Tdoc List

2025-02-21 16:14

Agenda Topic TDoc Title Source Type For Avail Treated Decision Wdrn Replaced-by Replaces
1 Agenda and Meeting Objectives S3‑250300 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250303 Process for SA3#120 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250304 Detailed agenda planning SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
2 Meeting Reports                      
2.1 Previous SA3 meeting report/s and SA report S3‑250301 Report from SA3#119 MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250302 Report from SA3#119 AdHoc-e MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250367 Report from SA#106 WG Chair report Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
2.2 SA3-LI Report                      
3 Reports and Liaisons from other Groups                      
3.1 Reports and Liaisons S3‑250314 LS on ProSe Message Content Type extensions for Release 19 C1-247001 LS in   Yes
YesQualcomm commented that despite having three proposals for a reply they all agreed that there was no security concern here. Xiaomi and Nokia wanted to incorporate a change in the 3GPP Specifications with a CR. This was taken offline.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑250955 Reply to: LS on ProSe Message Content Type extensions for Release 19 Xiaomi LS out approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250432 Reply LS on ProSe Message Content Type extensions for Release 19 Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250955  
    S3‑250674 Reply LS on ProSe Message Content Type extensions for Release 19 Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250955  
    S3‑250839 Reply LS on ProSe Message Content Type extensions for Release 19 Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250955  
    S3‑250315 LS on Clarifications related to the parameter to support 5G ProSe in SNPN C1-247074 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑250433 Reply LS on clarifications related to the parameter to support 5G ProSe in SNPN Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251121  
    S3‑250576 Reply LS on Clarifications related to the parameter to support 5G ProSe in SNPN China Telecom Corporation Ltd. LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251121  
    S3‑251121 Reply LS on Clarifications related to the parameter to support 5G ProSe in SNPN China Telecom Corporation Ltd. LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250576
    S3‑250673 Reply LS on on Clarifications related to the parameter to support 5G ProSe in SNPN Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251121  
    S3‑250317 LS on including the HPLMN ID in the PC5 discovery messages for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay C1-244647 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑250439 reply LS on including the HPLMN ID in the PC5 discovery messages for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251122  
    S3‑251122 reply LS on including the HPLMN ID in the PC5 discovery messages for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250439
    S3‑250316 LS on security questions related to NAS layer overhead reduction for data transfer using control plane CIoT C1-247156 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑250374 Reply LS on security questions related to NAS layer overhead reduction for data transfer using control plane CIoT vivo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251143  
    S3‑251143 Reply LS on security questions related to NAS layer overhead reduction for data transfer using control plane CIoT vivo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250374
    S3‑250424 Discussion on the response to C1-247126 on NAS overhead Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250425 Reply LS on security questions related to NAS layer overhead reduction for data transfer using control plane CIoT Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250511 Reply to LS on security questions related to NAS layer overhead reduction for data transfer using control plane CIoT Intel Sweden AB LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250512 Discussion paper of NAS Overhead Reduction Intel Sweden AB discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250838 Reply LS on security questions related to NAS layer overhead reduction for data transfer using control plane CIoT Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250877 Reply LS on security questions related to NAS layer overhead reduction for data transfer using control plane CIoT Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250318 Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication C4-244496 LS in   Yes
YesEricsson: no reply needed, they have made the changes.The CRs are not needed. Nokia supported this too. Huawei supported the CRs, but the reply LS was not needed according to them. Xiaomi: LS is not needed, CR is OK. Nokia: we usually don’t refer to stage 3.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250533 draft - Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250536 Clarifications for HONTRA procedure with respect to failure cases ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250538 Clarifications for HONTRA procedure with respect to failure cases ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250319 LS on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case C4-244497 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑250334 Reply LS on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case S2-2412738 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250570 Reply LS on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250581 Reply LS to CT4 on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case China Unicom LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250613 Security enhancement for indirect network sharing China Unicom CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250630 New mini WID on Security Aspects of Indirect Network Sharing China Unicom WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250806 LS on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250321 Reply LS on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure C6-240721 LS in   Yes
YesNokia: there is a msunderstanding in CT6 about the SA3 specs. The Chair asked for a show of hands: 1) Is any there specification change required to address SUCI error calculations? Yes: Apple, China Mobile, Qualcomm,Huawei,Nokia, Samsung, Phillips. No: AT&T, Lenovo, Vivo, Thales, IDEMIA, ORANGE, Verizon, Xiaomi, BT,Deutsche Telekom, NSA, BSI, NTT-Docomo, Tmobile USA, ZTE,Ericsson, MITRE. The Chair suggested to go for the no change. The reply LS was drafted with that in view.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑250375 Reply LS on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure vivo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251123  
    S3‑250376 DP on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure vivo discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250421 Discussion on incoming SUCI LS from CT6 Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250422 Reply LS on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251123  
    S3‑251123 Reply LS on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250422
    S3‑250423 ME behaviour when the USIM does not contain the parameter needed for SUCI calculation Qualcomm Inorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250508 Reply CT1 LS on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251123  
    S3‑250530 [draft] reply LS to CT1 on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251123  
    S3‑250785 Discussion paper on SUCI calculation failure Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250786 [draft] Reply LS on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure Samsung LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251123  
    S3‑250843 Reply LS on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure Xiaomi Technology UK Limited LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251123  
    S3‑250895 draft Reply LS on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure THALES LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251123  
    S3‑250330 LS Reply to Issues related to Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) S2-2409441 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑250483 LS reply on Issues related to Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) Nokia LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250583 LS reply on Issues related to Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250659 Reply LS on Issues related Analytics context transfer between AnLFs Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesEricsson: no need to keep asking questions, as this delays progress. This is about Rel-18 already.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251125 Reply LS on Issues related Analytics context transfer between AnLFs Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250735 Reply LS on Issues related to Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) CATT LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250335 Reply LS to request clarification on the potential baseline system architecture of 5G NR Femto S2-2412752 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250336 LS on User Privacy Aspects of LMF-based AI/ML positioning S2-2412940 LS in   Yes
YesNokia: all replies agree that user consent is required, the difference is in the level of detail.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑250388 Reply LS on User Privacy Aspects of LMF-based AI/ML positioning vivo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250526 Reply LS on User Privacy Aspects of LMF-based AIML positioning OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250569 Reply LS on User Privacy Aspects of LMF-based AI/ML positioning Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250663 Reply to LS on User Privacy Aspects of LMF-based AI/ML positioning Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250739 Reply LS on User Privacy Aspects of LMF-based AI/ML positioning Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250502 Discussion paper on AIML positioning Apple discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250503 Reply LS on AIML positioning Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No ‑  
    S3‑251095 Reply LS on AIML positioning Apple LS out - No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes   ‑
    S3‑250867 LS reply on User Privacy Aspects of LMF-based AI ML positioning Xiaomi Technology Netherlands LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250338 LS on Device Subscription Data S2-2501242 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑250379 Reply LS on Device Subscription Data vivo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251102  
    S3‑250830 LS reply on Device Subscription Data Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251102  
    S3‑250834 Reply LS on Device Subscription Data Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251102  
    S3‑250340 LS on security aspects of Ambient IoT S2-2411049 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑250521 Reply LS on security aspects of Ambient IoT OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251055  
    S3‑251055 Reply LS on security aspects of Ambient IoT OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250521
    S3‑250831 LS reply to LS on security aspects of Ambient IoT Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251055  
    S3‑250343 Reply LS on Masking of cryptographic keys in UE trace file from 3GPP core network entities S5-247312 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250346 TS.43 Service Entitlement Configuration, v11.0 ^^^^TS.43 CR1098 - App Token GSMA LS in   Yes
YesApple found Huawei's and Verizon's proposals equally good. Apple suggested to skip the question to SA2. Google: inform GSMA that their scheme doesn’t align with what SA3 agrees with.It's unclear what problem they are addressing here and SA3 shouldn’t rubber stamp a scheme like this. Verizon: no threat concern for a mechanism defined outside 3GPP's scope. The question to SA2 is in 3GPP's scope and there are no privacy concerns. It was commented that the output had to be coordinated in SA since it was an external LS coming to several 3GPP groups. Vodafone added that SA3 could reply to SA2.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑250400 LS reply to GSMA on App token Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250453 Reply LS on OSAppID usage by App Token use case Verizon Sweden LS out Approval Yes
YesNokia and Ericsson supported this LS. Apple: no security benefit in the solution provided in the incoming LS. Vodafone: there is no user identity here, just application identity. The user is not revealed.Apple and Google should go to GSMA to argue whether the app ID has something to do with the user privacy. The Chair proposed to postpone the reply and asked Google to show later on how the user privacy was exposed outside 3GPP. Qualcomm reminded that the response had to be coordinated at SA level.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250362 TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur InterDigital, Inc. other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250365 LS informing about the latest PQTN TF publications GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑250956 Reply to: LS informing about the latest PQTN TF publications Huawei LS out approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250893 LS on Privacy and security aspects regarding DC management by the network Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251144  
    S3‑251144 LS on Privacy and security aspects regarding DC management by the network Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250893
    S3‑250313 Reply to LS on CEN's requirements for eCall over IMS C1-246950 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250329 Reply LS on CEN requirements for eCall over IMS S1-244755 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250320 Reply LS on N32-f Lifetime and Reconnection C4-245540 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250322 Update on ETSI TC Cyber middlebox work ETSI TC CYBER LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250323 LS on signalling feasibility of dataset and parameter sharing R1-2410922 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250324 Reply LS to SA5 on AIML data collection R2-2411114 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250326 Reply LS to SA2 on AIML data collection R2-2411152 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250327 Reply LS on AIML data collection R3-247801 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250333 Reply LS on AIML data collection S2-2412726 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250342 Reply LS on AIML Data Collection S5-247219 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250344 Reply LS on AIML Data Collection S5-247336 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250328 LS on AI/ML UE sided data collection RP-243316 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250331 Reply LS to SA WG3-LI: Reply LS on UE-Satellite-UE Communication Architectures S2-2412670 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250332 Reply LS on request for IMS Data Channel related clarifications S2-2412697 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250341 Reply LS on request for IMS Data Channel related clarifications S4-242073 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250337 Reply to Reply LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions S2-2501085 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250345 Reply LS on clarifications on consent management S6-245716 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250347 LS Response to SA3-LI on RCS lawful intercept requirements GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250350 LS Response to GSMA RCSG on RCS lawful interception requirements s3i250083 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250339 Reply LS on Multi-hop U2N Relay Architecture Aspects S2-2501335 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250532 [draft] reply LS to CT4 on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250534 Security aspects for Indirect Network Sharing ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250812 Reply LS on User Privacy Aspects of LMF-based AI/ML positioning Ericsson LS out Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250954 O-RAN ALLIANCE ZTA Standardization Workshop O-RAN LS in   Yes
