use over Zn and Zh reference points.
Consequences if not approved:	⌘ Incomplete specification

Clauses affected:	⌘ 3, 4, 5										
Other specs affected:	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">Y</td> <td style="padding: 2px;">N</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">X</td> <td style="padding: 2px;"></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;"></td> <td style="padding: 2px;">X</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;"></td> <td style="padding: 2px;">X</td> </tr> </table>	Y	N	X			X		X	Other core specifications	⌘ TS 29.109
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Other comments:	⌘ -										

BEGIN OF CHANGE

3 Definitions and abbreviations

3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply:

Bootstrapping Server Function: BSF is hosted in a network element under the control of an MNO.

Editor's note: Definition to be completed.

ME-based GBA: in GBA_ME, all GBA-specific functions are carried out in the ME. The UICC is GBA-unaware. If the term GBA is used in this document without any further qualification then always GBA_ME is meant, see clause 4 of this specification.

UICC-based GBA: this is a GBA with UICC-based enhancement. In GBA_U, the GBA-specific functions are split between ME and UICC, see clause 5 of this specification.

Network Application Function: NAF is hosted in a network element under the control of an MNO.

Editor's note: Definition to be completed.

Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier:

Editor's note: Definition to be completed.

GBA User Security Setting: An application-specific parameter set describing the security related usage of bootstrapping function and some NAFs in the context of an application and in relation to a subscriber. A user security setting has two parts, an authentication part, which contains all the identities of the user associated with the application (e.g IMPI, IMPUs, MSISDN, pseudonyms), and an authorisation part, which contains the user permissions (e.g. access to application allowed, type of certificates which may be issued). Sometimes also called application-specific user security setting.

GBA User Security Settings: the set of all application-specific user security settings.

3.2 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

AK	Anonymity Key
AKA	Authentication and Key Agreement
B-TID	Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier
BSF	Bootstrapping Server Function
CA	Certificate Authority
FQDN	Fully Qualified Domain Name
GAA	Generic Authentication Architecture
GBA	Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
GBA_ME	ME-based GBA
GBA_U	GBA with UICC-based enhancements
HSS	Home Subscriber System
IK	Integrity Key
KDF	Key Derivation Function
Ks_int	Derived key in GBA_U which remains on UICC
Ks_ext	Derived key in GBA_U
MNO	Mobile Network Operator
NAF	Network Application Function
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
<u>USS</u>	<u>GBA User Security Setting</u>

4 Generic Bootstrapping Architecture

The 3GPP authentication infrastructure, including the 3GPP Authentication Centre (AuC), the USIM, and the 3GPP AKA protocol run between them, is a very valuable asset of 3GPP operators. It has been recognised that this infrastructure could be leveraged to enable application functions in the network and on the user side to establish shared keys. Therefore, 3GPP can provide the "bootstrapping of application security" to authenticate the subscriber by defining a Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) based on AKA protocol.

4.1 Reference model

Figure 4.1 shows a simple network model of the entities involved in the bootstrapping approach, and the reference points used between them.




Figure 4.1: Simple network model for bootstrapping

Figure 4.1a shows a simple network model of the entities involved when the network application function is located in the visited network.




Figure 4.1a: Simple network model for bootstrapping in visited network

4.2 Network elements

4.2.1 Bootstrapping server function (BSF)

A generic Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF) and the UE shall mutually authenticate using the AKA protocol, and agree on session keys that are afterwards applied between UE and an operator-controlled Network Application Function (NAF). The BSF shall restrict the applicability of the key material to a specific NAF by using a suitable key derivation procedure. The key derivation procedure may be used with multiple NAFs during the lifetime of the key material. The lifetime of the key material is set according to the local policy of the BSF. The generation of key material is specified in section 4.5.2.

[The BSF shall be able to acquire the GBA user security settings from the HSS.](#)

4.2.2 Network application function (NAF)

After the bootstrapping has been completed, the UE and an operator-controlled NAF can run some application specific protocol where the authentication of messages will be based on those session keys generated during the mutual authentication between UE and BSF.

General assumptions for the functionality of an operator-controlled NAF are:

- there is no previous security association between the UE and the NAF;
- NAF shall be able to locate and communicate securely with the subscriber's BSF;
- ~~NAF shall be able to acquire a shared key material established between UE and the BSF during the run of the application-specific protocol;~~
- [NAF shall be able to acquire an \(application-specific\) user security setting from the HSS via the BSF;](#)

- NAF shall be able to check lifetime of the shared key material.

4.2.2a Diameter proxy (D-Proxy)

In the case where UE has contacted a NAF that is operated in another network than home network, this visited NAF shall use a diameter proxy (D-Proxy) of the NAFs network to communicate with subscriber's BSF (i.e. home BSF).

