3GPP TSG-RAN WG2 Meeting #115 Electronic R2-21xxxx

Online, 16 – 27 August 2021

**Agenda item: 8.22**

**Source: Nokia**

**Title: Report of email discussion [AT115-e][031][NR17] MINT**

**WID/SID: FS\_MINT-CT - Release 17**

**Document for: Discussion and Decision**

# 1 Introduction

This is to provide an overview of TDocs [1-13] submitted under AI 8.22 for the CT1 LS on UAC enhancements for minimization of service interruption when disaster condition applies in [1].

# 2 Summary

## 2.1 Agreeable points

Based on the received CT1 LS in [1], CT1 has been performing stage 2 study (see 3GPP TR 24.811 for further details) and inform RAN2 that among the solutions that CT1 has not excluded to progress during the normative phase, there are two solutions impacting UAC after a disaster inbound roamer selects a PLMN without disaster condition: Solutions #38 and #40. These solutions require changes in the barring configuration in addition to introducing Access Identity 3 (see 3GPP TS 22.261), which are in the remit of RAN2.

The CT1 studies have been further consulted with SA3 from security perspective. SA3 guides in [2] that:

* broadcasting MINT related information from other PLMN in case of Disaster Condition risks because the broadcast information is not protected
* it must be ensured that the MINT feature is applicable only when UE is out of coverage of or cannot access any allowed PLMNs.
* it must be ensured that, except for emergency calls, unauthenticated network access (i.e. without primary authentication and NAS/AS SMC with null integrity algorithm) to the PLMN offering disaster roaming is not allowed

To address the potential impacts to RAN2, the input documents are providing converging conclusion on feasibility of the two solutions. Companies are invited to provide their views whether they agree with the proposed conclusion that both solutions seem feasible and that can be replied to CT1:

**Q1: Do you agree that RAN2 is ready to answer to CT1 that both solutions: Solution#38 and Solution#40 are feasible?**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company** | **Preference (Y/N)** | **Detailed Comments** |
| Lenovo | Yes but | We think the answer is valid under the assumption that only Access Identity 3 is valid for disaster inbound roamers. |
| OPPO | Yes | Feasibility-wise, we agree. |
| vivo | Yes |  |
| Samsung | Yes |  |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Yes | As CT1 mainly asks the feasibility of the two solutions, we think to state both of them is feasible is the reasonable way forward. |
| Ericsson (Mattias) | Y |  |
| Apple (Yuqin) | Yes |  |
| Qualcomm (Ozcan) | Yes |  |
| LG | Yes |  |
| ZTE(Yuan) | Yes |  |
| CATT | Yes |  |

When it comes to technical realization, the following observations are made in [3][5][6] [7][9][11][13] :

[Observation 1 [3]:Solution#38 is to reuse the existing UAC framework by taking one additional AI value (3).](file:///C:\Users\wro02711\AppData\Local\Temp\7zO0092F396\R2-2107184%20-%20Discussion%20on%20UAC%20for%20service%20interruption%20minimization%20during%20disaster.docx#_Toc77251719)

[Observation 2 [3]: Solution#40 is based on a framework which is different from legacy UAC procedure, by using an **offset** value on top of the existing barring factor.](file:///C:\Users\wro02711\AppData\Local\Temp\7zO0092F396\R2-2107184%20-%20Discussion%20on%20UAC%20for%20service%20interruption%20minimization%20during%20disaster.docx#_Toc77251720)

Observation 1 [5]: To support Solution #38, a new UAC-BarringInfoSetList for MINT is needed for Access Identity 3.

Observation 2 [5]: To support Solution #40, an extension to current UAC-BarringInfoSetList is required, to carry the uac-Disaster**Offset**ToBarringFactor and uac-BarringForAccessIdentity3.

Observation 1 [6,7] With just some NAS enhancement, Solution#38 would require a new Access Identity to work without any additional RRC enhancement and mostly can follow existing mechanisms.

Observation 2 [6,7] Besides NAS enhancement, Solution#40 would also require a new Access Identity and an **offset** which may require some significant RRC protocol enchantment to work.

