3GPP TSG SA WG 3 Meeting SA3#103e TDoc draft\_S3-211523-r6

Electronic meeting, Online, 17 - 28 May 2021

**Title: Reply LS to LS on broadcasting from other PLMN in case of Disaster Condition**

**Response to: LS C1-211189 on LS on broadcasting from other PLMN in case of Disaster Condition from CT1**

**Release: Rel-17**

**Work Item: FS\_MINT-CT**

**Source:** **SA3**

**To: CT1**

**Cc: RAN2**

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**Send any reply LS to: 3GPP Liaisons Coordinator,** [**mailto:3GPPLiaison@etsi.org**](mailto:3GPPLiaison@etsi.org)

**Attachments:** **None**

# 1 Overall description

SA3 thanks CT1 for the LS (C1-211189/ S3-211372) on FS\_MINT-CT being studied in TR 24.811.

SA3 is giving general comments for the two questions in this LS:

**Q1:** Whether receiving and utilizing broadcast information as being studied in TR 24.811 from PLMNs other than the PLMN with Disaster Condition, which can be the home PLMN or a visited PLMN, pose any security risks; and

**A1:** If UE's actions are not specified carefully, there might be security risks because the broadcast information is not protected. For example, a false base station may impersonate PLMN\_Alive or PLMN\_Disaster.

**Q2:** If the answer to Q1 is yes, then what would be SA3's recommendations from security perspective?

**A2**: Firstly, it must be ensured that the MINT feature is applicable only when UE cannot access to allowed PLMNs or UE is in absence of PLMN\_Disaster’s and any other allowable/equivalent PLMNs’s coverage.

Secondly, it must be ensured that the unauthenticated network access (without primary authentication and NAS/AS SMC with null integrity algorithm) to PLMN\_Alive is not allowed. This prevents a UE lured by a false base station from using any impersonated PLMN as mutual authentication and security setup will fail. If this is ensured, SA3 regards the impact of impersonation security risks as no worse than denial of service to the UE (e.g., MINT service not available).

Therefore, CT1 needs to decide if above mechanisms can be ensured and unavailability of PLMN\_Alive in absence of security setup are acceptable. If so, no additional security enhancement is needed in SA3.

# 2 Actions

**To CT1**

**ACTION:** SA3 kindly asks CT1 to take the above reply into consideration for their subsequent works.

# 3 Dates of next TSG SA WG 3 meetings

SA3#103bis-e 5 - 9 July 2021 Electronic meeting

SA3#104e 16 - 27 August 2021 Electronic meeting