

## CHANGE REQUEST

# **33.203** CR **CRNum** # rev **-** # Current version: **5.3.0** #

For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the # symbols.

**Proposed change affects:** UICC apps#  ME  Radio Access Network  Core Network

<b>Title:</b>	# Update of SIP Security Agreement Syntax in Appendix H				
<b>Source:</b>	# Ericsson and Nokia				
<b>Work item code:</b>	#	<b>Date:</b>	# 13/11/2002		
<b>Category:</b>	#	<b>Release:</b>	# Rel-5		
	Use <u>one</u> of the following categories:		Use <u>one</u> of the following releases:		
	<b>F</b> (correction)		2 (GSM Phase 2)		
	<b>A</b> (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release)		R96 (Release 1996)		
	<b>B</b> (addition of feature),		R97 (Release 1997)		
	<b>C</b> (functional modification of feature)		R98 (Release 1998)		
	<b>D</b> (editorial modification)		R99 (Release 1999)		
	Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP <a href="#">TR 21.900</a> .		Rel-4 (Release 4)		
			Rel-5 (Release 5)		
			Rel-6 (Release 6)		

<b>Reason for change:</b>	# This CR is conditional. If SIP Security Agreement draft is not approved in IETF, the solution described in this CR will apply. Otherwise, the solution in which the SIP Security Agreement syntax is updated applies.				
	This CR assumes that the SIP Security Agreement has not been approved in IETF. Appendix H must be updated according to these changes.				
<b>Summary of change:</b>	# The SIP Security Agreement headers are included as extensions to HTTP Digest authentication headers. The following changes has been made:				
	- Since this solution can not use new error codes, the server initiated negotiation has to be applied to existing error codes.				
	- Protocol operation descriptions has been added.				
	- The syntax has been changed according to the version -05 of SIP Security Agreement draft.				
<b>Consequences if not approved:</b>	# Interoperability between different implementations may suffer if the solution is not described anywhere.				

<b>Clauses affected:</b>	#										
<b>Other specs affected:</b>	#	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 20px; text-align: center;">Y</td> <td style="width: 20px; text-align: center;">N</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 20px; text-align: center;"> </td> <td style="width: 20px; text-align: center;"> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 20px; text-align: center;"> </td> <td style="width: 20px; text-align: center;"> </td> </tr> </table>	Y	N					Other core specifications	#	
Y	N										
		Test specifications	#								
		O&M Specifications	#								
<b>Other comments:</b>	#										

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## 2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

- [1] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Security Architecture".
- [2] 3GPP TS 22.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Service Requirements for the IP Multimedia Core Network".
- [3] 3GPP TS 23.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem".
- [4] 3GPP TS 21.133: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; T Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security Threats and Requirements".
- [5] 3GPP TS 33.210: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Network domain security; IP network layer security".
- [6] IETF RFC 3261 "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol".
- [7] 3GPP TS 21.905: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP specifications".
- [8] 3GPP TS 24.229: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Core Network; IP Multimedia Call Control Protocol based on SIP and SDP".
- [9] 3GPP TS 23.002: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, Network Architecture".
- [10] 3GPP TS 23.060: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service Description".
- [11] 3GPP TS 24.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Core Network; Signalling flows for the IP multimedia call control based on SIP and SDP".
- [12] IETF RFC 2617 (1999) "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication".
- [13] IETF RFC 2406 (1998) "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)".
- [14] IETF RFC 2401 (1998) "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol".
- [15] IETF RFC 2403 (1998) "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH".
- [16] IETF RFC 2404 (1998) "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH".
- [17] Draft-ietf-sip-digest-aka-01: "HTTP Digest Authentication Using AKA". April, 2002.
- [18] IETF RFC 3041 (2001): "Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6".
- [19] IETF RFC 2402 (1998): "IP Authentication Header".
- [20] ~~IETF RFC 2405 (1998): "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm With Explicit IV".~~
- [20] [RFC 2451 \(1998\): "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms".](#)

## 7 Security association set-up procedure

The security association set-up procedure is necessary in order to decide what security services to apply and when the security services start. In the IMS authentication of users is performed during registration as specified in clause 6.1. Subsequent signaling communications in this session will be integrity protected based on the keys derived during the authentication process.