YesNokia: we don’t have a study on RAN related Zero Trust topics in SA3.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑250957 Reply to: O-RAN ALLIANCE ZTA Standardization Workshop Ericsson LS out approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
3.2 Follow up topics from LSs                      
4 Work areas                      
4.1 Maintenance (Rel-15/16/17/18/19)                      
4.1.1 Security Assurance S3‑250354 Discussion on SCAS test cases for containerized network products BSI (DE) discussion Decision Yes
YesKeysight: we don't have requirements to test for containerized products, this will create problems.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250887 Update to the clause 4.2.3.4.3.1 - Password Structure Huawei, HiSilicon CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑250933 Update test case on access token verification MITRE-FFRDC, US National Security Agency CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: this should be in Rel-20, we finished this content in the last meeting. MCC commented that the WID was declared 100% done and not part of the WID description. This needed to be clarified and discussed offline.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250935 Add a threat on access token subject verification MITRE-FFRDC, US National Security Agency CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250938 Discussion on update of SCAS access token verification MITRE-FFRDC discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
4.1.2 Service Based Architecture S3‑250351 Authorization of a service request when the discovery is delegated to the target PLMN Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250993 S3‑244918
    S3‑250813 Token-based authorization for indirect communication scenarios when NF is selected at target PLMN Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250993 Token-based authorization for indirect communication scenarios when NF is selected at target PLMN Ericsson,Nokia draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   ‑
    S3‑250814 Token-based authorization for indirect communication scenarios when NF is selected at source PLMN Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250993  
    S3‑250485 NRF verification of parameters Nokia, Huawei CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250807 Discussion on the NF consumer PLMN ID check Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250808 Checking PLMNID of NF Service Consumer in interconnect scenario Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250809 Checking PLMNID of NF Service Consumer in interconnect scenario Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250810 Checking PLMNID of NF Service Consumer in interconnect scenario Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250811 Draft_LS on Checking PLMNID of NFc in interconnect scenario Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
4.1.3 Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe                      
4.1.4 Mission Critical                      
4.1.5 Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G S3‑250535 Correct the procedure of notification about AKMA service disabling ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑250537 Correction of parameters stored in AAnF ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑250648 Editorial change to AKMA procedure Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑250716 Notification about AKMA service disabling via NEF Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251063  
    S3‑251063 Notification about AKMA service disabling via NEF Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250716
4.1.6 Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS                      
4.1.7 Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services                      
4.1.8 Security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT                      
4.1.9 Security Aspects of eNPN                      
4.1.10 Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC                      
4.1.11 Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems                      
4.1.12 Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning                      
4.1.13 Security Aspects of eNA. S3‑250654 Update conclusion on key issue#1 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson, MCC: the TR is finished.Study was closed.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250655 Update conclusion on key issue#2 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250657 Update conclusion on key issue#3 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.1.14 Modified PRINS for roaming service providers in 5G S3‑250366 N32 consistency checks BSI (DE), Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251064  
    S3‑251064 N32 consistency checks BSI (DE), Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250366
4.1.15 All other maintenance topics (not listed above or below) S3‑250306 UPU Header Security Lenovo CR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm didn’t support this.They had an alternative in 937. Huawei didn’t support it either.
 		revised No S3‑251120  
    S3‑251120 UPU Header Security Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250306
    S3‑250363 Mitigation of GNSS spoofing MediaTek Inc., Ericsson discussion Decision Yes
YesNokia didn’t see a value in the proposal. Huawei: the network may make a decision that may impact all UE. Huawei: we need to do a proper study before sending the LS.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250445 Adding Abbreviations to TR 33.700-32 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250454 PKI Modifications for Clause 10 TS 33.310 NCSC discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250486 Adding missing abbreviations InterDigital CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑250500 Proposal for changing the description of SN counter in SCPAC Apple CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250991  
    S3‑250991 Proposal for changing the description of SN counter in SCPAC Apple CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250500
    S3‑250501 Editorial change on Security handling in Control Plane CIoT 5GS Optimization Apple, NTT DOCOMO CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251161  
    S3‑251161 Editorial change on Security handling in Control Plane CIoT 5GS Optimization Apple, NTT DOCOMO CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250501
    S3‑250571 Security related to Indirect Network Sharing Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250572 eNA related API Name correction Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250989  
    S3‑250989 eNA related API Name correction Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250572
    S3‑250573 eNA related API Name correction Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250990  
    S3‑250990 eNA related API Name correction Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250573
    S3‑250574 WWC related alignment Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑250575 SUCI error handling Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250593 Fixing API invoker onboarding – Rel15 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei didn’t support this CR.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250594 Fixing API invoker onboarding – Rel16 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250595 Fixing API invoker onboarding – Rel17 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250596 Fixing API invoker onboarding – Rel18 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251132 Fixing API invoker onboarding – Rel18 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250705 clarification in UP IP activation-R17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑250706 clarification in UP IP activation-R18 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑250707 clarification in UP IP activation-R19 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250936 Discussion on protecting header information in UPU Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250937 Protection of UPU header Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251120  
4.2 WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR).                      
4.3 WID on SCAS for Rel-18 features on existing functions.                      
4.4 WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF).                      
4.5 WID on Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms.                      
4.6 WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 19 S3‑250352 IdMS - OIDC Client Registration Leonardo SpA CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251096  
    S3‑251096 IdMS - OIDC Client Registration Leonardo SpA CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250352
    S3‑250353 IdMS - PKCE Downgrade Attack Leonardo SpA CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251097  
    S3‑251097 IdMS - PKCE Downgrade Attack Leonardo SpA CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250353
    S3‑250419 Access token scope clarification for recording authorization Airbus, Motorola Solutions CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.7 WID on Addition of Milenage-256 algorithm                      
4.8 WID on 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols                      
4.9 WID on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service phase 3                      
4.10 R19 SCAS WID S3‑250420 Finalising the certificate test for split gNBs Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250465  
    S3‑250465 Finalising the certificate test for split gNBs Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250420
    S3‑250529 Correction of TC UP integrity check failure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251133  
    S3‑250640 Correction of TC UP replay protection Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑250643 Correction of TC RRC replay protection Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑250688 Error correction and clarfication in clause 4.2.2.1.19 to TS 33.216 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251098  
    S3‑251098 Error correction and clarfication in clause 4.2.2.1.19 to TS 33.216 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250688
    S3‑250689 Update test case to clause 4.2.2.1.20 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250690 Reformulation to avoid normative language in test description Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑250691 Added missing references Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑250692 Adding missing references Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑250719 Adding Note to TC_BVT_PORT_SCANNING on external interfaces BSI CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251099  
    S3‑251099 Adding Note to TC_BVT_PORT_SCANNING on external interfaces BSI CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250719
    S3‑250720 Adding Note to TC_RESTRICTED_REACHABILITY_OF_SERVICES BSI CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251100  
    S3‑251100 Adding Note to TC_RESTRICTED_REACHABILITY_OF_SERVICES BSI CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250720
    S3‑250721 Correction of Expected Results in AS algorithm selection in Handover scenario BSI CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251138  
    S3‑251138 Correction of Expected Results in AS algorithm selection in Handover scenario BSI CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250721
    S3‑250722 Clarification of gNB SCAS test cases where an “or” could lead to missing test coverage. BSI CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251133  
    S3‑251133 Clarification of gNB SCAS test cases where an “or” could lead to missing test coverage. BSI CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250722
    S3‑250723 Clarification of gNB SCAS wording BSI CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251101  
    S3‑251101 Clarification of gNB SCAS wording BSI CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250723
    S3‑250724 Correction and clarification of TC_AMF_NAS_INTEGRITY_FAILURE BSI (DE) draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250726 Motivation for RES* verification SCAS test for AUSF in roaming scenarios BSI (DE) discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250727 Add threat description about the implications of the AUSF not validating RES* correctly BSI, Montsecure CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250728 Add test case that verifies if the AUSF processes RES* failures correctly BSI (DE) draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250729 Add threat description about the implications of the AUSF confirming an authentication with the SUPI whi e the authentication was started with the SUCI BSI, Montsecure CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250730 Add test case TC_AUSF_CONFIRMATION_WITH_SUPI that check whether the AUSF is vulnerable to a confirmation attack BSI (DE) draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
4.11 TEI19 topics (restricted to agreed topics only) S3‑250799 DRAFT CR SBA Rel-19 public key or cert retrieval for access token verification Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251134  
    S3‑251134 DRAFT CR SBA Rel-19 public key or cert retrieval for access token verification Ericsson draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑250799
    S3‑250800 Resolve ENs on authorized NRF in draft CR on Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson other Approval Yes
YesDiscussed with 948 and 949.
 		revised No S3‑250992  
    S3‑250992 Resolve ENs on authorized NRF in draft CR on Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250800
    S3‑250801 Resolve EN on several NRFs in draft CR on Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson other Approval Yes
YesNokia: not enough with deleting the editor's note, we prefer a note. NCSC: just delete the editor's note and refer to where this is described.
