## 3GPP TSG SA WG3 Security — S3#33

#### S3-040427

0 - 14 May 2004, Beijing, China											
CHANGE REQUEST											
ж		<mark>43.020</mark>	CR	CRNum	жrev	-	ж	Current vers	ion: <b>5.0</b>	0.0	ж
For <u>HELP</u> on Proposed chang		-		e bottom of this pps <b># <mark>X</mark></b>				e pop-up text		-	
Title:	ж	Introducir	<mark>ig VGC</mark>	S/VBS cipher	ring						
Source:	ж	Siemens,	Vodaf	one							
Work item code:	ж	SECGKY	V					Date: ೫	13/05/20	04	
Category:	[	F (corr A (corr B (add C (fun D (edit	rection) respond lition of ctional torial m planatio	ds to a correctic feature), modification of f odification) ns of the above	on in an e feature)		elease	Release: ₩ Use <u>one</u> of 2 () R96 R97 R98 R99 Rel-4 Rel-5 Rel-6	Rel-6 the followin (GSM Phas (Release 1 (Release 1 (Release 1 (Release 4 (Release 5 (Release 6	se 2) 996) 997) 998) 999) )	ases:

Reason for change:	# Introducing a new feature VGCS/VBS ciphering
Summary of change:	# The new ciphering feature is introduced into Annex F
Consequences if not approved:	# The feature cannot be realized
	Open issues are still (highlighted by coloured text):
	<ul> <li>Open issues are still (highlighted by coloured text):</li> <li>The inclusion of Global_Count (waiting for GERAN2 feasibility)</li> <li>An assessment of the timing requirements</li> <li>SAGE to assess if the RAND length is ok</li> </ul>

Clauses affected:	원 New Annex F
Other specs	Y         N           %         Y           Other core specifications         %           31.102, 42.068, 43.068, 42.069, 43.069, 43.069, 44.018, 48.008           N         Test specifications
Other comments:	N O&M Specifications

## Annex F (normative): Ciphering of Voice Group Call Service (VGCS) and Voice Broadcast Service (VBS)

This Annex defines the security related service and functions for VGCS and VBS in order to provide confidentiality protection to the group calls.

## F.1 Introduction

#### F.1.1 Scope

In this Annex the ciphering of the voice group call service (VGCS) [1] and voice broadcast service (VBS) [4] is described. The following functions are required:

- Key derivation

Encryption of voice group/broadcast calls

- [3] 3G TS 31.102: 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Terminals; Characteristics of the USIM application
- [4]
   3G TS 42.069: 3<sup>rd</sup> Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and system Aspects; Voice Broadcast Service (VBS) - Stage 1
- [5]
   3G TS 43.069: 3<sup>rd</sup> Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and system Aspects; Voice Broadcast Service (VBS) - Stage 2

The secure storage of the master group keys

VGCS and VBS provide no authentication functions, i.e. authentication is performed implicitly via encryption/decryption since only a legitimate subscriber shall be able to encrypt and decrypt the VGCS/VBS speech call when the group call requires confidentiality protection. To include a subscriber into a voice group the required group data (including the 2 master group keys) shall be stored on theUSIM, e.g. during the personalisation process or via OTA (over-the-air). To exclude a subscriber from a voice group the group data shall be deleted from the USIM. In case of a stolen or lost USIM, all USIMs of the remaining members of the voice groups that the USIM is a member of, need to be changed (e.g. via OTA or manual provisioning).

<u>A pre- Rel-6 VGCS/VBS capable mobile shall be able to participate in an un-ciphered group call, if it is</u> <u>part of that group.NOTE: The only security relevant difference between VBS and VGCS is</u> <u>that in the case of VBS there exists no uplink channel.</u>

#### F.1.2 References

[1]	3G TS 42.068: 3 <sup>rd</sup> Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and
	system Aspects; Voice Group Call Service (VGCS) - Stage 1
[2]	<u>3G TS 43.068:</u> 3 <sup>rd</sup> Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and system Aspects; Voice Group Call Service (VGCS) - Stage 2
[6]	3G TS 23.003: 3 <sup>rd</sup> Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network: Numbering, addressing and identification

