**3GPP TSG-CT WG4 Meeting #111-eC4-224xxx**

**E-Meeting, 18th – 26th August 2022 *Revision of C4-224304***

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| *CR-Form-v12.2* | | | | | | | | |
| **CHANGE REQUEST** | | | | | | | | |
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|  | **29.573** | **CR** | **0115** | **rev** | **1** | **Current version:** | **17.5.0** |  |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| *For* [***HE******LP***](http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm#_blank)*on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at* [*http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests*](http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests)*.* | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME |  | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network | **X** |

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| ***Title:*** | Modification policy in IPX | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Source to WG:*** | Huawei | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | CT4 | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Work item code:*** | TEI16 | | | | |  | ***Date:*** | | | 2022-08-01 |
|  |  | | | |  | |  | | |  |
| ***Category:*** | A |  | | | | | ***Release:*** | | | Rel-17 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:* ***F*** *(correction)* ***A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)* ***B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)* ***D*** *(editorial modification)*  Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | | | | | | | | *Use one of the following releases: Rel-8 (Release 8) Rel-9 (Release 9) Rel-10 (Release 10) Rel-11 (Release 11) … Rel-16 (Release 16) Rel-17 (Release 17) Rel-18 (Release 18) Rel-19 (Release 19)* | |
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| ***Reason for change:*** | | IPX providers may be involved in N32f interface on insertion of content modification instructions which the receiving SEPP applies after verifying the integrity of such modification instructions.  LS (C4-224033/S3-221163) on handling of the modification policy in the IPX and receiving SEPP from SA3 indicates the misalignment between CT4 and SA3, and request the clarification on handling in IPX.  It is better to update the definition to cover the IPX handling to align with the definition in SA3. | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Summary of change:*** | | Update the use of Application Layer Security to cover the handling in IPX. | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | | Unclear definition of the modification instructions in IPX may cause inter-operation issue. | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Clauses affected:*** | | 5.3.2.1 | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
|  | | **Y** | **N** |  | | | |  | | |
| ***Other specs*** | |  | **X** | Other core specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
| ***affected:*** | |  | **X** | Test specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
| ***(show related CRs)*** | |  | **X** | O&M Specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***Other comments:*** | | This contribution does not change the OpenAPI. | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***This CR's revision history:*** | |  | | | | | | | | |

\* \* \* First Change \* \* \* \*

#### 5.3.2.1 General

If the negotiated security capability between the two SEPPs is PRINS, one or more HTTP/2 connections between the two SEPPs for the forwarding of JOSE protected message shall be established, which may involve IPX providers on path. The forwarding of messages over the N32-f interface involves the following steps at the sending SEPP:

1. Identification of the protection policy applicable for the API being invoked (i.e either a request/response NF service API or a subscribe/unsubscribe service API or a notification API).

2. Message reformatting as per the identified protection policy.

3. Forwarding of the reformatted message over the N32 interface.

The processing of a message received over the N32-f interface at the receiving IPX provider involves the following steps:

1. Apply the modifications in the "modificationsBlock" appended by the sending IPX provider as a JSON patch in the DataToIntegrityProtectBlock (from the decoded "aad" part), if the "modificationsBlock" is received in the message.

2. Determine further modifications required based on modification policy and insert the modification entry in "modificationsBlock".

3. Forwarding the received message with the above inserted modification entry in "modificationsBlock" over the N32 interface.

The processing of a message received over the N32-f interface at the receiving SEPP involves the following steps.

1. Identify the N32-f context using the N32-f context Id received in the message.

2. Verify the integrity protection of the message using the keying material obtained from the TLS layer during the parameter exchange procedure for that N32-f context (see 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]). The TLS connection from which the keying material is obtained is the N32-c TLS connection used for the parameter exchange procedure.3. Decrypt the ciphertext part of the received JWE message. Decode the "aad" part of the JWE message using BASE64URL decoding.

4. Form the original JSON request / response body from the decrypted ciphertext and the decoded integrity verified "aad" block.

5. For each entry in the "modificationsBlock" of the received message:

- First verify the integity protection of that entry using the keying material applicable for the IPX that inserted that block (using the "identity" IE in the "modificationsBlock");

- Identify the modifications policy exchanged during the parameter exchange procedure with the sending SEPP if the IPX that inserted the modificationsBlock is from the sending SEPP side; else identify the modifications policy applicable for the IPX based on local configuration;

- Check if the inserted modifications are as per the identified modifications policy;

- Apply the modifications as a JSON patch over the formed original JSON request / response body from step 4.

6. If the reconstructed HTTP message has a "Authorization" header, then the SEPP shall check whether the service consumer's PLMN ID is present in the Bearer token contained in the Authorization header (see 3GPP TS 29.510 [18], clause 6.3.5.2.4) and if it matches with the "Remote PLMN ID" of the N32-f context. If they do not match, the SEPP shall respond to the sending SEPP with "403 Forbidden" status code with the application specific cause set as "PLMNID\_MISMATCH".

NOTE 1: In this case, the N32-f Error Reporting procedure specified in clause 5.2.5 is not used since the processing of the complete N32-f message fails at the receiving SEPP.

NOTE 2: If the service consumer's PLMN ID is present in the reconstructed HTTP message, then the receiving SEPP compares this with the sending SEPP's PLMN ID, which is retrieved from N32f Context (see clause 5.9.3 in 3GPP TS 33.501 [6]). See the above step 6 for the receiving SEPP behaviour. If the service consumer's PLMN ID is not present, the comparison is not done.

SEPPs and IPX should support gzip coding (see IETF RFC 1952 [23]) in HTTP requests and responses and indicate so in the Accept-Encoding header, as described in clause 6.9 of 3GPP TS 29.500 [4] and clause 6.2.2.2.3.

\* \* \* End of Changes \* \* \* \*