**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #103-e *S3-211579-r2***

**e-meeting, 17 - 28 May 2021** Revision of S3-20xxxx

**Source: Intel**

**Title: Updates to solution 14: Removal of Editor’s notes: Three Authentication**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 5.12**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***It is proposed to approve updates to solution 14 in TR 33.857***

# 2 References

[1] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G System."

[2] IETF RFC 5216: "The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol".

# 3 Rationale

This pCR proposes resolution of Editor’s notes on solution #14 as follows and provide evaluation:

Editor’s Note: The need for three different authentications and the threats mitigated by each is FFS:

This pCR also proposes an evaluation of Solution #14.

Solution #14 proposes a two-step approach:

* one-way primary authentication whereby the UE authenticates the O-SNPN
* followed by mutual authentication with the DCS using any EAP method as part of secondary authentication.

During the Registration procedure, UE authenticates the network with one-way primary authentication of O-SNPN using an appropriate EAP method, e.g., EAP-TLS. The mutual authentication required between DCS and UE is provided as part of the secondary authentication.

The benefit of one-way primary authentication solution is it avoids the additional complexity of any new control plane interfaces that needs to be defined between the O-SNPN and DCS during primary authentication. The one-way primary authentication i.e., only the UE authenticates the network provides security over the Uu interface by deriving the NAS and AS keys for signalling protection to prevent MITM attacks. For Uu interface, with one-way primary authentication, securing AS and NAS interfaces is similar to existing Primary authentication as defined in 33.501.

**Observation 1: One-way primary authentication avoids the complexity of a new C-plane interface between O-SNPN and DCS, while providing key material for derivation of NAS and RRC keys.**

Apart from one way primary authentication, the mutual authentication between DCS and UE is provided via secondary authentication, UE will be allowed to setup PDU session but with only limited connectivity to further enhance security. To mitigate further security issues, AUSF, SMF and UPF can be isolated using either e.g. different network slice or network configuration in the AMF as onboarding configuration data. UE may also get this slice information i.e. S\_NSSAI from AMF.

The key benefit of one-way primary authentication with Onboarding network when compared to two-way primary authentication is that the additional system impact to define service-based interface towards DCS from the Onboarding network is avoided. In addition, it avoids putting a burden on the DCS to support service-based interface for onboarding e.g. when the DCS is owned by a device vendor supporting traditional AAA interface based on Diameter or RADIUS protocol.

**Observation 2: One-way primary authentication avoids putting the burden on the DCS to support service-based interface or to support 3GPP-specific functionality such as SUCI deconcealment. The device vendor owning the DCS can use a traditional AAA interface.**

The mutual authentication required between UE and the DCS is performed by secondary authentication as defined in TS 33.501[1]. Irrespective of one-way or mutual primary authentication, in both cases the key material for AS and NAS security is generated.

The third authentication (i.e. between UE and Provisioning Server relying on DCS credentials) is out of of scope of this solution and depends on the conclusion of key issue 2. It is not clear what exactly is implied for further study in the Editor’s note. All UP based solutions proposed in this TR (as well as the majority of deployed authentication solutions in the Internet today) rely on the basic principle where a network server (in the role of Authenticator) authenticates the device (in the role of Supplicant) by communicating with a backend Authentication Server that stores the device credentials. As illustrated in Figure 1, the UE, the Provisioning Server and the DCS are in the role of Supplicant, Authenticator and Authentication Server, respectively.

 

**Figure 1: Generic Internet Based Authentiation Architecture**

This is a generic architecture for authentication that is widely used today and, in that sense, the Editor’s note is not needed. We propose to simply delete it

# 4 Detailed proposal

**\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*Start of Changes \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\***

6.14 Solution #14: Initial access for UE Onboarding for an SNPN from Onboarding SNPN using primary and secondary authentication

6.14.1 Introduction

This solution addresses key issue 4," Securing initial access for UE onboarding between UE and SNPN," for devices without UICC and figure 6.Y.1-1 shows a general use-case for this key issue. The actual provisioning mechanisms are outside the scope of this solution. In this solution, UE authenticates network using one-way authentication as part of authentication procedure and performs mutual authentication with DCS using any EAP method as part of secondary authentication.

When the UEs are deployed without a provisioned subscription, it provides a solution on how UE subscription/credentials are afterward provisioned to the UEs. The solution enables UEs to get network connectivity to an O-SNPN ("onboarding SNPN") so that it can be provisioned with necessary subscription credentials and configuration for the SO-SNPN that will own the UE's subscription ("SNPN owning the subscription"). The solution removes the complexity of O-SNPN by avoiding the need for any new Control plane interfaces, the connectivity between the O-SNPN and DCS relying on the existing interface for secondary authentication. ****

**Figure 6.14.1-1: UE onboarding in non-public network**

6.14.2 Solution details

6.14.2.0 General

Following pre-conditions are assumed:

- The UE is provisioned with some default UE credentials and a unique UE identifier at the manufacturing time. The unique UE identifier is assumed to be unique within the DCS. It takes the form of a Network Access Identifier (NAI), which is composed of the user part and the realm part, which may identify the domain name of the DCS. UE is provisioned with set of roots of trust certificate information that UE will use to authenticate O-SNPN during the authentication.