### 7.1 Security association parameters

For protecting IMS signaling between the UE and the P-CSCF it is necessary to agree on shared keys that are provided by IMS AKA, and a set of parameters specific to a protection method. The security mode setup (cf. clause 7.2) is used to negotiate the SA parameters required for IPsec ESP with authentication, but without confidentiality.

The SA parameters that shall be negotiated between UE and P-CSCF in the security mode set-up procedure, are:

#### - Integrity algorithm

NOTE-1: What is called "authentication algorithm" in [13] is called "integrity algorithm" in this specification in order to be in line with the terminology used in other 3GPP specifications and, in particular, to avoid confusion with the authentication algorithms used in the AKA protocol.

The integrity algorithm is either HMAC-MD5-96 [15] or HMAC-SHA-1-96 [16].

~~NOTE 2: This, in particular, excludes the use of the NULL integrity algorithm.~~

Both integrity algorithms shall be supported by both, the UE and the P-CSCF as mandated by [13]. In the unlikely event that one of the integrity algorithms is compromised during the lifetime of this specification, this algorithm shall no longer be supported.

NOTE-3: If only one of the two integrity algorithms is compromised then it suffices for the IMS to remain secure that the algorithm is no longer supported by any P-CSCF. The security mode set-up procedure (cf. clause 7.2) will then ensure that the other integrity algorithm is selected.

#### - SPI (Security Parameter Index)

The SPI is allocated locally for inbound SAs. The triple (SPI, destination IP address, security protocol) uniquely identifies an SA at the IP layer. The UE shall select the SPIs uniquely, and different from any SPIs that might be used in any existing SAs (i.e. inbound and outbound SAs). The SPIs selected by the P-CSCF shall be different than the SPIs sent by the UE, cf. section 7.2.

NOTE-4: This allocation of SPIs ensures that protected messages in the uplink always differ from protected messages in the downlink in, at least, the SPI field. This thwarts reflection attacks. When several applications use IPsec on the same physical interface the SIP application should be allocated a separate range of SPIs.

**The following SA parameters are not negotiated:**

- Life type: the life type is always seconds;
- SA duration: the SA duration has a fixed length of  $2^{32}-1$ ;

NOTE-5: The SA duration is a network layer concept. From a practical point of view, the value chosen for "SA duration" does not impose any limit on the lifetime of an SA at the network layer. The SA lifetime is controlled by the SIP application as specified in clause 7.4.

- Mode: transport mode;
- Key length: the length of the integrity key  $IK_{ESP}$  depends on the integrity algorithm. It is 128 bits for HMAC-MD5-96 and 160 bits for HMAC-SHA-1-96.

#### **Selectors:**

The security associations (SA) have to be bound to specific parameters (selectors) of the SIP flows between UE and P-CSCF, i.e. source and destination IP addresses, transport protocol, and source and destination ports.

- IP addresses are bound to a pair of SAs, as in clause 6.3, as follows:
  - inbound SA at the P-CSCF:  
The source and destination IP addresses associated with the SA are identical to those in the header of the IP packet in which the initial SIP REGISTER message was received by the P-CSCF.
  - outbound SA at the P-CSCF:  
the source IP address bound to the outbound SA equals the destination IP address bound to the inbound SA;  
the destination IP address bound to the outbound SA equals the source IP address bound to the inbound SA.

NOTE-6: This implies that the source and destination IP addresses in the header of the IP packet in which the protected SIP REGISTER message was received by the P-CSCF need to be the same as those in the header of the IP packet in which the initial SIP REGISTER message was received by the P-CSCF.

- The transport protocol is either TCP or UDP.
- Ports:
  1. The P-CSCF receives messages protected with ESP from any UE on one fixed port (the "protected port") different from the standard SIP port 5060. The number of the protected port is communicated to the UE during the security mode set-up procedure, cf. clause 7.2. No unprotected messages shall be sent to or received on this port. From a security point of view, the P-CSCF may receive unprotected messages from any UE on any port which is different from the protected port.

NOTE-7: The protected port is fixed for a particular P-CSCF, but may be different for different P-CSCFs.