Observation 1 [9]: Introducing the new UAC barring factor for Access Identity 3 is feasible in terms of signaling.

Observation 2 [9]: Introducing the new UAC barring offset value and “disaster loaming active” indicator from the forbidden PLMN is feasible in terms of signaling.

Observation 1 [11]: Solution #38: Introduce barring factor and timer for Access identity 3

Observation 2 [11]: Solution #40 Introduce offset to adjust the barring factor for Access Identity 3

Observation 1 [13]: Solution#38 requires an extension SIB1 with UAC parameters for Access Identity 3.

Observation 2 [13]: Solution#40 requires an extension SIB1 with the new uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor per PLMN and additional UE procedure to calculate uac-BarrignFactor..

Companies are invited to provide their views whether they agree with the proposals.

**Q2: Do you agree the observations made in [3][5][6][7][9][11][13]** **conclude that:**

**Solution#38 requires extension of the existing UAC for Access Identity 3?**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company** | **Preference (Y/N)** | **Detailed Comments** |
| Lenovo | Yes | Only new barring factor for Access Identity 3 needs to be introduced which is independent from the existing barring factor for Access Identity 0. The existing barring time can be reused for Access Identity 3. |
| OPPO | Yes with comment | Sol#38 does not touch the existing UAC framework  The extension is on the signalling part, since the current signalling does not support AI3. |
| vivo | Yes | Solution#38 has to just comply with SA1 requirement configuration for AI =3 to work |
| Samsung | Yes | Solution#38 only requires the new barring factor for Access Identity 3 on top of the current UAC mechanism. |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Yes but | Current UAC framework doesn’t support access control to Access Identity 3, so solution #38 requires extension of the existing UAC for Access Identity 3. However, companies seem to have different understanding on how to reflect solution #38 in RAN2 and this is the reason why the signalling overhead comparison has different results. We think we should have a common understanding on impact analysis on #38 first. In our understanding in [3][10] companies proposed to only introduce a new AI 3 in *UAC-BarringInfoSet*, while in [5][8] companies proposed to introduce from the parent level for solution#38 which is in parallel of existing *uac-BarringInfo*. If RAN2 cannot conclude which is the right way forward on supporting solution#38, we’d better ask SA1/CT1 on the original requirement to better understand what kind of signalling is more suitable. |
| Ericsson (Mattias) | Y |  |
| Apple (Yuqin) | Yes, and see comment | We think there is a missing point on Solution #38. As pointed in our contribution R2-2107590, to support Solution #38, it’s NOT that simple as only extending the usage of current UAC-BarringPerCatList for Access Identity 3.  Actually from our understanding on CT1 discussion, Solution #38 requires to introduce a new set of UAC-BarringPerCatList for MINT UE, in order to allow NW configure a different independent configuration on *uac-BarringFactor* and *uac-BarringTime* for **each** access category. Otherwise, NW could not make a more stringent access control per each access category to MINT UE compared to normal UE. |
| Qualcomm | Yes | Just introducing AI 3 will not be sufficient if we want to control MINT users differently than regular users. To do this, as pointed out by others above, we will need separate barring factors for each AC when AI = 3 is signalled. |
| LG | Yes but | It is not clear if #38 requires per AC control for accesses with AI 3. Companies have different views on this. |
| ZTE(Yuan) | Yes | In the existing UAC configuration, the barring factor and timer is configured per access category. For UE with specific access identity (1,2, 11-15), NW can allow high priority access by configuring uac-BarringForAccessIdentity with value 0 for certain access identity, which means all the access attempts are allowed and UE with the corresponding access identity will not draw a random value and compare with the barring factor. UE with other access identities, for which the corresponding bit in uac-BarringForAccessIdentity is set to “1” will be treated as the same and perform barring check based on the barring factor configured for each access category.  In summary, the existing UAC provides prioritization of certain access identities with a one bit indication but does not support barring factor and timer configuration per access category for each access identity.  For solution #38, barring factor and timer per access category will be introduced for access identity 3. |
| CATT | Yes | Share the same view with others, we need to extend UAC for AI 3 per AC. |

Companies are invited to provide their views whether they agree with the proposals.