NOTE: D-Proxy functionality may be implemented as a separate network element, or be part of any NE in the visited network that implements Diameter proxy functionality (examples of such NE's are the BSF of the network that the visited NAF belongs to, or an AAA-server).

General requirements for the functionality of D-Proxy are:

- D-Proxy shall be able to function as a proxy between the visited NAF, and the subscriber's home BSF;
- D-Proxy shall be able to locate subscriber's home BSF and communicate with it over secure channel;
- D-Proxy shall be able to validate that the visited NAF is authorized to participate in GBA and shall be able to assert to subscriber's home BSF the visited NAFs DNS name. The D-Proxy shall also be able to assert to the BSF that the visited NAF is authorized to request the GBA specific user profiles contained in the NAF request;
- the physical security level of the D-proxy shall not be lower than the highest level of the NAFs which it interfaces with.

4.2.3 HSS

~~HSS shall store new parameters in the subscriber profile related to the use of the bootstrapping function. Possibly also parameters related to the usage of some NAFs are stored in the HSS. The set of all user security settings (USSs) is stored in the HSS. There shall be at most one USS per application stored in the HSS.~~

Editor's note: Needed new subscriber profile parameters, i.e., GBA user security settings, are FFS.

The requirement on the HSS are:

- HSS shall provide the only persistent storage for GBA USSs;
- GBA USS shall be defined in such a way that interworking of different operators for standardised application profiles is possible;
- GBA USS shall be defined in such a way that profiles for operator specific applications and extensions to existing application profiles are supported without need for standardisation of these elements.

4.2.4 UE

The required functionalities from the UE are:

- the support of HTTP Digest AKA protocol;
- the capability to derive new key material to be used with the protocol over Ua interface from CK and IK;
- support of NAF-specific application protocol (For an example see TS 33.221 [5]).

4.3 Bootstrapping architecture and reference points

4.3.1 Reference point Ub

The reference point Ub is between the UE and the BSF. Reference point Ub provides mutual authentication between the UE and the BSF. It allows the UE to bootstrap the session keys based on 3GPP AKA infrastructure.

The HTTP Digest AKA protocol, which is specified in RFC 3310 [4], is used on the reference point Ub. It is based on the 3GPP AKA TS 33.102 [2] protocol. The interface to the USIM is as specified in TS 31.102 [1].

4.3.2 Reference point Ua

The reference point Ua carries the application protocol, which is secured using the keys material agreed between UE and BSF as a result of the run of HTTP Digest AKA over reference point Ub. For instance, in the case of support for subscriber certificates TS 33.221 [5], it is a protocol, which allows the user to request certificates from the NAF. In this case the NAF would be the PKI portal.

4.3.3 Reference point Zh

The reference point Zh used between the BSF and the HSS allows the BSF to fetch the required authentication information and [all GBA user security settings](#) ~~subscriber profile information~~ from the HSS. The interface to the 3G Authentication Centre is HSS-internal, and it need not be standardised as part of this architecture.

Editor's note: it is ffs, jointly with CN4 and SA2, whether the authorisation part of all USSs is transferred over Zh, or by other means. SA3 expresses a strong preference, however, to transfer the authorisation part of the USSs for, at least, the GBA-specific entities PKI-portal (cf. TS. 33.221) and Authentication Proxy (TS 33.222) over Zh.

4.3.4 Reference point Zn

The reference point Zn is used by the NAF to fetch the key material agreed during a previous HTTP Digest AKA protocol run over the reference point Ub from the UE to the BSF. It ~~may is~~ also ~~be~~ used to fetch ~~subscriber profile application-specific user security settings~~ ~~information~~ from the BSF, if requested by the NAF.

Editor's note: it is ffs, jointly with CN4 and SA2, whether the authorisation part of the application-specific USSs is transferred over Zn, or by other means. SA3 expresses a strong preference, however, to transfer also the authorisation part of the application-specific USSs for, at least, the GBA-specific entities PKI-portal (cf. TS. 33.221) and Authentication Proxy (TS 33.222) over Zn.

4.4 Requirements and principles for bootstrapping

The following requirements and principles are applicable to bootstrapping procedure:

- the bootstrapping function shall not depend on the particular NAF;
- the server implementing the bootstrapping function needs to be trusted by the home operator to handle authentication vectors;
- the server implementing the NAF needs only to be trusted by the home operator to handle derived key material;
- it shall be possible to support NAF in the operator's home network and in the visited network;
- the architecture shall not preclude the support of network application function in a third network;
- to the extent possible, existing protocols and infrastructure should be reused;

- in order to ensure wide applicability, all involved protocols are preferred to run over IP;
- it shall be prevented that a security breach in one NAF who is using the GBA, can be used by an attacker to mount successful attacks to the other NAFs using the GBA.

4.4.1 Access Independence

Bootstrapping procedure is access independent. Bootstrapping procedure requires IP connectivity from UE.