### F.1.3 Definitions and Abbreviations

#### F.1.3.1 Definitions

A5 Id	Identifier of the encryption algorithm which shall be used.			
CELL GLOBAL COUNT: A counter valid for all voice group calls within a cell (4 bit).				
Group_Id	Unique identifier of a voice call group.			
KMF	Key Modification Function. KMF derives from the short term key VSTK, the CGI and the			
	CELL GLOBAL COUNT the cipher key V Kc which is valid for that specific cell.			
VSTK	Short Term Key provided by the USIM and the GCR. VSTK is derived from VSTK_RAND and			
	<u>V Ki (128 bit)</u>			
VK Id	Identifier of the Master Group Key (1 bit) of a group. There are up to 2 V Ki per group			
VSTK_RAND	A random value (32 bit) for derivation of a short term key VSTK.			
V_Ki (Group_Id, i) Voice Group or Broadcast Group Key (128 bit) number i::=VK_Id of group with Group_Id. In				
	short also called Master Group Key or Group Key in this Annex			
V_Kc	Voice Group or Broadcast Ciphering Key (128 bit). V_Kc is derived from VSTK			

#### F.1.3.2 Abbreviations

The following list describes the abbreviations and acronyms used in this Annex.

CGI	Cell Global Identifier
GCR	Group Call Register
VBS	Voice Broadcast Service
VGCS	Voice Group Call Service

## F.2 Security Requirements

The ciphering concept for VGCS, VBS fulfils following security requirements

**REQ-1.** Prevent the same Voice group or Broadcast group ciphering key being used within different cells.

This requirement protects an observer of getting more information on the plaintext if different data is enciphered with the same key and COUNT (TDMA-numbers derived) in different cells.

**REQ-2.** The master group key shall never leave the USIM and the GCR.

Even though VGCS/VBS users should be trusted, this approach protects the 'root'-key (I.e. Master Group key) in the most secure way such that it need not be updated very frequently.

**REQ-3.** Prevent the reuse of COUNT with the same voice group or broadcast group ciphering key within the same cell.

The COUNT value is determined by the TDMA frame number. An overflow happens after each 3 hour and 8 minutes period. The lifetime of the used cipher key shall not be longer than the overflow period.

NOTE: This enhancement goes beyond the provided level of security of GSM-calls over a point to point channel (i.e. is not a VGCS/VBS-problem only) as long standing calls over a dedicated channel have the same characteristic of reusing the COUNT.

NOTE: GERAN2 is still investigating mechanisms for providing a global count to cope with COUNT number overflows.

**REQ-4.** Prevent the same key stream block being used in uplink and downlink direction.

This requirement is fulfilled by Point to Point voice calls already (See Annex C.1.2). By reusing the same mechanisms for uplink/downlink key stream derivation (I.e. reusing A5) the VBS/VGCS ciphering also fulfils this requirement.

### F.3 Storage of the Master Group Keys and overview of flows

The master group keys (in short called group keys in this Annex) are securely stored at two locations

- GCR: Beside other information, the GCR stores for each Group Id a list of group keys. Each group key is uniquely identified by the Group Id and the group key number VK Id (1-2).
- USIM: The USIM contains a list of 2 group keys for each Group\_Id. Deletion or changing of group keys are allowed only via OTA or via USIM-personalisation.

The Short Term Key VSTK shall be deleted by the network entities after tearing down the call and by the ME on power down or UICC removal. On each new VGCS/VBS call set up, a new short term key VSTK shallbe generated.

The following sequence gives an overview of how the different network entities make use of the group keys (and derived information) during the establishment of a voice group/broadcast call.

- 1. During the voice group/broadcast call set-up the anchor-MSC sends a GCR Interrogation to the GCR containing the Group\_Id.
- 2. The GCR provideson the basis of a fresh Random Number VSTK RAND the key VSTK as described in Annex F.4. VK\_Id, VSTK\_RAND, VSTK, the permitted ciphering algorithm (A5\_Id) and other voice group/broadcast call related information, are sent from the GCR back to the anchor-MSC.
- 3. The anchor-MSC sends this information to the relay-MSC's via a MAP-operation.
- 4. The anchor MSC and relay-MSC's sends this information to the BSS using the VGCS Assignment Request or VBS Assignment Request.
- 5. The BSS sends the VSTK RAND, Group Id and the group key number VK Id to the ME's via a notification procedure.
- 6. Each ME generates the VSTK, on the basis of the received information from step 5, as described in Annex F.4.


A late entrant belonging to the right Group Id in a cell where a call is active need to pick out the notification parameters from step 5 and executes step 6.

## F.4 Key derivation

The key derivation of the encryption is performed in two steps.

1. Derivation of a short term key VSTK on the GCR-side and USIM; VSTK\_RAND generation on the GCR-side and sending it to the ME via the BSS for use on the USIM.

