Tdoc List
2020-09-07 09:28
Agenda | Topic | TDoc | Title | Source | Type | For | Avail | Treated | Decision | Wdrn | Replaced-by | Replaces |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Agenda and Meeting Objectives | S3‑201500 | Agenda | SA WG3 Chair | agenda | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202152 | ||
S3‑201502 | Process for SA3#100-e meeting | SA WG3 Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201550 | ||||
S3‑201550 | Process for SA3#100-e meeting | SA WG3 Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202058 | S3‑201502 | |||
S3‑202058 | Process for SA3#100-e meeting | SA WG3 Chair | other | - | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202163 | S3‑201550 | ||
S3‑202163 | Process for SA3#100-e meeting | SA WG3 Chair | other | - | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑202058 | |||
S3‑202152 | Agenda | SA WG3 Chair | agenda | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201500 | ||||
2 | Meeting Reports | S3‑201501 | Report from SA3#99-e | MCC | report | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑201503 | Report from last SA | SA WG3 Chair | report | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
3 | Reports and Liaisons from other Groups | S3‑201504 | 5G capabilities exposure for factories of the future | 5GACIA | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑201509 | Reply PAP/CHAP and other point-to-point protocols usage in 5GS | S2-2004481 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑201510 | Reply LS on PAP/CHAP and other point-to-point protocols usage in 5GS | C3-203609 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201514 | Reply LS on S1/NG DAPS handover | CP-201312 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑201515 | LS on human-readable network name (HRNN) | CP-201361 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑201516 | LS to ITU-T Study Group 17 | ETSI TC CYBER QSC | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201517 | Announcement of ISG ETI | ETSI ISG ETI | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201523 | LS on system support for WUS | R2-2005985 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑201535 | LS on user consent requirements for analytics | S2-2004560 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑201540 | 256 bit algorithm candidates | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑201541 | Observations on ZUC-256 | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑201542 | Observations and questions on 256-bit security goals | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑201544 | Use of 256-bit block Rijndael in Milenage-256 | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑201545 | Liaison statement from ETSI ISG SAI on Securing Artificial Intelligence | ETSI ISG SAI | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201546 | Reply LS to TC CYBER QSC request for collaboration on migration planning of HSMs to support Quantum Safe Cryptography | ETSI TC SCP | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201556 | TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur | InterDigital, Inc. | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201738 | Reply LS on User consent requirements for analytics | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201955 | Reply LS on 256 bit algorithm candidates | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201984 | [DRAFT] Reply-LS on 256-bit algorithm candidates | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201985 | Reply-LS on user consent requirements for analytics | Nokia Germany | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202052 | LS from RIFS to SA on 4G authentication improvement | GSMA | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202053 | LS on initiation of new work item Q.Pro-Trust “Signalling procedures and protocols for enabling interconnection between trustable network entities in support of existing and emerging networks” | ITU-T SG11 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202054 | LS on initiation of new work item TR-USSD “Low resource requirement, quantum resistant, encryption of USSD messages for use in Financial services” | ITU-T SG11 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202173 | Reply LS to GSMA RIFS on 4G authentication improvement | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202190 | Reply to Reply PAP/CHAP and other point-to-point protocols usage in 5GS | NTT DOCOMO INC. | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202191 | Reply LS on 256 bit algorithm candidates | NTT DOCOMO INC. | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202192 | Reply LS on Observations on ZUC-256 | NTT DOCOMO INC. | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
4 | Work Areas |   | ||||||||||
4.1 | Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15) | S3‑201506 | Reply LS on specification of NAS COUNT for 5G | C1-203971 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑201511 | LS on 5G SoR integrity protection mechanism | C4-203367 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑201513 | LS Reply on Multiple Kausf upon registering via multiple Serving Networks | C4-203568 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201518 | Specification of NAS COUNT for 5G | GSMA FSAG | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201558 | Resolution of editor's note in clause 6.3.2.1 | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201559 | Resolution of editor's note in clause 6.3.2.1 - R16 mirror | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201560 | Discussion on treatment of editor's notes in 33.501 | NTT DOCOMO | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201561 | resolution of editor's notes in clause 6.8.1.2.0 | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201562 | resolution of editor's notes in clause 6.8.1.2.0 - R16 mirror | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201563 | resolution of editor's note in clause 6.8.1.2.2 | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201564 | resolution of editor's note in clause 6.8.1.2.2 - R16 mirror | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201565 | resolution of editor's note in clause 6.8.1.2.4 | NTT DOCOMO, ZTE | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201566 | resolution of editor's note in clause 6.8.1.2.4 - R16 mirror | NTT DOCOMO, ZTE | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201567 | resolution of editor's note in clause 6.9.1 | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201568 | resolution of editor's note in clause 6.9.1 - R16 mirror | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201569 | resolution of editor's note in clause 6.9.4.1 | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201570 | resolution of editor's note in clause 6.9.4.1 - R16 mirror | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201571 | resolution of editor's note in clause 6.9.4.2 | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201572 | resolution of editor's note in clause 6.9.4.2 - R16 mirror | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201573 | resolution of editor's note in clause 6.9.4.3 | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201574 | resolution of editor's note in clause 6.9.4.3 - R16 mirror | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201575 | resolution of editor's note in clause 10.2.2.2 | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202193 | |||
S3‑201576 | resolution of editor's note in clause 10.2.2.2 - R16 mirror | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202196 | |||
S3‑201577 | resolution of editor's note in clause 13.2.4.4.1 | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201578 | resolution of editor's note in clause 13.2.4.4.1 - R16 mirror | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201579 | resolution of editor's note in clause 13.5 | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201580 | resolution of editor's note in clause 13.5 - R16 mirror | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201646 | Discussion paper on contradictory text on Kseaf deletion | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201649 | CR on Kseaf text deletion | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202199 | |||
S3‑201651 | CR on Kseaf text deletion | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202200 | |||
S3‑201653 | Discussion paper on Profile B uncompressed mode misalignment with CT6 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201655 | CR to delete uncompressed mode text in profile B | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202201 | |||
S3‑201656 | CR to delete uncompressed mode text in Profile B | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201657 | Draft LS to CT6 on Profile B uncompressed mode | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201678 | Edirorials on 13.4.1.2 Service access authorization in roaming scenarios-R15 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201679 | Edirorials on 13.4.1.2 Service access authorization in roaming scenarios-R16 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202243 | |||
S3‑201731 | Alignment with RAN3 specification in R16 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201732 | Alignment with RAN3 specification in R15 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201733 | SUPI Type Clarification in R16 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202236 | |||
S3‑201734 | SUPI Type Clarification in R15 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202237 | |||
S3‑201747 | Secondary authentication revocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202241 | |||
S3‑201748 | Secondary authentication revocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202242 | |||
S3‑201841 | Change the long-lived TLS connection of N32-C to the short-lived | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202208 | |||
S3‑201842 | Mirror: change the long-lived TLS connection of N32-C to the short-lived | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202209 | |||
S3‑201843 | Update the N32-f context ID negotiation procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202211 | |||
S3‑201844 | Mirror: update the N32-f context ID negotiation procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202222 | |||
S3‑201848 | Discussion on the N32-f Protection Policy IE Data-Type Mapping issue | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201849 | Reply LS on N32-f Protection Policy IE Data-Type Mapping | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202224 | |||
S3‑201867 | Clarification of direct NAS reroute | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202206 | |||
S3‑201868 | Mirror:Clarification of direct NAS reroute | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202207 | |||
S3‑201889 | Correction to SN Addition or modification | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202175 | |||
S3‑201914 | Correction of the full form of the abbreviation NRF | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201915 | Correction of the full form of the abbreviation NRF | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201916 | Verification of Serving Network Name in AUSF | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201917 | Verification of Serving Network Name in AUSF | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201918 | Verification of Serving Network Name in AUSF | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201919 | Aligning steering of roaming security mechanism with TS 29.509, TS 29.503 and TS 24.501 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202248 | |||
S3‑201920 | Aligning steering of roaming security mechanism with TS 29.509, TS 29.503 and TS 24.501 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202249 | |||
S3‑201921 | Draft LS on Misalignment between TS 33.501 and TS 29.573 (N32-f, references to the encrypted values) | Ericsson, NCSC | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201922 | Aligning TS 33.501 with TS 29.573 regarding N32-f context ID | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202211 | |||
S3‑201923 | Aligning TS 33.501 with TS 29.573 regarding N32-f context ID | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202222 | |||
S3‑201954 | Reply LS on 5G SoR integrity protection mechanism | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201975 | Alignment of SoR procedures to Stage-3 | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202248 | |||
S3‑201976 | Alignment of SoR procedures to Stage-3 | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202249 | |||