**Q3: Do you agree with the observations made in [3][5][6][7][9][11][13]** **that conclude:**

**Solution#40 requires extending of the existing UAC for handling of “offset” parameter?**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company** | **Preference (Y/N)** | **Detailed Comments** |
| Lenovo | Yes | The new offset parameter is tied to the existing barring factor for Access Identity 0. |
| OPPO | Yes with comment | The offset based method does not exist in the existing UAC framework.  So we see the extension of sol#40 is from both framework perspective and signalling perspective. |
| vivo | Yes | The offset would require some significant RRC protocol enchantment to work |
| Samsung | Yes | The new UAC mechanism introducing offset of barring factor could be possible even though it requires some RRC signalling handling. |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Yes |  |
| Ericsson (Mattias) | Y |  |
| Apple (Yuqin) | Yes | The difference between Soltuion #38 and #40 is whether UE reads a barringFactor for AI#3 directly or reads an offset for AI#3 and applies it to the barringFactor for AI#0. |
| Qualcomm | Yes |  |
| LG | Yes | This solution is less straightforward extension of existing UAC, because RAN2 currently has no such mechanism in which we calculate a barring factor by applying an offset value to a particular barring factor. But the extension is not really difficult.  We think #40 is also per AC control for access with AI 3. |
| ZTE(Yuan) | Yes | Solution#40 requires more processing at UE side to drive the barring factor for each access category. |
| CATT | Yes |  |

The observations made in [6][7][8][10] differ when it comes in understanding on extension of the UAC framework for Solution#40. It is not clear whether Access Identity 3 is required for Solution#40.

**Q4: Do you share the understanding that:**

**Solution#40 requires Access Identity 3?**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company** | **Preference (Y/N/ask CT1)** | **Detailed Comments** |
| Lenovo | Yes | It is our understanding that the proposed offset parameter shall be applied only for Access Identity 3. |
| OPPO | No | Our understanding was solution#40 does not include the extension of AI#3. Yet we are open to double check on this point in some way/ |
| vivo | Yes | Solution#40 would also require an offset which may require some significant RRC protocol enchantment to work. |
| Samsung | Yes | Same view with Lenovo. |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Yes |  |
| Ericsson (Mattias) | Y | 24.811 states this for Solution #40:  The usage of new Access Identity 3 allows network to differentiate inbound roamers from own subscribers. But this alone would not be useful to mitigate congestion caused by a sudden inflow of inbound roamers.  We assume this means that disaster roaming UEs will use AI3 when doing disaster roaming. For solution#40 UEs that are associated to AI3 would use the offsets, otherwise not. |
| Apple | Yes | SA2 TR24.811 says in Section 6.40.1 (for Solution #40) which means the offset parameter is specific to Access Identity 3 UE.  The usage of new Access Identity 3 allows network to differentiate inbound roamers from own subscribers. But this alone would not be useful to mitigate congestion caused by a sudden inflow of inbound roamers.  A new offset value is introduced to the unified access control barring information. A UE which is registered or attempting registration in a PLMN which is on the forbidden PLMN list or on the list of "forbidden tracking areas for roaming", but which is broadcasting "disaster roaming active", shall apply a uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor to the uac-BarringFactor. |
| Qualcomm | Yes | This is quite clear. Otherwise, AS has no idea if this is a MINT user. |
| LG | Yes | We think both solutions assume that accesses subject to disaster roaming accesses control use AI 3. |
| ZTE | Yes | For now, we understand the offset is only for Access Identity 3. |
| CATT | Yes |  |

The Tdoc in [4][5][8][10] make further evaluation of the two solutions and proposes a reply to CT1 that there is one preferable solution.

[5][8] state:

-  **Solution #40 costs slightly less signaling overhead** than Solution #38, while [10] states the opposite:

- the **overhead of Solution #38 is slightly less** (the difference of final consuming bits depends on how many PLMNs configure specific barring factors), assuming the consuming bits of solution #40 could be further reduced. if overhead is seen as one key point.

