CR-Form-v7 CHANGE REQUEST											
æ	, •	<mark>33.141</mark>	CR <mark>CR</mark>	Num	ж rev	-	ж	Current ver	rsion:	1.1.1	ж
For <u>HELP</u> on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the \mathfrak{K} symbols.											
Proposed change affects: UICC apps# ME Radio Access Network Core Network							etwork X				
Title:	ж /	Applying N	IDS for Net	work side	security for	or Pres	sence				
Source:	н н	Nokia, Siemens									
Work item code:	жF	Presence se	ecurity					Date: 🖁	8 12/0	4/2004	
Category:	FRelease: % Rel-6Use one of the following categories:Ise one of the following releases:F (correction)2A (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release)R96B (addition of feature),R97C (functional modification of feature)R98D (editorial modification)R99D tetailed explanations of the above categories canRel-4be found in 3GPP TR 21.900.Rel-5Rel-6(Release 5)Rel-6(Release 6)					ses:					
Reason for change	:	# The n gener	etwork elem al tool.	ent securi	ty is a ffs.	This s	should	be resolved	by ND	S TS 33.2	10, the
Summary of chang	<i>ge:</i> # The NDS solution specified in TS 33.210 is added in the specification. And the compliance with TS 33.222 is mentioned.										
Consequences if not approved:		ж The s	olution for s	ecurity is	incomplet	e.					
Clauses affected:		₩ 2,4									
Other specs affected:		Y N X X X X X X	Other core Test specifi O&M Spec	specificati cations ifications	ons	ж					
Other comments:		ж									

2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.
- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
- [2] 3GPP TS 22.141: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Presence Service; Stage 1".
- [3] 3GPP TS 23.141: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Presence Service; Architecture and functional description".
- [4] 3GPP TS 33.203: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Access security for IP-based services".
- [5] 3GPP TS 23.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2".
- [6] IETF RFC 2246 (1999): "The TLS Protocol Version 1".
- [7] 3GPP TS 23.002: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and Systems Aspects; Network architecture".
- [8] IETF RFC 3268 (2002): "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)".
- [9] IETF RFC 3546 (2003): "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions".
- [10] 3GPP TS 33.210: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Network Domain Security; IP network layer security".
- [11] 3GPP TS 33.220: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture".
- [12] OMA WAP-211-WAPCert, 22.5.2001: http://www.openmobilealliance.org/tech/affiliates/wap/wap-211wapcert-20010522-a.pdf
- [13] OMA WAP-219-TLS, 4.11.2001: <u>http://www.openmobilealliance.org/tech/affiliates/wap/wap-219-tls-20010411-a.pdf</u>
- [14] IETF draft-ietf-tls-rfc2246-bis-05 (2003): "The TLS Protocol Version 1.1"
- [15] 3GPP TR 33.919: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); System Description".
- [16] 3GPP TS 24.cde: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Bootstrapping interface (Ub) and Network application function interface (Ua); Protocol details".
- [17] IETF RFC 2818 (2000): "HTTP over TLS".
- [18]
 3GPP TS 33.220: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and

 System Aspects; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Access to Network Application Functions

 using HTTPS".

4 Overview of the security architecture

An IMS operator using the CSCFs as Watcher Presence proxies and Presentity Presence proxies may offer the Presence services on top of the IMS network, cf. 3GPP TS 22.141 [2]. The access security for IMS is specified in 3GPP TS 33.203 [4] ensuring that SIP signalling is integrity protected and that IMS subscribers are authenticated through the use of IMS AKA. The security termination point from the UE towards the network is in the P-CSCF utilising IPsec ESP.

A watcher can be sending a SIP SUBSCRIBE over IMS towards the network to subscribe or to fetch presence information, i.e. the Presence Service supports SIP-based communications for publishing presence information. The presence information is provided by the Presence Server to the Watcher Application using SIP NOTIFY along the dialogue setup by SUBSCRIBE. This traffic is protected in a hop-by-hop fashion using a combination of SEGs as specified in 3GPP TS 33.210 [10] with the access security provided in 3GPP TS 33.203 [4]. The Presence Server is responsible for managing presence information on behalf of the presence entity and it resides in the presentity's home network. Furthermore the Presence Server provides with a subscription authorization policy that is used to determine which watchers are allowed to subscribe to certain presence information. Also the Presence Server shall before subscription is accepted try to verify the identity of the watcher before the watcher subscribes to presence information. Optionally, depending on the implementation, the Presence Server may authenticate an anonymous watcher depending on the Subscription Authorization Policy. A Presence List Server is responsible of storing grouped lists of watched presentities and enable a Watcher Application to subscribe to the presence of multiple presentities using a single SIP SUBSCRIBE transaction. The Presence List Server also stores and enables management of filters in the presence list, cf. Figure 1.



Figure 1: The Location of the Presence Server and the Presence List Server from an IMS point of view

A Presence User Agent shall be able to manage the data on the AS over the Ut interface, cf. 3GPP TS 23.002 [7], which is based on HTTP. This interface is not covered in 3GPP TS 33.203 [4] and it is mainly this interface for Presence use, which is covered in this specification. Before manipulation is allowed the user needs to be authenticated.

Note: In the text below the term Presence Server refers to both the Presence Server and the Presence List Server as depicted in Figure 1 above. For definitions of the Application Servers for Presence services the reader should consult 3GPP TS 23.141 [3]

The Ut interface needs the following security features:

- 1. it shall be possible to provide with mutual authentication between the Presence Server and the Watcher/Presentity;
- 2. a secure link and security association shall be established between the Presence Server and the Watcher/Presentity. Data origin authentication shall be provided as well as confidentiality protection.
- Editors Note The specification need to consider [6], [8] and [9] and make appropriate profiling of these TLS protocols and the TLS version 1.1. need to be considered also.
- Editors Note: The exact details of the security architecture is FFS and dependant on decisions related with the ongoing work on GBA (Generic Bootstrapping Architecture).

An overview of the security architecture for Presence Ut Interface is depicted in figure Figure 2:

No Proxy

IIF	Ut (HTTP)	Presence List		
		Server (NAF)		

Use of an Authentication Proxy

UE	Ut (HTTP)	Authentication		Presence List
	Ua (TLS)	Proxy (NAF)	— Zb —	Server

Figure 2: An overview of the Security architecture for the Ut interface including the support of an Authentication Proxy

The Authentication Proxy and the Presence List Server shall utilize the security protection specified in 33.210 [x] to protect the data carried between them. This is compliant with the mechanism specified in TS 33.222 [18].

Editors Note: The exact requirements on the Zb interface the use of NDS/IP for Presence Security are FFS.

*** END OF CHANGE ***