ж		<mark>33.310</mark>	CR CR	Num	жrev	- /	ж	Current vers	ion: 6	.0.0	ж
For HELP on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the # symbols.											
Proposed change affects: UICC apps# ME Radio Access Network Core Network											
Title:	ж	Correctio	n of 'Exten	ded key ι	usage' e	extension	on in S	SEG Certifica	ate profil	e	
Source:	ж	Nokia, Vo	odafone								
Work item code:	ו code: ೫ <mark>SEC1-NDS-AF Date: ೫ 03/05/200</mark>4						/2004				
Category:	æ I	F Use <u>one</u> of F (cor A (cor B (ad C (fur D (ed Detailed ex be found in	the following rection) rresponds to dition of featu actional modific planations of 3GPP <u>TR 21</u>	a correction re), fication of f ation) the above .900.	es: on in an feature) e catego	earlier re ries can	elease	Release: % Use <u>one</u> of 2) R96 R97 R98 R99 Rel-4 Rel-5 Pol 6	Rel-6 the follow (GSM P. (Release (Release (Release (Release (Release (Release	wing rele hase 2) e 1996) e 1997) e 1998) e 1999) e 4) e 5) e 6)	eases:

Reason for change: ¥	In section 6.1.3 the extension 'Extended key usage' is SEG Certificate Profile is defsigned as 'optional critical'. However, according to RFC 3280 when an extension is optional to support, a received extension marked as critical shall lead to an error if not recognized by the receiving SEG. RFC 3280 defines in section 4.2.1.13 that the extension 'Extended key usage' may be either critical or non-critical. Thus to avoid conflict due to different implementations of optional extensions the extensions should be designed as 'optional non-critical'.						
Summary of change: ೫	Change the extension 'Extended key usage' to 'optional non-critical'						
Consequences if # not approved:	An optional extension designed as 'critical' could lead to interoperability problems.						
Clauses affected: #	6.1.3						
Other specs अ affected:	YNXOther core specifications#XTest specificationsXO&M Specifications						
Other comments: #							

***** change *****

6.1.3 SEG Certificate profile

SEG certificates shall be directly signed by the roaming CA, i.e. without employing any intermediate CAs. This limits NDS/AF complexity and makes retrieval and validation of intermediate CA certificates by SEGs unnecessary. Any SEG shall use exactly one certificate to identify itself within the NDS/AF.

In addition to clause 6.1.1, the following requirements apply:

- The RSA key length shall be at least 1024-bit;
- Issuer name is the same as the subject name in the roaming CA certificate.
- Extensions:

- Optionally non critical authority key identifier;
- Optionally non critical subject key identifier;
- Mandatory non-critical subjectAltName;
- Mandatory critical key usage: At least digitalSignature and keyEncipherment shall be set;
- Optional <u>non-</u>critical extended key usage: If present, at least server authentication and IKE intermediate shall be set;
- Mandatory critical Distribution points: CRL distribution point;
- NOTE: Depending on the availability of DNS between peer SEGs, the following rule is applied:
 - subjectAltName should contain IP address (in case DNS is not available);
 - subjectAltName should contain FQDN (in case DNS is available).