As a compromised conclusion, it is proposed to confirm that RAN2 assumes only one of the two solutions is needed [8]:

**Q5: Do you agree it isn’t clear at this point which of the Solutions costs less signalling overhead?**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company** | **Preference (Y/N)** | **Detailed Comments** |
| Lenovo | Yes | Companies seem to have different views on how barring for Access Identity 3 can be introduced in UAC. |
| OPPO | Yes |  |
| vivo | Yes | Agree with Lenovo |
| Samsung | Yes |  |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Yes | For solution #38, the understanding of [5][8] is that there is Access Identity 3 specific barring factor but our understanding is that Access Identity 3 will follows the barring factor of one access category, which results in different signalling overhead evaluation. See also our detailed comments in Q2. |
| Ericsson (Mattias) | Y | Solution #38 requires a new set barring factors, one for each access category, for access identity 3.  From 24.811:  The 5GSM level congestion can be prevented by properly setting the values of the barring factor for Access Identity 3 each of which is associated with an access category.  Solution #40 requires adding a set of barring factor offsets, one for each access category.  From 24.811:  The uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor indicates to the disaster roaming UEs the offset value by which the BarringFactor must be reduced when evaluating the access barring condition for that access category. The uac-DisasterOffsetToBarringFactor is set per access category.  **It seems that the signallingoverhead is roughly the same for #38 and #40.** |
| Apple | See comments | Our reasoning is for Solution #38, a new UAC-BarringInfoSetList for MINT UE (Access Identity 3) is required. If companies feel differently, we would suggest to ask CT1 whether MINT UE requires a specific configuration on *uac-BarringFactor* and *uac-BarringTime* for each access category. |
| Qualcomm | Yes | Depends on whether #38 requires completely different barring factors for each AC if AI=3 is signalled. If so, #40 takes less signalling. |
| LG | Yes but | Solution#40 is slightly signalling-efficient. However the difference of signalling overhead is marginal, and it depends on the SIB (SIB1 or new SIB) conveying the disaster roaming barring information whether such small difference is meaningful or not. |
| ZTE | - | For solution #38, barring factor per access category will be introduced for access identity 3. In solution#40, the signaling overhead would be limited with a common adjustment to the barring factor but requires more processing at UE side to drive the barring factor for each access category.  If SA1 confirms that there is requirement to handle MINT and regular users in different way, we prefer solution#38 as it better fits the existing UAC structure and can be easily extended to other newly introduced Access Identities with similar requirement in the future. |
| CATT | Yes |  |
|  |  |  |

The signaling overhead would depend on undertaken technical realization, which discussed in [4][5][7][13] led to several drawbacks observed for Solution#40

**Q6: Do you agree RAN2 should send a reply LS recommending Solution#38?**

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| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company** | **Preference (Y/N)** | **Detailed Comments** |
| Lenovo | Yes | We prefer solution #38 as it allows an independent and flexible barring for Access Identity 3. |
| OPPO | Yes | Same view as Lenovo.  See our response to Q10 in a more detailed level. |
| vivo | Yes | Solution#38 would just require a new Access Identity to work without any additional RRC enhancement and mostly can follow existing mechanisms |
| Samsung | Yes, but | We also think that Solution#38 seems better approach from RAN2 point of view. RAN2 may give some analysis on both solutions without the recommended solution because RAN4 just asked the feasibility of both solutions. |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | No but | Since companies have different understanding on solution #38 about how to introduce barring factor for Access identity #3, this would result in different signalling overhead and we may also need to check with CT1 on the requirement first.  If CT1 understands solution#38 will introduce additional barring factor for Access Identity for each access category, it will consume significantly more signalling overhead compared to solution #40.  If CT1 understands solution#38 will reuse barring factor for each access category, RAN2 needs to introduce new bit for Access Identity#3 for each access category to indicate whether Access Identity #3 follows it’s barring factors. Then, we see No big difference on signalling overhead but solution#40 can provide more flexible and stricter access control to Access identity 3.  In general we see benefits on solution#40, but we are also fine that RAN2 only answers Q1-Q4 without any recommendation. |
| Ericsson (Mattias) | N | From a specification complexity point of view (and hence likely also implementation complexity point of view), Solution #38 is more complicated to implement compared to #40. To RAN2 this is important. |
| Apple | No | As we replied to the questions above, we don't feel Solution #38 is that simple, with only introducing a new access identity 3.  Instead according to our understanding on Solution #38, if CT1 once introduces some new access identities requiring for specific *uac-BarringFactor* and *uac-BarringTime*, we would have to extend the UAC-BarringInfoSetList again and again, leading to extremely high signalling overhead for SIB1. |
| Qualcomm | No | Assuming separate barring factors for each AC for MINT users, it is simpler to use an offset. A separate listing for an AI=3 in #38 can do equivalent but less compatible with existing UAC framework and will require more changes in the procedural text. |
| LG | Yes | We slightly prefer solution#38 because we think #38 is slightly more straightforward and flexible. But from functional point of view, there is no sufficient reasoning or difference to take one and exclude the other.  Hence, if RAN2 cannot converge to a single preference, RAN2 could simply answer that both are feasible from RAN2 signalling point of view and let CT1 decide which approach to take. |
| ZTE | - | We would like to consult SA1 if there is requirement to handle MINT and regular users in different ways before give any recommendation.  If SA1 confirms that there is requirement to handle MINT and regular users in different ways, we prefer solution#38 as it better fits the existing UAC structure and can be easily extended to other newly introduced Access Identities with similar requirement in the future. |
| CATT |  | Further clarification on solution#38 from CT1 is needed. |