2. For protected or unprotected outbound messages from the P-CSCF (inbound for the UE) any port number may be used at the P-CSCF from a security point of view.
3. For each security association, the UE assigns a local port to send or receive protected messages to and from the P-CSCF ("protected port"). No unprotected messages shall be sent to or received on this port. The UE shall use a single protected port number for both TCP and UDP connections. The port number is communicated to the P-CSCF during the security mode set-up procedure, cf. clause 7.2. When the UE sends a re-REGISTER request, it shall always pick up a new port number and send it to the network. If the UE is not challenged by the network, the port number shall be obsolete. Annex H of this specification gives detail how the port number is populated in SIP message. From a security point of view, the UE may send or receive unprotected messages to or from the P-CSCF on any ports which are not the protected ports.
4. The P-CSCF is allowed to receive only REGISTER messages on unprotected ports. All other messages not arriving on the protected port shall be discarded by the P-CSCF.
5. The UE is allowed to receive only the following messages on an unprotected port:
  - responses to unprotected REGISTER messages;
  - error messages.

All other messages not arriving on a protected port shall be discarded by the UE.

The following rules apply:

1. For each SA which has been established and has not expired, the SIP application at the P-CSCF stores at least the following data: (UE\_IP\_address, UE\_protected\_port, SPI, IMPI, IMPU1, ... , IMPUn, lifetime) in an "SA\_table".

NOTE-8: The SPI is only required when initiating and deleting SAs in the P-CSCF. The SPI is not exchanged between IPsec and the SIP layer for incoming or outgoing SIP messages.

2. The SIP application at the P-CSCF shall check upon receipt of a protected REGISTER message that the source IP address in the packet header coincides with the UE's IP address given in the contact header of the protected REGISTER message. If the contact header does not explicitly contain the UE's IP address, but rather a symbolic name then the P-CSCF shall first resolve the symbolic name by suitable means to obtain an IP address.
3. The SIP application at the P-CSCF shall check upon receipt of an initial REGISTER message that the pair (UE\_IP\_address, UE\_protected\_port), where the UE\_IP\_address is the source IP address in the packet header and the protected port is sent as part of the security mode set-up procedure (cf. clause 7.2), has not yet been

associated with entries in the "SA\_table". Furthermore, the P-CSCF shall check that, for any one IMPI, no more than three SAs per direction and per transport protocol are stored at any one time. If these checks are unsuccessful the registration is aborted and a suitable error message is sent to the UE.

NOTE-9: According to clause 7.4 on SA handling, at most three SAs per direction and per transport protocol need to exist at a P-CSCF for one user at any one time.

4. For each incoming protected message the SIP application at the P-CSCF shall verify that the correct inbound SA according to clause 7.4 on SA handling has been used. The SA is identified by the pair (UE\_IP\_address, UE\_protected\_port) in the "SA\_table". The SIP application at the P-CSCF shall further check that the IMPU associated with the SA in the "SA\_table" and the IMPU in the received SIP message coincide. If this is not the case the message shall be discarded.

5. For each SA which has been established and has not expired, the SIP application at the UE stores at least the following data: (UE\_protected\_port, SPI, lifetime) in an "SA\_table".

NOTE-10: The SPI is only required to initiate and delete SAs in the UE. The SPI is not exchanged between IPsec and the SIP layer for incoming or outgoing SIP messages.

6. When establishing a new pair of SAs (cf. clause 6.3) the SIP application at the UE shall ensure that the selected number for the protected port, as well as SPI number, do not correspond to an entry in the "SA\_table".

NOTE-11: Regarding the selection of the number of the protected port at the UE it is generally recommended that the UE randomly selects the number of the protected port from a sufficiently large set of numbers not yet allocated at the UE. This is to thwart a limited form of a Denial of Service attack. UMTS PS access link security also helps to thwart this attack.

7. For each incoming protected message the SIP application at the UE shall verify that the correct inbound SA according to clause 7.4 on SA handling has been used. The SA is identified by UE\_protected\_port in the "SA\_table".

NOTE-12: If the integrity check of a received packet fails then IPsec will automatically discard the packet.

8. The lifetime of an SA at the application layer between the UE and the P-CSCF shall equal the registration period.

## 7.2 Set-up of security associations (successful case)

The set-up of security associations is based on [HTTP Digest \[draft-IETF-sip-sec-agree-12\] extensions](#). Annex H of this specification shows how to use [\[draft-IETF-sip-sec-agree-12\]](#) for the set-up of security associations.

