**3GPP TSG-CT WG1 Meeting #134-eC1-22xxxx**

**E-Meeting, 17th – 25th February 2022**

Title: LS on the impact of MSK update on MBS multicast session update procedure

Response to: -

Release: Rel-17

Work Item: 5MBS

Source: CT1

To: SA2

Cc: SA3, CT4

**Contact Person:**

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Attachments: -

**1. Overall Description:**

CT1 has observed the following issue that is related to MBS security requirements:

The following requirements are specified in clause W.4.1.2 in **TS 33.501**, v17.4.2:

*The MSK may be updated based on the request from MB-SMF or AS (e.g., due to the change of authorization information) or based on the local policy (e.g., key lifetime expiration). When the MSK is updated, the MBSF shall send the new MSK to the MB-SMF and then the MB-SMF shall trigger the session update as specified in clause 7.2.6 in TS 23.247 [103]. The MSK and the corresponding key ID are delivered to the UEs that has joined the multicast session. The MBSF shall also send the new MSK to the MBSTF. The MBSTF may request a MSK to the MBSF when it does not have a valid MSK (e.g., due to the current MSK expiration).*

However, the "Multicast session update procedure" defined in clause 7.2.6 in **TS 23.247** v17.1.0 doesn't support the yellow highlighted requirement in the statement above.

CT1 would like to draw the attention of SA2 to reflect the above highlighted requirement into stage-2 specification TS 23.247, for CT1 to be able to proceed with the protocol implementation for MBS security requirements.

**2. Actions:**

**To SA2.**

**ACTION:** CT1 kindly requests SA2 to reflect the above highlighted requirement into the stage-2 specification TS 23.247.

**3. Date of Next CT4 Meetings:**

CT1#135e 6th - 12th April 2022 electronic meeting

CT1#136e 12th - 20th May 2022 electronic meeting