4.4.2 Authentication methods

Authentication between the UE and the BSF shall not be possible without a valid cellular subscription. Authentication shall be based on the 3GPP AKA protocol.

4.4.3 Roaming

The roaming subscriber shall be able to utilize the bootstrapping function in the home network. The subscriber shall be able to utilize network application function that is in a visited network.

4.4.4 Requirements on reference point Ub

The requirements for reference point Ub are:

- the BSF shall be able to identify the UE;
- the BSF and the UE shall be able to authenticate each other based on AKA;
- the BSF shall be able to send a Transaction Identifier to the UE.

4.4.5 Requirements on reference point Zh

The requirements for reference point Zh are:

- mutual authentication, confidentiality and integrity shall be provided;

NOTE: This requirement may be fulfilled by physical or proprietary security measures if BSF and HSS are located within the same operator's network.

- the BSF shall be able to send bootstrapping information request concerning a subscriber;
- the HSS shall be able to send 3GPP AKA vectors to the BSF in batches;
- the HSS shall be able to send the complete set of subscriber's GBA user security settings ~~GAA profile information~~ needed for security purposes to the BSF;

Editor's note: It's ff's how to proceed in the case where GBA user security settings ~~profile is~~ are updated in HSS after GBA user security settings ~~profile is~~ were forwarded. The question is whether this profile change should be propagated to BSF.

- no state information concerning bootstrapping shall be required in the HSS;
- all procedures over reference point Zh shall be initiated by the BSF;

Editor's note: This requirement may need to be modified depending on what happens in the case where the GBA user security settings ~~profile~~ in the HSS is updated.

- the number of different interfaces to HSS should be minimized.

4.4.6 Requirements on reference point Zn

The requirements for reference point Zn are:

- mutual authentication, confidentiality and integrity shall be provided;

NOTE: This requirement may be fulfilled by physical or proprietary security measures if BSF and NAF are located within the same operator's network.

Editors' Note: In the visited NAF scenario, it should be decided how the communication between a D-Proxy and a BSF is secured. The possible solutions for securing this link include TLS and IPsec.

- The BSF shall verify that the requesting NAF is authorised;
- The NAF shall be able to send a key material request to the BSF, containing NAF's public hostname used by the UE's corresponding request. The BSF shall be able to verify that a NAF is authorized to use this hostname, i.e. the FQDN used by UE when it contacts the NAF;
- The BSF shall be able to send the requested key material to the NAF;
- The NAF shall be able to get the [a selected set of application-specific user security settings](#) ~~subscriber profile information needed for security purposes~~ from BSF, [depending on the policy of the BSF and the application indicated in the request from the NAF over Zn](#);

[The NAF shall be able to indicate to the BSF the single application or several applications it requires user security settings for](#);

NOTE: [If some application needs only a subset of an application-specific user security setting, e.g. only one IMPU, the NAF selects this subset from the complete set of user security settings sent from BSF.](#)

[The BSF shall be able to configure on a per NAF or per application basis if private subscriber identity and which user security settings may be sent to a NAF](#);

- The BSF shall be able to indicate to the NAF the lifetime of the key material.

[Editor's note: it is ffs which actions are to be taken over Zn when the BSF receives a user security settings update from the HSS over Zh.](#)

~~Editor's note: Relationship between Transaction Identifier and subscriber identity is ffs. In the case of Presence reference point Ut, there are several potential identities that are related to Transaction Identifier, i.e. IMPI and IMPUs. The subscriber may have several Presence accounts related to same IMPI. Transaction Identifier does not carry enough information on which IMPU the end user is trying to use.~~

4.4.7 Requirements on Transaction Identifier

Transaction identifier shall be used to bind the subscriber identity to the keying material in reference points Ua, Ub and Zn.

Requirements for Transaction Identifier are:

- Transaction Identifier shall be globally unique;
- Transaction Identifier shall be usable as a key identifier in protocols used in the reference point Ua;
- NAF shall be able to detect the home network and the BSF of the UE from the Transaction Identifier.

NOTE 1: NAF can remove the security association based on deletion conditions after the key has become invalid.

NOTE 2: Care has to be taken that the parallel use of GBA and non-GBA authentication between UE and NAF does not lead to conflicts, e.g. in the name space. This potential conflict cannot be resolved in a generic way as it is dependent on specific protocol and authentication mechanism used between UE and application server. It is therefore out of scope of this specification.

For the example of HTTP Digest authentication used between UE and NAF, parallel use is possible as the following applies: <username,password>-pairs must be unique to one realm only. As the NAF controls the realm names, it has to ensure that only the GBA based realm is named with the reserved 3GPP realm name. In the special case that the NAF wants to allow non GBA based authentication in the GBA realm also, it has to ensure that no usernames in the format of a Transaction Identifier are used outside GBA based authentication.

