**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #108e *S3-222100***

**e-meeting, 22 - 26 August 2022**

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| *CR-Form-v12.1* | | | | | | | | |
| **CHANGE REQUEST** | | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | | | |
|  | **33.216** | **CR** | **DRAFT CR** | **rev** | **-** | **Current version:** | **16.7.0** |  |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| *For* [***HE******LP***](http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm#_blank)*on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at* [*http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests*](http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests)*.* | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME |  | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network |  |

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|  | | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Title:*** | Local UP IP configuration | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Source to WG:*** | Huawei, HiSilicon | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | S3 | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Work item code:*** | SCAS\_5G\_Ph2 | | | | |  | ***Date:*** | | | 2022-08-22 |
|  |  | | | |  | |  | | |  |
| ***Category:*** | B |  | | | | | ***Release:*** | | | Rel-18 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:* ***F*** *(correction)* ***A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)* ***B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)* ***D*** *(editorial modification)*  Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | | | | | | | | *Use one of the following releases: Rel-8 (Release 8) Rel-9 (Release 9) Rel-10 (Release 10) Rel-11 (Release 11) … Rel-15 (Release 15) Rel-16 (Release 16) Rel-17 (Release 17) Rel-18 (Release 18)* | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Reason for change:*** | | The eNB is expected to be locally configured with a UP integrity protection policy as specified in clause 7.3.3 of TS 33.401 | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***Summary of change:*** | | Update the requirement and test cast to include the eNB UP IP feature. | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | | Incomplete security assurance work for the UP IP feature | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Clauses affected:*** | | new | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
|  | | **Y** | **N** |  | | | |  | | |
| ***Other specs*** | |  | **X** | Other core specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
| ***affected:*** | |  | **X** | Test specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
| ***(show related CRs)*** | |  | **X** | O&M Specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***Other comments:*** | |  | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***This CR's revision history:*** | |  | | | | | | | | |

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* Begin 1st change\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

##### 4.2.2.1.X Local UP integrity protection configuration

*Requirement Name:* Select the right UP integrity protection policy.

*Requirement Reference:* TS 33.401 [2] clause 7.3.3

*Requirement Description:* *"* *The eNB shall be locally configured with UP integrity protection policy.* " in clause 7.3.3

*Threat References:* TBD

***Test Case****:*

**Test Name:** TC\_LOCAL\_UP\_INTEGRITY\_PROTECTION\_CONFIGURATION

**Purpose:** Toverify that the eNB is locally configured with a UP integrity protection policy

**Pre-Condition:**

- The eNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. UE and MME may be simulated.

- The eNB locally configured to activate UP integrity protection by default if no UP integrity protection policy is received from MME.

- Tester shall have knowledge of integrity algorithm and integrity protection keys.

- The tester can capture the message via the Uu interface, or can capture the message at the UE.

**Execution Steps:**

1.MME sends EPS security capability with EIA7 indicating the UP integrity protection is supported by the UE. But the MME does not send a UP integrity protection policy to the eNB.

2. eNB sends RRCConnectionReconfiguration with integrity protection indication "on".

3. Check any User data sent by eNB after sending RRCConnectionReconfiguration and while the UE is in active state is integrity protected.

**Expected Results:**

Any user plane packets sent between UE and eNB over the Uu interface after eNB sending RRCConnectionReconfiguration is integrity protected.

**Expected format of evidence:**

Evidence suitable for the interface e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* End of change\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*