 		merged No S3‑250992  
    S3‑250802 Resolve ENs on check failure in draft CR on Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250992  
    S3‑250803 Resolve EN on access token service in draft CR on Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yesclashing with 950.
 		merged No S3‑250992  
    S3‑250804 Resolve ENs in draft CR on Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250992  
    S3‑250805 Resolve EN on causes for validation failure in draft CR on Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250992  
    S3‑250948 Determining NRFs allowed to act as authorization servers Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250992  
    S3‑250949 NRF Set issue Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250992  
    S3‑250950 NRF Cert retrieval operation Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250992  
    S3‑250951 NRF Cert update notification and logging Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250992  
    S3‑250952 NRF error handling Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250992  
    S3‑250953 NF producer behavior Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250992  
4.12 WID on Security aspects of NR mobility enhancement Phase 4 S3‑250325 Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases R2-2411136 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑250355 Discussion paper for clustering of all solutions Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250356 Proposed Changes to Conclusions Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250377 Conclusion on security handling for LTM vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250504 LTM - Conclusions Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250545 Update conclusion for KI#1 ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250645 conclusion on NCC handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250766 Solution for inter-CU LTM and conclusion Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250847 LTM: More Conclusion on Key Issue #1 Xiaomi Technology UK Limited other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250871 Conclusion for Key issue #1 LG Electronics other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250767 Security procedure for inter-CU LTM Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251078 Security procedure for inter-CU LTM Samsung other Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250378 Procedure for security handling for LTM vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250548 Update Security mechanism and procedures for inter-CU LTM ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250646 Update on the mismatched UE security context handling in non-DC cases Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250357 Proposed Text for Normative Clause Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250361 Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251124  
    S3‑250507 LTM - Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251124  
    S3‑250539 reply LS to RAN2 on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251124  
    S3‑250644 Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251124  
    S3‑250732 Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases CATT LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251124  
    S3‑251124 Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases CATT LS out Approval Yes
YesEricsson asked to be minuted: "Ericsson prefers security protected NCC to the UE. Since RRC based solution directives provide such protection, option 4 from RAN2 LS to be selected for Rel19". Qualcomm asked to be minuted: "Qualcomm’s view is that SA3 should stick to sending NCC in a RRC messages as this is protected, but will accept the majority view on the issue that it will be sent unprotected at the MAC layer".
 		approved No   S3‑250732
    S3‑250769 [Draft] Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Samsung LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251124  
    S3‑250844 Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Xiaomi Technology UK Limited LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251124  
    S3‑250360 Proposed new KI on the MAC CE security Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250845 LTM: New Solution for NCC Encoding using C-RNTI Xiaomi Technology UK Limited other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250869 Update for Solution #6 LG Electronics other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250870 Evaluation update for Solution #6 LG Electronics other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250358 Proposed Changes to Solution 2 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250505 LTM - Update to solution#4 Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250506 LTM - Update to solution#5 Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250846 LTM: Update to Overall Summary Xiaomi Technology UK Limited other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250647 discussion paper on the security issue where CU is acting as MN and SN is unchanged Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250765 Living document on NR mobility enhancement Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251079 Living document on NR mobility enhancement Samsung draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250768 Rel-19 Work item exception for NR_Mob_Ph4_Sec Samsung WI exception request Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251162  
    S3‑251162 Rel-19 Work item exception for NR_Mob_Ph4_Sec Samsung WI exception request Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250768
    S3‑250359 Removing Editors Note in Solution 2 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4.13 WID on Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication                      
4.14 WID on Security for MonStra                      
4.15 WID on Security Aspects of Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 S3‑250687 Living document for 5G_ProSe_Sec_Ph3 skeleton Huawei, HiSilicon, China Telecom draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251039  
    S3‑251039 Living document for 5G_ProSe_Sec_Ph3 skeleton Huawei, HiSilicon, China Telecom draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑250687
    S3‑250609 Add scope and definition in TS 33.503 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251040  
    S3‑251040 Add scope and definition in TS 33.503 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250609
    S3‑250675 Update to the scope and terminology of ProSe draftCR Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251040  
    S3‑250610 Add multi-hop description in PKMF and AUSF China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251041  
    S3‑251041 Add multi-hop description in PKMF and AUSF China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250610
    S3‑250676 Adapts the reference point details and security requirements to multi-hop use cases Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251041  
    S3‑250677 Update functional entities and services to support multi-hop services Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251041  
    S3‑250678 Adding general introduction and security requirements of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay to ProSe draftCR Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251080  
    S3‑251080 Adding general introduction and security requirements of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay to ProSe draftCR Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250678
    S3‑250629 Security requirement for ProSe Multi-hop U2N Discovery China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251080  
    S3‑250435 U2N relay discovery security Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
YesEricsson: Multiple PLMNs are in scope according to SA2.
 		revised No S3‑251042  
    S3‑251042 U2N relay discovery security Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250435
    S3‑250679 Adding Security flow of Multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery procedure to ProSe draftCR Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251042  
    S3‑250632 Security procedure for ProSe Multi-hop U2N Discovery China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251042  
    S3‑250841 Security flows for 5G ProSe Multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay Discovery Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251042  
    S3‑250680 Adding Security flow of Multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay security establishment procedure to ProSe draftCR Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251043  
    S3‑251043 Adding Security flow of Multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay security establishment procedure to ProSe draftCR Huawei, HiSilicon, Interdigital other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250680
    S3‑250436 U2N relay communication security Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251043  
    S3‑250634 Security procedure for ProSe Multi-hop U2N Communication China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251043  
    S3‑250842 Security procedure for 5G ProSe Multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay communication Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251043  
    S3‑250681 Adding general introduction and security requirements of multi-hop UE-to-UE Relay to ProSe draftCR Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251044  
    S3‑251044 Adding general introduction and security requirements of multi-hop UE-to-UE Relay to ProSe draftCR Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250681
    S3‑250635 Security requirement for ProSe Multi-hop U2U Discovery China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251044  
    S3‑250437 U2U relay discovery security Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251045  
    S3‑251045 U2U relay discovery security Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250437
    S3‑250682 Adding Security flow of L3 Multi-hop UE-to-UE Relay discovery procedure to ProSe draftCR Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251045  
    S3‑250683 Adding Security flow of L3 Multi-hop UE-to-UE Relay security establishment procedure to ProSe draftCR Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251046  
    S3‑251046 Adding Security flow of L3 Multi-hop UE-to-UE Relay security establishment procedure to ProSe draftCR Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250683
    S3‑250438 U2U relay communication security Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251046  
    S3‑250840 Protection mechanism for PC5 discovery messages with ProSe Message Content Type extensions Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251047  
    S3‑251047 Protection mechanism for PC5 discovery messages with ProSe Message Content Type extensions Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250840
    S3‑250611 Add multi-hop description in PKMF and AUSF China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑251170 TITLE TBD Huawei CR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.16 WID on security aspects of 5G NR Femto S3‑250540 Draft skeleton for TS 33.545 Femto security ZTE Corporation draft TS Approval Yes
YesHuawei: remove 5G. It will be taken care of in the next version.
 		approved No    
    S3‑250541 Scope of TS 33.545 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250980  
    S3‑250980 Scope of TS 33.545 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250541
    S3‑250624 Pseudo-CR-Add the scope for Femto in TS 33.545 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250980  
    S3‑250625 Pseudo-CR- Add terms and abbriviations for Femto in TS 33.545 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250981  
    S3‑250637 Update clause 3.1 to add relevant terms and its definitions. Nokia pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250981  
    S3‑250981 Update clause 3.1 to add relevant terms and its definitions. China Mobile pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250637
    S3‑250542 Overview of Security Architecture and Requirements of TS 33.545 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250982  
    S3‑250626 Pseudo-CR-System architecture and security assumption for Femto in TS 33.545 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250982  
    S3‑250982 Pseudo-CR-System architecture and security assumption for Femto in TS 33.545 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250626
    S3‑250694 Content to clause 4.X Security Architecture of NR Femto Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250982  
    S3‑250693 Skeleton update to clause 4 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250695 Content to 4.Y.1 Functional entities Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250696 Content to 4.Y.1.1 NR Femto Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250697 Content to 4.Y.1.2 Security Gateway (SeGW) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250698 Content to 4.Y.1.3 NR Femto Mgmt System Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250699 Content to 4. Y.1.4 AAA Server/AUSF and UDM Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251135  
    S3‑251135 Content to 4. Y.1.4 AAA Server/AUSF and UDM Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250699
    S3‑250700 Content to 4.Y.2 Reference points Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250701 Content to clause 5 Security Feature Enhancements Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250543 Device Authentication clause 5.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: Using EAP-AKA is outdated. We don’t agree. Nokia supported Huawei's contribution.
 		merged No S3‑250983  
    S3‑250702 Content to clause 5.1 Device Authentication Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: use shall instead of can.
