**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #105e *S3-213924r1***

**e-meeting, 8 - 19 November 2021**  merger of 3924, 4126, 4162

**Source: Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Qualcomm**

**Title: UUAA procedure during PDU session establishment**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 4.6 ID\_UAS**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***Approve the proposed pCR as normative text***

# 2 References

[1]

# 3 Rationale

This contribution proposes the UUAA procedure based on the agreed principle in the study. It is in-line with SA2’s procedure as well.

# 4 Detailed proposal

pCR

\*\*\* BEGINNING OF CHANGES (all text new) \*\*\*

### 5.2.1.3 UUAA Procedure during PDU Session Establishment

The SMF may trigger a UUAA procedure during the PDU session establishment procedure with details described below, which considers only the security related (see TS 23.256 [3] for full details of the flows).



Figure 5.2.1.3-1: UUAA Procedure during PDU Session Establishment

1. The SMF determines whether UUAA is required as described in the clause 5.2.1.1, where the UE may provide a CAA-Level UAV ID indicating UAS services and optionally a transparent container composed of an Authentication message, e.g. an EAP message, for USS to authenticate the UAV in the PDU Session Establishment request. The SMF triggers a UUAA procecure after the determination in step 7 in the clause 5.2.1.1.

2. The SMF sends a message Nnef\_Auth\_Req to the UAS NF, including the GPSI and the CAA-Level UAV ID, and the transparent container if provided by the UE. The SMF may include other information in the request as in TS 23.256 [3].

3. The UAS NF resolves the USS address based on CAA-Level UAV ID or uses the provided USS address. Only authorised USS shall be used in order to ensure only legitimate entities can provide authorisation for UAVs. The UAS NF sends an Authentication Request to the USS which includes the GPSI, the CAA-Level UAV ID and the transparent container. Other information may also be included in this message (see TS 23.256 [3]).

4. The USS and the UE exchange multiple Authentication messages:

4a. The USS replies to UAS NF with the Authentication Response message. It shall include the GPSI, a transparent container composed of an authentication message.

4b. The UAS NF sends the transparent container to the SMF.

4c. The SMF forwards the transparent container to the AMF, which then forwards to the UE over a NAS MM transport message.

4d. The UE responses the AMF with an Authentication message embedded in a transparent container over a NAS MM transport message. The AMF forwards to the SMF.

4e. The SMF sends a message Nnef\_Auth\_Req to the UAS NF, including the GPSI and the CAA-Level UAV ID, and the transparent container provided by the UE.

4f. The UAS NF sends an Authentication Request to the USS. The Authentication Request shall include the GPSI, the CAA-Level UAV ID and the transparent container.

NOTE: Multiple round-trip messages (4a to 4f) may be needed as required by the authentication method used by USS. The method used to authenticate the UE and the content of Authentication Messages are out of scope of 3GPP.

5. The USS sends the UAS NF an Authentication Response message. The Authentication Response shall include the GPSI, the UUAA result (success/failure), the authorized CAA-level UAV ID, the USS Identifier, and a transparent container to the UAV.

If UUAA successful, the UAS NF stores the UAV UEs’ UUAA context, including the GPSI, USS Identifier (and the binding with the GPSI) and the CAA-level UAV ID (and the binding with the GPSI).

The transparent container contains UAS security information. The content of security information (e.g. key material to help establish security between the UAV and USS/UTM) is not in 3GPP scope

6. The UAS NF sends the SMF an Authentication Response message, including the GPSI, the UUAA result (success/failure), the authorized CAA-level UAV ID, and the transparent container received in step 5.

The SMF stores the results, together with the GPSI and the CAA-level UAV ID.

7. The SMF sends the UUAA result (success/failure) and the transparent container received in step 5 to the UE. The message(s) used in step 7 and any further actions the UE and SMF take are given in TS 23.256 [3].

\*\*\* END OF CHANGES \*\*\*