**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #105-e *draft\_S3-214292-r1***

**e-meeting, 8 - 19 November 2021**

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| *CR-Form-v12.1* | | | | | | | | |
| **DRAFT CHANGE REQUEST** | | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | | | |
|  | **33.501** | **CR** | **draft-CR** | **rev** | **-** | **Current version:** | **17.3.0** |  |
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| *For* [***HE******LP***](http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm#_blank)*on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at* [*http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests*](http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests)*.* | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME |  | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network | **x** |

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| ***Title:*** | SEPP to include and verify the source PLMN-ID | | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Source to WG:*** | Ericsson | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | S3 | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Work item code:*** | TEI17 | | | | |  | ***Date:*** | | | 2021-11-01 |
|  |  | | | |  | |  | | |  |
| ***Category:*** | F |  | | | | | ***Release:*** | | | Rel-17 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:* ***F*** *(correction)* ***A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)* ***B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)* ***D*** *(editorial modification)*  Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | | | | | | | | *Use one of the following releases: Rel-8 (Release 8) Rel-9 (Release 9) Rel-10 (Release 10) Rel-11 (Release 11) … Rel-15 (Release 15) Rel-16 (Release 16) Rel-17 (Release 17) Rel-18 (Release 18)* | |
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| ***Reason for change:*** | | In a roaming scenario where one SEPP serves a given PLMN, and such PLMN has multiple PLMN-IDs but uses the same N32 connection for all PLMN-IDs, the current specification does not describe the solution how to identify and verify the source PLMN-ID of a message. | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Summary of change:*** | | The sending SEPP shall include the source PLMN ID (i.e., 3gpp-Sbi-Asserted-Plmn-Id header) in the signaling message. The receiving SEPP shall discard messages if the source PLMN ID (i.e., 3gpp-Sbi-Asserted-Plmn-Id header) included in the signaling message does not belong to the sending SEPP’s own PLMN. | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | | Roaming scenarios where one SEPP serves a given PLMN, and such PLMN has multiple PLMN-IDs but uses the same N32 connection for all PLMN-IDs, will not work. | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Clauses affected:*** | | 5.9.3.2 | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
|  | | **Y** | **N** |  | | | |  | | |
| ***Other specs*** | |  | **X** | Other core specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
| ***affected:*** | |  | **X** | Test specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
| ***(show related CRs)*** | |  | **X** | O&M Specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***Other comments:*** | |  | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***This CR's revision history:*** | |  | | | | | | | | |

\*\*\* Start of Change \*\*\*

#### 5.9.3.2 Requirements for Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP)

The SEPP shall act as a non-transparent proxy node.

The SEPP shall protect application layer control plane messages between two NFs belonging to different PLMNs that use the N32 interface to communicate with each other.

The SEPP shall perform mutual authentication and negotiation of cipher suites with the SEPP in the roaming network.

The SEPP shall handle key management aspects that involve setting up the required cryptographic keys needed for securing messages on the N32 interface between two SEPPs.

The SEPP shall perform topology hiding by limiting the internal topology information visible to external parties.

As a reverse proxy the SEPP shall provide a single point of access and control to internal NFs.

The receiving SEPP shall be able to verify whether the sending SEPP is authorized to use the PLMN ID in the received N32 message.

The SEPP shall be able to clearly differentiate between certificates used for authentication of peer SEPPs and certificates used for authentication of intermediates performing message modifications.

NOTE 1: Such a differentiation could be done e.g. by implementing separate certificate storages.

The SEPP shall discard malformed N32 signaling messages.

The sending SEPP shall reject messages received from the NF (directly or via SCP) with JSON including "encBlockIndex" (regardless of the encoding used for that JSON request).

The receiving SEPP shall reject any message in which an IPX has inserted or relocated references to encBlockIndex.

The SEPP shall implement rate-limiting functionalities to defend itself and subsequent NFs against excessive CP signaling. This includes SEPP-to-SEPP signaling messages.

The SEPP shall implement anti-spoofing mechanisms that enable cross-layer validation of source and destination address and identifiers (e.g. FQDNs or PLMN IDs).

NOTE 2: An example for such an anti-spoofing mechanism is the following: If there is a mismatch between different layers of the message or the destination address does not belong to the SEPP’s own PLMN, the message is discarded.

The SEPP shall be able to use one or more PLMN IDs. In the situation that a PLMN is using more than one PLMN ID, this PLMN's SEPP may use the same N32-connection for all of the PLMN's PLMN IDs, with each of the PLMN's remote PLMN partners. If different PLMNs are represented by the PLMN IDs supported by a SEPP, the SEPP shall use separate N32-connections for each pair of home and visited PLMN.

The sending SEPP shall include the source PLMN ID (i.e., 3gpp-Sbi-Asserted-Plmn-Id header) in the NF's service/subcription request and notification messages.

Editor’s note: It is FFS how does the sending SEPP determine the source PLMN ID of the signaling message. Specifically, whether the sending SEPP inserts the PLMN-ID header itself, or whether the NF inserts the PLMN-ID header and the sending SEPP makes sure it is included in case the NF (e.g. Rel-15 NF) has not included it.

Editor’s note: It is FFS what should be the asserted PLMN-ID if the NF serves multiple PLMN-IDs.

The receiving SEPP shall discard service/subcription request and notification messages if the source PLMN ID (i.e., 3gpp-Sbi-Asserted-Plmn-Id header) included in the signaling message does not belong to the sending SEPP’s own PLMN.

NOTE X: For example, the receiving SEPP compares 3gpp-Sbi-Asserted-Plmn-Id header with the known PLMN-ID(s) in the sending SEPP’s certificate. Alternatively, the receiving SEPP can also compare the PLMN-ID of the 3gpp-Sbi-Asserted-Plmn-Id header with a locally configured list of PLMN-IDs that the sending SEPP represents. If the PLMN-ID of the 3gpp-Sbi-Asserted-Plmn-Id header matches with any one of PLMN-IDs belonging to the peer SEPP, the header is verified ok and the receiving SEPP forwards it to the target NF, otherwise the receving SEPP discards the whole message.

Editor’s note: It is FFS whether the receiving SEPP also needs to verify that the PLMN-ID given in the message itself (in case it is explicitly or implicitly contained) matches the asserted-PLMN-ID header.

\*\*\* End of Change \*\*\*