S3‑202049 | Clarifications to SoR integrity protection mechanism | Orange | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202248 | |||
S3‑202050 | Clarifications to SoR integrity protection mechanism | Orange | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202249 | |||
S3‑202055 | N32-f Protection Policy IE Data-Type Mapping | GSMA | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑202056 | N32-f Error Responses - Mapping | GSMA | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202175 | Correction to SN Addition or modification | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201889 | |||
S3‑202193 | resolution of editor's note in clause 10.2.2.2 | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201575 | |||
S3‑202194 | NF Service Producer authorization | Nokia Germany | CR | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | |||||
S3‑202195 | NF Service Producer authorization | Nokia Germany | CR | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | |||||
S3‑202196 | resolution of editor's note in clause 10.2.2.2 - R16 mirror | NTT DOCOMO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201576 | |||
S3‑202197 | OAuth 2.0 based authorization | Nokia Germany | CR | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | |||||
S3‑202198 | OAuth 2.0 based authorization | Nokia Germany | CR | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | |||||
S3‑202199 | CR on Kseaf text deletion | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201649 | |||
S3‑202200 | CR on Kseaf text deletion | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201651 | |||
S3‑202201 | CR to delete uncompressed mode text in profile B | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Verizon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201655 | |||
S3‑202206 | Clarification of direct NAS reroute | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201867 | |||
S3‑202207 | Mirror:Clarification of direct NAS reroute | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201868 | |||
S3‑202208 | Change the long-lived TLS connection of N32-C to the short-lived | Huawei, Hisilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201841 | |||
S3‑202209 | Mirror: change the long-lived TLS connection of N32-C to the short-lived | Huawei, Hisilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201842 | |||
S3‑202211 | Update the N32-f context ID negotiation procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201843 | |||
S3‑202222 | Mirror: update the N32-f context ID negotiation procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201844 | |||
S3‑202224 | Reply LS on N32-f Protection Policy IE Data-Type Mapping | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201849 | |||
S3‑202236 | SUPI Type Clarification in R16 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑201733 | |||
S3‑202237 | SUPI Type Clarification in R15 | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑201734 | |||
S3‑202241 | Secondary authentication revocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑201747 | |||
S3‑202242 | Secondary authentication revocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑201748 | |||
S3‑202243 | Edirorials on 13.4.1.2 Service access authorization in roaming scenarios-R16 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201679 | |||
S3‑202248 | Clarifications to SoR integrity protection mechanism | Orange, Ericsson, Samsung | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202049 | |||
S3‑202249 | Clarifications to SoR integrity protection mechanism | Orange, Ericsson, Samsung | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202050 | |||
S3‑202251 | Reply LS on LS on 5G SoR integrity protection mechanism | Orange | LS out | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202160 | LS on Misalignments on HTTP message format over N32-f | C4-204409 | LS in | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | ||||
S3‑202164 | Error handling by the receiving NF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑202165 | Error handling by the receiving NF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
4.2 | Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16) | S3‑201547 | NESAS Official Launch | GSMA SECAG | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑201840 | Clarification on the test cases if the UDM and AUSF are collocated | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202228 | |||
S3‑201879 | gNB-specific adaptation to account protection by authentication attribute | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201880 | gNB-specific adaptation to minimum number of individual accounts | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201882 | gNB-specific adaptation to enforcement of password change after initial login | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202219 | Relay LS to NESAS Official Launch | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202228 | Clarification on the test cases if the UDM and AUSF are collocated | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201840 | |||
4.3 | Mission Critical security (Rel-16) | S3‑201505 | Reply LS on IANA assigned values for mission critical | C1-203503 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑201647 | [33.180] R16 Group regroup and user regroup security | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201648 | [33.180] MCData message store security | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202176 | |||
S3‑202176 | [33.180] MCData message store security | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201648 | |||
4.4 | Enhancements for Security aspects of Common API Framework for 3GPP Northbound APIs (Rel-16) |   | ||||||||||
4.5 | Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (Rel-16) |   | ||||||||||
4.6 | Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16) | S3‑201610 | Access Token Signature using MAC with symmetric key | Mavenir, Deutsche Telekom | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑202162 | Access Token Signature using MAC with symmetric key | Mavenir, Deutsche Telekom | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201611 | Static authorization details | Mavenir,Deutsche Telekom | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202174 | |||
S3‑201612 | Access token indication of NF service consumer authentication via NRF | Mavenir | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yesminuted by Nokia "Nokia and Mavenir want to raise to leadership and group that the objection by Ericsson on -1612 was hold even though in the last meeting, the previous version was agreed among all participants only conditionally, ie. under the assumption that the change from S3-201612 will be accepted in this meeting"
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201794 | Missing abbreviations | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201795 | Alignment and clarifications to SBA network or transport layer protocol | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202181 | |||
S3‑201796 | N32 interface | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202046 | |||
S3‑201797 | Resolving ed note in 13.2.2.6 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201798 | Authentication and static authorization | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202183 | |||
S3‑201799 | Overview clause on communication models and related security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202182 | |||
S3‑201800 | Authorization of NF service access | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202189 | |||
S3‑201801 | Integrity protection of service request | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202186 | |||
S3‑201802 | Re-using of access token in indirect communication with delegated discovery | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201803 | Making NF instance id in SBA certificate profile mandatory to support | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202184 | |||
S3‑201845 | Enhancement on the client credentials assertion verification | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201924 | Token request parameters in Scenario D | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201983 | Roaming case for indirect communication | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑202046 | N32 interface | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202180 | S3‑201796 | ||
S3‑202167 | N32 interface | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑202174 | Static authorization details | Mavenir,Deutsche Telekom | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201611 | |||
S3‑202180 | N32 interface | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202046 | |||
S3‑202181 | Alignment and clarifications to SBA network or transport layer protocol | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201795 | |||
S3‑202182 | Overview clause on communication models and related security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201799 | |||
S3‑202183 | Authentication and static authorization | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201798 | |||
S3‑202184 | Making NF instance id in SBA certificate profile mandatory to support | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201803 | |||
S3‑202186 | Integrity protection of service request | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑201801 | |||
S3‑202189 | Authorization of NF service access | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202259 | S3‑201800 | ||
S3‑202259 | Authorization of NF service access | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202189 | |||
S3‑202166 | Static authorization details | Mavenir,Deutsche Telekom | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
4.7 | Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16) | S3‑201680 | Add three Abbreviations to clause 3.3 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202233 | |
S3‑201681 | Delete routing ID in A-KID | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201682 | Discussion on KAF update | ZTE Corporation | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201683 | Kaf update in clause 5.2 and 6.4.3 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201684 | AUSF needs not store KAUSF | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201685 | Resolution of editor's note on other parameter in clause 6.3 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201686 | Services Provided by AAnF in clause 7.1 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202246 | |||
S3‑201687 | Services Provided by AUSF in clause 7.2 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202246 | |||
S3‑201688 | Clarification of when to derive Kaf in UE | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201700 | AKMA Anchor Key derivation in the UE | CATT | draftCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑201717 | Clarifications on error case in AKMA process | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202217 | |||
S3‑201742 | Aware of AF‘s AKMA service capability in the UE | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201753 | The deployment of AAnF | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201754 | Use routing ID to find AAnF | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201755 | Reauthenticaiton in AKMA | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202218 | |||
S3‑201768 | Adding AMF functionality in clause 4.2 | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201769 | Adding details of AKMA key generation in the UE | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201785 | Add abbreviations to TS 33.535 | China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202233 | |||
S3‑201786 | FC values allocation | China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202168 | |||
S3‑201787 | CR to TS 33.220-FC values allocation for AKMA | China Mobile | CR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑201788 | Correction of AKMA services in section 7 | China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202246 | |||
S3‑201789 | Adding AKMA context description | China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201790 | Adding details on UE AKMA capability handling | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201791 | Clarification on AKMA Application Key derivation in the UE | CATT | CR | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | |||||
S3‑201869 | FC values for TS 33.535 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202169 | |||