 		revised No S3‑250983  
    S3‑250983 Content to clause 5.1 Device Authentication Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250702
    S3‑250544 Hosting Party Authentication clause 5.2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250984  
    S3‑250984 Hosting Party Authentication clause 5.2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250544
    S3‑250639 Update clause 5.2 for femto hosting party authentication Nokia pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250984  
    S3‑250703 Content to clause 5.2 Hosting party Authentication Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250984  
    S3‑250546 Location Security clause 5.3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250985  
    S3‑250985 Location Security clause 5.3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250546
    S3‑250628 Pseudo-CR-The support of location security in TS 33.545 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250985  
    S3‑250636 Update clause 5.3 for femto location security Nokia pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250985  
    S3‑250704 Content to clause 5.3 Location security Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250985  
    S3‑250547 Backhaul Link Protection clause 5.4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250986  
    S3‑250986 Backhaul Link Protection clause 5.4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250547
    S3‑250708 Content to clause 5.4 Backhaul Link Protection Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250986  
    S3‑250549 Access Control Mechanisms clause 5.5 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250987  
    S3‑250709 Content to clause 5.5 Access Control Mechanisms For Femto Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250987  
    S3‑250987 Content to clause 5.5 Access Control Mechanisms For Femto Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250709
    S3‑250550 Topology Hiding clause 5.6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250988  
    S3‑250988 Topology Hiding clause 5.6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250550
    S3‑250710 Contentt to clause 5.6 Topology Hiding Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250988  
    S3‑250627 Pseudo-CR-Void solution#36 in TR 33.713 China Mobile pCR Approval No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250641  
    S3‑250711 N/A Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250979 Draft TS 33.545 ZTE draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑251163 Cover sheet TS 33.545 ZTE TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.17 WID on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC — phase 3 S3‑250879 DraftCR for TS 33.558 on ID verification Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251126  
    S3‑251126 DraftCR for TS 33.558 on ID verification Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250879
    S3‑251136 CR for TS 33.558 on ID verification Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑250471 Solutions for secure retrieval of 5G system UE Ids and privacy related information Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251083  
    S3‑251083 Solutions for secure retrieval of 5G system UE Ids and privacy related information Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250471
    S3‑250472 Requirements for secure retrieval of 5G system UE lds and privacy related information Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   Yes
YesContent will be merged in the revision of 881.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250881 Adding priciple on ID verification to draftCR of MEC ph3 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: this should go to an informative annex.
 		revised No S3‑251084  
    S3‑251084 Adding priciple on ID verification to draftCR of MEC ph3 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250881
    S3‑250591 UE ID Token based mechanism Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesContent will be merged in S3-251085.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250882 Adding token based mechanism to draftCR of MEC ph3 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251085  
    S3‑251085 Adding token based mechanism to draftCR of MEC ph3 Huawei, HiSilicon,Ericsson draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250882
    S3‑250883 Adding hash based mechanism draftCR of MEC ph3 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
YesSome steps of the solutions need to be explicitly stated as left for implementation. Nokia: it’s an informative annex, the whole thing is up to implementation. You don’t have to follow this.
 		revised No S3‑251086  
    S3‑251086 Adding hash based mechanism draftCR of MEC ph3 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250883
    S3‑250884 Adding Temporeary ID based mechanism draftCR of MEC ph3 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251087  
    S3‑251087 Adding Temporeary ID based mechanism draftCR of MEC ph3 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250884
    S3‑250481 Requirements for secure retrieval of 5G system UE Ids and privacy related information Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   Yes
YesEricsson: I prefer to have this in an informative annex. Huawei: capture the requirement of the TR in a NOTE instead of adding a new clause in the normative part of TS 33.501.
 		revised No S3‑251137  
    S3‑251137 Requirements for secure retrieval of 5G system UE Ids and privacy related information Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250481
    S3‑250592 UE ID Token based mechanism for 33501 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: no need to have this informative text in TS 33.501. We can agree with capturing the principle in a note.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250470 Security of N6 delay measurements Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251088  
    S3‑251088 Security of N6 delay measurements Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250470
    S3‑250880 DraftCR for TS 33.501 on the requirement of N6 deplay management protection. Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251088  
4.18 Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) S3‑250413 Informative Annex general clause Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251089  
    S3‑250449 Living document for Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) Cisco Systems draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251089  
    S3‑251089 Living document for Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) Cisco Systems draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250449
    S3‑250349 Initial Trust in the NF for ACME account creation NCSC other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251090  
    S3‑250943 pCR to the living document on: secure message transport using ACME to ACME-SBA Google, Cisco Systems, AT&T, TELUS other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251090  
    S3‑251090 pCR to the living document on: secure message transport using ACME to ACME-SBA Google, Cisco Systems, AT&T, TELUS other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250943
    S3‑250415 certificate renew Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251091  
    S3‑250940 pCR to ACME-SBA living document on: certificate enrollment and renewal in 5G SBA using ACME Google Ireland Limited, AT&T, TELUS other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251091  
    S3‑251091 pCR to ACME-SBA living document on: certificate enrollment and renewal in 5G SBA using ACME Google Ireland Limited, AT&T, TELUS other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250940
    S3‑250414 challenge validation Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
YesNCSC didn’t agree with this contribution.Cisco agreed with Cisco that there were several vulnerabilities that needed to be addressed before putting this into the TR. This was taken offline.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250452 ACME challenge validation for 5G SBA NFs Cisco Systems, U.S. National Security Agency other Approval Yes
YesHuawei: stage 3 code doesn’t need to be here. It's up to CT groups. It's the first time we do JSON in SA3. Nokia: SA3 does all the stages in here, CT will not take care of this. This was taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑251139  
    S3‑251139 ACME challenge validation for 5G SBA NFs Cisco Systems, U.S. National Security Agency other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250452
    S3‑250468 certificate revocation Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco Systems, U.S. National Security Agency other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251092  
    S3‑251092 certificate revocation Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco Systems, U.S. National Security Agency other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250468
    S3‑250451 ACME as optional protocol for ACM for SBA Cisco Systems other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251093  
    S3‑251093 ACME as optional protocol for ACM for SBA Cisco Systems other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250451
    S3‑250467 Updates to Annex I.2 Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco Systems other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251094  
    S3‑251094 Updates to Annex I.2 Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco Systems other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250467
    S3‑250939 pCR to the living document on: secure message transport using ACME to ACME-SBA Google Ireland Limited, AT&T, TELUS other Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑251152 Living document for Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) Cisco draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑251164 WID exception ACME_SBA Cisco WI exception request Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.19 WID on Security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 3 S3‑250738 Skeleton for security aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3 CATT draftCR Approval Yes
YesIt was noted that the deployment architectures in SA2 were informative, but the procedures were normative.The annex could be infoirmative, but some normative text should be place elsewhere in the specification.
 		revised No S3‑250997  
    S3‑250997 Skeleton for security aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3 CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑250738
    S3‑250427 Proposed text for general clause of satellite store & forward Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251119  
    S3‑250525 Security Considerations for Store and Forward (S&F) Satellite Operation Intel Sweden AB CR   Yes
YesContent will go to S3-251033
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250620 Add description to the General Clause China Mobile draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251119  
    S3‑250740 General description for security aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3 CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251119  
    S3‑251119 Living document on General description for security aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3 CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250740
    S3‑250761 Security for S&F satellite operation - General Philips International B.V. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251119  
    S3‑250787 pCR on General part on S&F operation Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251119  
    S3‑250875 Generic security aspects to support store and Forward operation Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250997  
    S3‑250428 Proposed text for split MME clause of satellite store & forward Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251036  
    S3‑250462 Addition of the new content specifying security aspects of Store and Forward Satellite operation in Split MME architecture InterDigital, Inc. draftCR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm didn’t agree with creating new signalling between the UE and the network for this DoS attack. GSMA: take user plane out in the last paragraph as this shouldn't happen.
 		revised No S3‑251035  
    S3‑251035 Addition of the new content specifying security aspects of Store and Forward Satellite operation in Split MME architecture InterDigital, Inc. draftCR Agreement No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑250462
    S3‑250552 security mechanism for S&F operation in split-MME architecture ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251036  
    S3‑250662 Security aspects on store and forward operation with split MME architecture Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251036  
    S3‑250742 Security aspects of Split MME architecture CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251036  
    S3‑250762 Security for S&F satellite operation - Split MME architecture Philips International B.V. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251036  
    S3‑251036 Security for S&F satellite operation - Split MME architecture Philips International B.V. draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑250762
    S3‑250788 pCR on Security for S&F operation on split MME architecture Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251035  
    S3‑250833 Security aspects on Split MME architecture Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250932 DP on handling NAS counters in S&F Mode when the UE registration is valid in multiple satellites Sateliot, Novamint discussion Approval Yes
YesNokia: leave it for Rel-20. Interdigital agreed with Nokia.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250429 Proposed text for full EPC clause of satellite store & forward Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251034  
    S3‑251034 Proposed text for full EPC clause of satellite store & forward Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑250429
    S3‑250430 Adding in-band key deprecation to the informative annex on IOPS Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250551 security mechanism for S&F operation in full EPC onboard architecture ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251034  
    S3‑250621 Security aspects on full EPC in each satellite China Mobile draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251034  
    S3‑250743 Security aspects of Full EPC in each satellite CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251034  
    S3‑250763 Security for S&F satellite operation - Full EPC onboard Philips International B.V. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251034  
    S3‑250789 pCR on Security for S&F operation on Full EPC architecture Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251034  
    S3‑250876 Security aspects on store and forward operation with full EPC in each satellite Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251034  
    S3‑250931 draftCR: security aspects on Full EPC in each satellite THALES other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251034  
    S3‑251149 Exception sheet 5GSAT_Ph3_SEC CATT WI exception request Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.20 WID on UAS security enhancements Phase 3 S3‑250416 authorized USS list Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251007 authorized USS list Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250442 UUAA update for multi-USS support InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251007  
    S3‑250417 USS initiated UUAA Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251008  
    S3‑250466 Adding support for multiple USSs Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251008 S3‑250431
    S3‑251008 Adding support for multiple USSs Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑250466
    S3‑250443 Adding USS changeover with multi-USS support InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251008  
    S3‑250418 security aspects of USS changeover procedure Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251009  
    S3‑250733 UUAA in 5GS updates Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251009 UUAA in 5GS updates Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250444 Location tracking update for multi-USS support InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251010 Location tracking update for multi-USS support InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250731 Updates to Terms, Abbreviations and Overview Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251011  
    S3‑251011 Updates to Terms, Abbreviations and Overview Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250731
    S3‑250431 Adding support for multiple USSs Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250466  
    S3‑251165 WI exception UAS_Ph3_Sec Ericsson WI exception request Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.21 WID on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services S3‑250779 Skeleton for security aspects of 5G mobile metaverse services Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250556 Authentication and authorization for spatial localization services ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251052  
    S3‑251052 Authentication and authorization for spatial localization services Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250556
    S3‑251053 Authentication and authorization for spatial localization services when CAPIF is not used ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250685 Update metaverse draftCR to support Authentication and authorisation for spatial localisation services Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251052  
    S3‑250780 Authentication and authorization for spatial localization services Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251052  
    S3‑250891 input to metaverse sec draftCR for solution on KI1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251052  
    S3‑250554 Authentication and authorization for digital asset services ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250684 Update metaverse draftCR to support Authentication and authorisation for digital asset services Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250781 Authentication and authorization for digital asset services Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250558 Privacy protection for user information exposure ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250782 Privacy protection for user information exposure Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250783 Rel-19 Work item exception for Metaverse_Sec Samsung WI exception request Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251054  
    S3‑251054 Rel-19 Work item exception for Metaverse_Sec Samsung WI exception request Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250783
    S3‑251166 Living document on Metaverse_Sec Samsung draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.22 New WID on Security aspects of CAPIF Phase3 S3‑250853 Draft skeleton for CAPIF_Ph3_Sec Xiaomi Technology Netherlands draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250854 Rel-19 exception sheet for CAPIF_Ph3_sec Xiaomi Technology Netherlands WI exception request Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251031  
