*CR-Form-v7*

# CHANGE REQUEST

| ⌘ | **33.222** CR | **012** ⌘ rev | **-** ⌘ | Current version: | **6.1.0** ⌘ |

*For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.*

**Proposed change affects:** UICC apps⌘ ☐   ME ☐   Radio Access Network ☐   Core Network **X**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| ***Title:*** ⌘ | Correction of inconsistencies within AP specification | |
| ***Source:*** ⌘ | Siemens | |
| ***Work item code:*** ⌘ | GBA-SSC | ***Date:*** ⌘ 12/11/2004 |
| ***Category:*** ⌘ | **F** | ***Release:*** ⌘ Rel-6 |

*Use one of the following categories:*
**F** *(correction)*
**A** *(corresponds to a correction in an earlier release)*
**B** *(addition of feature),*
**C** *(functional modification of feature)*
**D** *(editorial modification)*
Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP TR 21.900.

*Use one of the following releases:*
2 *(GSM Phase 2)*
R96 *(Release 1996)*
R97 *(Release 1997)*
R98 *(Release 1998)*
R99 *(Release 1999)*
Rel-4 *(Release 4)*
Rel-5 *(Release 5)*
Rel-6 *(Release 6)*

| | |
|---|---|
| ***Reason for change:*** ⌘ | Subclauses 6.4 and 6.5 were changed in S3-040319 at SA3#33. At that time two inconsistencies slipped in:<br>- Subclause 6.5.2.3 and stage 3 TS 24.109 specify the transfer of asserted identity to AS as optional to implement ("may"). Subclause 6.4.2 is corrected accordingly.<br>- Subclause 6.5.1.2 specifies access control based on user security settings as mandatory to implement. Subclause 6.5.2.2 is a consequence of 6.5.1.2 and therefore also (automatically) implemented. |
| ***Summary of change:*** ⌘ | Alignment of subclause 6.4.2 with 6.5.2.3 and stage 3 spec.<br>Alignment of subclause 6.5.2.2 with 6.5.1.2. |
| ***Consequences if not approved:*** ⌘ | Inconsistency between mentioned subclauses and between stage 2 and 3 specs. |

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| ***Clauses affected:*** ⌘ | 6.4.2, 6.5.2.2 |

| | Y | N | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Other specs affected:*** ⌘ | X | | Other core specifications ⌘ | TS 24.109 |
| | | X | Test specifications | |
| | | X | O&M Specifications | |

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|---|---|
| ***Other comments:*** ⌘ | - |

******************** **begin change** *****************.

## 6.4.2    AP-AS reference point

The HTTP protocol is run over the AP-AS reference point.

Confidentiality and integrity protection can be provided for the reference point between the AP and the AS using NDS/IP mechanisms as specified in TS 33.210 [12]. For traffic between different security domains, the Za reference point shall be operated. For traffic inside a security domain, it is up to the operator to decide whether to deploy the Zb reference point. As AP terminates the TLS tunnel from UE, also a TLS tunnel is possible.

The AP ~~shall~~ may support the transfer of an identity of the UE authenticated by the AP from AP to AS in a standardised format. The format of this information element in the HTTP request header is left to stage 3 specifications.

> Editor's Note: If further information elements from the application specific user profile are transferred in standardised format to AS is ffs.

************************ **begin next change** *****************************

## 6.5.2.2    Authorised User of Application Anonymous to AS

The AP checks that the UE is an authorised user of the application according to application specific user security setting received from BSF. No user identity shall be transferred to AS.

This case ~~may~~ shall be supported by AP.

*********************** **end change** *****************************

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