

**3GPP TSG-CN Meeting #26**  
**8th – 10th December 2004. Athens, Greece.**

**NP-040558**

**Source:** TSG CN WG3  
**Title:** CRs to Rel-6 on Work Item “TEI-6”(Pack1)  
**Agenda item:** 9.21  
**Document for:** APPROVAL

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**Introduction:**

This document contains 1 CRs to Rel-6 on Work Item “TEI-6”(Pack1) that have been agreed by TSG CN WG3, and are forwarded to TSG CN Plenary for approval.

<b>WG_tdoc</b>	<b>Spec</b>	<b>CR</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>Cat</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Rel</b>	<b>C_Ver</b>	<b>Work Item</b>
N3-040869	29.061	137	3	F	IP spoofing for Early IMS security	Rel-6	6.2.0	TE16

## CHANGE REQUEST

⌘ **TS 29.061** **CR 137** ⌘ rev **3** ⌘ Current version: **6.2.0** ⌘

For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.

**Proposed change affects:** UICC apps  ME  Radio Access Network  Core Network

<b>Title:</b>	⌘ Prevention of IP spoofing		
<b>Source:</b>	⌘ mmO2		
<b>Work item code:</b>	⌘ TEI6	<b>Date:</b>	⌘ 15/11/2004
<b>Category:</b>	⌘ <b>F</b>	<b>Release:</b>	⌘ Rel-6
	<i>Use one of the following categories:</i> <b>F</b> (correction) <b>A</b> (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release) <b>B</b> (addition of feature), <b>C</b> (functional modification of feature) <b>D</b> (editorial modification) Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP <a href="#">TR 21.900</a> .		<i>Use one of the following releases:</i> <b>Ph2</b> (GSM Phase 2) <b>R96</b> (Release 1996) <b>R97</b> (Release 1997) <b>R98</b> (Release 1998) <b>R99</b> (Release 1999) <b>Rel-4</b> (Release 4) <b>Rel-5</b> (Release 5) <b>Rel-6</b> (Release 6) <b>Rel-7</b> (Release 7)

<b>Reason for change:</b>	⌘ Prevention of IP spoofing via verification capabilities on the GGSN is required for services basing authentication on IP addresses
<b>Summary of change:</b>	⌘ A sub section is added. To avoid IP spoofing the GGSN shall compare the IP source address of the packets received against the PDP address.
<b>Consequences if not approved:</b>	⌘ IP source address of packets received by the GGSN cannot be verified this resulting in security threats.

<b>Clauses affected:</b>	⌘ A new clause is introduced.										
<b>Other specs affected:</b>	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">Y</td> <td style="padding: 2px;">N</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; padding: 2px;">X</td> <td style="padding: 2px;"></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; padding: 2px;">X</td> <td style="padding: 2px;"></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; padding: 2px;">X</td> <td style="padding: 2px;"></td> </tr> </table>	Y	N	X		X		X		Other core specifications	⌘
	Y	N									
	X										
	X										
X											
Test specifications	⌘										
O&M Specifications	⌘										
<b>Other comments:</b>	⌘										

**How to create CRs using this form:**

Comprehensive information and tips about how to create CRs can be found at <http://www.3gpp.org/specs/CR.htm>. Below is a brief summary:

- 1) Fill out the above form. The symbols above marked ⌘ contain pop-up help information about the field that they are closest to.
- 2) Obtain the latest version for the release of the specification to which the change is proposed. Use the MS Word "revision marks" feature (also known as "track changes") when making the changes. All 3GPP specifications can be

downloaded from the 3GPP server under <ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/specs/> For the latest version, look for the directory name with the latest date e.g. 2001-03 contains the specifications resulting from the March 2001 TSG meetings.

- 3) With "track changes" disabled, paste the entire CR form (use CTRL-A to select it) into the specification just in front of the clause containing the first piece of changed text. Delete those parts of the specification which are not relevant to the change request.

## 10. Prevention of IP spoofing.

If IP spoofing has to be prevented, the GGSN shall verify the source IP address of the IP packets issued by the UE and compare it against the address assigned during the PDP context activation procedure. If the verification fails the GGSN shall discard the packets and shall be capable to log the event in the security log against the subscriber information (IMSI/MSISDN).