Beijing, Cinna, 10-14 May 2004									
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ж	33.234 CR	CRNum	жrev	- 8	₩ C	urrent vers	sion:	6.0.0	ж
For HELP on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the # symbols.									
Proposed change affects: UICC apps# X ME X Radio Access Network Core Network									
<i>Title:</i> ೫	Requirement or stored in USIM	keeping WLA	N access	keys i	ndepe	endent from	n 2G/3	G access	s keys
Source: ೫	Nokia								
Work item code: %	WLAN-3G inter	working securi	ty			Date: ೫	14/0	5/2004	
Category: ೫	Use <u>one</u> of the folk F (correction) A (correspon B (addition of	ds to a correctio f feature), modification of f nodification) ons of the above	n in an ear feature)			elease: # Use <u>one</u> of 2 R96 R97 R98 R99 Rel-4 Rel-5 Rel-6	the foll (GSM (Relea (Relea (Relea	owing rele Phase 2) se 1996) se 1997) se 1998) se 1999) se 4) se 5)	ases:
Reason for change	"Access via release) of single UIC In SA2's ar the require " - Existing - Authen - R6 US privacy With such	age-1 specifica a an I-WLAN s the UICC or u C shall be poss chitecture spe ment on the sr SIM and USII tication shall rel IM may include ," requirements, ss) and Kc (fo	hall be po sing a SIN sible." cification 2 nart card 3 M shall be y on (U)SI e new fund the WLAN	ssible A. Acco 23.234 as: suppo M base ctional I speci	using ess to orted. ed auth ity if n	earlier rele services v ion 5.1 Act entication r ecessary e rameters s	eases (ria an I cess C nechan e.g. in o uch as	(than the -WLAN v ontrol, it isms. order to i	current vith a states mprove IK (for

they should not overwrite the corresponding parameters for 2G/3G RAN access).

- Summary of change: # A general description is added to cover all cases specified.
- **Consequences if not approved: *** WLAN access would result in UE lossing keys for 2G/3G RAN access, and thereby require that the UEs initiate a full authentication at 2G/3G RAN connection establishment, because the key set reads out from the smart card is not correct.

Clauses affected:	¥ <mark>6.1</mark>		
	YN		

Other specs affected:	ж	X	Other core specifications Test specifications O&M Specifications	Ħ	
Other comments:	ж				

6 Security mechanisms

6.1 Authentication and key agreement

The WLAN UE and AAA server shall support both EAP AKA and EAP SIM methods. The procedure to select the method is:

- 1) The WLAN UE shall send an identity (whatever it is: permanent, pseudonym, etc.) to the AAA server. If this identity is an IMSI, it shall contain an indication of the EAP method to be used.
- 2) If the AAA server recognizes the EAP method but not the user identity (for example an obsolete pseudonym), it shall request a new identity using the EAP method indicated by the WLAN UE.
- 3) If the AAA server recognizes the user identity (and hence the EAP method), it shall fetch AVs from HSS. If they don't match the EAP method received (e.g. the EAP method received is EAP AKA and triplets are received from HSS), the user's subscription shall prevail (in the previous example EAP SIM shall be used).
- 4) If the user identity is not recognized, the AAA server shall decide which method to use (there may exist a default method ONLY in this situation). If this default method does not match user's subscription (e.g. EAP AKA for a SIM user), the WLAN UE shall respond a NACK to the AAA server and then the AAA shall try with the other EAP method until a recognised identity is received.

The authentication and key agreement shall be dedicated for WLAN access only, thus the keys provided by the SIM (Kc) or USIM (CK, IK) during authentication and key agreement shall be stored in the ME's volatile memory.

*** END OF CHANGE***