	CHANGE REQUEST
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[X]	33.246 CR 021
For <u>HELP</u> on u	sing this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the 🕱 symbols.
Proposed change affects: UICC apps ME X Radio Access Network Core Network X	
Title:	Clarification of MSK key management
Source:	SA WG3
Work item code: ₩	MBMS Date: ≭ 8/10/2004
Category: 第	Release: Release: Rel-6 Use one of the following categories: Use one of the following releases: F (correction) 2 (GSM Phase 2) A (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release) R96 (Release 1996) B (addition of feature), R97 (Release 1997) C (functional modification of feature) R98 (Release 1998) D (editorial modification) R99 (Release 1999) Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP TR 21.900. Rel-4 (Release 4) Rel-5 (Release 5) Rel-6 (Release 6)
	Initiation of key management is not specified. The details of MSK request from UE to the BM-SC are unclear. The details of MIKEY solicit message from the BM-SC are unclear. The structure of the MSK procedure sections are enhanced. The split to pull and push procedures is seen to be more clear and enable smoother update of the TS in the future, if for example new triggers are introduced for pulling the MSK from the BM-SC like initiation of key management Initiation of key management is specified. Required Security parameters in Service Annoucement are specified. It is specified that the UE shall request for the Key Group ID(s) from the BM-SC. MSK ID(s) are not needed in the request since BM-SC will send the current valid MSK for each Key Group ID. BM-SC should solicit the UE to contact the BM-SC by setting the MSK ID to 0x0 in the MIKEY MSK message. The message will not carry any MSK.
Consequences if not approved:	Initiation and details of MBMS key management messages remain unspecified.
Clauses affected:	第 2, 6.3.2.2, 6.3.2.3
Other specs affected:	Y N X Other core specifications Test specifications O&M Specifications
Other comments:	≋

2 References

The following documents contain provisions, which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.

- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.
- 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". [1] 3GPP TS 22.146: "Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service; Stage 1". [2] 3GPP TS 23.246: "Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS); Architecture and Functional [3] Description". [4] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3G Security; Security Architecture". 3GPP TS 22.246: "MBMS User Services". [5] [6] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture". [7] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the USIM application". IETF RFC 2617 "HTTP Digest Authentication". [8] [9] IETF RFC 3830 "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing" IETF RFC 1982 "Serial Number Arithmetic". [10] IETF RFC 3711 "Secure Real-time Transport Protocol". [11] 3GPP TS 43.020: "Security related network functions". [12]

***** NEXT CHANGE *****

6.3.2 MSK procedures

6.3.2.1 MSK identification

Every MSK is uniquely identifiable by its Network ID, Key Group ID and MSK ID

3GPP TS 26.346: "MBMS, Protocols and codecs".

where

[13]

Network ID = MCC || MNC and is 3 bytes long. It is carried in the IDi payload in MIKEY message

Key Group ID is 2 bytes long and is used to group keys together in order to allow redundant MSKs to be deleted. It is carried in the CSB ID field of MIKEY common header.

MSK ID is 2 bytes long and is used to distinguish MSKs that have the same Network ID and Key Group ID. It is carried in the MSK-ID field of MIKEY extension payload.

If the UE receives an MSK and already contains two other MSKs under the same Network ID and Key Group ID, then the UE shall delete the older of these two MSKs.

Editorís Note: The handling of MSKs may need some enhancement to cover download services, where the MSK is fetched after the UE has received the encrypted data.

6.3.2.2 **UE initiated** MSK retrieval update procedures

6.3.2.2.1 Basic MSK retrieval procedure

When a UE detects that it needs the MSK(s) for a specific MBMS User service, the UE should try to get the MSK(s) that will be used to protect the data transmitted as part of this multieast-User sService. In the MSK request the UE shall list the Key Group IDs for which the UE needs the MSK(s).

The basic MSK retrieval procedure is a part of different other procedures, e.g. Reasons for UE to retrieve the MSK(s) include e.g.:

- retrieval of initial MSKs initiation of key management e.g. when the UE has joined the MBMS user service;

Editorís note: The initial key request may also be part of User Service joining procedure if SA4 decides to have such procedure. In this case the MSKs will be transported after the joining procedure has completed.

- -___retrieval of MSK(s) when the UE has missed a key update procedure e.g. due to being out of coverage-
- BM-SC solicited pullIf the UE fails to get hold of the MSK or receives confirmation that no updated MSK is necessary or available at this time, then, unless the UE has a still valid, older MSK, the UE shall leave the MBMS user service




Figure 6.1: **UE initiated MSK delivery**Basic MSK retrieval procedure

The communication between the UE and the BM-SC is authenticated and integrity protected with HTTP Digest as described in subclause 6.2.1 of this specification.

The UE requests for the MSKs using with the HTTP POST message. The following information key identification information is included in the elient payload of the HTTP message

- key identification information: a list of Key Group IDs-

NOTE: MSK ID(s) are not needed in the request since BM-SC will send the current valid MSK for each Key Group ID.

Editorsí Note: The exact syntax of the HTTP request message, e.g. possible XML schema of the request parameters in the client payload and its MIME type are to be specified in stage 3.