4.5 Procedures

This chapter specifies in detail the format of the bootstrapping procedure that is further utilized by various applications. It contains the AKA authentication procedure with BSF, and the key material generation procedure.

4.5.1 Initiation of bootstrapping

Before communication between the UE and the NAF can start, the UE and the NAF first have to agree whether to use the GBA. When a UE wants to interact with a NAF, but it does not know if the NAF requires the use of shared keys obtained by means of the GBA, the UE shall contact the NAF for further instructions (see figure 4.2).




Figure 4.2: Initiation of bootstrapping

1. UE starts communication over reference point Ua with the NAF without any GBA-related parameters.
2. If the NAF requires the use of shared keys obtained by means of the GBA, but the request from UE does not include GBA-related parameters, the NAF replies with a bootstrapping initiation message. The form of this indication may depend on the particular reference point Ua and is specified in the relevant stage 3-specifications.

4.5.2 Bootstrapping procedures

When a UE wants to interact with a NAF, and it knows that the bootstrapping procedure is needed, it shall first perform a bootstrapping authentication (see figure 4.3). Otherwise, the UE shall perform a bootstrapping authentication only when it has received bootstrapping initiation required message or a bootstrapping negotiation indication from the NAF, or when the lifetime of the key in UE has expired (cf. subclause 4.5.3).

NOTE 1: The main steps from the specifications of the AKA protocol in TS 33.102 [2] and the HTTP digest AKA protocol in RFC 3310 [4] are repeated in figure 3 for the convenience of the reader. In case of any potential conflict, the specifications in TS 33.102 [2] and RFC 3310 [4] take precedence.




Figure 4.3: The bootstrapping procedure

1. The UE sends an HTTP request towards the BSF.
2. BSF retrieves [the complete set of GBA user security settings](#) ~~the user profile~~ and one or a whole batch of Authentication Vectors (AV, AV = RAND||AUTN||XRES||CK||IK) over the reference point Zh from the HSS.
3. Then BSF forwards the RAND and AUTN to the UE in the 401 message (without the CK, IK and XRES). This is to demand the UE to authenticate itself.
4. The UE checks AUTN to verify that the challenge is from an authorised network; the UE also calculates CK, IK and RES. This will result in session keys IK and CK in both BSF and UE.
5. The UE sends another HTTP request, containing the Digest AKA response (calculated using RES), to the BSF.
6. The BSF authenticates the UE by verifying the Digest AKA response.

7. The BSF generates key material Ks by concatenating CK and IK. The Transaction Identifier value shall be also generated in format of NAI by taking the RAND value from step 3, and the BSF server name, i.e. RAND@BSF_servers_domain_name.
8. The BSF shall send a 200 OK message, including a Transaction Identifier, to the UE to indicate the success of the authentication. In addition, in the 200 OK message, the BSF shall supply the lifetime of the key Ks. The key material Ks is generated in UE by concatenating CK and IK.
9. Both the UE and the BSF shall use the Ks to derive the key material Ks_NAF during the procedures as specified in clause 4.5.3. Ks_NAF shall be used for securing the reference point Ua.

Ks_NAF is computed as $Ks_NAF = KDF(Ks, \text{key derivation parameters})$, where KDF is a suitable key derivation function, and the key derivation parameters consist of the user's IMPI, the NAF_Id and RAND. The NAF_Id consists of the full DNS name of the NAF. KDF shall be implemented in the ME.

NOTE 2: To allow consistent key derivation based on NAF name in UE and BSF, at least one of the three following prerequisites shall be fulfilled:

- (1) The NAF is known in DNS under one domain name (FQDN) only, i.e. no two different domain names point to the IP address of the NAF. This has to be achieved by administrative means. This prerequisite is not specific to 3GPP, as it is necessary also under other circumstances, e.g. for TLS V1.0 without use of wildcard or multiple-name certificates.
- (2) Each DNS entry of the NAF points to a different IP address. The NAF responds to all these IP addresses. Each IP address is tied to the corresponding FQDN by NAF configuration. The NAF can see from the IP address, which FQDN to use for key derivation.
- (3) Ua uses a protocol which transfers the host name (FQDN of NAF as used by UE) to NAF (e.g. HTTP/1.1 with mandatory Host request header field). This requires the NAF to check the validity of the host name, to use this name in all communication with UE where appropriate, and to transfer this name to BSF to allow for correct derivation of Ks_NAF. In case of a TLS tunnel this requires either multiple-identities certificates or the deployment of RFC 3546 [9] or other protocol means with similar purpose.

Editor's note: The definition of the KDF is left to ETSI SAGE and is to be included in the Annex B of the present specification.

The UE and the BSF shall store the key Ks with the associated Transaction Identifier for further use, until the lifetime of Ks has expired, or until the key Ks is updated.