On the other hand [8][10] analyse that:

* Solution #: 38 add new dimension in signaling handling, due to the need to provide multiple barring factors for Access Identity 3 (to allow to differentiate e.g. disaster UEs using emergency services from disaster UEs that are browsing, there must be a barring factor per Access Category for Access Identity 3).
* solution#38 does not help to minimize the potential congestion, thus the original motivation of preventing these UEs as many as possible may not be fulfilled

**Q7: Do you agree RAN2 should send a reply LS recommending Solution#40?**

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| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company** | **Preference (Y/N)** | **Detailed Comments** |
| Lenovo | No | Solution #40 has some minor drawbacks (less flexibility compared to solution #38, tied to barring for Access Identity 0) compared to solution #38. |
| OPPO | No | We do not think the offset-based extension of UAC framework in solution#40 is sufficiently justified  See our response to Q10 in a more detailed level. |
| vivo | No | Solution#40 would also require a new Access Identity and an offset which may require some significant RRC protocol enchantment to work. |
| Samsung | No, but | See comment on Q6. |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Yes but | See answer of Q6 |
| Ericsson (Mattias) | Y | We can say: Solution 40 is slightly less complex to implement from a RAN2 specification point of view.  But again, both solutions are feasible. |
| Apple | Yes | The advantage of Solution #40 is not only on signalling overhead saving. But also on aspects:  1) As pointed out in R2-2108366, for Solution #38, procedural text would need to be changed so that in the access barring check, the UE will check if Access Identity 3 is indicated by NAS and then apply the barring factor(s) specific for Access Identity 3.  2) As in our contribution in R2-2107590, with Solution #38, the operator has to make sure that if they are making changes to barringFactor for a particular category, then if disaster roaming is on, they should also make corresponding changes to the MINT barringFactor too.  In Solution #40, operators can just tweak the value for the barringOffset if they want to tighten access for roamers only. Thus, it it may be easier for operators to tweak the offset to the regular barringFactor, rather than controlling the two barringFactors independently.  In addition, we disagree with the comment from companies of "significant enhancement needed in RRC" for offset. Introducing a new parameter into the formula does not make it a “significant” change, rather from implementation point of view, it’s quite easy to achieve. |
| Qualcomm | Yes | It would also be useful to have pseudo CRs for each option to do a comparison. |
| LG | No | See Q6 |
| ZTE | No | We slightly prefer solution#38 if SA1 confirms that there is requirement to handle MINT and regular users in different way. |
| CATT |  | Both solutions are feasible. But at least it is unclear on the signalling impact with solution#38. |

Besides ASN.1 impacts, [4][10] make the observation that Solution#38 means access barring for AI 3 is handled similarly to but independently from AI 0. This implies special procedural handling for the existing special AIs (1, 2, 12 to 14) of disaster roaming UEs, if configured, may be valid in the PLMN that provides disaster roaming service as well. The reason is that acc. to TS 22.261 the AIs 1, 2, 12, 13, 14 are valid in visited PLMNs of the home country. Thus, the barring configuration of the special AIs will override the one for AI 3.