S3‑201943 | Updates to Abbreviations and Corrections and clarifications to clause 4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202203 | |||
S3‑201944 | Corrections to AKMA key lifetimes | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202204 | |||
S3‑201945 | Corrections and clarifications to AKMA procedures | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202205 | |||
S3‑201946 | Assignment of FC values for key derivations | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202168 | |||
S3‑201947 | Assigning FC values for AKMA TS | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202169 | |||
S3‑201948 | Specification of value of SUPI for key derivations | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201966 | [AKMA] Service Update to clause 6.1, 6.2 and 7.1 | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202246 | |||
S3‑201967 | [AKMA] Deletion of service provided by AUSF in clause 7.2 | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202246 | |||
S3‑201968 | Support for context deregistration option in AKMA | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202036 | AKMA Anchor Function selection clause | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202037 | AKMA SBA interface clarifications | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202246 | |||
S3‑202038 | AKMA reference point architecture specification | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202039 | Several clarifications and editorials | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202247 | |||
S3‑202040 | Discussion of the AKMA reference point interface names | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202041 | LS on Reference point interface names for AKMA | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202250 | |||
S3‑202168 | Assignment of FC values for key derivations | Qualcomm Incorporated, China Mobile | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201946 | |||
S3‑202169 | Assigning FC values for AKMA TS | Qualcomm Incorporated, China Mobile, Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201947 | |||
S3‑202203 | Updates to Abbreviations and Corrections and clarifications to clause 4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201943 | |||
S3‑202204 | Corrections to AKMA key lifetimes | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201944 | |||
S3‑202205 | Corrections and clarifications to AKMA procedures | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201945 | |||
S3‑202217 | Clarifications on error case in AKMA process | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201717 | |||
S3‑202218 | Reauthenticaiton in AKMA | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201755 | |||
S3‑202233 | Add three Abbreviations to clause 3.3 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201680 | |||
S3‑202246 | AKMA SBA interface clarifications | Ericsson, ZTE, China Mobile, Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202037 | |||
S3‑202247 | Several clarifications and editorials | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202039 | |||
S3‑202250 | LS on Reference point interface names for AKMA | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202041 | |||
4.8 | Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16) | S3‑201521 | LS on early UE capability retrieval for eMTC | R2-2003935 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑201531 | Reply LS on early UE capability retrieval for eMTC | S2-2004446 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201974 | Reply LS on 5G-GUTI reallocation after paging of a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode with suspend indication | Samsung, Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201991 | CIoT: Converting remaining ENs into Notes | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201992 | CIoT: Converting TBDs to notes | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201993 | CIoT: Adding missing references | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑202057 | LS on 5G-GUTI reallocation after paging of a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode with suspend indication | C1-200967 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
4.9 | Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16) | S3‑201519 | Uniqueness of FN-RG PEI for Lawful Interception purposes | BBF | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑201537 | LS on uniqueness of PEI in certain FN-RG configurations | S3i200069 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201870 | Selecting the authentication method for devices that do not support 5GC NAS over WLAN access | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201877 | Discussion Anonymous IDs | Ericsson LM | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201881 | Anonymous SUCI for N5GC | Ericsson LM | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202051 | Completion of WT-456 and WT-470 | BBF | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
4.10 | Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16) | S3‑201512 | LS on Clarification on AAA-Server address | C4-203452 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑201534 | Reply LS on NSSAAF in slice specific authentication | S2-2004476 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201743 | AMF selection in NSSAA related procedure in case of dual registration in different PLMNs | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201744 | AMF selection in NSSAA related procedure in case of dual registration in different PLMNs | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201745 | Slice privacy protection in NSSAA related procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201746 | Correction to Nnssaaf_NSSAA services service | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202239 | |||
S3‑201781 | Addressing editor note on transformation of S-NSSAI during NSSAA | China Mobile | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201805 | Modification on AAA Server triggered Slice-Specific Authorization Revocation procedure | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202245 | |||
S3‑201812 | Discussion on validity period | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201813 | validity peirod of NSSAA results | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201814 | Discussion on SN-ID in NSSAA | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201815 | Serving network name in NSSAA | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201816 | Clarification on binding of NSSAI and UE ID at AAA-S | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201817 | Editorial changes to clause 16 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202231 | |||
S3‑202048 | Draft LS Response on Clarification on AAA-Server address | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202231 | Corrections to clause 16 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201817 | |||
S3‑202239 | Correction to Nnssaaf_NSSAA services service | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑201746 | |||
S3‑202240 | Correction to Nnssaaf_NSSAA services service | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑201746 | |||
S3‑202245 | Modification on AAA Server triggered Slice-Specific Authorization Revocation procedure | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201805 | |||
4.11 | Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (Rel-16) | S3‑201977 | Allocation of FC values for KIAB derivation function | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202172 | |
S3‑201978 | Allocation of FC values for IAB key derivation function | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202169 | |||
S3‑202172 | Allocation of FC values for KIAB derivation function | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201977 | |||
4.12 | Security aspects of SEAL (Rel-16) | S3‑201508 | LS on Key Management procedure in SEAL | C3-203588 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑201650 | [33.434] KM Clarifications | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202178 | |||
S3‑201654 | Reply LS on Key Management procedure in SEAL | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | LS out | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202177 | |||
S3‑201958 | [Draft] Reply LS on key management procedure in SEAL | Samsung | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202177 | |||
S3‑201959 | [SEAL] CR for TS 33.434 cleanup | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202170 | |||
S3‑202170 | [SEAL] CR for TS 33.434 cleanup | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201959 | |||
S3‑202177 | Reply LS on Key Management procedure in SEAL | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | LS out | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201654 | |||
S3‑202178 | [33.434] KM Clarifications | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201650 | |||
4.13 | Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16) | S3‑201522 | LS on the re-keying procedure for NR SL | R2-2005978 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑201548 | LS on technical reports on use cases and requirements as well as architecture for vehicular multimedia | ITU-T Focus Group on Vehicular Multimedia (FG-VM) | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201557 | Clarification on the definition of KNRP-sess | InterDigital, Inc., LG Electronics, Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201609 | Corrections on security establishment | InterDigital, Inc. | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201689 | Clarification of handling of the user plane security policy in clause 5.3.3.1.4.2.3 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201690 | Clean up for eV2X | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202212 | |||
S3‑201691 | Update the clause 5.3.3.1.4.3 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201692 | Update the clause 5.3.3.2.2 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202232 | |||
S3‑201710 | Editorial changes about subscript corrections | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202212 | |||
S3‑201711 | Propose to add descriptions about Knrp ID confliction | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201712 | Clarification on policy handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202213 | |||
S3‑201713 | Clarification on algorithm selection and key derivation | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202214 | |||
S3‑201714 | Clarification on processing null-algorithms | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202215 | |||
S3‑201715 | Propose to mitigate the bidding down attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201716 | Propose to complete security lagorithm selection for UP | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202216 | |||
S3‑201838 | Clarification on the UP security configuration checking | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202210 | |||
S3‑201839 | Clarification on the UP security policy activation | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201942 | Clarification on the unicast privacy procedures | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202210 | Clarification on the UP security configuration checking | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201838 | |||
S3‑202212 | Editorial changes about eV2X | Huawei, Hisilicon, ZTE Corporation | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201710 | |||
S3‑202213 | Clarification on policy handling | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201712 | |||
S3‑202214 | Clarification on algorithm selection and key derivation | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201713 | |||
S3‑202215 | Clarification on processing null-algorithms | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201714 | |||
S3‑202216 | Propose to complete security lagorithm selection for UP | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201716 | |||
S3‑202232 | Update the clause 5.3.3.2.2 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201692 | |||
4.14 | Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17) | S3‑201751 | Adding HSS and BSF SBI services | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202069 | |
S3‑201752 | Architecture support complement | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202069 | |||
S3‑201863 | Discussion on UE privacy in GBA | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201864 | Adding security requirement on UE privacy | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202027 | Living document of Service Based Interfaces for GBA | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202028 | Living document of Service Based Interfaces for GBA Push | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202029 | pCR to living document for TS 33.220: SBA support for Zh and Zn interfaces | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202069 | |||