    S3‑251031 Rel-19 exception sheet for CAPIF_Ph3_sec Xiaomi Technology Netherlands WI exception request Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250854
    S3‑250411 Security requirements and procedures for CAPIF-8 reference point Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251032  
    S3‑251032 Security requirements and procedures for CAPIF-8 reference point Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250411
    S3‑250475 Security requirements on CAPIF-8 reference points Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251032  
    S3‑250559 Security procedures for CAPIF-8 reference points ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251033 Security procedures for CAPIF-8 reference points ZTE Corporation CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250567 Security requirements on the CAPIF-6/6e reference points ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251030  
    S3‑250474 Security requirements on CAPIF-6 and -6e reference points Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251030  
    S3‑251030 Security requirements on CAPIF-6 and -6e reference points Nokia, ZTE, Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250474
    S3‑250409 RO authentication and authorization information for CAPIF-8 reference point Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251112 RO authentication and authorization information for CAPIF-8 reference point Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250410 Authorization revocation through CAPIF-8 reference point Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesContent will go into S3-251113
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250477 CAPIF-8 - Security aspects of RO authorization Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251112  
    S3‑250479 Security solution for revocation at CAPIF-8 Nokia CR Agreement Yes
YesContent will go into S3-251113
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250510 draft CR of Resource owner authorization management China Telecom draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251113  
    S3‑251113 draft CR of Resource owner authorization management China Telecom draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250510
    S3‑250866 Resource owner authorization management update Xiaomi Technology Netherlands other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251112  
    S3‑250412 Finer granularity support for security procedures Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251114  
    S3‑250478 CAPIF-8 - Authorization for finer level service API access Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251114 CAPIF-8 - Authorization for finer level service API access Huawei, Nokia draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250473 RNAA and Interconnect aspects in function security model Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251115  
    S3‑251115 RNAA and Interconnect aspects in function security model Samsung, Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250473
    S3‑250476 Security solution for interconnect Nokia CR Agreement Yes
YesContent will go to S3-251116
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250509 draft CR on Authentication and authorization for CAPIF interconnection China Telecom draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251116  
    S3‑250608 Updates for CAPIF interconnection Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesContent will go to S3-251116
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250772 Security procedures for CAPIF interconnection Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251116  
    S3‑251116 Security procedures for CAPIF interconnection Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250772
    S3‑250773 Security procedures for nested API invocation Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250480 RNAA authentication and authorization - mapping of API Invoker ID and GPSI Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251117  
    S3‑251117 RNAA authentication and authorization - mapping of API Invoker ID and GPSI Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250480
    S3‑250484 Correction of existing text in section 6.10 Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251118  
    S3‑251118 Correction of existing text in section 6.10 Nokia CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250484
    S3‑250494 CR on Authentication and authorization for CAPIF interconnection China Telecom CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250495 CR of Resource owner authorization management China Telecom CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250560 Security requirements on the CAPIF-6/6e reference points ZTE Corporation other Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250561 Security requirements on the CAPIF-6/6e reference points ZTE Corporation other Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250562 Security requirements on the CAPIF-6/6e reference points ZTE Corporation other Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250563 Security requirements on the CAPIF-6/6e reference points ZTE Corporation other Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250564 Security requirements on the CAPIF-6/6e reference points ZTE Corporation other Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250565 Security requirements on the CAPIF-6/6e reference points ZTE Corporation other Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4.23 New WID on Security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 S3‑250750 Proposal for a living document for NG_RTC_SEC_Ph2: draftCR to TS 33.203, Signing and verification of third party user identity information in IMS Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250752 Rel-19 Work Item Exception for the Security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 (NG_RTC_SEC_Ph2) Ericsson WI exception request Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251077  
    S3‑251077 Rel-19 Work Item Exception for the Security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 (NG_RTC_SEC_Ph2) Ericsson WI exception request Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250752
4.24 Security aspects of Core Network Enhanced Support for AIML S3‑250617 Draft skeleton for AIML_CN_SEC China Mobile, Vivo draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251056  
    S3‑251056 Draft skeleton for AIML_CN_SEC China Mobile, Vivo draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250617
    S3‑250389 Abbreviations for AIML_CN_SEC vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250390 General description for security for UE positioning based on a ML model at the LMF vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251057  
    S3‑251057 General description for security for UE positioning based on a ML model at the LMF vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250390
    S3‑250618 General description of X.11 China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250391 Security for data collection for the LMF-based AI/ML positioning vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251058  
    S3‑250616 Add user consent description of X.11 China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251058  
    S3‑251058 Add user consent description of X.11 China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250616
    S3‑250718 Content to X.11.2 Security for data collection for the LMF-based AIML positioning OPPO other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251058  
    S3‑250656 Authorization of LMF retrieval of a trained AI/ML model for positioning Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251140  
    S3‑251140 Authorization of LMF retrieval of a trained AI/ML model for positioning Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250656
    S3‑250392 General description for security for vertical federated Learning among NWDAFs and AFs vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251059  
    S3‑251059 General description for security for vertical federated Learning among NWDAFs and AFs vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250392
    S3‑250619 General description of X.12 China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251059  
    S3‑250668 General Clause for 12.x Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251059  
    S3‑250393 Authorization of candidate VFL participants for vertical federated learning when NWDAF or internal AF is acting as the VFL server vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251060  
    S3‑250568 NWDAF VFL server authorization Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251060  
    S3‑250669 Authorization for selection of VFL participants in VFL Group NWDAF As VFL Server Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251060  
    S3‑251060 Authorization for selection of VFL participants in VFL Group NWDAF As VFL Server Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250669
    S3‑250868 Authorization of candidate VFL participants for vertical federated learning Xiaomi Technology Netherlands other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251060  
    S3‑250394 Authorization of candidate VFL participants for vertical federated learning when external AF is acting as the VFL server vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251061  
    S3‑250665 Authorization of VFL members (External AF as a Server) Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251061  
    S3‑251061 Authorization of VFL members (External AF as a Server) Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250665
    S3‑250754 VFL Authorization when the External AF acts as a VFL Server Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesContent will go to S3-251061
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑250658 Update NEF security requirements for VFL Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250667 Privacy of VFL during sample Alignment ( NWDAF as a server) Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250670 pCR to update the draft skeleton X.12.3 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250395 NEF security requirements vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250615 Add NEF requirements of X.12 China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250396 Protection of communication data used in VFL process vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251062  
    S3‑250614 Add description for protection of communication data used in VFL process China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251062  
    S3‑251062 Add description for protection of communication data used in VFL process China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250614
    S3‑250666 Protection of communication data used in VFL process Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251062  
    S3‑250741 Content to X.12.4 Protection of communication data used in VFL process OPPO other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251062  
    S3‑251141 Living document for AIML_CN_SEC China Mobile draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑251167 WI exception sheet AIML_CN_SEC China Mobile draftCR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.25 WID on Security for PLMN hosting a NPN S3‑250489 Living CR for security for PLMN hosting a NPN China Telecommunications Corp.,ZTE draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251168  
    S3‑251168 Living CR for security for PLMN hosting a NPN China Telecommunications Corp.,ZTE draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑250489
    S3‑250490 General China Telecommunications Corp.,ZTE other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251068  
    S3‑251068 General China Telecommunications Corp.,ZTE other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250490
    S3‑250496 Architecture China Telecommunications Corp.,ZTE other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251069  
    S3‑251069 Architecture China Telecommunications Corp.,ZTE other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250496
    S3‑250776 SUPI privacy for PLMN hosted NPN Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251070  
    S3‑251070 SUPI privacy for PLMN hosted NPN Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250776
    S3‑250308 SUPI Privacy Issue in PLMN hosted NPN Lenovo draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251070  
    S3‑250497 Proxy entity at the border China Telecommunications Corp.,ZTE other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250775 DNS Message Security Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250774 Access policy enforcement Samsung, Nokia other Approval Yes
YesHuawei and Ericsson didn’t agree with this document.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251169 Security for PLMN hosting a NPN China Telecom CR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5 Rel-19 Studies                      
5.1 Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security S3‑250821 Editorial Correction to TR 33.794 Motorola Mobility CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251071  
    S3‑251071 Editorial Correction to TR 33.794 Motorola Mobility CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250821
5.2 Study on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services phase 2 S3‑250873 Updating conclusion of KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250793 Update to solution #12 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250745 New solution for KI#2: Security of IMS based Avatar Communication Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251142  
    S3‑251142 New solution for KI#2: Security of IMS based Avatar Communication Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250745
    S3‑250746 Conclusion update for KI#2: Security of IMS based Avatar Communication Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250792 Conclusion for KI#2 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250874 Solving ENs in Solution#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250747 Conclusion update for KI#3: Security and privacy aspects of IMS DC capability exposure Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251075  
    S3‑251075 Conclusion update for KI#3: Security and privacy aspects of IMS DC capability exposure Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250747
    S3‑250892 update conclusion for KI3 Security and privacy aspects of IMS DC capability exposure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251075  
    S3‑250748 TR 33.790 cleanup Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251076  
    S3‑251076 TR 33.790 cleanup Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250748
    S3‑250749 Presentation of Report to TSG: TR 33.790 Study on the security support for the next generation real time communication services phase 2, Version 1.2.0 Ericsson TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250964 Draft TR 33.790 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.3 Study on security for PLMN hosting a NPN S3‑250894 Updates to Solution#11 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: just left for implementation, remove the operator.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251066 Updates to Solution#11 Lenovo pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250487 Clean Up for TR 33.757 China Telecommunications Corp.,ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251067  
    S3‑251067 Clean Up for TR 33.757 China Telecommunications Corp.,ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250487
    S3‑250488 Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG: TR 33.757, Version 0.7.0 China Telecommunications Corp.,ZTE TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250969 Draft TR 33.757 China Telecom draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.4 Study of ACME for Automated Certificate Management in SBA                      
5.5 Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256-bits                      
5.6 Study on mitigations against bidding down attacks                      
5.7 Study on security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 2 S3‑250426 Pseudo-CR on proposed privacy conclusion for split MME case Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250994  
    S3‑250577 Adding conclusion for KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250994  
    S3‑250736 pCR to TR33.700-29 Update conclusion#2 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250994  
    S3‑250994 pCR to TR33.700-29 Update conclusion#2 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250736
    S3‑250760 KI#2 conclusion Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250994  
    S3‑250790 Update to conclusion for key issue#2 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250994  
    S3‑250872 Update Conclusion for KI #2 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250994  
    S3‑250878 Update of conclusions KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250994  
    S3‑250791 Discussion on S&F operation for a split MME architecture Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250578 Update overall summary ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250995  
    S3‑250631 Updates to Overall Summary of solutions Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250995  
    S3‑250995 Updates to Overall Summary of solutions Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250631
    S3‑250970 Draft TR 33.700-29 CATT draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑250996 Cover sheet TR 33.700-29 CATT TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.8 Study on security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication                      
5.9 Study on security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G S3‑250312 AIoT TR clean up OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesThales: editor's notes should be addressed in the end, not now.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250519 Clean up for TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250463 New KI: Reader Authorization for 5G Ambient IoT Services InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250815 New key issue for secure storage in AIoT devices Ericsson, Thales pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital didn’t agree with this secure hardware component. Thales: this document aligns with the requirement in TS 33.501. ORANGE: just reference to TS 33.501 or make a change there.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250819 New Key Issue on Amplification of resource exhaustion by exploiting AIoT paging messages Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: no requirements here: how do we compare solutions that don’t have any requirements? Lenovo: no solution expected here.Correlation ID can be used here. Sony: additional information is going against RAN2 agreements. NTT-Docomo: better to document this, with future CVDs and academic papers in mind. GSMA supported this, and added that a better formulation was needed in the NOTE.