**Q8: Do you agree that RAN2 has to work further on special handling for the existing special AIs (1, 2, 12 to 14) of disaster roaming UEs?**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company** | **Preference (Y/N)** | **Detailed Comments** |
| Lenovo | See comments | Clarification on the applicability of the special AIs (1, 2, 12 to 14) for disaster inbound roamers is needed. We should ask SA1 for guidance since they specified the service requirements for the MINT feature and the new Access Identity 3. |
| OPPO |  | We are fine to ask SA1 for the view. |
| vivo | No | The CT1 Ls just ask RAN2 to provide feedback on Solutions #38 and #40 described in 3GPP TR 24.811. We should let CT1 decide on which solution to further proceed and at what extend. |
| Samsung | No | Agree with vivo. We should wait for CT1’s decision. |
| Huawei, HiSilicon |  | We think this is a bit out of RAN2 discussion, may need clear requirements from SA1 and CT1. |
| Ericsson (Mattias) | N | It is not clear to us if something special is needed at this point in time. If CT1 provides more input we can address that if/when we get it. |
| Apple (Yuqin) | See comments | We think this is a good question but would like to leave it to SA1 to decide and keep CTI in loop. |
| Qualcomm | No | We didn’t get such a request from CT1. |
| LG | No | For now, we do not find any requirements that require RAN2 to have special handling for AI 1, 2, 12 to 14 of disaster roaming UEs.  Furthermore, we think RAN2 can proceed without considering the special handling of access with special AIs other than AI3. RAN2 only need to work on AI3 access subject to disaster roaming access control for now. |
| ZTE | No | No request from CT1 or SA1 so far. |
| CATT |  | Share the same view with vivo, Samsung and Ericsson. |

[3] makes a suggestion to involve SA1

|  |
| --- |
| [Proposal 1: RAN2 reply the LS by asking for guidance from SA1 on the two solutions.](file:///C:\Users\wro02711\AppData\Local\Temp\7zO0092F396\R2-2107184%20-%20Discussion%20on%20UAC%20for%20service%20interruption%20minimization%20during%20disaster.docx#_Toc79139736)  [Proposal 2**:** If Proposal 1 is not agreeable, RAN2 reply the LS by selecting solution #38, and ask SA1 to confirm.](file:///C:\Users\wro02711\AppData\Local\Temp\7zO0092F396\R2-2107184%20-%20Discussion%20on%20UAC%20for%20service%20interruption%20minimization%20during%20disaster.docx#_Toc79139737) |

**Q9: Do you see it necessary to involve SA1 and agree with the proposal 1 in [3]?**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company** | **Preference (Y/N)** | **Detailed Comments** |
| Lenovo | See comments | Yes: We should definitely ask SA1 for clarifying UAC for disaster inbound roamers such as:   * Whether only new Access Identity 3 applies for disaster inbound roamers or special AIs (1, 2, 12 to 14) as well, if configured for disaster inbound roamers. * Whether access barring for Access Identity 3 should be always lower than Access Identity 0 or can be independent from Access Identity 0. * In case a PLMN provides disaster roaming service for multiple PLMNs with disaster condition, whether access barring for the disaster inbound roamers from the concerned PLMNs should be common for all those PLMNs or can be set differently for each PLMN with disaster condition.   No: We don’t need to ask SA1 for guidance on the solutions. This is what RAN2 can do. |
| OPPO | Proponent | SA1 can be consulted since   1. how to do UAC is more of the scope of SA1, 2. there are still unclear detailed issues included in the whole procedure (we tend to agree with the first point by Lenovo, but not for the second/third point which seems out of the scope of the discussion). |
| vivo | See comments | SA1 is already CC-ed in CT1 Ls, if SA1 wants to make any decision, they can do it by themselves. No need to specifically ask them for guidance. |
| Samsung |  | Same view with vivo. |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Yes for P1  No for P2 | We are in general fine to ask guidance from SA1 to make the requirements clearer. However as explained above, we do not see RAN2 can now select one solution and exclude the other. |
| Ericsson (Mattias) | N | RAN2 is not the WG leading this work. We should just answer the LS. CT1 can communicate with SA1 if they see a need. |
| Apple (Yuqin) | See comments | SA1 discussion might be needed, but the trigger should not come from RAN2. |
| Qualcomm | See comments | We can ask questions to CT1 for clarification (and CC SA1 if needed). The main question is if there should be differentiation between MINT and regular users for each Access Category. |
| LG | No | We would like to focus on answering LS to CT1. Any further input from SA1/2 or CT1 could be coming if they see any need for it. |
| ZTE | Yes for P1 | We agree to ask SA1 if there is requirements on differentiated handling of MINT and regular users before we make any recommendation on solutions. |
| CATT | Yes |  |