### Annex H (normative):

### The use of [\[draft-IETF-sip-sec-agree\]](#) [HTTP Digest](#) for security mode set-up

#### [H.1 Syntax and semantics](#)

The BNF syntax of [\[12draft-ietf-sip-sec-agree\]](#) is [defined-extended](#) for negotiating security associations for [semi-manually keyed IPsec](#) in the following way:

[auth-param](#) = [sec-agree-phase](#) [COMMA](#) [sec-mechanism](#) \*([COMMA](#) [sec-mechanism](#))

[sec-agree-phase](#) = "phase" EQUAL ( "client" / "server" / "verify" )

~~[security-client](#) = "Security-Client" HCOLON [sec-mechanism](#) \*([COMMA](#) [sec-mechanism](#))~~

~~[security-server](#) = "Security-Server" HCOLON [sec-mechanism](#) \*([COMMA](#) [sec-mechanism](#))~~

~~[security-verify](#) = "Security-Verify" HCOLON [sec-mechanism](#) \*([COMMA](#) [sec-mechanism](#))~~

sec-mechanism = mechanism-name \*(SEMI mech-parameters)  
 mechanism-name = "ipsec-~~man~~[3gpp](#)"  
 mech-parameters = ( preference / algorithm / protocol / mode / encrypt-algorithm / spi / port1 / port2 ~~/ transport~~ )  
 preference = "q" EQUAL qvalue  
 qvalue = ( "0" [ "." 0\*3DIGIT ] ) / ( "1" [ "." 0\*3("0") ] )  
 algorithm = "alg" EQUAL ( "hmac-md5-96" / "hmac-sha-1-96"  ~~/ "null"~~ )  
 protocol = "prot" EQUAL ( "ah" / "esp" )  
 mode = "mod" EQUAL ( "trans" / "tun" )  
 encrypt-algorithm = "ealg" EQUAL (  ~~"des-ede3-cbc" / "des-ede" / "null"~~ )  
 spi = "spi" EQUAL spivalue  
 spivalue = 10DIGIT; 0 to 4294967295  
 port1 = "port1" EQUAL port  
 port2 = "port2" EQUAL port  
 port = 1\*DIGIT  
~~transport = "transport" EQUAL ( "TCP" / "UDP" )~~

The parameters described by the BNF above have the following semantics:

Mechanism-name: For manually keyed IPsec, this field includes the value "ipsec-~~man~~[3gpp](#)".

Preference: As defined in [draft-ietf-sip-sec-agree].

Algorithm: If present, defines the authentication algorithm. May have a value "hmac-md5-96" for algorithm defined in [15], or "hmac-sha-1-96" for algorithm defined in [16] ~~or "null" if authentication is not used. If no Algorithm parameter is present, the algorithm will be "null"~~.

**NOTE 1:** ~~According to clause 7.1 the "null" algorithm is not allowed for use in IMS.~~

Protocol: Defines the IPsec protocol. May have a value "ah" for [19] and "esp" for [13]. If no Protocol parameter is present, the value will be "esp".

**NOTE 2:** According to clause 6 only "esp" is allowed for use in IMS.

Mode: Defines the mode in which the IPsec protocol is used. May have a value "trans" for transport mode, and value "tun" for tunneling mode. If no Mode parameter is present, the value will be "trans".

**NOTE 3:** According to clause 6.3 ESP integrity shall be applied in transport mode i.e. only "trans" is allowed for use in IMS.

Encrypt-algorithm: If present, defines the encryption algorithm. May have a value "~~des-ede3-cb~~~~des-ede~~" for algorithm defined in [20] or "null" if encryption is not used. If no Encrypt-algorithm parameter is present, the algorithm will be "null".

**NOTE 4:** In Release 5, According to clause 6.2 no encryption is provided in IMS i.e. only Encrypt algorithm "null" is allowed for use in IMS. In Release 6, encryption is mandatory.

Spi: Defines the SPI number used for inbound messages.

**NOTE 5:** The SPI number will be used for outbound messages for the entity which did not generate the "spi" parameter

Port1: Defines the port number for inbound messages

Port2: Defines the port number for outbound messages. If no Port2 parameter is present port1 is also used for outbound messages.

NOTE-6: According to clause 7.1, Port2 parameter is not used in IMS.

~~— Transport: If present, defines the transport layer protocol. May have a value "TCP" for TCP, or value "UDP" for UDP. If not present, any transport protocol can be used (cf. transport = "wildcard" as in [14]).~~

It is assumed that the underlying IPsec implementation supports selectors that allow all transport protocols supported by SIP to be protected with a single SA.