 		revised No S3‑250959  
    S3‑250959 New Key Issue on Amplification of resource exhaustion by exploiting AIoT paging messages Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250819
    S3‑250945 KI on attacking via external carrier wave NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250960 S3‑250145
    S3‑250960 KI on attacking via external carrier wave NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250945
    S3‑250384 Update generic conclusion for AIoT vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: no defintion for dedicated network existing in SA3. Interdigital: this is not needed.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250455 Updates on general conclusion for AIoT Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250962 Updates on general conclusion for AIoT Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250651 Update to generic conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: the note doesn’t make sense at this stage.
 		revised No S3‑250963  
    S3‑250963 Update to generic conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250651
    S3‑250744 pCR to TR33.713 Generic conclusion CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250963  
    S3‑250816 Updating General Conclusion Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital didn’t agree with the contribution.Tamper resistan storage didn’t have a defintion. Qualcomm supported this; SA3 hadn't addressed this before. Nokia: "should" instead of "shall" and remove tamper resistant.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250965 Updating General Conclusion Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250447 Update KI#1 Conclusion OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250967  
    S3‑250513 Conclusion for KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250967  
    S3‑250759 KI#1 conclusion Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250967  
    S3‑250967 KI#1 conclusion Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250759
    S3‑250518 Discussion on Temp ID based AIOT device ID protection OPPO discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250712 Way forward for key issue #3 on privacy Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250524 Conclusion on AIOT KI#3 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: Note 1 says optional to implement but then it says shall be supported. This is contradictory. Note 1 needs rewording.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250968 Conclusion on AIOT KI#3 OPPO pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250753 pCR to TR33.713 Conclusion#3 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250498 AIoT - Concusion on KI#3 Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250514 Conclusion for KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250817 Conclusion on KI#3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesDeutsche Telekom didn’t agree with the note. It should be an editor's note given that it needed to be decided. ORANGE: add an editor's note on additional conclusions for the solutions are FFS.
 		revised No S3‑251048  
    S3‑251048 Conclusion on KI#3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250817
    S3‑250382 Conclusion for privacy in AIoT vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250458 KI#3 conclusion for AIoT Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250517 Update Conclusion to Key issue 3 and 4 Intel Sweden AB pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250825 Proposal for a conclusion on KI#3 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250612 KI#3, Conclusions Sony pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250522 Update AIOT KI#3 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250713 Way forward for key issue #4 on communication security Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250649 Proposed baseline for conclusion on KI#4 Huawei, HiSilicon, OPPO, China Unicom, Lenovo, ZTE, CATT, Xiaomi, Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250975  
    S3‑250975 Proposed baseline for conclusion on KI#4 Huawei, HiSilicon, OPPO, China Unicom, Lenovo, ZTE, CATT, Xiaomi, Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250649
    S3‑250381 Conclusion for communication protection in AIoT vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250457 KI#4 conclusion Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250499 AIoT - Concusion on KI#4 Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250515 Conclusion for KI#4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250642 KI#4, Conclusions Sony pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250755 pCR to TR33.713 Conclusion#4 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250835 Conclusion for KI#4 in TR 33.713 Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250650 Additional update to the proposed baseline for conclusion on key issue#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250798 Conclusion on KI#4 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250818 Conclusion on Key Issue #4 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250826 Proposal for a conclusion on KI#4 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250714 Way forward for key issue #5 on the authentication framework Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250531 Update conclusion on AIOT KI#5 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250829 Refinement of EN in KI#5 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250836 Updates to conclusion for KI#5 in TR 33.713 Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250383 Update conclusion for authentication in AIoT vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250456 Updates on KI#5 conclusion Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250652 Update to key issue#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250520 Update Conclusion to Key issue 5 Intel Sweden AB pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250717 KI#5, Updated Conclusions Sony pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250756 pCR to TR33.713 Conclusion#5 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250516 Conclusion for KI#6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251103  
    S3‑251103 Conclusion for KI#6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250516
    S3‑250827 Proposal for a conclusion on KI#6 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251103  
    S3‑250464 Conclusion for New KI: Reader Authorization for 5G Ambient IoT Services InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251145  
    S3‑251145 Conclusion for New KI: Reader Authorization for 5G Ambient IoT Services InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250464
    S3‑250460 A new solution for network layer security based on the key provided by AF Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251171  
    S3‑251171 A new solution for network layer security based on the key provided by AF Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250460
    S3‑250622 Pseudo-CR on Lightweight authentication and privacy protection for inventory and command procedure China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251104  
    S3‑251104 Pseudo-CR on Lightweight authentication and privacy protection for inventory and command procedure China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250622
    S3‑250623 Pseudo-CR-New solution on AIoT privacy for TR 33.713 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251105  
    S3‑251105 Pseudo-CR-New solution on AIoT privacy for TR 33.713 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250623
    S3‑250757 pCR to TR33.713 New solution AIoT command message security protection procedure CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251106  
    S3‑251106 pCR to TR33.713 New solution AIoT command message security protection procedure CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250757
    S3‑250758 Solution#1 update - Addressing Ens Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251107  
    S3‑251107 Solution#1 update - Addressing Ens Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250758
    S3‑250555 Evaluation for solution 6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251108  
    S3‑251108 Evaluation for solution 6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250555
    S3‑250553 resolving ENs in sol#6 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251109  
    S3‑251109 resolving ENs in sol#6 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250553
    S3‑250527 Update AIOT sol#7 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251110  
    S3‑251110 Update AIOT sol#7 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250527
    S3‑250385 Remove EN for Sol#10 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251111  
    S3‑251111 Remove EN for Sol#10 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250385
    S3‑250459 Updates on solution 15 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑250820 Update Solution #17 in TR 33.713 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250794 Resolving EN on solution #22 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑250795 Evaluation update on solution #22 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑250523 Update AIOT sol#24 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑250557 resolving ENs in sol#25 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑250885 Remove ENs in Solution #32 and #33 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑250380 Align conclusion with SA2 LS and conclusion for KI#5 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250828 Resolution of EN in solution 35 concerning device constrains Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑250641 Pseudo-CR-Void solution#36 in TR 33.713 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250627
    S3‑250528 Update AIOT sol#37 Xidian University, OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑250796 Resolving EN on solution #38 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑250797 Evaluation update on solution #38 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑250934 Resolution of ENs in solution #39 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑250386 Remove EN for Sol#40 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑250387 Remove EN for Sol#41 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑250886 Resolving ENs in Solution #42 of TR 33.713 KPN pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑250653 reply LS on Device Subscription Data Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251102  
    S3‑251102 LS on Device Subscription Data Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250653
    S3‑250450 Cover for draft TR 33.713 Guangdong OPPO Mobile Telecom. TS or TR cover   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250958 Draft TR 33.713 OPPO draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑250966 LS on secure storage and processing of credentials for AIoT ORANGE LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250978 Way forward discussion Huawei discussion discussion Yes
YesDeutsche Telekom: the mandatory use cannot be required from the manufacturers to the operators.Maybe it's better to have that the protection mechanism shall be supported instead.
