CR-Form-v7.1

CHANGE REQUEST

| ⌘ | **33.234** CR **060** | ⌘**rev** | **-** | ⌘ | Current version: | **6.3.0** | ⌘ |

*For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.*

Proposed change affects: | UICC apps⌘ **X** | ME **X** Radio Access Network ☐ Core Network ☐

Title: ⌘	Removal of editors' notes	
Source: ⌘	NOKIA, BT	
Work item code: ⌘	WLAN	***Date:*** ⌘ 09/02/2005
Category: ⌘	**D**	***Release:*** ⌘ Rel-6

Use one of the following categories:
F *(correction)*
A *(corresponds to a correction in an earlier release)*
B *(addition of feature),*
C *(functional modification of feature)*
D *(editorial modification)*
Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP TR 21.900.

Use one of the following releases:
Ph2 (GSM Phase 2)
R96 (Release 1996)
R97 (Release 1997)
R98 (Release 1998)
R99 (Release 1999)
Rel-4 (Release 4)
Rel-5 (Release 5)
Rel-6 (Release 6)
Rel-7 (Release 7)

Reason for change: ⌘	There are still some editor's notes in TS 33.234, which can be removed from Rel-6.
Summary of change: ⌘	Remove the editor'snotes.
Consequences if not approved: ⌘	Outdated editors information left in the TS

Clauses affected: ⌘	3.1, 4.2.4.3, 4.2.5, 6.1.1, 6.1.2

	Y	N	
Other specs affected: ⌘		X	Other core specifications ⌘
		X	Test specifications
		X	O&M Specifications

Other comments: ⌘	Any enhancements, identified by SA3,to SIM Access Profile developed in BLUETOOTH SIG , will be addressed by 3GPP and the Bluetooth SIG in R7.

*** BEGIN OF CHANGE ***

3.1   Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply.

3GPP - WLAN Interworking: Used generically to refer to interworking between the 3GPP system and the WLAN family of standards.

Data origin authentication: The corroboration that the source of data received is as claimed.

Entity authentication: The provision of assurance of the claimed identity of an entity.

Key freshness: A key is fresh if it can be guaranteed to be new, as opposed to an old key being reused through actions of either an adversary or authorised party.

Local interface: an interface between the devices that may conform to the WLAN UE, normally one device with WLAN capabilities and one UICC or SIM card holding device.

Temporary identity: an identity given by the home network to the WLAN UE, used to identify the user temporarily, normally in one authentication process lifetime. In this TS it refers to a pseudonym or a re-authentication identity.

Tunnel: it refers to an IPsec security association used in WLAN 3GPP IP access to protect the communications from the WLAN UE to the 3GPP network. It is preceded by an IKE negotiation.

W-APN: WLAN Access Point Name – identifies an IP network and a point of interconnection to that network (Packet Data Gateway).

WLAN 3GPP IP Access: Access to an IP network via the 3GPP system.

WLAN Direct IP Access: Access to an IP network is direct from the WLAN AN.

WLAN coverage: an area where wireless local area network access services are provided for interworking by an entity in accordance with WLAN standards.

WLAN-UE: user equipment to access a WLAN interworking with the 3GPP system, including all required security functions.

Editors note: This WLAN-UE definition needs to be reflected in related specifications.

*** NEXT CHANGE ***

4.2.4.3   Communication over local interface via a Bluetooth link

For SIM access via a Bluetooth link, the SIM Access Profile developed in BLUETOOTH SIG forum may be used. See [22].

Editor note: The version of the SIM Access Profile specification in the reference needs to be updated, if SA3 decides that a new version is required.

*** NEXT CHANGE ***

4.2.5   Link layer security requirements

Editors note: This section is FFS, LS (S3-030167) sent to SA2 group on 1) the need for requiring 802.11i in TS 23.234. SA2 to explain the impact (if any) a change of technology from 802.11i to WPA would have on the standardisation work. 2) SA2 to study the architectural impacts of implementing protection on Wa interface 3) SA2 to Investigate the importance of specifying specific WLAN technologies to be used for the WLAN access network.

Most WLAN technologies provide (optional) link-layer protection of user data. Since the wireless link is likely to be the most vulnerable in the entire system, 3GPP-WLAN interworking should take advantage of the link layer security provided by WLAN technologies. The native link-layer protection can also prevent against certain IP-layer attacks.

*** NEXT CHANGE ***

6.1.1   USIM-based WLAN Access Authentication

USIM based authentication is a proven solution that satisfies the authentication requirements from section 4.2. This form of authentication shall be based on EAP-AKA (ref. [4]), as described in section 6.1.1.1. For the case of WLAN-UE Functional Split, see section 4.2.4.

Editor's note: also see section 4.2.4 on WLAN-UE Functional Split.

*** NEXT CHANGE ***

6.1.2   GSM SIM based WLAN Access authentication

SIM based authentication is useful for GSM subscribers that do not have a UICC with a USIM application. This form of authentication shall be based on EAP-SIM (ref. [5]), as described in section 6.1.2.1. This authentication method satisfies the authentication requirements from section 4.2, without the need for a UICC with a USIM application. For the case of WLAN-UE Functional Split, see section 4.2.4.

Editor's note: Also see section 4.2.4 on WLAN UE split.

*** END OF CHANGE ***