4.5.3 Procedures using bootstrapped Security Association

Before communication between the UE and the NAF can start, the UE and the NAF first have to agree whether to use shared keys obtained by means of the GBA. If the UE does not know whether to use GBA with this NAF, it uses the Initiation of Bootstrapping procedure described in clause 4.5.1.

Once the UE and the NAF have established that they want to use GBA then every time the UE wants to interact with an NAF the following steps are executed as depicted in figure 4.4.

UE starts communication over reference point Ua with the NAF:

- in general, UE and NAF will not yet share the key(s) required to protect the reference point Ua. If they already do (i.e. if a key Ks_NAF for the corresponding key derivation parameter NAF_Id is already available), the UE and the NAF can start to securely communicate right away. If the UE and the NAF do not yet share a key, the UE proceeds as follows:
 - if a key Ks is available in the UE, the UE derives the key Ks_NAF from Ks, as specified in clause 4.5.2;
 - if no key Ks is available in the UE, the UE first agrees on a new key Ks with the BSF over the reference point Ub, and then proceeds to derive Ks_NAF;

NOTE 1: If it is not desired by the UE to use the same Ks to derive more than one Ks_NAF then the UE should agree on a new key Ks with the BSF over the reference point Ub, and then proceed to derive Ks_NAF;

- if the NAF shares a key with the UE, but the NAF requires an update of that key, e.g. because the key's lifetime has expired, it shall send a suitable bootstrapping renegotiation request to the UE and terminates the protocol used over reference point Ua, see figure 4.5. The form of this indication depends on the particular protocol used over reference point Ua. If the UE receives a bootstrapping renegotiation request, it starts a run of the protocol over reference point Ub, as specified in clause 4.5.2, in order to obtain a new key Ks.

NOTE 2: To allow for consistent key derivation in BSF and UE, both have to use the same FQDN for derivation (see NOTE 2 of section 4.5.2). For each protocol used over Ua it shall be specified if only cases (1) and (2) of NOTE 2 of section 4.5.2 are allowed for the NAF or if the protocol used over Ua shall transfer also the FQDN used for key derivation by UE to NAF.

NOTE 3: If the shared key between UE and NAF is invalid, the NAF can set deletion conditions to the corresponding security association for subsequent removal.

- the UE supplies the Transaction Identifier to the NAF, in the form as specified in clause 4.3.2, to allow the NAF to retrieve the corresponding keys from the BSF;

NOTE 4: The UE may adapt the key material Ks_NAF to the specific needs of the reference point Ua. This adaptation is outside the scope of this specification.

- when the UE is powered down, or when the UICC is removed, any keys Ks and Ks_NAF shall be deleted from storage;
- when a new Ks is agreed over the reference point Ub and a key Ks_NAF, derived from one NAF_Id, is updated, the other keys Ks_NAF, derived from different values NAF_Id, stored on the UE shall not be affected;

NAF starts communication over reference point Zn with BSF

- The NAF requests key material corresponding to the Transaction Identifier supplied by the UE to the NAF over reference point Ua. If the NAF has several FQDNs, which may be used in conjunction with this specification, then the NAF shall transfer in the request over Zn the same FQDN, which was used over Ua (see NOTE 2 on key derivation in this clause);

- [The NAF may also request application-specific user security settings for the applications, which the request received over Ua from UE may access;](#)

- With the key material request, the NAF shall supply NAF's public hostname that UE has used to access NAF to BSF, and BSF shall be able verify that NAF is authorized to use that hostname;
- The BSF derives the keys required to protect the protocol used over reference point Ua from the key Ks and the key derivation parameters, as specified in clause 4.5.2, and supplies to NAF the requested key Ks_NAF, as well as the lifetime of that key. If the key identified by the Transaction Identifier supplied by the NAF is not available at the BSF, the BSF shall indicate this in the reply to the NAF. The NAF then indicates a bootstrapping renegotiation request to the UE.

NOTE 5: The NAF shall adapt the key material Ks_NAF to the specific needs of the reference point Ua in the same way as the UE did. This adaptation is outside the scope of this specification.

- [The BSF may also send the private user identity \(IMPI\) and requested user security settings to NAF according to the BSF's policy;](#)

NAF continues with the protocol used over the reference point Ua with the UE.

Once the run of the protocol used over reference point Ua is completed the purpose of bootstrapping is fulfilled as it enabled UE and NAF to use reference point Ua in a secure way.




Figure 4.4: The bootstrapping usage procedure




Figure 4.5: Bootstrapping renegotiation request

4.5.4 Procedure related to service discovery

To enable the bootstrapping procedure, a procedure needs to be described on how to discover the location of BSF. It shall be possible to enable the terminal to be configured either manually or automatically via one of the following approaches:

- The address information shall be published via reliable channel. Subscribers shall store all the parameters as part of the initial establishment of IP connectivity. The addresses need to be input only once;
- The address information shall be pushed automatically to the UE over the air interface when the subscription to bootstrapping service is accepted. All the parameters shall be saved in the UE and used the same manner as above. The procedure is specified in [7];
- The location information shall be discovered automatically based on DHCP, after the IP connectivity has been established. The DHCP server shall provide the UE with the domain name of a BSF and the address of a

Domain Name Server (DNS) that is capable of resolving the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of the BSF. The procedure is specified in TS 23.228 [8].