The BM-SC <u>authenticates the UE with HTTP Digest using the keys received from GBA as described in subclause 6.2.1</u> and verifies that the subscriber is authorized to receive the MSKs for this service. <u>may challenge the UE with HTTP response including WWW-Authenticate header and digest-challenge. Upon receiving the digest-challenge, the UE</u>

calculates the digest response and re-sends HTTP POST message including the key request and Authorization Request header including the digest response.

The BM-SC sends a response in HTTP 200 OK message with Authentication-Info header. The response in elient payload includes cause code for success or rejectfailure.

Editorsí Note: The exact syntax of the HTTP response message, e.g. possible XML schema of the success or failure parameters in the client payload and its MIME type are to be specified in stage 3.

The UE checks the validity of the HTTP response message. If the message indicated failure, the UE may retry or leave the User Service.

If the key request HTTP procedure above resulted to success, the BM-SC sends initiates MIKEY messages procedures over UDP transporting the requested MSKs to the UE.

If it was requested by the BM-SC, the UE sends a MIKEY acknowledgement message to the BM-SC.

If the UE fails to get hold of the MSK or receives no confirmation that no updated MSK is necessary or available at this time, then, unless the UE has a still-valid, older MSK, the UE shall leave the MBMS user service.

6.3.2.2.2 Initiation of key management

When a UE has received User Service information via User Service Discovery / Announcement procedures describing a MBMS User Service and the user has triggered the activation of that User Service, the UE should try to get the MSK(s) that will be used to protect the data transmitted as part of this User Service.

NOTE: The User Service Discovery / Announcement procedures are specified in TS 26.346 [13]. It is out of the scope of the present specification how the UE receives the User Service information and how the User Service is triggered in the UE.

The UE shall receive the following information via the User Service Discovery / Announcement procedures:

- Domain name of the key management server (i.e. the BM-SC). This for the UE to know to which IP address to send the MSK request
- Confidentiality protection: on / off
- Integrity protection: on / off
- Identifiers of the Key Groups IDs needed for the User Service

NOTE: MSK ID(s) are not used since they may change over time and Key Group ID is sufficient to identify the MSKs.

- Mapping information how the MSKs are used to protect the different User Service Sessions

Editorsí Note: The exact syntax of the service announcement information including security parameters, e.g. possible XML schema of the parameters and its MIME type are to be specified in SA4.




Figure 6.x: MSK retrieval procedure

The communication between the UE and the BM-SC is authenticated and integrity protected with HTTP Digest as described in subclause 6.2.1 of this specification.

The UE requests for the MSKs using with the HTTP POST message.


The rest of the procedure is the same as in 6.3.2.3.1.

6.3.2.2.3 Missed key update procedure

When the UE has missed an MSK update and it detects that it has not got the current MSK, e.g. from the received traffic, it may trigger the retrieval of the current MSK from the BM-SC. The procedure is the same as the Basic MSK Retrieval procedure in subclause 6.3.2.3.1.

6.3.2.2.4 BM-SC solicited pull

While the push is the regular way of updating the MSK to the UE, there may be situations where the BM-SC solicits the UE to contact the BM-SC and request for new MSK. Examples of such situations are when the BM-SC wants the UE to authenticate itself during the service or when the MUK has expired or when the BM-SC wants to re-key all UEs.



The BM-SC sends MIKEY message over UDP to the UE. The MSK ID in the extension payload of the MIKEY message shall be set to 0x0 to indicate that the UE should request for current MSK from the BM-SC.

NOTE: Since the integrity of the MIKEY message still needs to be assured, a KEMAC payload shall be included in the MIKEY message from the BM-SC. There is however no key present in the message. Thus by setting the Encr data len field to zero, only the MAC of the message will be included.

When receiving the message, the UE shall request for the MSK for the specified Key Group. The BM-SC may trigger re-authentication of the UE or even re-run of GBA procedure to update the MUK.

The rest of the procedure is the same as in 6.3.2.3.1.

6.3.2.3 BM-SC initiated MSK update push procedures

6.3.2.3.1 Pushing the MSKs to the UE

The BM-SC controls when the MSKs used in a multicast service are to be changed. The below flow describes how MSK changes are performed.





Figure 6.2: Pushing the MSKs to the UE

When the BM-SC decides that it is time to update the MSK, the BM-SC sends MIKEY message over UDP transporting the requested MSKs to the UE.

If requested by the BM-SC, the UE sends a MIKEY acknowledgement message to the BM-SC.

6.3.2.3.2 Push solicited pull Void

While the push is the regular way of updating the MSK to the UE, there may be situations where the BM SC solicits the UE to contact the BM SC and request for new MSKs. An example of such situation is when the BM SC wants the UE to authenticate itself during the service or when the MUK has expired.



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The BM SC sends MIKEY message over UDP to the UE. The key IDs in the extension payload of the MIKEY message set to 0x0 to indicate that the UE should request for current MSK from the BM SC.

When the UE contacts the BM-SC, the BM-SC may trigger re-authentication of the UE or even re-run of GBA procedure to update the MUK.

The rest of the procedure is the same as in 6.3.1.