S3‑202030 | pCR to living document for TS 33.223: SBA support for Zpn interface | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202071 | |||
S3‑202031 | Discussion of HSS role in supporting SBA for GBA | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202069 | Living document for TS 33.220: SBA support for Zh and Zn interfaces | Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202029 | |||
S3‑202071 | Living document for TS 33.223: SBA support for Zpn interface | Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202030 | |||
4.15 | Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17) | S3‑201851 | IMS SCAS: adding the Introduction part | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202075 | |
S3‑201852 | IMS SCAS: Assets and threats of the IMS product classes | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202149 | |||
S3‑201853 | IMS SCAS: adding threats related to de-registration during the authentication | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201854 | IMS SCAS: new test case on de-registration | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202077 | |||
S3‑201855 | Threats specific of high-priority algorithm selection in the P-CSCF | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202078 | |||
S3‑201856 | IMS SCAS: new test case on high-priority algorithm selection in the P-CSCF | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202080 | |||
S3‑201857 | Threats specific of bidding down on security association set-up | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202081 | |||
S3‑201858 | IMS SCAS: new test case on bidding down on security association set-up | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202082 | |||
S3‑201859 | Threats specific of unprotected register message | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201860 | IMS SCAS: new test case on unprotected register message | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202083 | |||
S3‑202075 | IMS SCAS: adding the Introduction part | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201851 | |||
S3‑202077 | IMS SCAS: new test case on de-registration | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201854 | |||
S3‑202078 | Threats specific of high-priority algorithm selection in the P-CSCF | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201855 | |||
S3‑202079 | IMS SCAS: new test case on high-priority algorithm selection in the P-CSCF | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑201856 | |||
S3‑202080 | IMS SCAS: new test case on high-priority algorithm selection in the P-CSCF | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202156 | S3‑201856 | ||
S3‑202081 | Threats specific of bidding down on security association set-up | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202154 | S3‑201857 | ||
S3‑202082 | IMS SCAS: new test case on bidding down on security association set-up | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201858 | |||
S3‑202083 | IMS SCAS: new test case on unprotected register message | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201860 | |||
S3‑202084 | Draft TS 33.226 v0.2.0 Security assurance for IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) | Huawei, Hisilicon | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202149 | IMS SCAS: living document for assets and threats of the IMS product classes | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201852 | |||
S3‑202153 | Threats specific of bidding down on security association set-up | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑201857 | |||
S3‑202154 | Threats specific of bidding down on security association set-up | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202081 | |||
S3‑202156 | IMS SCAS: new test case on high-priority algorithm selection in the P-CSCF | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202080 | |||
4.16 | Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17) | S3‑201761 | Threat analysis on NAS based redirection from 5GS to EPS | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202131 | |
S3‑201762 | SCAS-NAS based redirection from 5GS to EPS | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202132 | |||
S3‑201763 | threat analysis on state transation | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202133 | |||
S3‑201764 | Add state transation to gNB SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202134 | |||
S3‑201765 | Threat analysis on the RLF scenario in Control Plane CIoT 5GS Optimization | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201766 | RRCReestablishment in Control Plane CIoT 5GS Optimization | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201767 | living doc to 33.117 | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202135 | |||
S3‑201846 | Threats related to security enforcement configuration for vertical LAN | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201847 | New test case on security enforcement configuration for vertical LAN | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201891 | Threat analysis of incorrect validation of client credentials assertion | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202140 | |||
S3‑201892 | Test case for correct handling of client credentials assertion validation failure | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202141 | |||
S3‑202131 | Threat analysis on NAS based redirection from 5GS to EPS | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201761 | |||
S3‑202132 | SCAS-NAS based redirection from 5GS to EPS | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201762 | |||
S3‑202133 | threat analysis on state transation | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201763 | |||
S3‑202134 | Add state transation to gNB SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201764 | |||
S3‑202135 | living doc to 33.117 | Huawei, Hisilicon, Interdigital, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201767 | |||
S3‑202140 | Threat analysis of incorrect validation of client credentials assertion | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201891 | |||
S3‑202141 | Test case for correct handling of client credentials assertion validation failure | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201892 | |||
S3‑202148 | Living CR to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
4.17 | Security Assurance Specification for Service Communication Proxy (SECOP) (Rel-17) | S3‑201996 | SCAS SCP: Requirements and test cases of SBA/SBI aspects | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202138 | |
S3‑201997 | Critical Assets of SCP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202139 | |||
S3‑201998 | Analysis of threats over SCP internal network interfaces | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201999 | SCAS SCP: Requirement and Test Case for Protection over Internal Interfaces | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202000 | Threat analysis of tokens forwarded by the SCP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202006 | SCAS SCP: Token forwarded to the current pNF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202007 | SCAS SCP: Correct Token forwarded to the pNF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202138 | SCAS SCP: Requirements and test cases of SBA/SBI aspects | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201996 | |||
S3‑202139 | Critical Assets of SCP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201997 | |||
S3‑202143 | Draft TS 33.522 v0.2.0 5G SCAS for SCP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
4.18 | Security Assurance Specification for 5G NWDAF (Rel-17) |   | ||||||||||
4.19 | Security Assurance Specification for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) (Rel- 17) |   | ||||||||||
4.20 | Security Assurance Specification for Inter PLMN UP Security (Rel-17) | S3‑201693 | Updating IPUPS of UPF to Annex L of TR 33.926 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑202136 | Updating IPUPS of UPF to Annex L of TR 33.926 | ZTE Corporation | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
4.21 | Other work areas | S3‑201524 | LS on propagation of user consent related information during Xn inter-PLMN handover | R3-204378 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑201528 | LS on AMF Reallocation via RAN re-routing | S2-2001730 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑201532 | Reply LS on manipulation of CAG Information element by a VPLMN | S2-2004453 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201533 | Reply LS on protection of allowed CAG list against MITM Attack | S2-2004455 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201581 | Editorial corrections to NDS/AF | Juniper Networks | CR | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑201624 | Removing rel-15 text relating to N9 roaming UP | Juniper Networks | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201659 | Draft reply LS to RAN3 LS on User consent during Xn inter PLMN handover | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201677 | reply LS on AMF Reallocation via RAN re-routing | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201850 | Clarification on the Data-type encryption policy | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201862 | LS out on AMF reallocation via RAN | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201866 | SHA-1 deprecation in GBA | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201873 | Clarification to SEAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑201493 | |||
S3‑201874 | Status of RFC 5448bis update | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑201147 | |||
S3‑201878 | Clarification to 5G AV | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202253 | S3‑201492 | ||
S3‑201883 | eNB-specific adaptation to account protection by authentication attribute R15 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201884 | eNB-specific adaptation to account protection by authentication attribute R16 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201885 | eNB-specific adaptation to minimum number of individual accounts R15 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201886 | eNB-specific adaptation to minimum number of individual accounts R16 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201887 | eNB-specific adaptation to enforcement of password change after initial login R15 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201888 | eNB-specific adaptation to enforcement of password change after initial login R16 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑201912 | Discussion paper on the NAS COUNTs storage | Apple | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201913 | Draft LS to CT6 on the NAS COUNTs storage | Apple | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201980 | Removal of response from gNB to the AMF after inter-gNB-CU HO | Samsung | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202002 | Update of the OAuth Proof-of-Possession security architecture reference | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑202003 | Update of the OAuth Proof-of-Possession security architecture reference | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑202004 | Update of the OAuth Proof-of-Possession security architecture reference | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑202005 | Update of the OAuth Proof-of-Possession security architecture reference | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑202034 | Handling of counter wrap around in UDM | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202035 | Storage of KAUSF in the UE and AUSF | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202253 | Clarification to 5G AV | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201878 | |||
S3‑202254 | Clarification to 5G AV | Nokia,Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | |||||
4.22 | New work item proposals | S3‑201652 | New WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 17 | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | WID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202179 | |
S3‑201741 | New WID on Security Assurance Specification for NSSAAF | Huawei, Hisilicon | WID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202221 | |||
S3‑201941 | Enhancements to UPIP Support in 5GS | Qualcomm Incorporated | WID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202202 | |||