- The UE is not provisioned with *subscription credentials* that grant access to a SO-SNPN.

- The Onboarding SNPN (O-SNPN) that is used by the UE in the onboarding process is not necessarily the same as the SO-SNPN (Subscription Owner SNPN) for which subscription credentials will be provisioned in the UE.

- The O-SNPN operator has access to a Default Credential Server (DCS), which is used to verify that UE is subject to onboarding based on the UE identifier and the associated default UE credentials. The DCS is used for UE authentication/authorization in the O-SNPN during the establishment of a PDU Session for onboarding purposes. The DCS owner is out of this document's scope and can be inside or outside of the O-SNPN, e.g., DCS can be owned by the device manufacturer, by an SNPN other than the O-SNPN, or by a 3rd party.

In some deployments, the DCS and the Provisioning Server can be the same entity. In deployments where the DCS and the Provisioning Server are different entities, it is expected that they communicate with each other for the purpose of UE authentication based on the default UE credentials via an interface that is outside of this solution’s scope.

NOTE 1: Provisioning is out of scope of this solution

The SO-SNPN owning the subscription (SO-SNPN) interacts with the Provisioning Server during the UE onboarding procedure and provides the corresponding UE's subscription credentials and UE's configuration data to be provisioned to the UE. The actual provisioning mechanisms are outside the scope of this solution

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**Figure 6.14.2-1 UE Onboarding for Remote Provisioning Procedure**

0. UE pre-configuration: The UE is provisioned with default UE credentials that allow for successful UE authentication and a unique UE identifier. A configuration may also include information for selecting SNPN needed to access the provisioning server.

1. Initial access to the Onboarding SNPN:

a. Selection of SNPN: UE selects the O-SNPN based on the indication in SIB broadcasted by O-SNPN (e.g., "Support for onboarding" indicator). In this step, if the UE wants to initiate the UE onboarding, the UE either automatically discovers and selects the O-SNPN network based on the broadcasted information or presents a list of available ONs to the user for manual selection. The UE registers to O-SNPN for onboarding by including an indication in the Registration Request, indicating that the registration is for UE onboarding.

b. Registration Procedure: During the registration procedure, the UE provides the UE-specific information, e.g corresponding identity (encoded in SUPI format) to the network. The user may also provide the UE with additional information, such as an application identifier and/or Service Provider Identifier. An authentication using non-AKA (e.g. EAP-TLS) based method is performed. The SUPI is of the type of NAI in the form of username@realm. The “username” shall be either “anonymous” or UE identity can be omitted if the subscriber identifier privacy is required by SNPN. The UE performs the one-way authentication of O-SNPN based on O-SNPN’s certificate.

2. Configuration PDU session: UE obtains limited connectivity to the Provisioning Server. In the Configuration PDU Session Establishment Request, the UE includes DCS identity and optionally includes PS identity, SO-SNPN identity, or both. When the UE provides SO-SNPN identity, the SMF in the O-SNPN may decide to override the PS identity provided by the UE and send the new PS identity to the UE in the PDU Session Establishment Accept as PCO parameter. The PS identity received in the PDU Session Establishment Accept overrides any configured PS identity in the device. It is assumed that one and only one Configuration PDU session can be established, and connectivity of this PDU session is limited (cf. RLOS), so that the UE can only access a Provisioning Server.

3. The PDU session establishment authentication/authorization is performed as described in TS 23.502 [6] clause 4.3.2.3 and in TS 33.501[2] clause 11.1.2. Secondary authentication is triggered with the DCS by the SMF during PDU Session establishment. The SMF selects the DCS either based on the DCS identity sent from the UE to the SMF or based on the realm part of the UE identity. It is required that the secondary authentication performed between the UE and the DCS is an EAP authentication that supports mutual authentication

Editor’s Note: If the O-SNPN can perform mutual EAP authentication with DCS as part of secondary authentication, it needs to be clarified why such a EAP authentication cannot be performed as part of primary authentication in step 1.

4. The UE discovers the Provisioning Server using the stored PS identity. At this point, the stored PS identity is either the PS identity pre-configured in the UE, or the PS identity entered manually by the user, or the PS identity received by the O-SNPN. If the UE still does not have a stored PS identity, then the UE uses a well-known FQDN to perform PS discovery. The UE provides the provisioning server with the unique UE identifier, optionally the identity of the selected SO-SNPN. The provisioning server discovers the DCS using DCS identity sent from the UE to PS or based on the realm part of the unique UE identity and authenticates the UE and make a secure connection for provisioning with the UE, based on the default UE credentials. Interface between DCS and PS is out of the scope of this solution.

NOTE 2: This solution assumes there is trust relationship between DCS and PS. Specifics of the interface between DCS and PS including the aspects of mutual authentication, encryption and integrity protection are out of the scope of this solution.