NOTE: The location of DHCP server may be pushed to UE through the procedure specified in [7].

5 UICC-based enhancements to Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA_U)

It is assumed that the UICC, BSF, and HSS involved in the procedures specified in this section are capable of handling the GBA_U specific enhancements. For issues of migration from UICC, BSF, and HSS, which are not GBA_U-aware, see Annex C of this specification. The procedures specified in this section also apply if NAF is not GBA_U aware, but, of course, in that case there are no benefits of the GBA_U specific enhancements.

5.1 Architecture and reference points for bootstrapping with UICC-based enhancements

The text from clause 4.4 of this specification applies also here, with the addition that the interface between the ME and the UICC, as specified in TS 31.102 [1], needs to be enhanced with GBA_U specific commands. The requirements on these commands can be found in clause 5.2.1, details on the procedures are in clause 5.3.

5.2 Requirements and principles for bootstrapping with UICC-based enhancements

The requirements and principles from clause 4.3 also apply here with the following addition:

5.2.1 Requirements on UE

The 3G AKA keys CK and IK resulting from a run of the protocol over the Ub reference point shall not leave the UICC.

The UICC shall be able to distinguish between authentication requests for GBA_U, and authentication requests for other 3G authentication domains.

Upon an authentication request from the ME, which the UICC recognises as related to GBA_U, the UICC shall derive two keys from CK and IK. All 3G MEs are capable of such a request.

Upon request from the ME, the UICC shall be able to derive further NAF-specific keys from the derived key stored on the UICC. Only GBA_U-aware 3G MEs are capable of such a request.

Editors' Note: The location (whether in the UICC or in the ME) of the storage of Ks_ext is ffs.

5.3 Procedures for bootstrapping with UICC-based enhancements

5.3.1 Initiation of bootstrapping

The text from clause 4.5.1 of this document applies also here.

5.3.2 Bootstrapping procedure

The procedure specified in this clause differs from the procedure specified clause 4.5.2 in the generation of the Authentication Vector in the HSS and the local handling of keys in the UE and the BSF. The messages exchanged over the Ub reference point are identical for both procedures.

When a UE wants to interact with a NAF, and it knows that the bootstrapping procedure is needed, it shall first perform a bootstrapping authentication (see figure 5.1). Otherwise, the UE shall perform a bootstrapping authentication only when it has received bootstrapping initiation required message or a bootstrapping renegotiation indication from the NAF, or when the lifetime of the key in UE has expired (see clause 5.3.3).

NOTE: The main steps from the specifications of the AKA protocol in TS 33.102 [2] and the HTTP digest AKA protocol in RFC 3310 [4] are repeated in Figure 5.1 for the convenience of the reader. In case of any potential conflict, the specifications in TS 33.102 [2] and RFC 3310 [4] take precedence.




Figure 5.1: The bootstrapping procedure with UICC-based enhancements

1. The ME sends an HTTP request towards the BSF.

2. The BSF retrieves [the complete set of GBA user security settings](#) ~~the user profile~~ and one or a whole batch of Authentication Vectors (AV, AV = RAND||AUTN||XRES||CK||IK) over the Zh reference point from the HSS. The HSS recognises that the UICC is GBA_U aware and that the request for AVs came from a GBA_U aware BSF, and generates a GBA_U-AV. If the BSF received GBA_U-AVs then it stores the XRES after flipping the least significant bit.

Editors' Note: The GBA_U-AV will be described within Annex D of this specification.

3. Then BSF forwards the RAND and AUTN to the UE in the 401 message (without the CK, IK and XRES). This is to demand the UE to authenticate itself.
4. The ME sends RAND and AUTN to the UICC. The UICC checks AUTN to verify that the challenge is from an authorised network; the UICC also calculates CK, IK and RES. This will result in session keys CK and IK in both BSF and UICC.
5. The UICC checks if a GBA_U-AV was received as specified in step 2 of this clause. If this is not the case, the UICC transfers RES, CK and IK to the ME, and the ME proceeds according to the procedures specified in section 4 of this document, without involving the UICC any further. If a GBA_U-AV was received, the UICC then applies a suitable key derivation function h1 to Ks, which is the concatenation of CK and IK, and possibly further h1-key derivation parameters to obtain two keys, Ks_ext and Ks_int, each of length 128 bit, i.e. $h1(Ks, h1 \text{ key derivation parameters}) = Ks_ext \parallel Ks_int$ (see also figure 5.2). The UICC then transfers RES (after flipping the least significant bit) and Ks_ext to the ME and stores Ks_int/ks_ext on the UICC.