 		noted No    
5.10 Study on security aspects of Usage of User Identities                      
5.11 Study on UAS security enhancement                      
5.12 Study on security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 S3‑250434 Updates on KI#1 conclusions Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251038  
    S3‑250580 Address the Note in U2N conclusion China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm was fine with this contribution.
 		revised No S3‑251038  
    S3‑251038 Address the Note in U2N conclusion China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250580
    S3‑250671 Clearn up TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: some things don’t need to be postponed to the normative phase. We prefer to say that it is not addressed in the present document. What’s addressed in the normaive work should be put in the conclusions.
 		revised No S3‑251037  
    S3‑251037 Clearn up TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250671
    S3‑250672 Cover sheet Draft TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250837 Updates to conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.743 Xiaomi Technology Spain S.L pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251038  
    S3‑250971 Draft TR 33.743 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.13 Study on security aspects of AIML enhancements                      
5.14 Study on EdgeComputing S3‑250469 Update Conclusion of KI#2.1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251081  
    S3‑251081 Update Conclusion of KI#2.1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250469
    S3‑250633 Clean Up for TR 33.749 China Unicom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251082  
    S3‑251082 Clean Up for TR 33.749 China Unicom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250633
    S3‑250638 Presentation of Report to TSG: TR 33.749, Version 1.0.0 China Unicom TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250972 Draft TR 33.749 China Unicom draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.15 Study on security aspects for Multi-Access                      
5.16 Study on 5GS enhancements for Energy Saving S3‑250822 Resolution of EN in KI#1 conclusion Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251012  
    S3‑251012 Resolution of EN in KI#1 conclusion Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250822
    S3‑250664 Resolve EN for KI2 Conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251013  
    S3‑251013 Resolve EN for KI2 Conclusion Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250664
    S3‑250823 Resolution of EN in KI#2 conclusion Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251013  
    S3‑250824 Presentation of Report to TSG: TR 33.766, Version 1.0.0 Nokia TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250973 Draft TR 33.766 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.17 Study on security aspects of 5G NR Femto S3‑250566 Clean up for TR 33.745 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
5.18 Study on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services S3‑250888 update conclusion for KI2 Privacy of user sensitive information Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251065  
    S3‑251065 update conclusion for KI2 Privacy of user sensitive information Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250888
    S3‑250579 Adding conclusion to KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251049  
    S3‑250777 Update to conclusion for Key Issue#3 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251049  
    S3‑250850 Pseudo-CR on 33.721: Update to Conclusion on Key Issue #3 Xiaomi Technology UK Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251049  
    S3‑250889 update conclusion for KI3 Security aspects of digital asset container in 5G Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251049  
    S3‑251049 update conclusion for KI3 Security aspects of digital asset container in 5G Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250889
    S3‑250848 Pseudo-CR on 33.721: Resolution of the Editor’s Notes in Solution #10 Xiaomi Technology UK Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251147  
    S3‑251147 Pseudo-CR on 33.721: Resolution of the Editor’s Notes in Solution #10 Xiaomi Technology UK Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250848
    S3‑250849 Pseudo-CR on 33.721: CAPIF-based Solution for Key Issue #4 Xiaomi Technology UK Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251050  
    S3‑251050 Pseudo-CR on 33.721: CAPIF-based Solution for Key Issue #4 Xiaomi Technology UK Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250849
    S3‑250851 Pseudo-CR on 33.721: Update to Conclusion on Key Issue #4 Xiaomi Technology UK Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251148  
    S3‑251148 Pseudo-CR on 33.721: Update to Conclusion on Key Issue #4 Xiaomi Technology UK Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250851
    S3‑250890 update conclusion for KI4 Authentication and authorization of digital representation Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250778 Presentation of Report to TSG SA: TR 33.721, Version 0.7.0 Samsung TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251051  
    S3‑251051 Presentation of Report to TSG SA: TR 33.721, Version 0.7.0 Samsung TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250778
    S3‑250974 Draft TR 33.721 Samsung draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.19 Study on security aspects of CAPIF Phase 3 S3‑250406 KI#1.1 conclusions on ROF authentication Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250998  
    S3‑250492 Update the conclusion of key issue #1.1 in TR 33.700-22 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250998  
    S3‑250600 Further conclusion for key issue #1.1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250998  
    S3‑250857 TR 33.700-22 KI#1.1 conclusion update Xiaomi Technology Netherlands pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250998  
    S3‑250998 TR 33.700-22 KI#1.1 conclusion update Xiaomi, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Telecom, Ericsson, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250857
    S3‑250923 Conclusion KI1.1 CAPIF-8 reference point Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250998  
    S3‑250407 KI#1.2 conclusions on RO authorization Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250999  
    S3‑250493 Update the conclusion of key issue #1.2 in TR 33.700-22 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250999  
    S3‑250601 Further conclusion for key issue #1.2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250999  
    S3‑250858 TR 33.700-22 KI#1.2 conclusion update Xiaomi Technology Netherlands pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑250999  
    S3‑250924 Conclusion KI1.2 Recource owner authorization management Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250999  
    S3‑250999 Conclusion KI1.2 Recource owner authorization management Nokia, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Telecom, Ericsson, Xiaomi pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250924
    S3‑250408 KI#1.3 conclusions on granularity of authorization and revocation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251000  
    S3‑251000 KI#1.3 conclusions on granularity of authorization and revocation Huawei, HiSilicon, Ericsson, Nokia, Xiaomi pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250408
    S3‑250602 Further conclusion for key issue #1.3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251000  
    S3‑250859 TR 33.700-22 KI#1.3 conclusion update Xiaomi Technology Netherlands pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251000  
    S3‑250925 Conclusion KI1.3 Finer granular authorization Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251000  
    S3‑250491 Update the conclusion for KI#2 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251001  
    S3‑250603 Further conclusion for key issue #2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251001  
    S3‑251001 Further conclusion for key issue #2 Ericsson, China Telecom, Samsung, Xiaomi, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250603
    S3‑250770 Updates to conclusion for key issue#2 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251001  
    S3‑250860 TR 33.700-22 KI#2 conclusion update Xiaomi Technology Netherlands pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251001  
    S3‑250926 Conclusion KI2 CAPIF interconnect security Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251001  
    S3‑250604 Further conclusion for key issue #3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251002  
    S3‑250861 TR 33.700-22 KI#3 conclusion update Xiaomi Technology Netherlands pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251002  
    S3‑250725 pCR to TR33.700-22 Conclusion for KI#3 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251002  
    S3‑250927 Conclusion KI3 Authorizing API invoker on UE accessing other UE Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251002  
    S3‑251002 Conclusion KI3 Authorizing API invoker on UE accessing other UE Nokia, Ericsson, CATT, Xiaomi pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250927
    S3‑250605 Conclusion for key issue #4 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251023  
    S3‑250771 Conclusion for key issue#4 (Nested API invocation) Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251023  
    S3‑251023 Conclusion for key issue#4 (Nested API invocation) Samsung, Ericsson, Xiaomi, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250771
    S3‑250855 Conclusion for KI#4 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi Technology Netherlands pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251023  
    S3‑250928 Conclusion KI4 Nested API Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251023  
    S3‑250606 Conclusion for key issue #5 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251024  
    S3‑250929 Conclusion KI5 multiple API invoker Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251024  
    S3‑251024 Conclusion KI5 multiple API invoker Nokia, Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250929
    S3‑250309 Conclusion to KI#6 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251025  
    S3‑250607 Conclusion for key issue #6 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251025  
    S3‑250856 Conclusion for KI#6 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi Technology Netherlands pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251025  
    S3‑251025 Conclusion for KI#6 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi, Nokia, Ericsson, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250856
    S3‑250930 Conclusion KI6 Onboarding Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251025  
    S3‑250311 KI#6 update to add Clarifications Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251028  
    S3‑250582 Correct the CCF associated with the registered AEF in KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250599 Moving CIBA discussion from KI#1.2 to KI#3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251026  
    S3‑250862 Resolve ENs in TR 33.700-22 KI#6 Xiaomi Technology Netherlands pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251028  
    S3‑251026 Moving CIBA discussion from KI#1.2 to KI#3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250599
    S3‑251028 Resolve ENs in TR 33.700-22 KI#6 Xiaomi, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250862
    S3‑250901 Additional aspects for KI6 onboarding Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251027  
    S3‑251027 Additional aspects for KI6 onboarding Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250901
    S3‑250310 Updates to Solution #33 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251003  
    S3‑251003 Updates to Solution #33 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250310
    S3‑250921 Solution 33 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251003  
    S3‑250598 Resolving ENs and evaluation of solution #26 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251004  
    S3‑251004 Resolving ENs and evaluation of solution #26 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250598
    S3‑250916 Solution 26 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251004  
    S3‑250863 Resolve ENs in TR 33.700-22 solution #19 Xiaomi Technology Netherlands pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251005  
    S3‑251005 Resolve ENs in TR 33.700-22 solution #19 Xiaomi, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250863
    S3‑250913 Solution 19 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251005  
    S3‑250864 Resolve ENs in TR 33.700-22 solutions #8, #9, #20, and #31 Xiaomi Technology Netherlands pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251006  
    S3‑251006 Resolve ENs in TR 33.700-22 solutions #8, #9, #20, and #31 Xiaomi, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250864
    S3‑250904 Solution 8 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251006  
    S3‑250905 Solution 9 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251006  
    S3‑250914 Solution 20 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251006  
    S3‑250919 Solution 31 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251006  
    S3‑250896 Update to solution 32 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250902 Solution 3 Security procedures for CAPIF-8 reference points - EN resolution Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251020  
    S3‑251020 Solution 3 Security procedures for CAPIF-8 reference points - EN resolution Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250902
    S3‑250903 Solution 7 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250906 Solution 12 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250907 Solution 13 evaluation and EN resolution Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250908 Solution 14 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250909 Solution 15 update Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250910 Solution 16 update Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250911 Solution 17 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250912 Solution 18 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251021  
