**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #106-e *S3-220331-r1***

**e-meeting, 14 - 25 February 2022**

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| --- |
| *CR-Form-v12.1* |
| **CHANGE REQUEST** |
|  |
|  | **33.847** | **CR** | **0006** | **rev** | **-** | **Current version:** | **17.0.1** |  |
|  |
| *For* [***HE******LP***](http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm#_blank)*on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at* [*http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests*](http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests)*.* |
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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME | **X** | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network | **X** |

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|  |
| ***Title:***  | Conclusion for KI#16 – privacy protection of PDU session-related parameters |
|  |  |
| ***Source to WG:*** | Qualcomm Incorporated, Xiaomi |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | S3 |
|  |  |
| ***Work item code:*** | FS\_5G\_ProSe\_Sec |  | ***Date:*** | 2022-02-04 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Category:*** | **F** |  | ***Release:*** | Rel-17 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:****F*** *(correction)****A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)****B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)****D*** *(editorial modification)*Detailed explanations of the above categories canbe found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | *Use one of the following releases:Rel-8 (Release 8)Rel-9 (Release 9)Rel-10 (Release 10)Rel-11 (Release 11)…Rel-15 (Release 15)Rel-16 (Release 16)Rel-17 (Release 17)Rel-18 (Release 18)* |
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| ***Reason for change:*** | Conclusion in key issue #16 for the case of an L3 U2N relay between the Remote UE and the network is not addressed. |
|  |  |
| ***Summary of change:*** | Add unaddressed conclusion |
|  |  |
| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | Missing conclusion |
|  |  |
| ***Clauses affected:*** | 7.16 |
|  |  |
|  | **Y** | **N** |  |  |
| ***Other specs*** |  | **X** |  Other core specifications  | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***affected:*** |  | **X** |  Test specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***(show related CRs)*** |  | **X** |  O&M Specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
|  |  |
| ***Other comments:*** |  |
|  |  |

**\*\*\*\*\* START OF CHANGES \*\*\*\*\***

## 7.16 Key Issue #16: Privacy protection of PDU session-related parameters for relaying

With a L2 UE-to-Network relay between the Remote UE and the network, no new security vulnerabilities related to KI #16 is identified, hence no new solution is needed. The existing mechanism in TS 23.501 [15] and TS 33.501 [14] are capable to meet the security requirements of KI #16.

As per TS 23.304[16], for a L3 UE-to-Network relay, both remote UE and the UE-to-Network relay are provisioned with a set of PDU session parameters for each Relay Service Code (RSC) during the initial provisioning step. But the PDU session parameters are not exchanged during discovery and PC5 connection setup procedures, so no new security vulnerabilities regarding this KI are identified. The RSC may indirectly reveal the PDU session parameters, but is protected during discovery as per KI#1 and protected during connection setup as per KI#5. Therefore, no solution is needed for the normative work.

**\*\*\*\*\* END OF CHANGES \*\*\*\*\***