Editors' Note: The definition of the h1 is left to ETSI SAGE and is to be included in the Annex B of the present specification.

Editors' Note: The location (whether in the UICC or in the ME) of the storage of Ks_ext is ffs.

6. The ME sends another HTTP request, containing the Digest AKA response (calculated using RES), to the BSF.
7. The BSF authenticates the UE by verifying the Digest AKA response.
8. The BSF generates the key Ks by concatenating CK and IK. The BSF checks if the AV was a GBA_U-AV as specified in step 2 of this clause. If this is not the case, the BSF applies the procedures specified in clause 4 of this document. If the GBA_U-AV was recognized then the BSF applies the key derivation function h1 to Ks and possibly further h1-key derivation parameters to obtain two keys, Ks_ext and Ks_int, in the same way as the UICC did in step 5. The Transaction Identifier value shall be also generated in format of NAI by taking the RAND value from step 3, and the BSF server name, i.e. RAND@BSF_servers_domain_name.
9. The BSF shall send a 200 OK message, including the Transaction Identifier, to the UE to indicate the success of the authentication. In addition, in the 200 OK message, the BSF shall supply the lifetime of the keys Ks_ext and Ks_int, The lifetimes of the keys Ks_ext and Ks_int shall be the same.
10. The BSF shall use the keys Ks_ext and Ks_int to derive the NAF-specific keys Ks_ext_NAF and Ks_int_NAF, if requested by a NAF over the Zn reference point. Ks_ext_NAF and Ks_int_NAF are used for securing the Ua reference point. The UE shall use the key Ks_ext to derive the NAF-specific key Ks_ext_NAF, if applicable. The UICC shall use the key Ks_int to derive the NAF-specific key Ks_int_NAF, if applicable.

Ks_ext_NAF is computed as $Ks_ext_NAF = h2(Ks_ext, h2\text{-key derivation parameters})$, and Ks_int_NAF is computed in the UICC as $Ks_int_NAF = h2(Ks_int, h2\text{-key derivation parameters})$, where h2 is a suitable key derivation function, and the h2-key derivation parameters include the user's IMPI, the NAF_Id and RAND. The NAF_Id consists of the full DNS name of the NAF.

Editors' Note: The definition of the h2 is left to ETSI SAGE and is to be included in the Annex B of the present specification.

NOTE: The NOTE 2 of clause 4.5.2 also applies here.

The ME, the UICC and the BSF store the keys Ks_ext and Ks_int together with the associated Transaction Identifier for further use, until the lifetime of Ks_ext and Ks_int has expired, or until the keys Ks_ext and Ks_int are updated.




Figure 5.2: Key derivation for GBA-aware UICC when GBA-run was triggered

5.3.3 Procedures using bootstrapped Security Association

Before communication between the UE and the NAF can start, the UE and the NAF first have to agree whether to use shared keys obtained by means of the GBA. If the UE does not know whether to use GBA with this NAF, it uses the Initiation of Bootstrapping procedure described in clause 5.3.1.

Once the UE and the NAF have established that they want to use GBA then every time the UE wants to interact with a NAF the following steps are executed as depicted in figure 5.3.

Next, the UE and the NAF have to agree, which type of keys to use, Ks_ext_NAF or Ks_int_NAF , or both. The default is the use of Ks_ext_NAF only. This use is also supported by MEs and NAFs, which are GBA_U unaware. If Ks_int_NAF , or both, are to be used, this use has to be agreed between UE and NAF prior to the execution of the procedure described in the remainder of this clause 5.3.3. How this agreement is reached is application-specific and is not within the scope of this document.

NOTE 1: Such an agreement could e.g. be reached by manual configuration, or by an application-specific protocol step.

Editors' Note: The support of unaware GBA_U MEs, which are GBA_{ME} aware only is FFS.

In general, UE and NAF will not yet share the key(s) required to protect the Ua reference point. If they do not, the UE proceeds as follows:

- if Ks_ext_NAF is required and a key Ks_ext is available in the UE, the UE derives the key Ks_ext_NAF from Ks_ext, as specified in clause 5.3.2;
- if Ks_int_NAF is required and a key Ks_int is available in the UICC, the ME requests the UICC to derive the key Ks_int_NAF from Ks_int, as specified in clause 5.3.2;

NOTE 2: If it is not desired by the UE to use the same Ks_ext/int to derive more than one Ks_ext/int_NAF then the UE should first agree on new keys Ks_ext and Ks_int with the BSF over the Ub reference point, as specified in clause 5.3.2, and then proceeds to derive Ks_ext_NAF or Ks_int_NAF, or both, as required.