S3‑202179 | New WID on mission critical security enhancements phase 2 | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | WID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201652 | |||
S3‑202202 | Enhancements to UPIP Support in 5GS | Qualcomm Incorporated | WID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201941 | |||
S3‑202221 | New WID on Security Assurance Specification for NSSAAF | Huawei, Hisilicon | WID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201741 | |||
S3‑202255 | New WID on Security Assurance Specification for NSSAAF | Huawei, Hisilicon | WID new | Agreement | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑201741 | |||
5 | Studies |   | ||||||||||
5.1 | Study on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul | S3‑201981 | Updates on Rel-16 IAB Conclusions | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑201982 | Clean-up of IAB TR 33.824 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.2 | Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations | S3‑201520 | Reply LS to SA3 on FBS detection | R2-1914224 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑201555 | pCR: Updates to TR 33.809 | Deutsche Telekom AG | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201592 | Add certificate based solution for NPN as a new Solution | MITRE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202161 | |||
S3‑202161 | Add certificate based solution for NPN as a new Solution | MITRE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201592 | |||
S3‑201635 | Updates to solution #20 - resolving EN in 6.20.2.2.1 | CableLabs, Apple, Intel, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202223 | |||
S3‑201636 | Updates to solution #20 - resolving ENs in 6.20.2.3.1 | CableLabs, Apple, Intel, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202225 | |||
S3‑201637 | Updates to solution #20 - resolving ENs in 6.20.2.4 | CableLabs, Apple, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202226 | |||
S3‑201638 | Updates to solution #20 - resolving ENs in 6.20.2.5.1 | CableLabs, Apple, Intel, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202227 | |||
S3‑201707 | Reply LS to RAN2 on FBS detection | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201708 | Clarification for solution 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201709 | Detection of MiTM False Base Station | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201718 | NAS security based MIB SIBs integrity protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201735 | System Information Protection using On-boarding Credential in NPN | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201861 | Resolving the EN of solution#5 in the TR 33.809 | Huawei, Hisilicon, Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201871 | pCR: Conclusion of Key issue#5 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Huawei | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201872 | pCR: Removal of Editor’s Note in solution #15 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Huawei | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201894 | 5GFBS-RRCResumeRequest message protection | Apple, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201895 | 5GFBS-Way forward on DoS attack caused by modifying the signature | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201896 | 5GFBS-Way forward on bidding down attack | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201897 | 5GFBS-Way forward on replay attack | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201898 | 5GFBS-Add a NOTE in the key issue#7 on the MitM attack | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201899 | 5GFBS-Addressing EN on how to prevent UE camping on the FBS for solution#11 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201900 | 5GFBS-Addressing EN on MitM attack for solution #11 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201901 | 5GFBS-Draft reply LS to RAN2 on reply LS to SA3 on FBS detection(R2-1914224/S3-200944) | Apple | LS out | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑201952 | Conclusion of Key Issue #3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201979 | [5GFBS] Resume Cause protection | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202018 | |||
S3‑202009 | DSnF improvements in time synchronization | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202108 | |||
S3‑202016 | 5GFBS: Detecting FBS based on UE Positioning Measurements | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202142 | |||
S3‑202018 | [5GFBS] Resume Cause protection | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑201979 | |||
S3‑202026 | Cryptographic CRC in MAC to avoid MitM relay nodes | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202109 | |||
S3‑202108 | DSnF improvements in time synchronization | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202009 | |||
S3‑202109 | Cryptographic CRC in MAC to avoid MitM relay nodes | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202026 | |||
S3‑202142 | 5GFBS: Detecting FBS based on UE Positioning Measurements | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202016 | |||
S3‑202150 | draft TR for 5GFBS | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202223 | Updates to solution #20 - resolving EN in 6.20.2.2.1 | CableLabs, Apple, Intel, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201635 | |||
S3‑202225 | Updates to solution #20 - resolving ENs in 6.20.2.3.1 | CableLabs, Apple, Intel, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑201636 | |||
S3‑202226 | Updates to solution #20 - resolving ENs in 6.20.2.4 | CableLabs, Apple, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201637 | |||
S3‑202227 | Updates to solution #20 - resolving ENs in 6.20.2.5.1 | CableLabs, Apple, Intel, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital Communications, Rogers Communications, Charter Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201638 | |||
5.3 | Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products | S3‑201770 | Clarifying summary of threats for GVNP | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201771 | Adding security functional requirements derived from 3GPP specifications – general SBA SBI aspects | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201772 | Adding hardening requirements for GVNP of type 1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201773 | Adding hardening requirements for GVNP of type 2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201774 | Adding hardening requirements for GVNP of type 3 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201775 | Adding basic vulnerability testing requirements for GVNP | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201776 | Adding vendor development and product lifecycle processes and test laboratory accreditation into clause 6 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201777 | Adding evaluation and SCAS instantiation into clause 7 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201778 | Adding test case into clause 5.2.5.5.8.5.1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201779 | Adding test case into clause 5.2.5.6.6.1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201780 | Adding conclusion into clause 8 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202010 | SCAS VNP: Threats on VNF-VNFM Interface | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202011 | SCAS VNP: Security requirements on the interface between VNF and VNFM | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202012 | SCAS VNP: Software Tampering | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202013 | SCAS VNP: VM Escape and Hypervisor Escape | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202014 | SCAS VNP: Secure Execution Environment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202015 | SCAS VNP: DoS Attack via Changing Virtualized Resource | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
5.4 | Study on User Plane Integrity Protection | S3‑201507 | Reply LS on Updated User Plane Integrity Protection advice | C1-204194 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑201549 | LS on mandatory support of full rate user plane integrity protection for 5G | SP-200617 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201634 | Revise the Evaluation for Solution 5 in TR 33.853 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201911 | UP IP-New solution to address key issue#5 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201940 | Solving key issue #7 on moving bearer that require UP IP to EPS using the existing methods | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202097 | |||
S3‑201956 | UPIP: Update to solution #11 (UP IP over eUTRA connected to EPS) | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202086 | |||
S3‑201957 | UPIP: Update to solution #12, resolving editor note | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202001 | pCR to TR33.853 - Updates to solution 14 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202258 | |||
S3‑202008 | pCR to TR33.853 - Addition of solution addressing KI#8 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202257 | |||
S3‑202045 | pCR to TR33.853 - Update to section 4 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202047 | pCR to 55.853 - Addition of conclusions | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202086 | UPIP: Update to solution #11 (UP IP over eUTRA connected to EPS) | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201956 | |||
S3‑202097 | Solving key issue #7 on moving bearer that require UP IP to EPS using the existing methods | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201940 | |||
S3‑202257 | pCR to TR33.853 - Addition of solution addressing KI#8 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202008 | |||
S3‑202258 | pCR to TR33.853 - Updates to solution 14 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202001 | |||
S3‑202260 | TR 33.853 v1.1.0 | VODAFONE Group Plc | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.5 | Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation |   | ||||||||||
5.6 | Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS | S3‑201543 | Reply to LS on Resynchronisations | ETSI SAGE | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑201598 | Certificate-Based Encryption Solution | MITRE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202076 | |||
S3‑201613 | SQNms protection by concealment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202099 | |||
S3‑201614 | SQN protection during re-synchronisation procedure in AKA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202098 | |||
S3‑201615 | Key Issue on Linking of UEs by SUCI replay attack | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202100 | |||
S3‑201631 | Key issue about the SUCI Replaying attacks in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202100 | |||
S3‑201632 | Solution to mitgate the SUPI guessing attack in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201633 | Complementary to Key issue to mitigate the SUCI guessing attacks in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201725 | Conclusion on mitigation against the linkability attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201929 | Proposed removal of a redundant Editor’s Note from key issue #4.1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201930 | Some evaluation of solution#2.1 in TR 33.846 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201931 | Some evaluation of solution #2.2 in TR 33.846 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202094 | |||
S3‑201932 | Some evaluation of solution #2.3 in TR 33.846 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201933 | Some evaluation of solution #2.5 in TR 33.846 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201934 | Resolving the editor’s notes in the solution #4.1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201935 | Proposing a conclusion for key issue #4.1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201936 | Adding MACS as an input parameter to the calculation of AK* to provide freshness | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑191529 | |||
S3‑202019 | pCR to TR 33.846: editorial corrections for solution #2.4 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202070 | |||