## 2.2 Reply LS content

**Q10: Do you agree RAN2 should send a reply LS to CT1 including at least the outcome of the Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4?**

**Q1: Do you agree that RAN2 is ready to answer to CT1 that both solutions: Solution#38 and Solution#40 are feasible?**

**Q2: Do you agree the observations made in [3-13] conclude that Solution#38 requires extension of the existing UAC for Access Identity 3?**

**Q3: Do you agree with the observations made in [3-13]** **conclude that Solution#40 requires extending of the existing UAC for handling of “offset” parameter?**

**Q4: Do you share the understanding that: Solution#40 requires Access Identity 3? (if the outcome isn’t clear, RAN2 will ask for clarification)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Company** | **Preference (Y/N)** | **Detailed Comments** |
| Lenovo | No | We think a reply with outcome of Q1 to Q4 is not sufficient. We should further indicate a preference for a solution and add issues for clarification which we identified from RAN2 pov. This will help RAN2 later when the stage 3 details need to be specified. For the clarification part we should ask SA1 for guidance. |
| OPPO | See comment | We are Ok to rely on the outcome of Q1/2/3.  And there are seems still missing input for R2 to get a thoughtful down-selection, e.g., Q4 and the other related issue (like Q8), so we are not sure if a clear down-selection/preference expression by R2 is easy.  In light of that, to identify a way-out   1. either to do the downselection in RAN2: Our preference is sol#38, yet it may not be easy considering the unclear aspects above or necessary 2. or leave this to CT1/SA1, i.e., no clear down-selection in RAN2? It seems a more feasible way-out, so we are thinking maybe good to ask for guidance from SA1 is one way out |
| vivo | Yes, with comments | We should also point out that Solution#40 would also requires which may require some significant RRC protocol enchantment to work. |
| Samsung | Yes | We are fine for adding the outcome of Q1/2/3/4.  If needed, some more aspects regarding the analysis on each solution e.g. concerns, observation, etc. could be added as well. |
| Huawei, HiSilicon | Yes | If companies cannot converge on solution preference, we think reply LS including Q1-Q4 can be a way forward. For Q4, this may also require confirmation from SA1 first. |
| Ericsson (Mattias) | Y | Whatever is the outcome, RAN2 should reply to CT1. |
| Apple | Yes and also see comments | We are fine to indicate two points as RAN2 agreement:  1) Conclusion to Q1: both solutions are feasible.  2) Conclusion to Q2 and Q4 (we believe AI 3 is needed for Solution #40): Extension to have AI3 is required for both solutions.  In addition, we need to ask questions: For Solution #38, whether MINT UE requires a specific/independent configuration on *uac-BarringFactor* and *uac-BarringTime* for each access category.  We are fine to leave solution down-selection to CT1. |
| Qualcomm | Yes | It would be good to have more details in #2 and #3 though, e.g. signalling and procedural text impact. CT1 is aware that some extension to UAC is needed and hence they sent this LS. But we should reply with whatever we can conclude. |
| LG | Y | If RAN2 cannot converge to a single solution, RAN2 can only say that both are feasible from signalling point of view and let CT1 decide which direction to go. |
| ZTE | Yes |  |

# 3 Conclusion

TBD

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