    S3‑251021 Solution 18 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250912
    S3‑250915 Solution 24 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250917 Solution 28 update and evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251015  
    S3‑251015 Solution 28 update and evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250917
    S3‑250918 Solution 29 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250920 Solution 32 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251018  
    S3‑251018 Solution 32 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250920
    S3‑250922 Solution 34 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250597 New solution for onboarding of UE hosted API invoker Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251019  
    S3‑251019 New solution for onboarding of UE hosted API invoker Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250597
    S3‑250865 TR 33.700-22 Reusing existing mechanism to enable cross-UE authorization Xiaomi Technology Netherlands pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251022  
    S3‑251022 TR 33.700-22 Reusing existing mechanism to enable cross-UE authorization Xiaomi Technology Netherlands pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250865
    S3‑250897 Enabling mTLS between ROF and CCF by CAPIF-specific key derivation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251014  
    S3‑251014 Enabling mTLS between ROF and CCF by CAPIF-specific key derivation Nokia, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250897
    S3‑250898 Solution on ROF and CCF to enable mTLS using AKMA Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251016  
    S3‑251016 Solution on ROF and CCF to enable mTLS using AKMA Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250898
    S3‑250899 Onboarding solution Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251017  
    S3‑251017 Onboarding solution Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250899
    S3‑250900 Solution on ROF certificate Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251029  
    S3‑251029 Solution on ROF certificate Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250900
    S3‑250976 Draft TR 33.700-22 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑251146 Cover sheet TR 33.700-22 Vivo TS or TR cover Approval No
Yes
 		approved No    
5.20 New Study on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory S3‑250401 TR 33.938 skeleton_FS_CryptoInv Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250399 Framework Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251073  
    S3‑251073 Framework Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250399
    S3‑250440 Pseudo-CR on Template Proposal for 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250441 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory for DTLS and TLS Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251072  
    S3‑251072 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory for DTLS and TLS Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250441
    S3‑250398 Technical Content Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250370 Technical Content for 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory KDDI Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251073  
    S3‑250403 general clause Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesMCC commented that this read like
 		revised No S3‑251074  
    S3‑251074 general clause Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250403
    S3‑250404 inventory of 5G security protocols Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251073  
    S3‑250405 inventory of 5G protocols by organizations Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251073  
    S3‑250397 Scope of the TR on 3GPP crypto inventory Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250402 scope of TR 33.938 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250977 Draft TR 33.938 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
6 New Study/Work item proposals S3‑250307 FS_eZTS next steps Offline Call Minutes Motorola Mobility discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250348 New WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 20 Motorola Solutions Germany WID new Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: there is no stage 2/SA6 related WID. We cannot start this now.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250364 Study on UE Security Assurance Keysight Technologies UK Ltd SID new   Yes
YesThe Chair wondered who needed to be in charge of this, for Keysight the security issues should be taken care of by SA3. OPPO: GSMA can take care of this. We don’t support this kind of work in SA3. Apple agreed with OPPO. Vivo didn’t support it either. Keysight wondered why other groups were taking care of 3GPP related issues, that was a real issue.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250368 New SID on use of AEAD KDDI Corporation SID new Approval Yes
YesIt was commented that this could be part of the 6G study. Qualcomm found it too early to agree on this WID. Apple supported this study.
 		revised No S3‑250961  
    S3‑250961 New SID on use of AEAD KDDI Corporation SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑250368
    S3‑250369 Use of AEAD in Next-Generation 3GPP system KDDI Corporation discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250371 New WID on supporting 256-bit ciphering and integrity protection algorithms KDDI Corporation WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250372 Algorithm identifier values for 256-bit algorithms KDDI Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250446 Security_Aspects_for_User_Identities_Ph2 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. SID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson: too early to agree on a Rel-20 SID.we should also wait for SA2 progress.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250448 New WID on Ambient IoT security OPPO, Huawei, HiSilicon, Intel, Lenovo, Inter Digital, China Unicom, Sony, Vivo, Xiaomi, China Mobile, Philips, Cable Labs, CATT, ZTE WID new Approval Yes
YesThere were discussions on whether the study had progressed enough to justify the normative work. China Unicom, Huawei supported continuing the work. IDEMIA, Thales, ORANGE objected to start the normative work. Vodafone: let's move forward in normative phase with what has been concluded already in the study. Otherwise there will be no progress. NTT-Docomo: tough to figure out what needs to be managed where if we start the normative part now. Huawei: we have plenary guidance to start the normative work.
 		revised No S3‑251150  
    S3‑251150 New WID on Ambient IoT security OPPO, Huawei, HiSilicon, Intel, Lenovo, Inter Digital, China Unicom, Sony, Vivo, Xiaomi, China Mobile, Philips, Cable Labs, CATT, ZTE WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250448
    S3‑250461 New WID on Key Derivation for QUIC/TLS in ATSSS CableLabs, Charter Communications, Lenovo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251153  
    S3‑250482 Protecting XRM Media related information in connect-UDP Nokia other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251127  
    S3‑250584 New WID on specification of alternative example f5* (f5**) function Ericsson, Thales, Qualcomm Incorporated WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251154  
    S3‑251154 New WID on specification of examplea algorithm for alternative f5* (f5**) function Ericsson, Thales, Qualcomm Incorporated WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250584
    S3‑250585 Skeleton of specification of alternative example f5* (f5**) function Ericsson, Thales other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251155  
    S3‑251155 Skeleton of specification of alternative example f5* (f5**) function Ericsson, Thales other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250585
    S3‑250586 pCR to f5** specification TS Ericsson, Thales other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑250587 Presentation of specification of alternative example f5* (f5**) function Ericsson, Thales TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251156  
    S3‑251156 Presentation of specification of alternative example f5* (f5**) function Ericsson, Thales TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑250587
    S3‑250588 Clarifying the naming for the new alternative example f5* (f5**) function Ericsson, Thales CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251157  
    S3‑251157 Clarifying the naming for the new alternative example f5* (f5**) function Ericsson, Thales CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250588
    S3‑250589 Adding a reference for the new alternative example f5* (f5**) function Ericsson, Thales CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251158  
    S3‑251158 Adding a reference for the new alternative example f5* (f5**) function Ericsson, Thales CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250589
    S3‑250590 Adding a reference for the new alternative example f5* function Ericsson, Thales CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251159  
    S3‑251159 Adding a reference for the new alternative example f5* function Ericsson, Thales CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250590
    S3‑250660 Discussion paper on the security establishment of QUIC protocol used in 3GPP Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250661 New SID on security aspects for MPQUIC Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Discussion Yes
YesQualcomm: not ready to endorse this for Rel-20.
 		revised No S3‑251153  
    S3‑251153 New SID on security aspects for MPQUIC Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑250661
    S3‑250686 Discussion paper on the security aspects of Integrated Sensing and Communication Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250715 On the Rel-20 planning Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
YesThe Chair presented some slides on the planning for 6G: timeline and structure of the work. SA3 independent topics can start earlier. 5gA: SID for new algorithms (e.g. AEAD mode, etc..)? 6G: - Independent topics to start by June 2025? - Architecture dependent topics to start by September 2025 plenary? - One 6G SID or a SID per each security domain (NAS, AS, Authentication, Core network, Service exposure,..)? Overall, companies were in favour of having multiple stuides to avoid what happened with 5G, which had a large TR of dubious quality. Nokia: extend the current 256 bit SID to address the shift to Quantum. KDDI: for that we need to wait for IETF before planning any migration. Qualcomm: the split into multiple independent TRs is what really matters.Stick to the timelines too. Ericsson: AEAD should be in 6G. Telefonica supported having this in 5GA.
 		noted No    
    S3‑250734 New WID on Protection of XRM Media related information Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑250737 Protecting XRM Media related information in QUIC aware forwarding Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251127  
    S3‑251127 Protecting XRM Media related information in QUIC aware forwarding Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250737
    S3‑250751 Revised WID on security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 Ericsson WID revised Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251151  
    S3‑251151 Revised WID on security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 Ericsson WID revised Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250751
    S3‑250764 New SID on enhanced security management service about security policy provisioni China Mobile Com. Corporation SID new   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250784 Revise WID on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services Samsung WID revised Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251129  
    S3‑251129 Revise WID on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services Samsung WID revised Approval No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250784
    S3‑250832 Security Monitoring AT&T, Charter Communications, Deutsche Telekom, KDDI, NTT DOCOMO, Telecom Italia, Vodafone WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑250944  
    S3‑250852 Revised WID on security aspects of CAPIF Phase3 Xiaomi Technology Netherlands WID revised Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251130  
    S3‑251130 Revised WID on security aspects of CAPIF Phase3 Xiaomi Technology Netherlands WID revised Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250852
    S3‑250941 Key Derivation for QUIC/TLS in ATSSS Lenovo draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250942 Protecting XRM Media related information in UDP Option Lenovo draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑251127  
    S3‑250944 New WID on Security Monitoring AT&T, Charter Communications, Deutsche Telekom, KDDI, NTT DOCOMO, Telecom Italia, Verizon, Vodafone WID new Approval Yes
YesVodafone suggested to endorse this WID now and present the WID for approval in the June Plenary.
 		revised No S3‑251131 S3‑250832
    S3‑251131 New WID on Security Monitoring AT&T, Charter Communications, Deutsche Telekom, KDDI, NTT DOCOMO, Telecom Italia, Verizon, Vodafone WID new Approval Yes
YesIt will be sent to the June Plenary.
 		endorsed No   S3‑250944
    S3‑250946 SA3 Rel-20 Planning WG Chair discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250947 New WID on Protection of XRM Media related information Ericsson, Lenovo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑251128  
    S3‑251128 New WID on Protection of XRM Media related information Ericsson, Lenovo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑250947
    S3‑251160 Draft TS 35.XXX Ericsson other Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
7 CVD and research                      
8 Any Other Business S3‑250305 SA3 meeting calendar SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑250373 Guidelines on WID names and acronyms MCC other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No