S3‑202020 | pCR to TR 33.846: evaluation of solution #2.4 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202042 | Discussion paper on removal of invalid authentication result in UDM | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202043 | LS on Removal of invalid authentication result in UDM | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202044 | Authentication Result Confirmation | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202070 | pCR to TR 33.846: editorial corrections for solution #2.4 | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202019 | |||
S3‑202072 | Draft TR 33.846 v0.7.0 Study on authentication enhancements in the 5G System (5GS) | Ericsson Japan K.K. | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202076 | Certificate-Based Encryption Solution | MITRE Corporation, AT&T, InterDigital, DoD, Apple, CISA/ECD, III, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201598 | |||
S3‑202094 | Some evaluation of solution #2.2 in TR 33.846 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201931 | |||
S3‑202098 | SQN protection during re-synchronisation procedure in AKA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201614 | |||
S3‑202099 | SQNms protection by concealment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201613 | |||
S3‑202100 | Key Issue on Linking of UEs by SUCI replay attack | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201615 | |||
5.7 | Study on storage and transport of the security parameters in a 5GC, that are used by the ARPF for Authentication | S3‑201551 | New Solution for KI2 - Encrypted storage of LTK in UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202060 | |
S3‑201552 | New Solution for KI3 - Encrypted transfer of LTK out of UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202059 | |||
S3‑201626 | Milenage AKA authenticaiton | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201627 | TUAK AKA authenticaiton | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202110 | |||
S3‑201628 | Counter related parameters | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201927 | pCR to TR 33.845: Location of ARPF functionality | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202061 | |||
S3‑201928 | Location of ARPF functionality | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑202059 | New Solution for KI3 - Encrypted transfer of LTK out of UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201552 | |||
S3‑202060 | New Solution for KI2 - Encrypted storage of LTK in UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201551 | |||
S3‑202061 | pCR to TR 33.845: Location of ARPF functionality | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201927 | |||
S3‑202110 | TUAK AKA authenticaiton | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201627 | |||
S3‑202261 | TR33.845 v0.4.0 | VODAFONE Group Plc | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.8 | Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems | S3‑201593 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – UAV and UAV-C Location Information veracity | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202088 | |
S3‑201594 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 –UAV authentication and authorisation | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202111 | |||
S3‑201595 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – C2 communications security | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202155 | |||
S3‑201596 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – UAV and UAC-C pairing authorization | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202112 | |||
S3‑201597 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – New_KI_UAS_TR_-_Revocation of UAV auhorisation | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202111 | |||
S3‑201599 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – Privacy protection of UAS identities | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202090 | |||
S3‑201600 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – differentiated privacy for UAS-UTM connection | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201601 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – differentiated security for UAS-UAV connection | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201602 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – non-repudiation for UAS-UAV exchanges | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201603 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – regulatory compliance | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201604 | Withdrawn - New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – Detection and identification of problematic UAS | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑201605 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – Security protection of UAS-UTM information exchanges | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202127 | |||
S3‑201606 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – Impersonation of UAS entities’ identities | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202111 | |||
S3‑201607 | Withdrawn - New Key Issue for TR 33.xyz – Limiting the information exchange between UAS and UTM/USS to authorised types and granularity of information | InterDigital, Inc. | other | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑201608 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – Secure delivery of UAV and UAC-C identities and other info to UTM/USS | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202127 | |||
S3‑201664 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854– Detection and identification of problematic UAS | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201670 | UAS Key Issue on location | Futurewei | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202088 | |||
S3‑201671 | UAS Key Issue on UAV | Futurewei | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202127 | |||
S3‑201726 | New Key Issue on protection of flight information in remote identification | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202127 | |||
S3‑201792 | KI on UAV authentication and authorization | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202111 | |||
S3‑201818 | New KI: UAV/UAV-C authentication and authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202111 | |||
S3‑201819 | New KI: UAV and UAV-C pairing security | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202112 | |||
S3‑201820 | New KI: privacy in remote Identification | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202090 | |||
S3‑201821 | New KI: TPAE security | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202113 | |||
S3‑201822 | Introduction: Overview of Unmanned Aerial Systems | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202096 | |||
S3‑201823 | A solution to UAV/UAV-C authentication and authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202114 | |||
S3‑201824 | A solution to UAV/UAV-C pairing authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201876 | Key Issue on privacy protection for broadcast messages | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202090 | |||
S3‑201893 | Key Issue on Security of Command and Control Communication | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202155 | |||
S3‑201937 | Proposed scope for TR 33.854 on UAS security | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202095 | |||
S3‑201938 | Adding a reference to the UAS architecture from TS 23.754 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202096 | |||
S3‑201939 | Proposal to add a key issue on authorising UAV to use the 3GPP network | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202111 | |||
S3‑202088 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – UAV and UAV-C Location Information veracity | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd., Futurewei Technologies | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201593 | |||
S3‑202090 | New Key Issue for TR 33.854 – Privacy protection of UAS identities | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd., Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201599 | |||
S3‑202095 | Proposed scope for TR 33.854 on UAS security | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201937 | |||
S3‑202096 | Adding a reference to the UAS architecture from TS 23.754 | Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, Hsilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201938 | |||
S3‑202111 | New KI: UAV/UAV-C authentication and authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon, InterDigital, Qualcomm, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201818 | |||
S3‑202112 | A new key issue on pairing authorization for UAV and UAVC | Huawei, HiSilicon, InterDigital | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201819 | |||
S3‑202113 | A new key issue on TPAE security | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201821 | |||
S3‑202114 | A new solution to UAS authentication and authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon, InterDigital | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201823 | |||
S3‑202127 | New Key Issue on protection of information in remote identification and between UAV/UAVC and UTM/USS | Huawei, Hisilicon, Interdigital, Futurewei | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201726 | |||
S3‑202155 | Key Issue on Security of Command and Control Communication | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Huawei, HiSilicon, Interdigital | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201893 | |||
S3‑202159 | Draft TR 33.854 | Qualcomm | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.9 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC | S3‑201530 | Reply LS on Application Architecture for enabling Edge Applications | S2-2004386 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑201538 | LS on security procedures for Edge Applications | S6-200945 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑201539 | LS on IP address to GPSI translation | S6-200947 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑201625 | Key issue on user consent/authorization for network capability exposure to Edge Application Servers | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202063 | |||
S3‑201663 | TR 33.839 - New key issue on UE location spoofing attack in 5G EC environment | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201668 | Key Issue on Edge Data Network authentication and authorization | Futurewei | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201669 | Key Issue on Edge UE ID and credential protection | Futurewei | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑201672 | Key issue on Authentication and Authorization | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202115 | |||
S3‑201701 | Key Issue: Security Requirements for EDGE-1 Interface | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202115 | |||
S3‑201703 | Key Issue: Security Requirements for EDGE-4 Interface | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202116 | |||
S3‑201706 | Key Issue: Security Requirements for EDGE-6 Interface | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202117 | |||
S3‑201739 | Reply LS for IP address to GPSI translation | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | ||||
S3‑201749 | New KI for EAS discovery | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202119 | |||
S3‑201750 | New KI for on Network Information Provisioning to Local Applications with low latency | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201830 | New Key Issue on service provisioning | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202116 | |||
S3‑201831 | New Key Issue on service consuming | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202115 | |||
S3‑201832 | New Key Issue on EES capability exposure to EAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201833 | EC: Scope for edge computing SID | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201834 | Skeleton for edge computing SID | Huawei, Hisilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202073 | |||
S3‑201835 | EC: New Key issue on the transport security for the EDGE-1-9 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202074 | |||
S3‑201902 | MEC-New key issue on DNS address modification | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202119 | |||
S3‑201903 | MEC-New Solution on mitigating DNS request modification attack | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201904 | MEC-New key issue on user consent on sharing sensitive information | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202063 | |||
S3‑201905 | MEC-Reply LS to SA6 (S6-200947) on the protection of user’s consent | Apple | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201906 | MEC-New key issue on authentication based on 3GPP credentials | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202115 | |||