NOTE 3: When the Onboarding network is the same as SNPN owning the subscription of the UE, the Provisioning Server is owned by the Onboarding Network

5. Upon successful provisioning, the UE releases the Configuration PDU Session and deregisters from the O-SNPN.

6. Upon a successful de-registration, the UE initiates a regular procedure, including a selection of a SO-SNPN, Registration using the provisioned credentials with the SO-SNPN owning the subscription, and PDU Session establishment(s). Depending on the provisioned subscription credentials, the UE may select an SNPN that is the same or different from the SNPN owning the credentials.

6.14.2.1 Using EAP-TLS Authentication Procedures over 5G Networks for initial one-way authentication

Figure 6.14.2.1-1 below shows the EAP-TLS Authentication Procedures over 5G Networks as described in TS 33.501 Annex B.2.1; the difference with respect to the EAP-TLS authentication procedure for one-way authentication is highlighted and described below.

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**Figure** **6.14.2.1-1: Using EAP-TLS Authentication Procedures over 5G Networks for initial one-way authentication**

Step 1: When the UE sends a registration request with Registration Type as Onboarding, the UE sends an anonymous SUCI described in clause B 2.1.2.2 of TS 33.501 [2].

Step 2: The AMF (SEAF) selects an AUSF and sends the Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Request message to the AUSF, including information to assist the AUSF in selecting the EAP-TLS authentication method for one-way authentication.

NOTE 1: The information to assist the AUSF in selecting EAP-TLS for one-way authentication can be sent as an explicit parameter or can be encoded inside the realm part of the SUCI. Alternatively, the AMF (SEAF) can use a dedicated AUSF for onboarding.

Step 3,4,5: are not required as the AUSF determines the authentication method.

It is required that the secondary authentication performed between the UE and the DCS is an EAP authentication that supports mutual authentication

Step 6,7,8,9: Same procedure as described in TS 33.501[2] Annex B.2.1

Step 10-11: The AUSF replies to the SEAF with EAP-Request/EAP-TLS in the Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Response, which may include a chain of TLS certificates leading to root of trust certificate authority.

Step 12: The UE authenticates the server with the received message from step 8.

Editor’s Note: Details on how the server certificates are issued to the O-SNPNs and how the server certificates are authenticated by the UE is FFS.

NOTE 2: The underlying assumption is that the device is configured with a set of root-of-trust certificates at manufacturing time.

NOTE 3: If the AUSF has a certificate issued by a root-of-trust authority, it includes a single certificate in step 10. Otherwise, the AUSF includes a chain of certificates that leads to the root-of-trust authority.

Step 13-14: If the TLS server authentication is successful, the UE replies with EAP-Response/EAP-TLS in the Authenthentication Response message. The response message does not include the TLS Certificate, and TLS\_certificate\_verify message as the network authentication of the UE is not required.

With one-way authentication where only the UE authenticates the onboarding network, the key material for AS and NAS security is generated following the same procedure as described in TS 33.501[2] Annex B.2.1

6.14.3 System impact

UE:

- During the registration procedure, UE provides information to the SNPN, indicating that the registration is for restricted onboarding service only.

- the UE might have been provisioned with some initial default configuration, including PLMN ID and NID of the SNPN, S-NSSAI, DNN needed to access the provisioning server.

NG-RAN:

- A new indication in SIB to indicate that the SNPN provides access to onboarding service.

5GC:

 - SMF to provide Limited connectivity to the provisioning server

 - AMF to handle Registration procedure for onboarding

 - AUSF to handle one-way authentication

6.14.4 Evaluation

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The solution fulfills the security requirements as described below, while avoiding any additional complexity for O-SNPN and DCS:

During the Registration procedure, UE authenticates the network with one-way primary authentication of O-SNPN using an appropriate EAP method, e.g., EAP-TLS. The mutual authentication required between DCS and UE is provided as part of the secondary authentication.

Solution avoids additional complexity of any new control plane interfaces that needs to be defined between the O-SNPN and DCS. On the other hand, one-way primary authentication similar to two-way primary authentication generates key material for derivation of NAS and AS keys for signalling protection to prevent MITM attacks.

All key hierarchy and derivation remains the same as defined in 33.501[2].

The mutual authentication between DCS and UE is provided via secondary authentication. UE is allowed to setup a PDU session, but with only limited connectivity. To mitigate any security issues, the AUSF, SMF and UPF can be isolated on a distinct network slice that is dedicated for UE onboarding..

The third authentication (i.e. between UE and Provisioning Server relying on DCS credentials) is out of of scope of this solution and depends on the conclusion of key issue 2.

A rogue network pretending to be an O-SNPN will need to assert a valid identity via a digital certificate as part of the one-way authentication and for that reason attacks via a rogue network are highly unlikely in the context of UE onboarding but are possible. Moreover, such attacks can only be used once, as the UE can keep track of the asserted identities of networks with which the UE onboarding has failed.

In the absence of client authentication, it may be possible that malicious entity can perform an attack by sending multiple registration requests to O-SNPN.

Unnecessary authentication performed with the DCS (due to the session being hijacked by the MitM) and that this would result in some charging issues between the legitimate O-SNPN and the DCS, the DCS charging the O\_SNPN on per authentication basis.

**\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*End of Changes \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\***