2. Derivation of the actual encryption key V\_Kc in the BSS and ME.



### F.4.1 Key derivation within the USIM / GCR

This function is performed on

• the set-up of a voice group or broadcast call by the GCR

entry to a voice group or broadcast call by the USIM


On the set-up of a voice group/broadcast call the GCR generates an unpredictable random number VSTK\_RAND. Also an appropriate group key V\_Ki (identified by VK\_Id) is selected by the GCR. Using the function A8\_V a short term key VSTK is derived using as input parameters:

- V Ki (Group Id , VK Id)

- VSTK\_RAND

Output of A8 V is

- VSTK



The GCR sends the parameters Group Id, VK Id, VSTK RAND, VSTK, A5 Id via the anchor-MSC and the relay-MSC's to the BSS. The BSS signals the Group Id, VSTK RAND and VK Id to the ME.

On the ME-side, each ME sends the Group Id of the voice group, the identifier of the key VK ID and the random number VSTK RAND to the USIM. The USIM performs the calculation of the short term key VSTK using the function A8\_V and returns it (together with the encryption algorithm identifier A5\_Id).

### F.4.2 Key derivation within the ME/BSS

This function is performed on

- Entry to a voice group/broadcast call
- Cell reselection
- Changing of the value of CELL\_GLOBAL\_COUNT
- Handover
- by the ME.

On the network side the function is performed on

- Set-up of a voice group/broadcast call in a cell
- Changing of the value of CELL GLOBAL COUNT


by the BSS.

For each cell the BSS and ME calculate an encryption key V Kc using the key modification function KMF. Input parameter of the KMF are:

- VSTK: the short term key for this voice call group and this call
- CGI: the cell global identifier which identifies a cell world-wide uniquely.
- CELL GLOBAL COUNT: this parameter shall be incremented by the BSS when the TDMA-frame-number wraps around.

NOTE: It is an implementation issue whether the CELL GLOBAL COUNT is synchronised between different cells or not.

The output of the key modification function is the actually cipher key V Kc.



To provide the required information to the ME the parameters CELL GLOBAL COUNT and CGI are included in various messages from the BSS to the ME (I.e. on the NCH, FACCH and PCH).

### F.4.3 Encryption algorithm selection

The encryption algorithm identifier A5\_Id is stored in the GCR and the USIM. For each group key V\_Ki(Group\_Id, i) there is a unique A5\_Id.

A5\_Id is transmitted from the GCR to the BSS. The ME fetches the A5\_Id together with the VSTK from the USIM.

- NOTE: It is possible that different algorithm identifiers are bound to different V\_Ki of the same group.
- NOTE: The algorithm identifier A5\_Id stored in the GCR and on the USIM shall match with the encryption capabilities of the ME's used by the group and the BSS where the voice group calls are allowed to take place.

#### F.4.4 Algorithm requirements

#### F.4.3.1 A8\_V

The key derivation function A8\_V has the following input and output parameter:

Input Parameter:

VSTK RAND: 32 bit random value

V\_Ki (Group\_Id, i): 128 bit secret key

Output:

VSTK: 128 bit short term key

A8\_V is an operator specific algorithm. The calculation time for A8\_V shall not exceed 500 ms.

A8 V is implemented in the GCR and on the USIM

#### F.4.3.1 KMF

The key derivation function KMF has the following input and output parameter:

Input Parameter:

VSTK: 128 bit random value

CGI: the cell global identifier: 56 bit ([6] TS 23.003)

CELL\_GLOBAL\_COUNT:4 bit

Output:

V Kc 128 bit encryption key

The calculation time for KMF shall not exceed 100 ms.


The KMF is implemented in the BSS and in the ME.

The specification of KMF can be found in Annex F.6

## F.5 Encryption of voice group calls

For the encryption of a voice group call the same encryption algorithms are used as for a normal GSM speech call. Which algorithm out of the algorithm suite A5/x is used is determined by the identifier A5\_Id, which is stored on the USIM (together with the group key V Ki(Group Id, i)). The algorithm A5/X is used in the same way as in the GSM (ref. Annex C.1) using the key V Kc as encryption/decryption key Kc as input to A5/x.

If the key length KL of the encryption algorithm A5/X is shorter than the length of V\_Kc (128 bit) then only the KL least-significant KL-bits of V\_Kc are used.



# F.6 Specification of the Key Modification Function (KMF)

NOTE: The definition of the KMF is left to ETSI SAGE and will be included here when available.