S3‑201907 | MEC-New solution on authentication based on 3GPP credentials | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202151 | |||
S3‑201969 | Key issue on authentication/authorization of Edge Enabler Client | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202115 | |||
S3‑201970 | Authentication/authorization framework for Edge Enabler Client and server | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202062 | |||
S3‑201971 | Key issue on user's consent for exposure of information to Edge Application | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202063 | |||
S3‑201972 | User's consent for exposure of information to Edge Application | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202062 | Authentication/authorization framework for Edge Enabler Client and server | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201970 | |||
S3‑202063 | Key issue on user's consent for exposure of information to Edge Application | Samsung, China Telecommunications, Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201971 | |||
S3‑202073 | Skeleton for edge computing SID | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201834 | |||
S3‑202074 | EC: New Key issue on the transport security for the EDGE-1-9 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201835 | |||
S3‑202085 | Draft TR 33.839 Study on security aspects of enhancement of support for edge computing in 5G Core (5GC) | Huawei, Hisilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202087 | Reply LS on security procedures for Edge Applications | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202115 | Key Issue: Security Requirements for EDGE-1 Interface | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201701 | |||
S3‑202116 | Key Issue: Security Requirements for EDGE-4 Interface | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201703 | |||
S3‑202117 | Key Issue: Security Requirements for EDGE-6 Interface | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201706 | |||
S3‑202119 | New KI for EAS discovery | Huawei, Hisilicon, Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201749 | |||
S3‑202151 | MEC-New solution on authentication based on 3GPP credentials | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201907 | |||
5.10 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS | S3‑201536 | LS on Security Requirements for Sidelink/PC5 Relays | S2-2004750 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑201616 | New Key Issue for TR 33.847 – privacy of information over the UE-to-Network | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201617 | New Key Issue for TR 33.847 – integrity and confidentiality of information over the UE-to-Network Relay. | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202130 | |||
S3‑201618 | New Key Issue for TR 33.847 – privacy of information over the UE-to-UE Relay. | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201619 | New Key Issue for TR 33.847 – integrity and confidentiality of information over the UE-to-UE Relay. | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202158 | |||
S3‑201620 | New Key Issue for TR 33.abc – security preservation for path change | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201621 | New Key Issue for TR 33.847 – privacy preservation for path change | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201622 | New Key Issue for TR 33.847 – Authorisation of UE to Network Relay | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202147 | |||
S3‑201623 | New Key Issue for TR 33.847 – Authorisation of UE to UE Relay | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202146 | |||
S3‑201658 | Draft LS to SA2 on Security requirements for Side link PC5 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201661 | ProSe TR 33.847 - new KI on E2E security for ProSe UE2UE relay | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202158 | |||
S3‑201662 | ProSe TR 33.847 - new KI on restricted discovery | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202129 | |||
S3‑201756 | Architecture Introduction in 5G Prose | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201757 | New key issue on key distribution in prose discovery scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201758 | New key issue on discovery message protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202129 | |||
S3‑201759 | New key issue on security of UE-to-Network Relay | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202130 | |||
S3‑201760 | New key issue on security of one-to-one communication | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201804 | Draft skeleton of TR 33.847 | CATT | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201806 | pCR to TR33.847-Scope | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202144 | |||
S3‑201807 | pCR to TR33.847-Key issue on ProSe UE-to-UE relay discovery | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202129 | |||
S3‑201808 | pCR to TR33.847-Key issue on ProSe relays | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202130 | |||
S3‑201826 | Definitions and abbreviations | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201827 | Scope of Prose Security | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202144 | |||
S3‑201836 | 5G ProSe: New Key issue on authorization in the UE-to-UE relay scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202146 | |||
S3‑201837 | 5G ProSe: New Key issue on authorization in the UE-to-Network relay scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202147 | |||
S3‑201908 | ProSe- New key issue on privacy protection in authentication procedure via UE-to-network relay | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202130 | |||
S3‑201909 | ProSe- New key issue on PC5 security against UE-to-UE relay | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202158 | |||
S3‑201910 | ProSe- New solution on security of UE-to-UE relay | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201949 | Key Issue on PC5 link establishment for UE-to-network relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202130 | |||
S3‑201950 | Reply LS on Security Requirements for Sidelink/PC5 Relays | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201960 | Key issue on key management in 5G ProSe | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202064 | |||
S3‑201961 | Key management in 5G ProSe | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202065 | |||
S3‑201962 | Key issue on handling security policies in ProSe relay communication | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201963 | Handling security policies in ProSe relay communication | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201964 | Key issue on secure data transfer between UE and 5GDDNMF in ProSe | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202066 | |||
S3‑201965 | Secure data transfer between UE and 5GDDNMF in ProSe | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202067 | |||
S3‑202021 | ProSe: KI for Provisioning of ProSe parameters | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202066 | |||
S3‑202022 | ProSe: KI for Open Discovery | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202129 | |||
S3‑202023 | ProSe: KI for Restricted discovery | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202129 | |||
S3‑202024 | ProSe: KI for UE-to-network Relay | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202147 | |||
S3‑202025 | ProSe: KI for UE-to-UE Relay | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202146 | |||
S3‑202064 | Key issue on key management in 5G ProSe | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201960 | |||
S3‑202065 | Key management in 5G ProSe | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201961 | |||
S3‑202066 | Key issue on secure data transfer between UE and 5GDDNMF in ProSe | Samsung, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201964 | |||
S3‑202067 | Secure data transfer between UE and 5GDDNMF in ProSe | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201965 | |||
S3‑202129 | New key issue on discovery message protection | Huawei, Hisilicon, LG Electronics, Ericsson, CATT, Interdigital | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201758 | |||
S3‑202130 | New key issue on security of UE-to-Network Relay | Huawei, Hisilicon, Interdigital, Qualcomm Incorporated,CATT, Ericsson,Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201759 | |||
S3‑202144 | pCR to TR33.847-Scope | CATT, Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201806 | |||
S3‑202145 | Draft TR 33.847 | CATT | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202146 | 5G ProSe: New Key issue on authorization in the UE-to-UE relay scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201836 | |||
S3‑202147 | 5G ProSe: New Key issue on authorization in the UE-to-Network relay scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201837 | |||
S3‑202157 | New Key Issue for TR 33.847 – submission of draft_S3-201619-r5 that is a merger of S3-201619, S3-201661, and S3-201909 | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑201619 | |||
S3‑202158 | New Key Issue for TR 33.847 – submission of draft_S3-201619-r5 that is a merger of S3-201619, S3-201661, and S3-201909 | InterDigital, Inc., LG Electronics, Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201619 | |||
5.11 | Study on security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT | S3‑201583 | TR_33.851_IIoT_Sec skeleton | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202101 | |
S3‑201584 | Scope of study | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202102 | |||
S3‑201585 | References | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202103 | |||
S3‑201586 | Abbreviations | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201587 | Architectural considerations | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202105 | |||
S3‑201588 | External 5GS TSN user plane interfaces | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201589 | N60 interface security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201590 | Multiple TSN working domains | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202106 | |||
S3‑201591 | Updating 33.501 Annex L text for PTP support | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201694 | New key issue on security for uplink time synchronization | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202118 | |||
S3‑201695 | New solution for key issue on security for uplink time synchronization | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201724 | New Key Issue on protection of UE-UE communication | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202126 | |||
S3‑202101 | TR_33.851_IIoT_Sec skeleton | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201583 | |||
S3‑202102 | Scope of study | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201584 | |||
S3‑202103 | References | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201585 | |||
S3‑202104 | Abbreviations | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑201586 | |||
S3‑202105 | Architectural considerations | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201587 | |||
S3‑202106 | Multiple TSN working domains | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201590 | |||
S3‑202107 | TR_33.851_IIoT_Sec | Nokia | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202118 | New key issue on security for uplink time synchronization | ZTE Corporation,Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201694 | |||
S3‑202126 | New Key Issue on protection of UE-UE communication | Huawei, Hisilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201724 | |||
5.12 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services | S3‑201696 | New key issue on authorization for multicast communication services | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202120 | |
S3‑201719 | New Key Issue on Security of the MBS service authentication and authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202120 | |||
S3‑201720 | New Key Issue on security protection of MBS traffic | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202121 | |||
S3‑201721 | Scope for TR on MBS security | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202123 | |||
S3‑201722 | Proposed Skeleton for MBS SID | Huawei, Hisilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201723 | New Key Issue on key distribution | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202125 | |||