- if Ks_ext and Ks_int are not available in the UE, the UE first agrees on new keys Ks_ext and Ks_int with the BSF over the Ub reference point, as specified in clause 5.3.2, and then proceeds to derive Ks_ext_NAF or Ks_int_NAF, or both, as required;
- if the NAF shares a key with the UE, but the NAF requires an update of that key, it shall send a suitable bootstrapping renegotiation request to the UE and terminate the protocol used over Ua reference point. The form of this indication depends on the particular protocol used over Ua reference point. If the UE receives a bootstrapping renegotiation request, it starts a run of the protocol over Ub, as specified in clause 5.3.2, in order to obtain new keys.

NOTE 3: If the shared keys between UE and NAF become invalid, the NAF can set deletion conditions to the corresponding security association for subsequent removal.

NOTE 4: If it is not desired by the NAF to use the same Ks to derive more than one Ks_int/ext_NAF then the NAF should always reply to the first request sent by a UE by sending a key update request to the UE.

UE and NAF can now start the communication over Ua reference point using the keys Ks_ext_NAF or Ks_int_NAF, or both, as required. They proceed as follows:

- The UE supplies the Transaction Identifier to the NAF, as specified in clause 5.3.2, to allow the NAF to retrieve the corresponding keys from the BSF

NOTE 5: To allow for consistent key derivation in BSF and UE, both have to use the same FQDN for derivation (cf. NOTE 2 of clause 4.5.2). For each protocol used over Ua it shall be specified if only cases (1) and (2) of NOTE 2 of clause 4.5.2 are allowed for the NAF or if the protocol used over Ua shall transfer also the FQDN used for key derivation by UE to NAF.

NOTE 6: The UE may adapt the keys Ks_ext_NAF or Ks_int_NAF to the specific needs of the Ua reference point. This adaptation is outside the scope of this specification.

- when the UE is powered down, or when the UICC is removed, any GBA_U keys shall be deleted from storage in the ME. There is no need to delete keys Ks_int and Ks_int_NAF from storage in the UICC;

NOTE 7: After each run of the protocol over the Ub reference point, new keys Ks_ext and Ks_int, associated with a new transaction identifier, are derived in the UE according to clause 5.3.2, so that it can never happen, that keys Ks_ext and Ks_int with different transaction identifiers simultaneously exist in the UE.

- When new keys Ks_ext and Ks_int are agreed over the Ub reference point and new NAF-specific keys need to be derived for one NAF_Id, then both, Ks_ext_NAF and Ks_int_NAF (if present), shall be updated for this NAF_Id, but further keys Ks_ext_NAF or Ks_int_NAF relating to other NAF_Ids, which may be stored on the UE, shall not be affected;

NOTE 8: This rule ensures that the keys Ks_ext_NAF and Ks_int_NAF are always in synch at the UE and the NAF.

NAF now starts communication over the Zn reference point with the BSF.

- The NAF requests from the BSF the keys corresponding to the Transaction Identifier, which was supplied by the UE to the NAF over the Ua reference point. If the NAF is GBA_U aware it indicates this by including a corresponding flag in the request. If the NAF has several FQDNs, which may be used in conjunction with this specification, then the NAF shall transfer in the request over Zn the same FQDN, which was used over Ua (see note above on key derivation in this clause).

- [The NAF may also request application-specific user security settings for the applications, which the request received over Ua from UE may access:](#)

- With the keys request over the Zn reference point, the NAF shall supply NAF's public hostname that UE has used to access NAF to BSF, and BSF shall be able to verify that NAF is authorized to use that hostname.
- The BSF derives the keys Ks_ext_NAF, and Ks_int_NAF (if additionally required), as specified in clause 5.3.2. If the NAF indicated in its request that it is GBA_U aware, the BSF supplies to NAF both keys, Ks_ext_NAF, and Ks_int_NAF, otherwise the BSF supplies only Ks_ext_NAF. In addition, the BSF supplies the lifetime time of these keys. If the key identified by the Transaction Identifier supplied by the NAF is not available at the BSF, the BSF shall indicate this in the reply to the NAF. The NAF then indicates a bootstrapping renegotiation request (See figure 4.5) to the UE.

NOTE: The NAF may adapt the keys Ks_ext_NAF and Ks_int_NAF to the specific needs of the Ua reference point in the same way as the UE did. This adaptation is outside the scope of this specification.

- [The BSF may also send the private user identity \(IMPI\) and requested user security settings to NAF according to the BSF's policy:](#)

The NAF now continues with the protocol used over the Ua reference point with the UE.

Once the run of the protocol used over Ua reference point is completed the purpose of bootstrapping is fulfilled as it enabled the UE and NAF to use Ua reference point in a secure way.




Figure 5.3: The bootstrapping usage procedure with UICC-based enhancements

5.3.4 Procedure related to service discovery

The text from clause 4.5.4 of this document applies also here.