S3‑201865 | Revocation of 5G multicast service authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201951 | Key Issue on transport security for MBS flows | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202121 | |||
S3‑202120 | New Key Issue on Security of authentication and authorization for Multicast communication services | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201719 | |||
S3‑202121 | New Key Issue on security protection of MBS traffic | HuaWei Technologies Co., Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201720 | |||
S3‑202122 | Scope for TR on MBS security | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑201721 | |||
S3‑202123 | Scope for TR on MBS security | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201721 | |||
S3‑202124 | Proposed Skeleton for MBS SID | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑201722 | |||
S3‑202125 | New Key Issue on key distribution | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201723 | |||
S3‑202137 | Draft TR 33.850 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.13 | Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks | S3‑201525 | LS on Questions on onboarding requirements | S1-201087 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑201526 | Reply LS on Questions on onboarding requirements | S1-202266 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201527 | Questions on onboarding requirements | S2-2001729 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201529 | LS on architectures for access to SNPNs using credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | S2-2004385 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑201582 | Skeleton TR 33.857 v000 | Ericsson | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201639 | Architectural assumptions and definitions | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202091 | |||
S3‑201640 | Key issue on requirements for storing non-3GPP credentials | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201641 | Key issue on device and DCS authenticity | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201642 | Key issue on trustworthiness of onboarding networks | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201643 | Key issue related to primary authentication during onboarding | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201644 | Key issue on invalid device provisioning | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201645 | Key issue on AUSF with AAA integration | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202092 | |||
S3‑201697 | Key Issue: UE onboarding and provisioning for non-public networks | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202128 | |||
S3‑201698 | Key Issue: Authentication using credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN UE onboarding and provisioning for non-public networks | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202092 | |||
S3‑201699 | Solution to UE onboarding and provisioning for non-public networks | Intel Deutschland GmbH | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201727 | New key issue on authentication with credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202092 | |||
S3‑201728 | New key issue on authentication and authorization for UE onboarding between UE and PNI-NPN | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201729 | New key issue on authentication and authorization for UE onboarding between UE and SNPN | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202128 | |||
S3‑201730 | Reply LS on architectures for access to SNPNs using credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑201825 | New KI: Authentication and authorization checkpoint for PNI-NPN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201828 | New Key Issue on user ID privacy | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201829 | New Key Issue on secure provisioning between provisioning server and UE | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202093 | |||
S3‑201875 | Key Issue to support SNPN along with credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑202092 | |||
S3‑201925 | New KI: Support of IMS voice and emergency services for SNPN | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑201953 | Reply LS on architectures for access to SNPNs using credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201986 | eNPN Proposed TR Assumptions | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202091 | |||
S3‑201987 | eNPN New KI: Credentials owned by an external entity | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202092 | |||
S3‑201988 | eNPN New KI: Initial Access | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201989 | eNPN New KI: Provisioning | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202093 | |||
S3‑201990 | eNPN [DRAFT] LS on AAA based solutions for credentials owned by an entity separate from the SNPN | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201994 | eNPN TR scope | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201995 | eNPN TR Definitions | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202017 | eNPN Proposed TR Introduction | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202089 | |||
S3‑202068 | Draft TR 33857 v010 Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks (NPN) | Ericsson Telecomunicazioni SpA | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑202089 | eNPN Proposed TR Introduction | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202017 | |||
S3‑202091 | eNPN Proposed TR Assumptions | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201986 | |||
S3‑202092 | eNPN New KI: Credentials owned by an external entity | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Huawei, Hisilicon, Intel, Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201987 | |||
S3‑202093 | eNPN New KI: Provisioning | Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201989 | |||
S3‑202128 | New key issue on authentication and authorization for UE onboarding between UE and SNPN | Huawei, Hisilicon,Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel, Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑201729 | |||
S3‑202238 | New key issue on authentication and authorization for UE onboarding between UE and SNPN | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
5.14 | Study on security aspects of the Disaggregated gNB Architecture | S3‑201629 | Skeleton for TR 33.840 | China Telecommunications | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201704 | |
S3‑201630 | Scope for TR 33.840 | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201665 | Requirements for TR 33.840 | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑201666 | Discussion on the Scenario and Requirement for the Disaggregated gNB | China Telecommunications | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201667 | key issue on security policy differentiation in CU-UPs | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201702 | |||
S3‑201673 | Key issue on key isolation | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201674 | Key issue on security policy differentiation | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201702 | key issue on security policy differentiation in CU-UPs | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑201667 | |||
S3‑201704 | Skeleton for TR 33.840 | China Telecommunications | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑201705 | S3‑201629 | ||
S3‑201705 | Skeleton for TR 33.840 | China Telecommunications | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑201704 | |||
S3‑201740 | Scope of Study on security aspects of the disaggregated gNB Architecture | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201890 | Key Issue on User Plane Security Compromise | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201973 | Key issue on UP keys for Disaggregated gNB architecture | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202229 | Skeleton for TR 33.840 | China Telecommunications | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202230 | S3‑201705 | ||
S3‑202230 | Skeleton for TR 33.840 | China Telecommunications | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202229 | |||
5.15 | Other study areas | S3‑201660 | TR 33.836 - clean-up | LG Electronics Inc. | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑201926 | Clean-up, including removal of Editor's Notes | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
5.16 | New study item proposals | S3‑201553 | Discussion on adapting BEST for use in 5G networks supporting AKMA | KPN N.V. | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑201554 | Study on adapting BEST for use in 5G networks supporting AKMA | KPN N.V. | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201675 | Discussion on new SID Security Study on system enablers for devices having multiple USIMS | Intel Deutschland GmbH | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201676 | New SID on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules (USIM) | Intel Deutschland GmbH | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201736 | New Study on Enhancement of Authorization of API Invocation | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Unicom, CAICT, CATT | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202235 | |||
S3‑201737 | Discussion on Enhancement of Authorization of API Invocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201782 | new SID on security aspects of 5G MSG | China Mobile, China Unicom, Huawei, ZTE, CATT | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑201783 | Discussion on new SID for security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G System (5GS) Phase 2 | China Mobile | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201784 | new SID on security aspects of eNA phase2 | China Mobile, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, China Unicom, CATT, ZTE | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202256 | |||
S3‑201793 | SID on eSBA sec cont | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | SID new | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202185 | |||
S3‑201809 | New SID on introducing penetration test | Huawei, Hisilicon | SID new | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202234 | ||||
S3‑201810 | Discussion paper for Rel17 SID on network slicing security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, CableLab, CATT, CAICT | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑201811 | Rel17 SID on network slice security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, CableLab, CATT, CAICT | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202032 | Proposal for a new study on AMF re-allocation security | Ericsson | discussion | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑202033 | New study on the security of AMF re-allocation | Ericsson | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202252 | |||
S3‑202171 | FS_eSBA_SEC | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Deutsche Telecom, Verizon, Mavenir, CableLabs, Mavenir, Docomo, China Mobile, Huawei, HiSilicon | SID new | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑202185 | SID on eSBA sec cont | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | SID new | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑201793 | |||
S3‑202220 | LS for penetration test inclusion of SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑202244 | |||
S3‑202234 | New SID on introducing penetration test | Huawei, Hisilicon | SID new | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑201809 | ||||
S3‑202235 | New Study on Enhancement of Authorization of API Invocation | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Unicom, CAICT, CATT | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑201736 | |||
S3‑202244 | LS for penetration test inclusion of SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑202220 | |||
S3‑202252 | New study on the security of AMF re-allocation | Ericsson | SID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202033 | |||
S3‑202256 | new SID on security aspects of eNA phase2 | China Mobile, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, Hisilicon, China Unicom, CATT, ZTE, Ericsson, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, LG Elecronics, CableLabs, Interdigital | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑201784 | |||
6 | Any Other Business | S3‑202187 | SA3 meeting calendar | Ericsson LM | other | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑202188 | Draft agenda for SA3#100bis-e meeting | Ericsson LM | agenda | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No |